Memorial entrepreneurs and dissonances in post-conflict tourism

NAEF, Patrick James

Abstract

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Reference

Chapter 12: Memorial entrepreneurs and dissonances in post-conflict tourism

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Introduction

This chapter, which examines cases in Colombia and ex-Yugoslavia, seeks to analyze the role of tourism, and in particular related discourses and representations, in the construction of peace. By analyzing the practices and narratives of various stakeholders and citizens directly or indirectly involved in the tourism sector in post-conflict countries, it challenges the idea that the development of tourism naturally contributes to reconciliation and peace-building. Although public bodies and international organizations often present tourism as a tool that helps enhance peace, research has demonstrated that the reality in the field is often much more complex. (Naef 2016, Viejo-Rose 2011, Baillie 2011). In 2004, the French Ministry of Tourism stated in a convention signed with the Secretariat of State for Veterans that ‘in times troubled by large international events, tourism of memory (‘tourisme de mémoire’ in French in the text) appears like a vector of peace, of exchange and of mutual respect between people’. (Convention 2004 cited in Hertzog 2013: 54). Similarly, UNESCO discourses frequently highlight the way cultural tourism contributes to the production of a shared memory. After the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the reconstruction of the Old Bridge in the Bosnian city of Mostar – one of the main historical and touristic landmarks of the country – has been repeatedly pointed out as a symbol of reconciliation. The World Heritage list describes it as follows: ‘The reconstructed Old Bridge and Old City of Mostar is a symbol of reconciliation, international co-operation and of the coexistence of diverse cultural, ethnic and religious communities.’ (UNESCO 2005). However, more than twenty years after the war, while the architectural and technical success of this reconstruction is undeniable, the tense and polarized context still prevailing in this historical town casts doubt on this statement. Some would even argue that the reconstruction of the bridge benefits exclusively the tourism trade, a sector that is becoming the only reliable economic generator in the town. Calame & Pasic
(2009: 15) note that for certain residents of Mostar ‘if they had been forced to choose, a factory on the outskirts of town would have been preferable to the restored Old Bridge at its center’. Indeed, for them, factories would have provided jobs, ‘while the reconstructed Old Bridge merely reminds them of a past that seems irretrievable’ (Ibid: 15) More generally, Young (2012) shares this view of polarised benefits for residents and tourists, pointing out that projects aimed primarily at attracting tourists rarely seek to improve the quality of life of permanent residents.

There is thus a crucial need for academics and practitioners to reach beyond easy metaphors, like the ones featuring bridges and reconciliation, and to take a thorough look at the role of tourism and cultural heritage in divided societies. As will be shown here, stakeholders involved in tourism and peacebuilding should be cautious when promoting tourism as a tool to enhance peace. This sector can no doubt participate to a reconciliation process. It can however also be a source of tensions. While tourism can contribute in some cases to fostering an ‘alternative form of diplomacy’ (Kim & Crompton 1990) and a ‘rhetoric linked to peace and international cooperation’ (Hertzog 2013: 54), it would be over-simplistic to consider this as a given. In post-conflict settings, tourism activities can reappear quickly after the end of a war, in a highly unregulated setting. Private entrepreneurs, often former war actors, seize this opportunity, offering their services as tour guides or transforming war sites into tourist attractions, as it has been the case for instance in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia or Colombia (see chapter van der Broek in this volume). By analyzing the practices and discourses of what are conceived here as ‘memorial entrepreneurs’ (Dwyer & Alderman 2008, Jordan 2006, Naef 2018), this chapter will show how different and sometimes competing actors contribute to building new touristscapes in these countries, using conflicting narratives and representations. The data presented here is the result of ten years of research focusing on these memorial entrepreneurs in different settings: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Eastern Croatia and Colombia. Centered mainly on urban contexts (e.g. Medellin in Colombia, Vukovar in Croatia, Sarajevo in Bosnia-Herzegovina), this research sought to identify these actors and to look at the different ways they exploited war memory and heritage in various cultural practices, including tourism. The methodology is grounded on the anthropological corpus: observation of sites and participation in tours linked to war heritage; semi-structured interviews and focus groups with so-called ‘memorial entrepreneurs’ and stakeholders from the tourism sector; and a thorough content analysis of print, video and Internet elements.
Memorial entrepreneurs in the realm of tourism

