Contentious politics in complex societies: New social movements between conflict and cooperation

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Contentious Politics in Complex Societies

New Social Movements between Conflict and Cooperation

Marco G. Giugni and Florence Passy

As several observers have pointed out (e.g., Luhmann 1982; Melucci 1996a; Willke 1991), complexity is a fundamental feature of contemporary societies. Social complexity stems both internally from a growing functional differentiation and externally from the emergence of a world system transcending national states (Willke 1991). As a result, unlike in traditional societies, the modern state has to act upon the social system to regulate the society. This intervention raises important problems, most notably that of governability: the state is always less able to warrant the governability of complex democracies (Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1975) and to pilot the society alone. This new situation is a major challenge for the modern state. The classical regulatory media, such as the law, money, and the legitimate use of violence, are no longer sufficient for the regulation of complex societies (Willke 1992). To face such complexity, the state needs new sources of legitimacy, for in complex societies no one can anticipate the long run consequences of most decisions, which implies that the state does not have the authority for autonomous decisions (Willke 1991). In addition, information and knowledge become crucial resources for social regulation (Papadopoulos 1995). In brief, the modern state has lost its hegemony over the piloting of society and is now engaging in a process of coregulation (Willke 1991).

As students of the so-called third sector have pointed out (e.g., Bütschi and Cattacin 1994; Evers 1990, 1993; Willke 1991), certain organized groups of the civil society play an important role in this joint regulatory process. Yet, few social movement theorists have examined the role of
movements therein, a lack of attention that stems from the very definition of social movements. Most recent research on social movements is based on the assumption that they challenge the political authorities and the state. According to this view, movements and their allies form a conflict system opposing political authorities. To be sure, this view of social movements as a specific form of contentious politics must not be abandoned, quite the contrary. Nevertheless, we must acknowledge that various contemporary movements also engage in a series of activities that do not necessarily entail a conflicting relationship with powerholders. Apart from activities aimed at reproducing the sense of belonging and collective identity of participants or at raising citizens' consciousness about specific political issues, movements also cooperate with the state. In complex societies, where the solution of public problems as well as the elaboration and, above all, implementation of policies are particularly difficult tasks, certain movements tend to become integrated into the decisional, regulatory, or implementation phases of the political process. These activities are increasingly important and supplement, for certain movements, the range of activities that characterize them as a specific form of contentious politics. In particular, the new social movements undergo a process of incorporation in state structures and procedures. Thus, new social movements intervene in the political process in two ways: by challenging existing or proposed policies and by helping to elaborate and enforce government policies.

The integration of social movements aimed at the coregulation of complex societies is the result both of a bottom-up and a top-down process. On the one hand, movements try to expand the channels of access to the state in order to increase the chances to reach their political aims. One way for movements to do so is to become integrated into state structures and to address their claims from inside. At least in western democracies, social movements have constantly been knocking at the state's door in order to obtain, at a minimum, procedural impacts and, preferably, substantial impacts. Women's movements are a good example. Since their early days, women's groups have looked for institutional channels to influence the state from within. Women's organizations are nowadays invited to collaborate with the state to find solutions to inequality and discrimination. Thus, most western states have created structures (ministries, offices, etc.) jointly with the movements in order to improve the condition of women. On the other hand, states are also working to integrate social movements and their organizations. In various policy areas, they face an information gap and lack the knowledge needed for appropriate problem solving. As a result, they look for collaboration with actors and organizations in the civil society that possess such knowledge and may help them in the regulation of society. An area that is subject to this kind of coregulation between the state and social movements today concerns the AIDS epidemic. Several western governments have asked gay movement organizations to "lend" them knowledge and experience in order to respond to this plea in a more effective manner.

As we shall see below, certain institutional features of the state provide favorable opportunities for the creation of cooperation between social movements and the state. Although all western states are confronted with the complexity of society, not all of them share the same willingness to share their power with sectors of the civil society in the regulatory process. With respect to AIDS, Switzerland is a "school case," for the government has incorporated several movement organizations that have become real partners in the search for solutions to this social problem (Bütschi and Cattacin 1994).

In this chapter, we focus on the cooperation between social movements and the state. We argue that certain contemporary movements are following a path of incorporation in state structures that is nevertheless qualitatively different from the traditional path of institutionalization followed by labor movements. We address this new kind of incorporation both theoretically and empirically. First, we define cooperation and single out the main differences with three traditional models of interest-mediation: the pluralist, the corporatist, and the policy-network models. Second, we examine the conditions that make cooperation more likely. Third, we provide an empirical illustration of this process drawn from two policy areas: development aid to Third-World countries (targeted by the solidarity movement) and environmental protection (targeted by the ecology movement). Finally, we discuss several implications of cooperation both for social movements and the state. It is important to note that the focus of this essay is on the national level. We only marginally deal with cooperation taking place in the international arenas, which yet is a crucial aspect of the cooperative behavior of movements (Passy 1995; Smith and Pagnocco 1995; Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnocco 1997). It is also important to remark that, although we argue that what we are witnessing is conflictual cooperation, in this chapter we will stress its cooperative side rather than its conflictual side.