First, the concept of ‘memorial entrepreneur’ needs to be defined. Building on the work of the sociologist Fine on ‘reputational entrepreneurs’ (1996), leading experts in the field of memory studies such as Dwyer and Alderman refer to memorial entrepreneurs as people who seek to shape our understanding of the past: ‘individuals, alone or in league with others, who endeavour to influence the meaning of social issues and debates about the past’. (Dwyer & Alderman 2008: 7) Adopting a broader view than the one proposed by Fine – who limits his conception to the role of social actors in shaping the reputation of historical figures – the two geographers explore the place of commemoration and activism in modelling not only the reputation of historical figures, but also that of the places associated with remembrance. Sharing this view, Jordan (2006) highlights the vital role Berlin’s memorial entrepreneurs play in anchoring an official collective memory in one place. Focusing on ‘official’ memory, she adds that in non-democratic settings, when memory culture is the domain of a single party or a single leader, the role of memorial entrepreneurs is far less important.

In the French context, Michel (2010) develops the concept of ‘entrepreneurs of history’ (entrepreneurs d’histoire in French), also relating it to ‘official’ memory, when he examines what he refers to as ‘memorial governance’. Demonstrating that States have lost their quasi-monopoly in terms of public memory production, Michel limits his conceptualization to public or semi-public actors such as teachers, historians or scholars. Representatives of civil society are excluded from this definition, even if Michel acknowledges that increasing pressure from grassroots movements tends to question the vertical power relation that imposes an official public memory. Building on Dwyer and Alderman’s conception of ‘memorial entrepreneurs’, the objective here is to expand this definition to include actors from civil society (e.g. artists, novelists, tour guides, journalists, community leaders, NGO volunteers, war veterans, former criminals) in addition to public agents (e.g. public museum curators, government employees, UNESCO collaborators, elected officials). Using an anthropological approach and drawing on an interest in the tourism sector, the author will take a close look at these ‘non-official memorial entrepreneurs’, to explore their strategies and the limits they face when expressing and representing a dissonant memory associated with war heritage. A ‘memorial entrepreneur’ is defined here as an individual contributing to the production of discourses and representations, for commercial or non-commercial purposes, and associated with specific contexts and events, through artistic, documentary, scientific, touristic or heritage practices (Naef 2018). In what follows, the study
will examine the role of some of these memorial entrepreneurs in the tourism sector, in various settings around the world, specifically highlighting practices associated with so-called ‘memorial tourism’, ‘heritage tourism’ or ‘historical tourism’. The author is particularly interested in the way these practices can contribute to diffuse dissonant, and sometimes hegemonic narratives and representations on the wars in question.

Heritage, tourism and dissonances

In post-conflict contexts, when one leaves the court of law and enters the tourism sphere, or more broadly the domain of heritage management, interpretation takes on a more prominent role. In a sector related to leisure and guided by commercial imperatives, the notion of ‘truth’ becomes increasingly blurred, raising the question of whether it is the role of tourism to present ‘true facts’. Moreover, reconciliation is generally not a priority in the management of museums or other tourism and heritage sites; on the contrary, as the author personal research has demonstrated, they can participate in spreading significant antagonistic discourses (Naef 2016). The concept of ‘dissonant heritage’ developed by Turnbridge and Ashworth (1996) leads us to explore how a single heritage site or object can be associated with different – and sometimes competing – values and meanings. War and slavery sites around the world show the conflicting viewpoints these places may represent. When war is the issue, definitions such as ‘perpetrators’, ‘victims’, or ‘bystanders’ are far from being homogenous and are highly dependent on the interpretation of history. The ‘reconciliation vs division’ dichotomy is shaped by many power relations: dominant groups can promote some objects, sites, values, or interpretations and exclude others (Naef 2016). As stated by Logan and Reeve (2008: 11), one always faces the risk ‘that only those places that reflect the official interpretation of historical events are likely to be commemorated and that those places that do not reflect the ideology of the regime in power or the dominant social, ethnic or racial group are neglected.’