What Is Cooperation?

According to the definition given in the introduction to this volume, a social movement is a sustained series of challenges to powerholders (Tilly 1994; see also Tarrow 1994a, 1996; Tilly 1984). This definition clearly sees movements as the expression of an existing social conflict. Virtually all scholars who are interested in the political aspect of movements follow
this line of reasoning (e.g., McAdam 1982; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Tarrow 1994a; Tilly 1995a). In addition, some include in the definition the use of unconventional and/or disruptive actions (e.g., della Porta 1996; Tarrow 1994a, 1996). Also scholars working within a different sociological tradition, although they strongly criticize what they see as political reductionism in the above definition, view the essence of movements in the underlying conflict of which they are the carriers (e.g., Melucci 1996a; Touraine 1984). They argue that a definition in terms of overt protest activities ignores a whole range of activities aimed at the construction and reproduction of individual and collective identities, which are seen as a fundamental dimension of social movements. However, they do not point to the fact that movements may not only challenge the powerholders, but also establish a cooperative relationship with them. Even an author like Melucci (1996a, 28), who has made a useful attempt to plotting social movements in the context of a broader variety of forms of collective action, including cooperation, still sees movements as the overt expression of a latent social conflict. Yet, even a cursory look at the relation between several contemporary movements and the state suggests that it is made both of conflict and cooperation.

Generally speaking, by cooperation we mean a relationship between two parties based on an agreement over the ends of a given action and involving an active collaboration aimed at reaching such ends. In our case, the two parties involved are the state and a social movement or parts of it, such as an organization or a group of organizations. Cooperation must be distinguished from three other broad types of activity carried out by movements, as shown in figure 4.1. Protest actions represent the typical means that movements have at their disposal to reach their goals. But movements can also voice their opposition to state policies in a discursive manner, for example, through proclamations, resolutions, and the like. Although the kind of involvement differs, both types of activity stem from a disagreement with government priorities, decisions, and policies. On the other hand, interactions between social movements and the state can also take place on the basis of an agreement over the ends of a given action. This type of interaction takes two different forms. When the agreement is located at the level of discourse instead of that of action, we speak of consensus. When the agreement is a matter of action, we define the interaction as cooperative.

Thus far, we have spoken of cooperation to define the latter type of interaction between social movements and the state. However, there is seldom full cooperation. The distribution of power between actors in a cooperative relationship is uneven: social movement organizations (SMOs) have much less power than the state. This leads SMOs to use an ambivalent strategy made of a combination of conflict and cooperation. Following Evers (1990), we call it conflictual cooperation.

Conflictual cooperation between social movements and the state occurs at different points in the political process. First, it takes place in the legislative arena and in the decision-making process. SMOs become integrated in the legislative process, for example, when a parliamentary committee needs specific competencies possessed by SMOs before an issue goes to the floor to be discussed and voted. Second, conflictual cooperation occurs in the administrative arena and in the regulatory process. Regulation refers to those state activities aimed at managing and problem solving through means that do not imply the adoption of new laws or the amendment of existing ones. This task is usually accomplished by state agencies. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency, created in 1970, is charged with the regulation of environmental matters in the United States. New opportunities stemming from the creation of agencies at the local, regional, national, and international level (in particular, on the European Union level), coupled with the need on the part of these agencies of specific knowledge about complex problems, have facilitated the integration of movement actors in the regulatory process. Third, we can observe conflictual cooperation still in the administrative arena, but with regard to policy implementation. Here the role of movement actors is particularly important, for the complexity of problems and tasks faced...
by the government is especially high in the implementation stages of the political process. In various policy areas, the state resorts to noninstitutional actors in order to implement the decisions taken on legislative and regulatory levels. Often the state delegates certain tasks to these actors.

Similarly to what happens in the conflict system, social movements intervene in the collaboration system in various ways. Three broad types of cooperation can be distinguished in this respect. To begin with, the state can resort to noninstitutional actors in order to get information that may help reach certain decisions or realize them. Here collaboration takes the form of consultation. In this case, the movement has mainly an advisory role for the state. A deeper collaboration occurs when the movement becomes part of the structures in charge of taking or implementing a decision. In this case, we observe the integration of movements in panels, committees, working groups, or government agencies. Such integration is usually aimed at transferring information from the civil society to the state in order to help the elaboration of public policies. Finally, a still deeper cooperation implies a delegation of certain tasks, that is, a transfer of responsibility from the state to the movements on the operational level. This occurs above all in the phase of policy implementation, which in certain areas is becoming increasingly complex and difficult to be carried by state structures alone.

Each of these three types of cooperative interaction between social movements and the state can be carried at the individual or at the collective level. Although in this essay we focus on the collective level, it is important to make this distinction. In the first situation, for example, single members of SMOs are hired by the state to work in specific policy areas on the movement’s agenda. A common instance of the second situation is the integration of certain SMOs in a committee created by the legislature or by the administration. In addition, within each type, regardless of its individual or collective nature, there can be different degrees of collaboration, which may be measured according to various criteria. Among these, the number of actors involved and that of contacts are certainly important ones for assessing the intensity of cooperation between social movements and the state.

On the empirical level, we may say that collaboration becomes stronger as we go from consultation to integration to delegation, as we shift from the individual to the group level, and as we get higher values on various indicators of intensity (number of actors, number of contacts, regularity of contacts, etc.). Figure 4.2 gives an overview of the types of cooperative behavior according to the three criteria we have just described.

### Interest Intermediation and Conflicting Cooperation

If we go through the history of social movements, we can easily see that the incorporation into institutional structures and procedures is not a new phenomenon. In particular, labor movements have followed a process of institutionalization in the polities of western countries. In part, also the new social movements, which apparently are less willing to become incorporated in state structures, have nonetheless institutionalized (Giugni and Passy 1997; Kriesi 1996; Melucci 1996a; Roth 1997). The political science literature offers a number of studies that deal with the system of interest mediation and, indirectly, with the institutionalization of social movements. The study of the processes of interest intermediation involving interest groups (employers’ associations and labor unions) gives us some clues for analyzing the cooperative relationship between social movements and the state. In this respect, we can distinguish between three distinct models of interest intermediation. The pluralist model stresses the negotiation between a plurality of interest groups within the political system and maintains that even the less structured and powerful groups can influence the political decisions (Dalh 1971; Polsby 1985). According to this view, the role of the state is to balance and reconcile conflicting interests in the society. In contrast, the neo-corporatist model maintains that only the most powerful groups are able to influence the political decisions through peak agreements (Cawson 1986; Lembruch 1993; Schmitter 1981). In this elitist perspective, the state plays a role of regulator of opposing interests in a strongly structured and closed system of interest intermediation, thus offering an opportunity to the most powerful actors to negotiate. Finally, a policy-network model has recently been brought to the fore (Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Smith 1993), which stresses the existence of a community of actors organized around specific policy areas and trying to influence the political decisions. Each network is relatively closed, but might change over time through the inclusion of new actors and the exclusion of old ones.

We argue that conflictual cooperation involving new social movements differs from these three models of interest intermediation (and of institutionalization) in at least five respects. First, as regards the content of the exchange, cooperation implies that organized groups possess specific knowledge needed by the state to regulate the society. As we have previously pointed out, in complex societies information becomes a crucial
resource and the state has to rely upon organized groups that can transfer their knowledge to the state for a more efficient regulation of society. Several SMOs, for example, are knowledgeable about the AIDS epidemic or other health-care, environmental, or development-aid matters. The nature of the exchange between these organized actors and the state is different from the one described in the three models of interest intermediation. Pluralist and neo-corporatist models focus on the exchange between labor movements and the state aimed at preserving a balance between conflicting interests and avoiding class conflicts. Conflictual cooperation with new social movements, on the other hand, involves an exchange of competencies and a transfer of knowledge aimed at problem solving.

Second, in conflictual cooperation nonstate actors and the state work together on a common goal, be it the protection of the environment, the aid to Third-World countries, the improvement of the conditions of women, or other goals. Unlike the pluralist and neo-corporatist models, here we are not in a situation of interest intermediation. SMOs and state actors try to find solutions to shared problems. Indeed, here lies the core of cooperative interaction. However, it is still conflictual interaction insofar as, although the goals are in common, there often is disagreement over the means for reaching such goals as well as over the extent of the proposed solutions. For example, labor unions cannot be said to act on the basis of an agreement with the state over the goal of a given policy. The asymmetry of power between employers' associations and unions reflects a difference of goals between the labor movement and the state (Offe and Wiesenthal 1980).

Third, conflictual cooperation has a dialogical nature. Social movements interact directly with state actors. In contrast, in the pluralist and neo-corporatist models, the state takes on a role of mediator, balancing and reconciling conflicting interests. In the area of industrial conflict, for example, employers' associations and labor unions negotiate in order to find compromises and the state regulates the negotiations. To be sure, the state is far from being a neutral regulator of conflicts (e.g., Kriesi 1980; Offe and Wiesenthal 1980) and generally facilitates the entrance of employers' associations, to which it provides more freedom of action. In the case of new social movements, we are in the presence of an unmediated interaction between organized groups of the society and the state. However, sometimes nonstate actors with divergent interests—for example, supporters of the economy versus those of the ecology—are involved in negotiations, whereby the state intervenes not as a mediator but as an actor directly involved. In such situation, negotiations form a policy network.