It is thus of prime importance to discuss the various practices, discourses and representations promoted by so-called ‘memorial entrepreneurs’ in the field of tourism, in order to understand how tourism development in post-conflict contexts can serve as a tool for peace and reconciliation. The following focus on cases in Colombia and the former Yugoslavia, and presents various strategies that different actors – tourism stakeholders or simple citizens – use in order to achieve specific objectives, which lie somewhere between division and reconciliation.
Tourism stakeholders and narcos as memorial entrepreneurs in Colombia

Colombia certainly represents an instructive example when it comes to memory work and peace-building. On 17th June 2018, a right-winger, Ivan Duque, was elected president, succeeding the 2016 Nobel Peace Laureate Juan Manuel Santos. One of the first moves of the new president was to announce that he would modify the peace treaty achieved by his predecessor. Although he guaranteed that he would not call into question the peace deal that represents a beacon of hope for many Colombians in a country rent by more than sixty years of armed conflict involving the army, guerrillas, paramilitaries and narcotics, the new president – following the hard line of his mentor, former president Alvaro Uribe – clearly stated that he did not want to see guerrilla leaders and narco-traffic patrons walking freely in the streets of the country.

Colombia also experienced a ‘memory boom’ (Huyssen 2003, Winter 2007, Naef 2018) after the 2011 ‘Victims and Land Restitution Law’ was signed, a decree that acknowledged the existence of an armed conflict and thus opened the way for stronger protection for the victims. Numerous commemorations and museums focusing on the war sprang up all over the country, as victims exercised their ‘right to remember’ (Hoskins 2014). Furthermore, Colombia is now seeing an increasing number of foreign tourists in certain regions where security has progressively improved over the last decade, principally in the Caribbean North. According to the World Tourism Organization (2016), tourist arrivals in the country rose from 933’000 in 2005 to 2’978'180 in 2015. While many tourism stakeholders, eager to attract foreign visitors and investors, generally aim to do away with the country’s violent image – promoting instead touristic resources such as natural beauties, coffee production or Fernando Botero\(^1\) - the heritage and memory associated with the war and drug trafficking are nevertheless exploited by other entrepreneurs, some of them closely associated with this context of violence. Thus, different and sometimes competing actors contribute to building the Colombian touristscape, using conflicting narratives and representations.

Representing (or not) Colombia’s Violent Past

‘Former gang members (pandilleros in Spanish) from the Egipto neighbourhood will take us to what was once a territory where war was waged between gangs and criminal groups. Today it is just a place that aims to help the youngest recover through tourism, art and sport. […] One former gang member known as Calabazo, will allow us into his house, to tell

\(^1\) A famous Colombian painter and sculptor.
us what he has lost in his life [...]’ Together with some recommendations on what to bring (money, because ‘tips to the locals are part of the community support’ and an umbrella ‘because there is always a possibility of rain in Bogota), this is how zomos, a global travel platform presents its ‘Barrio Egipto Tour’. The Egipto neighbourhood,’ now part of the ‘Candelaria’ area that hosts many restaurants, guest houses and museums of the Colombian capital, is known for its invisible borders and its gang wars (in which more than 1’400 people died between 1990 and 2004, according to the Externado University, cited in Kowol 2017). But in addition to being situated just next to one of the most touristy areas of Bogota, it is also near the Externado University, one of leading academic institutions in the country. In 2016, the University, well-known for its tourism administration program, offered tour guide training to twenty youngsters who had left the Egipto gangs. This lead to the creation of the ‘Breaking Borders’ initiative, where tourism is described as a ‘powerful weapon for positive transformation and generation of opportunities’: ‘See how tourism trumps violence in this amazing tour in Bogotá. These ex-gang members have turned their life around and chosen peace. [...] Be enchanted by the stories of former gang members that now have new dreams, goals and hopes.’ (Impulse Immersive Travel Experience 2018) For a little more than 50 dollars, these tour guides propose a four-hour tailored visit of the area, described as ‘unexplored and one of the most antique neighbourhoods of Bogota’, and including sites such as a soccer field, the main cobble-stoned street, and even a tasting of the local craft alcoholic beverage: the ‘Chicha’.