A fourth important difference between conflictual cooperation and the three traditional models of interest intermediation concerns the concept of agency. The space for action of social movements is greater in the former than in the latter. This is mainly due to the knowledge that certain movements have in comparison to state actors, knowledge that is a valuable resource and provides them with some power in the negotiations. If we accept the Foucaultian argument that knowledge is power, in complex societies this is all the more true. Thus, knowledge opens a space for action that is much broader for new social movements than, say, for labor movements.

Finally, conflictual cooperation is typical of a self-reflexive society. The modern state is conscious of its own limits to pilot complex societies. According to Willke (1992), the state must regulate the society with more flexibility and adopt an ironic attitude to survive in complex societies. The consciousness by the state of its own limits represents a qualitative break that leads to a new attitude toward the organized sectors of the civil society. In this context, we are witnessing a shift toward a reflexive state (Willke 1991) or even a propulsive state (Morand 1991). This new kind of state has emerged in reaction to both the "authoritarian" way of piloting complex societies, promoted by the socialist tradition, and the autoregulation promoted by the liberal tradition (Willke 1991). The resulting new way of piloting the society relies upon organized actors of the civil society who possess specific skills, knowledge, and competencies that can be used in the coregulation of the complexity of modern societies.

The five aspects just mentioned clearly distinguish conflictual cooperation from the pluralist and neo-corporatist models. However, differences with the policy-network model are less obvious. In fact, sometimes collaboration between new social movements and the state forms a policy network, that is to say, a community of state and nonstate actors negotiating in a given policy area. The difference between conflictual cooperation and the policy-network model is analytical rather than empirical. The latter focuses on the form of negotiations, whereas the former looks at the nature of negotiations, which it defines as a combination of conflicting and cooperative strategies.

Conditions of Cooperation

A number of hypotheses can be formulated about the conditions under which cooperation between social movements and the state is more likely to occur. To begin with, the nature and outcome of a relationship based on collaboration depends on the characteristics and attitudes of the two parties involved. According to our first hypothesis, the type and intensity of cooperation vary as a function of the formal structure of the state. Here
we can refer to the opposition between strong and weak states (Atkinson and Coleman 1989; Birnbaum 1988; Kriesi, et al. 1995; Waarden 1992). Strong states have concentrated (versus fragmented) structures of power, a coherent and effective public administration, and offer few points of access to external actors. These characteristics make them more effective in making and implementing public policies than weak states. Therefore, we expect them to be less likely to resort to external actors. For example, in a country such as France—the ideal-typical case of contemporary strong state—cooperation between social movements and the state should be less pronounced than in a weak state such as Switzerland.

A similar argument can be advanced for the prevailing strategies of the authorities to deal with challengers. Like the institutional structures, this is an aspect of the political opportunity structure, but referred to its informal side (Kriesi, et al. 1995). Our second hypothesis is that, in countries that are characterized by exclusive prevailing strategies of powerholders, cooperation with social movements is less likely to occur. The rationale for that is quite obvious: although cooperation is not identical to an inclusive strategy of the authorities, a cooperative relationship can only emerge to the extent that the latter accept movements as a legitimate and trustful partner. Thus, cooperation should be stronger in countries with inclusive strategies, such as Switzerland and the Netherlands, than in countries with exclusive strategies, such as France and Germany.

In addition to these two structural characteristics, there is a third, more conjunctural aspect of the state that partly influences the possibilities of cooperation between powerholders and social movements: the specific configuration of alliances at a given time (Kriesi, et al. 1995; Tarrow 1994a). When the main ally of a social movement is in the government, the chances of this movement to engage in cooperation with state actors should be greater. For instance, when the Socialist Party—the principal ally of the new social movements—leads the government, this movement family should tend to collaborate with the state to a greater extent than when right-wing parties rule the government. Thus, depending on the presence of movement allies in the executive power, the closedness of the state may become a relative openness. This hypothesis was verified in France when the Socialists seized the power and, despite the closedness of the state, several organizations belonging to the new social movements—in particular, anti-racist SMOs—suddenly became partners of the government. Once the Left lost the elections and was replaced by the Right, cooperation between these SMOs and the state faded away.

While the first three conditions refer to the state, the remaining ones regard social movements, the other party involved. In particular, we stress four relevant aspects in this context: the type of issue raised by the movements, their organizational structure, their strategies, and the knowledge they possess. To begin with, cooperation depends on the type of issue at hand. On the one hand, certain policy areas are more complex than others because they imply the consideration of a variety of technical issues. For instance, the area of environmental protection is particularly complex, due to the multiplicity of problems created by pollution and to the overlap of local, regional, national, and international levels of government intervention. In addition, the increasingly global character of environmental problems makes their management and resolution extremely difficult. On the other hand, certain issues are more threatening for the authorities than others (Duyvendak 1995; Kriesi et al. 1995) because they pose an electoral threat to powerholders or because they strike the core interests of the state. As they are a matter of strong disagreement, such issues are also less likely to become the object of cooperation. Thus, our fourth hypothesis is that cooperative interactions between social movements and the state are more likely to occur when the issues at hand do not pose a fundamental threat to the political authorities. In this respect, environmental protection and the aid to Third-World countries are certainly two domains that present a potential for collaboration. In these domains, there is a high degree of consensus, among political elites and among the general public, about the need to find feasible solutions to given problems.

A further condition of cooperation refers to the organizational characteristics of social movements. The state often looks for collaboration with sectors of the civil society. However, it does not do so at random, but it selects carefully its partners according to their characteristics. As the institutional approach to organizations suggests (Meyers and Rowan 1977; Zucker 1987), organizations with formalized and professionalized structures have greater access to the state, for governments and public administrations prefer to deal with groups that have working procedures reflecting their own routines. Thus, according to our fifth hypothesis, we expect cooperation to be facilitated by the internal structuring of SMOs, in particular, when the latter display a high degree of formalization, professionalization, centralization, and bureaucratization (Kriesi 1996).

The emergence of a cooperative relationship is also facilitated by the strategic and tactical choices made by social movements (Staggenborg 1988). SMOs that make use of radical or violent actions have fewer chances to become part of a cooperation system than those that opt for moderate and conventional forms of action. In fact, strongly formalized and professionalized SMOs prefer to adopt institutional means because the latter are more compatible with a formal structure and with the routines of a professional staff. Hence, our sixth hypothesis is that cooperation is more likely to take place with moderate movements (in terms of forms of action) than with radical movements.

Finally, as we have hinted above, cooperation depends on the knowl-
edge possessed by social movements and their organizations. Public administrations increasingly rely on external actors (often in their capacity as experts) to manage and regulate public policies. However, in order to be considered by the authorities, these actors must have specific competencies in the domain in which they are asked to intervene. Knowledge may be theoretical as well as practical and gives SMOs the capability to find solutions in a specific domain. For instance, several environmental organizations hold theoretical knowledge on specific ecological issues, such as the destruction of rainforests, the impact of pollution on the change of the climate, the disappearing of animal and vegetal species, and so forth. Theoretical knowledge stems from their own research or from scientific studies that they politicize by interacting with the state. In addition, SMOs also have practical knowledge coming from their experiences in the field and from the elaboration of concrete projects. Movements may thus become part of an epistemic community (Holzner and Marx 1979), that is, a community of experts who share a given set of beliefs and values over policies to be applied (Haas 1989). Therefore, our seventh hypothesis maintains that cooperation between social movements and the state is a function of the amount of knowledge possessed by the latter in given policy areas and on given issues.

Confictual Cooperation in Solidarity and Ecology Movements: An Illustration

The hypotheses proposed above represent several avenues for research into the causes and mechanisms of the conflictual cooperation between social movements and the state. In order to provide a preliminary test, we have conducted an empirical investigation on the basis of official documents of state agencies, interviews, and a structured questionnaire sent to a sample of SMOs of the ecology and solidarity movements in France and Switzerland, two important new social movements. The goal of the questionnaire was to provide a picture of conflictual cooperation by comparing two different movements in two different political contexts over time. It included a series of questions about cooperation with government institutions (national, regional, or local), such as its origins, nature, and form (consultation, participation in committees, etc.), changes in the cooperative relationship, and the margin for action of SMOs. The empirical material we have in our hands is not sufficient for a strong test of our hypotheses, but gives us some interesting insights into the kind of state–movement interaction we focus on in this chapter. In particular, it suggests that conflictual cooperation between certain new social movements and the state is becoming a central feature of western societies and that it varies according to the type of state as well as to the type of movement.

The Solidarity Movement

As of today, the solidarity movement has reached perhaps the strongest degree of cooperation with state institutions. This holds less for issues pertaining to the national context, such as immigration and political asylum, than for matters related to the international context, particularly development aid. Traditionally, noncontentious interactions between the state and social movements have taken the form of subsidies granted to some SMOs. In France, this type of interaction became institutionalized in 1959, at the peak of the decolonization process, with the creation of the ministry of cooperation and the aid and cooperation fund (FAC). The latter was aimed at funding the development of former colonies in Africa. The entire public aid to development amounted to 42 billion French francs in 1995 (including large shares from other ministries) and made France the second highest contributor to public aid in the world. However, only a small part of this budget is devoted to the funding of non-profit organizations. In 1994 SMOs received 49 million French francs from the FAC (that is, for the cofinancing of specific projects). France ranked fifteenth among the eighteen Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries as to the share of public aid to development generated by SMOs. Furthermore, as table 4.1 shows, the share of financial resources of organizations dealing with international solidarity issues coming from public funds has increased steadily in the nineties, both in relative and absolute terms, after a decline in the late eighties.