As this comment posted by a foreign tourist on the Facebook page of ‘Breaking Borders’ shows, some of the public authorities, like police officers, may still have doubts about this new tourism venture: ‘Jaime is a legend, if you can stomach his history. [...] Halfway through, cops did arrive on motos, and told us these guys were gangsters and would rob us, that we had to come with them to the station to report them. But the two of us believed in Jaime and Alejandro, and we finished the amazing tour.’ In other words, while this tour may now feature as a ‘top cultural choice’ in the Lonely Planet travel bible, its local recognition is still limited. Similarly, the author personal research in Medellin (Naef 2016a, 2018a) has shown that tours focusing on the violent past of the second city of Colombia are chiefly taken by foreigners, mostly North Americans and Europeans. Moreover, although the situation is changing, public bodies related to the tourism sector usually distance themselves from any representations of the violent years that plagued the country (Naef 2018a, Giraldo, Van Broeck, & Posada 2014). Andrés, one of the tour guides involved in the ‘Barrio Egipto
Tour’, commented in VICE (Kowol 2017) on the complete absence of the state in efforts to enhance peace in his neighbourhood. Besides the support of the private University Externado, the creation of this tour in 2016 was inspired by the existence of a similar undertaking in another neighbourhood and another town, also well-known for a context of violence, the Commune 13 in the outskirts of Medellin.

Colombia’s second largest city, once considered as one of the most dangerous in the world thanks to the Medellin drug cartel and its boss, Pablo Escobar, is now attracting increasing numbers of visitors from all over the world. While local authorities are more than reluctant to feature the city’s darkest years - most of the tours promoted by public tourism bodies focus on tango, the flower fest and what is referred to as ‘social innovation’ – many private entrepreneurs are capitalizing on this violent past through so-called ‘narco tours’ (or ‘Pablo tours’) and ‘comuna tours’. When he was released from jail, Roberto Escobar, brother of Pablo Escobar and former treasurer of the Medellin Cartel, converted a house formerly belonging to his brother into a museum dedicated to the drug lord and himself (Naef 2018a). Dozens of Western backpackers, channelled by local tour guides working with Roberto Escobar, visit this informal museum daily, eager to get a selfie with the former narco-trafficker, especially since the success of the Netflix TV-show ‘Narcos’. Similarly, after 23 years in jail, Jhon Jairo Velásquez – alias Popeye – Pablo Escobar’s main hitman, attempted to move into the tourism scene. According to the regional newspaper ‘El Pais’, the former narco offers four-hour tours for up to a thousand dollars. (Palomino 2017). In another initiative, in 2016 a Puerto Rican tourist operator proposed a four-day trip in Colombia for 1.449 dollars, labelled ‘Medellín en Halloween’. Aside from the main attractions usually offered during ‘narco tours’ (the grave of Pablo Escobar, his hacienda in the countryside and other sites related to the drug lord), the key moment of this tourism package was a dinner with Popeye (Restrepo 2016).

In Medellin’s touristscape, Popeye and Roberto Escobar are not the only ones cashing in on the city’s violent past. Many ‘narco tours’ are now available for tourists, most of them foreigners, since locals generally look on this practice with something between curiosity and disgust. Not all tourist and memorial entrepreneurs are former criminals: most of them are citizens who have studied abroad, mainly in the United States, where they learned foreign languages, enabling them to interact with international tourists (Naef 2018a). Some are also indirectly related to the tourism sector. Pablo Escobar’s ex-butler for example is now managing a restaurant next to the farm La Manuela, near the resort town of Guatapé, where
one can participate in the ‘Escobar Paintball Tour’² (Havis 2018). Whatever their background, one way or another all these actors are moving into the growing tourist landscape of Medellin and its region, spreading various and often competing narratives and representations of the drug war and its main symbol, Pablo Escobar; these discourses include of course condemnation, but some also promote the legitimization, glorification, glamorization and trivialization of Colombia’s narco past. (Naef 2018a)

Tourism, Memory and Transformation

Over several decades, informal neighbourhoods sprang up in the hills surrounding Medellin as widespread violence in the countryside led to the displacement of many inhabitants of rural areas. Guerrillas took advantage of the poverty-stricken social tissue in these settlements to recruit the local youth and develop the illicit trade of drugs and weapons. (National Centre for Historical Memory 2011) At the end of the 1990s, a social cleansing process began, largely supported by paramilitary groups backed by the state: the main objective was to banish guerrillas from Medellin. However, this so-called ‘limpieza social’ (social cleaning) also targeted other individuals, such as prostitutes, union leaders and petty criminals. The commune 13, on the western side of the city, was specifically targeted and became an infamous symbol of this process, after several military and paramilitary operations took place there. On the other hand, Medellin has won praise globally for its transformation, often referred to as ‘the miracle of Medellin’ (Navarro 2014, Moss 2015). An ambitious ‘social investment’ program, launched at the beginning of the 2000’s, prioritizes public space recuperation and social projects. The commune 13 plays a key role in the branding of the ‘new Medellin’. It has seen the development of large-scale projects, such as the construction of its celebrated outdoor electric stairways. The transformation of Medellin is being used as a tourism resource, especially by the public authorities, who exploit it to sell the image of a city which has recovered from many dark years of violence. In this context, tour guides now offer so-called ‘comuna tours’ (Naef 2016a, Van de Broek in this volume), taking tourists to the informal settlements of Medellin, with the commune 13 being the most visited.

‘Comuna tourism’, sometimes called ‘transformation tourism’, thus gives memorial entrepreneurs directly or indirectly involved in tourism opportunities to disseminate particular representations of the violence associated with Medellin’s peripheral neighbourhoods, as well as of the transformation of the city. The author research (Naef 2016a) demonstrated that the

narrative that is conceived as ‘the miracle of Medellin’ is a hegemonic and selective discourse, favouring heroic and romantic representations of this process, and covering some of the darker aspects of a city still facing many problems of violence and equity. Here again, memorial entrepreneurs, whether public authorities implicated in the branding of the new Medellin or community leaders trying to make their voices heard, spread different and sometimes dissonant levels of discourse on the city’s violent past and its transformation. To limit stereotypes and oversimplifications of the past and the transformation of Medellin, various readings of the city must be encouraged. Tourism can play a significant role in this dynamic, by allowing public as well as private entrepreneurs to integrate Medellin’s touristcape, hence contributing to showing the numerous aspects of this multifaceted city.

War veterans as memorial entrepreneurs in the Former Yugoslavia

Former war actors are also active in tourism practices related to a situation in Europe: they are operating in the post-war cities of Sarajevo (see also Wise chapter in this volume), the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the town of Vukovar, in Eastern Croatia. During the wars that rent Bosnia and Croatia, both cities were besieged by the JNA — which became the Serbian army in the course of the conflicts — and paramilitary groups. The siege of Sarajevo lasted almost four years; the siege of Vukovar went on for three months. Both events caused heavy casualties and left the inhabitants with traumatizing memories. They are now memorialized in contrasting ways; in memorials, commemorations and museums, but also in the touristscapes of these two cities. Divisions caused by the wars, and also by the ways these are memorialized, have been the topics of many debates within academia and international agencies (See for instance: Baillie 2011, Baker 2009, Calame & Pašić 2009, Capuzzo-Derkovic 2010, Glasson Deschaumes 2005, Duijzings 2007, Kardov 2007, Naef 2016, Petritsch & Dzihic 2010). Drawing on notions such as ‘divided memories’ (Baillie 2011) or ‘ethnized heritage’ (Kaiser 2000), scholars have shown how history and memory have been used as instruments of political manipulation, promoting nationalistic discourses, and often causing harsh confrontations between the communities in the region. In 2010, Petritsch and Dzihic (2010: 20) stated that: ‘diverging memories and selective narratives of the recent past are still dominant in the former states of Yugoslavia. There are still no traces of dialogic remembering at all.’ Colin Kaiser (2000), former director of the UNESCO office in Sarajevo, has said that technical problems related to reconstruction in ex-Yugoslavia are far less serious than the ethnic divisions caused by heritage management.