### TABLE 4.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Resources of French SMOs International Solidarity Issues</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Year</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
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<td>1987</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
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<td>1992</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes:* Absolute figures are in millions of French francs. Figures for 1990 are not available.  
*Source:* Commission Coopération Développement
Already at this stage, which is not an indicator of cooperation per se, state agencies and bureaucrats prefer to deal with relatively formal and professional SMOs that have working procedures similar to their own (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Zucker 1987). For example, we can read in a joint document of the ministry for foreign affairs and the ministry of cooperation in France that, in order to be eligible for obtaining state funds, an association, among other organizations, must have been created at least three years before and hold general assemblies as well as regular reunions.

Besides the rise in funds granted by the French state to various SMOs of the solidarity movement, in recent years the cooperation between the two parties has turned toward a growing consultative role of SMOs and toward their integration in the state’s structure. Several bodies have been created in order to facilitate the dialogue and collaboration in the policy area of development aid. The most important is the committee cooperation development, created by the ministry for foreign affairs in 1983, as an institution within which government representatives and organized groups of civil society participate on equal terms. In general, the latter participate as members of groups of SMOs (collectifs, in the French jargon), which the state recognizes as legitimate partners in various advisory bodies. The committee cooperation development has a consultative role on issues pertaining to international solidarity; in addition to gathering and diffusing information about and sensitizing toward Third-World issues, it suggests policies and interventions to the competent state bodies, mainly (but not solely) the ministry for foreign affairs and the ministry of cooperation.

The integration of the solidarity movement is further facilitated by several institutions that have been created with the aim of facilitating the links and coordination with state agencies. The office of associative life, which has recently replaced a number of previous bodies, is the most important one. This office is linked both to the ministry for foreign affairs and to the ministry of cooperation. It is in charge of managing the relations with SMOs that deal with development issues and functions as the interface between these SMOs and the state, in particular the two aforementioned ministries. In addition to the office of associative life, the other bodies further facilitate the interface between the SMOs of the solidarity movement and the ministry for foreign affairs with regard to issues related to development aid.

The committee cooperation development itself has promoted other opportunities for the coordination between SMOs and government agencies. For example, a number of thematic networks have been created in 1983 with the aim of integrating into several sectoral policies the reflection of a series of other actors in the field of development, SMOs among others.

Here we have a clear indication of the significance of knowledge possessed by social movements for them to establish a cooperative relationship with the state. The goal of these networks is precisely to take advantage of the know-how of nonstate actors for the elaboration and implementation of policies in the domain of development aid. A similar function is fulfilled by the two existing solidarity programs: the solidarity program water, created in 1984, and the solidarity program habitat, launched in 1988. However, these programs are, in principle, open to a wider range of collective actors, both public and private.

The process of incorporation sped up during the nineties. In 1991, for example, a discussion began, aimed at creating a new contractual relationship between the state and the SMOs and at reaching a better coordination of activities, as well as a simplification of the existing procedures. At the beginning of 1995, in addition, the joint programming committee was created in which both sides are represented on equal terms. As the term indicates, this device provides for a joint programming of interventions in the nongovernmental sector and helps the integration of SMOs beginning in the conceptual phase of cooperation policies.

The situation in Switzerland displays both similarities with and differences from that of France. As in France, in the early years, the collaboration between the state and the SMOs of the solidarity movement was based mostly on the provision of financial resources. From the point of view of the state, the Swiss government, unlike that of France, has never had a strong and well-defined foreign policy. The small size of the country, the internal fragmentation of power, the absence of colonial tradition, and, above all, the neutrality principle have prevented the formulation of a clear policy in this domain. As a result, development-aid policies also had a slow start. But, at the same time, they were carried out almost exclusively by private institutions (Schild, n.d.) In this context, the intervention of the state was mostly limited to providing financial help to private initiatives and organizations. This situation has changed starting from the sixties. The Swiss agency for development and cooperation (SDC), the governmental agency in charge of policy elaboration and implementation in this domain, was formed in 1961. Since then, the role of the state in development aid has sensibly increased. Today, cooperation between the Swiss state and SMOs dealing with Third-World issues is very strong on all dimensions, but especially on the operational level.

As far as financial resources given to SMOs are concerned, at first glance Switzerland seems to be less generous than France. If we compare the total financial resources given to SMOs by the SDC in 1995, shown in Table 4.2, with the share of public funds of French SMOs in 1996 (Table 4.1), we see that the latter are more than six times larger than the former. If we subtract international public funds in the French case (about three
TABLE 4.2

Financial Contributions to SMOs
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Contributions to programs</th>
<th>Credits for small projects</th>
<th>Programs for volunteers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
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<td>2.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>53.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Note: Projected figures in millions of Swiss francs.
Source: Operationelles Organisationshandbuch DEH (15 November 1995)

quarters of the total), the funds of internal origin are still higher than those provided by the SDC. However, if we take into account the different size of the two countries and the consequent larger state revenue in France, we see that Switzerland does not seem to invest less than France to support SMOs in the domain of development aid. Furthermore, the figures for Switzerland do not include all the contributions to SMOs. In 1995, for example, the SDC gave 187 million Swiss francs to private organizations of development.7 Hence, it is reasonable to say that the Swiss government has given more support to SMOs than France. According to a recent survey, the share of public funds amounted to 47 percent of the total budget of private institutions of development in 1994 (42 percent from the central government).8 Yet, the contributions by the French government display a steady increase in recent years, while those by the Swiss government are expected not to rise in a dramatic way.