3 Jugoslovenska narodna armija
However, while scholars have had intensive discussions on issues of war memory and division in ex-Yugoslavia, the role of tourism has been underexplored until recently (Naef 2016, Dragićević Šešić & Rogač Mijatović 2014; Aussems 2016; Kamber, Karafotias & Tsitoura 2016, Arnauld 2016, Čorak, Mikačić & Ateljević 2013). The wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia had a catastrophic impact on their tourism sectors. Croatia recovered rapidly, but Bosnia-Herzegovina took more than ten years to regain its pre-war tourism market, a market far smaller than that of its neighbour. Nevertheless, the wars related to the break-up of Yugoslavia gave rise to cultural heritage production and the touristification of war sites, memorials and museums. In the post-conflict settings of Vukovar and Sarajevo, private memorial entrepreneurs started to offer visitors ‘war tours’ (Naef 2016). These tailored tours are conducted by former war actors, such as ex-soldiers or fixers, or individuals less implicated in the conflict, such as students who were exiled during the sieges, but who – as in the case of Medellín’s ‘narco tours’ – speak foreign languages and can thus interact with international visitors. These guides propose visits to war sites such as front lines and destroyed buildings. In addition, both cities have significant numbers of war museums and memorials that are heavily promoted by the tourism sector, especially in Vukovar, which is considered in Croatia to be a symbol of the martyrdom, bravery and independence of the country. Indeed, at the end of the 1990’s, the town experienced a form of memorial tourism in which Croats from all over the country came to pay their respects to this martyred town and region (Kardov 2007).

The memory of the war and its unilateral interpretation

Vukovar, close to the Serbian border, is a divided city. Croats have a hostile relationship with the local Serbian community, which stayed in their hometown after the period in which the region came under Serbian control and was named the ‘Serb Republic of Krajina’. (Kardov 2007, Baillie 2011) This division is noticeable in many ways: in political declarations, in discrimination in the employment market and even in public inscriptions (in Cyrillic for Serbians and in Latin for Croats). Moreover, due to the symbolic role of Vukovar in the Croatian imagination, the tourism sector is intrinsically associated with the memory of the conflict: most of the landmarks promoted are memorials underlining the martyrdom of Croatia, and hence the guilt of Serbia. The city map distributed by the Vukovar Office of Tourism in 2010 is illustrative of this phenomenon: thirteen out of the twenty sites singled out for visitors are directly related to the war: memorials, cemeteries or ruined buildings. In addition, the back cover of the map features the emblematic illustration of ‘The Croatian
Association for Prisoners in Serbian Concentration Camps’. (Naef 2016) Many jobs in museums and memorial centres at that time were held by Croatian war veterans, some of them named ‘Braniteljis’, a reference to soldiers and inhabitants who decided to stay in the town to fight the assailants. These memorial entrepreneurs were thus influential in diffusing hegemonic and unilateral narratives on the past war, presenting Croats as solely ‘victims’ and inevitably, Serbs as solely ‘perpetrators’. Serbian memorial entrepreneurs and material symbols are therefore almost absent in Vukovar’s memorialscape, but in surrounding villages dominated by Serbian majorities, the opposite is true.

In Sarajevo, a somewhat similar, but certainly more nuanced phenomenon can be seen. Like the country of which it is the capital, the city is officially divided. ‘East Sarajevo’, mostly composed of suburbs, is predominantly inhabited by a Serbian population. The rest of the city, encompassing the old city and most of the touristic highlights and museums, is more diverse, but is predominantly populated by Bosniaks (or Bosnian Muslims). This political division has produced a touristscape entirely administered by the Canton of Sarajevo in which museums and other historical sites are managed by Bosniak actors, leaving only the administration of surrounding natural parks to local Serbian tourism stakeholders. As a collaborator of the Ministry of Tourism and Trade of the Republika Srpska (the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina) commented in 2011: ‘Most part of Sarajevo is within the Federation. In the Republika Srpska we have mostly the suburbs, but the core is in the Federation. […] There are less tourism attractions in the Republika Srpska, so we don’t do much. And all the international institutions and foreign companies are in the Federation’. (Personal communication, 11th of July 2011, cited in Naef 2016). At the state level, tourism management is almost inexistent and financial resources are scarce. Cantons (in the Federation) and municipalities (in the Republika Srpska) are thus the chief actors in this context, a dynamic often leading to the diffusion of one-sided and nationalistic narratives. As a result, discourses and representations of the history of the siege in museums and other cultural sites in Sarajevo are presented solely by Bosniak memorial entrepreneurs. Of course, these narratives are far from being homogenous, and it would be over-simplistic to describe them all as unilateral representations of the last war. Nevertheless, Serbian memorial entrepreneurs are left without any way of participating in the construction of Sarajevo’s memorialscape. This dynamic can also be observed in the practices of Bosniak ‘war tour’

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4 Following the Dayton Agreement that ended the Bosnian war, Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided in two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), with mostly Bosniaks and Croats, and the Republika Srpska (RS) with mostly Serbs.
guides, who often encourage tourists participating in their tours to ‘learn from the other side’ (Naef 2016). Unfortunately, in the Republik Srpska, ‘war tours’ are not available.

**Memorial entrepreneurs in a contested touristscape**

In the former Yugoslavia, in the post-war cities of Vukovar and Sarajevo, tourism is an active participant in memory conflicts. Different memorial entrepreneurs - tourism stakeholders, war veterans or simple citizens – take part in the construction of contested memorialscapes through the touristification of war memorials and the intense promotion of ‘war tours’ and war museums. While some tour guides and museum projects clearly try to diffuse a message of peace and reconciliation detached from the overwhelming nationalistic narratives characterizing the former Yugoslavia (see for instance the permanent exhibition of the History Museum ‘Sarajevo under Siege’ which focuses on the inhabitants without mentioning their nationalities), a significant majority of tourism representations and discourses related to the memory of the war tend to present a unilateral version of history, involving clear-cut categories of victims and perpetrators. In parallel with the wide corpus of work on domains like politics, media or cultural heritage management, analysing tourism practices is thus crucial to understanding memorial issues in the region. In ex-Yugoslavia, tourism has been sometimes hastily presented as a tool for peace and reconciliation by international bodies (e.g. UNESCO, UNWTO, the European Commission). However, as the author research has demonstrated, it can also contribute to increasing tensions.

Although rooted in very distinct contexts, cases like Vukovar and Sarajevo can provide interesting insights into the development of tourism in post-conflict Colombia. In Medellin’s rapidly evolving touristscape, memory of violence is expressed in ambivalent ways. Private memorial entrepreneurs cash in on the fascination that the narco-world can exert on an international audience (see for instance the Netflix show ‘Narcos), but also on the local population (for instance the success of so-called *narconovelas* in the country). These new actors in the field of tourism propose ‘narco tours’- an offer that is now one of the most popular with the city’s foreign visitors – and play a role in spreading contested narratives and representations on the narco-related past. Moreover, the touristification of the memory of violence that plagued the country also inspires rejection within public bodies trying to promote the image of a transformed city, as well as among locals (many of whom are direct or indirect victims of the narcotics).
The objective of this chapter has been to focus on the individuals involved in memory practices and their role in the development of tourism in post-conflict contexts. While all of them are to some extent involved in the tourism sector of the cases explored, the scope of the subject goes beyond the study of tourism stakeholders. For an in-depth understanding of the role of tourism in post-conflict contexts, it is of foremost importance to enlarge the focus to other actors in the tourism sphere. Artists, former criminals, community leaders, war veterans, NGO collaborators, to mention only a few, can play an important role in the dissemination of tourism narratives and representations associated with the memory of war. Studies often tend to overlook these ‘alternative tourism stakeholders’ and focus on only one side of the problematic. Therefore, the concept of ‘memorial entrepreneurs’ advocated here is a broad one that includes official as well as non-official actors involved in tourism and memorial practices. It is particularly interesting in how grassroots initiatives evolve in the burgeoning, and sometimes unregulated and free-ranging touristscapes of post-conflict cities. By giving close attention to what is excluded or included in these memorial entrepreneurs’ narratives we will gain a better understanding of the role of tourism and memory in sites recovering from wars.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has stressed the importance of carefully analyzing problematics identified in tourism and dissonant memory in post-conflict contexts. While the complex relationships between tourism and memory of war have been widely explored in tourism studies, this topic is still surprisingly under-explored in the case of ex-Yugoslavia and Colombia. The work briefly presented here aims to partly fill this gap and lay the foundations for future research. Through a close look at the role of official and non-official memorial entrepreneurs in tourism practices, this chapter has sought to explore some of the power relations associated with dissonant interpretations of post-war memory, in order to demonstrate that, although tourism is often presented as an instrument for peace and reconciliation, it can also serve as an ideological tool to adapt, obliterate or reinvent dissonant memories.

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