With regard to consultative procedures, cooperation in the area of development aid is noteworthy. The SMOs of the Swiss solidarity movement (specifically, those devoted to mutual aid) take part in policy formation in this domain. The SDC provides a number of channels for the institutional dialogue with SMOs, both with respect to the significance in terms of development policy of various political issues and with regard to specific issues of development policy on the operational plan, mutual information, and negotiations about financial contributions to SMOs. Such institutionalized dialogue sped up in the nineties, particularly in the aftermath of the United Nations conference on environment and development held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, which gave a decisive boost to the collaboration between governments and SMOs in various countries.

Today, several organizations have access to the Swiss state in extraparlia-

mentary committees, both temporary and permanent, created by the government, such as the committee for development aid.

Although incorporation in consultative procedures, unlike in France, is a typical feature of the Swiss political system in general, much like in France, it is facilitated by the gathering of SMOs in peak organizations. The so-called Working Community, which gathers five among the major SMOs that deal with humanitarian and development issues, is the privileged interlocutor of the government and the SDC for matters related to development aid. SMOs are often consulted by the government as experts on development matters. The case of Intercooperation is quite instructive. Largely supported by the government (39 million Swiss francs in 1995), it was created in 1982 with the aim of providing the government with a tool for the implementation of projects in the area of development. It gathers seven among the major SMOs and functions as the interface between SMOs and state institutions, a role similar to that played by the nine collectives in France.

If a dialogue exists in Switzerland between the SMOs and the state in connected but distinct policy areas such as development aid, humanitarian aid, human rights, aid to refugees, and, as we describe below, environmental protection, cooperation on the operational level is particularly strong in the first of these areas. It is here that a genuine cooperation takes place.

The traditional policy, based on the provision of funds to SMOs so that they can carry out specific projects in Third-World countries or educational initiatives in Switzerland, has been complemented with a policy of operational collaboration, particularly starting from the early eighties. Indeed, development aid is the policy area in which sectors of the civil society actively intervene in the enactment of political decisions, not only in the elaboration of those decisions. This cooperation occurs in two basic ways. On the one hand, the government contributes financially on an institutional basis to projects developed by the SMOs by means of the SDC. The share of funds thus granted usually covers between 30 and 50 percent of the costs (59 million Swiss francs in 1995). On the other hand, the Swiss government can also delegate the execution of projects or programs elaborated on the state level to one or more SMOs through the so-called mandats de régie (65 million Swiss francs in 1995). In this case, the government keeps control over operations. In this division of tasks, SMOs are responsible for the operational planning, the execution, and the monitoring of the project, but they often intervene in the project’s conceptual phase as well. The SDC is responsible for the general policy, the project’s general planning (though, as we have seen, SMOs are consulted on this level as well), and the project’s evaluation.

With the mandats de régie, cooperation between social movements and
the state reaches its peak. SMOs that are seen as being of public utility become an instrument of the state in order to reach its goals in a given policy area. SMOs are chosen according to their specific skills and knowledge, get funds, and are responsible for the implementation of the planned projects. In fact, some private organizations were active in development aid before the Swiss government became involved in this domain. Afterwards, development aid has become increasingly centered around the state and put under its control. But, as compared to the French situation, which is mostly based on a subsidizing state, the Swiss case reflects the model of the inciting state (Büttschi and Cattacin 1994), whereby the latter invites and stimulates the intervention of organized groups of the civil society, in particular social movements. In the case of development-aid policies, this relationship is becoming so close that we may ask whether certain SMOs of the solidarity movement are not becoming part of the state. Is it the same in the ecology movement?

The Ecology Movement

The complexity of environmental problems in contemporary society forces the state to search for forms of cooperation with the ecology movement. SMOs such as the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), both in France and Switzerland, or the Swiss League for the Protection of Nature, have long established collaborations of various kinds with the political authorities at different administrative levels. However, in comparison to the solidarity movement, the cooperative relationship of the ecology movement is not only less pronounced but also more decentralized, bearing on the regional and local levels, in addition to the national one (although these administrative levels are not absent from development-aid policies, both in France and Switzerland). Various environmental SMOs collaborate with local authorities (municipalities, local councils, communal committees, etc.). This cooperation may consist of occasional or regular consultation and expertise, participation in local committees, or intervention in specific projects (planning, monitoring, evaluation, etc.). For example, the Movement Defense of the Bicycle is regularly consulted by the city of Paris since 1986, and has participated in a local committee and a working group since 1996; the Swiss Foundation for the Protection and Planning of Landscape is officially consulted on environmental issues by the government since its creation in 1970, and collaborates at the communal and communal level as well. The Swiss Society for the Protection of the Environment (SPE) is occasionally consulted by local authorities, such as in Geneva, and collaborates with other cities as well. In addition to national SMOs, various local SMOs have established a cooperative relationship with the political authorities on the communal level.

Most typically, however, SMOs display a multilevel intervention. Thus, the French National Movement of Struggle for the Environment has established different forms of cooperation with the ministry of the environment, as well as with several regions, department, and communes since 1981. The forms of cooperation range from regular consultation to participation in committees and working groups. Similarly, the SPE in Switzerland cooperates with the Swiss Agency for the environment, forests, and landscape, with the federal office of energy, with the canton of Geneva, and with several cities. Some SMOs, however, tend to concentrate on the national level. This seems to be the case of Pro Natura, an old organization of the Swiss ecology movement, whose collaboration with the Swiss Agency for the environment, forests, and landscape goes back to the mid-sixties, when it was charged with the management of a national park. Later on, the relationship with this regulatory agency came to include several consultative tasks and, most important, the delegation of specific projects to the SMO. In addition, during the eighties and nineties, this SMO has engaged in some kind of cooperation with other governmental bodies that deals with environmental or energy issues and even with the SDC. The cooperation with the latter also includes the delegation of projects.

A second difference between ecology and solidarity movements lies precisely in the kinds of activities undertaken by SMOs in a cooperative relationship. Less involved in the operational aspects of specific projects, environmental SMOs often intervene in the political process as consultants. Thus, their role consists mainly of providing information and expertise to state actors. At the beginning, they were consulted only occasionally. Later on, consultative procedures on a regular basis were created. Finally, participation in extraparlamentary committees has become more common. The origins of the incorporation of parts of the ecology movement in decisional and regulative processes is twofold. On the one hand, the growing complexity and global character of environmental problems force the authorities to look for support from SMOs that have specific knowledge about these as well as related matters. The emerging concept of sustainable development, which the 1992 conference in Rio de Janeiro has brought to the fore, clearly calls for the collaboration of various state and nonstate actors, on both the national and international levels. On the other hand, environmental issues are increasingly dealt with through a problem-solving behavior based on cooperation among various actors (Amy 1992; Wälti 1993; Weidner 1993). This holds true above all in a country such as Switzerland, where the search for consensus is a general feature of the political system (Linder 1994; Lipshart 1984; Neidhart 1970). This would explain, at least in part, why cooperation between the
ecology movement and the state is more pronounced in Switzerland than in France.

However, the clearest examples of cooperation between environmental SMOs and the Swiss state can be seen on the international level. On the one hand, the scope and complexity of international problems require the intervention of knowledgeable external actors. On the other hand, it is in this domain that the ecology movement has pushed the collaboration with state agencies and bureaucracies farthest in order to put into practice the concept of sustainable development. Some SMOs acting in the international arena work so closely with state powers that they can hardly be seen as parts of a social movement. One of the most powerful among them is the World Union for the Nature, a peak organization whose members are states, public bodies, and SMOs that work in partnership to protect the natural world and its resources.

Just as in the area of development aid, cooperation between the ecology movement and international administrative and regulatory bodies has increased after the 1992 United Nations conference on environment and development. Indeed, the Declaration of Rio includes explicit references to the participation of the civil society in the management of environmental problems. In addition, the so-called Agenda 21, also a result of the conference, calls for a partnership between SMOs and the political authorities for its execution, not only on the international level, but also on the national level. Thus, in the nineties, cooperation between the ecology movement and the state has strengthened in various European countries, including France and Switzerland. A publication of the Swiss department of foreign affairs, for example, mentions eighteen SMOs that cooperate with the Swiss government on environmental matters, including several SMOs of the solidarity movement. This also shows the growing interconnection between environmental and development issues on the world scale.

Discussion

Our empirical illustration shows that social movements do not only challenge powerholders, but establish a cooperative relationship with state actors and structures, and that collaboration between the state and the two movements studied here has increased, beginning in the eighties. The illustration also reveals that collaboration between SMOs and the state is not a homogenous process, but varies across countries as well as across movements. In this respect, the seven hypotheses that we have proposed find some support. To begin with, we observe a striking difference between the two national contexts under study. In France, collaboration between social movements and the state remains strongly based on the provision of financial resources to SMOs and on sporadic consultation. In other words, collaboration between SMOs and the French state exists, but its intensity is rather low. Cooperation is much more widespread and intense in Switzerland, where the political process is characterized by the joint action of state agencies and social movements in several policy areas, especially on the operational level (that is, delegation of tasks) in the case of the solidarity movement. This difference is partly a result of divergent state structures and prevailing strategies of the authorities toward challengers. Switzerland is a paradigmatic case for the favorable opportunities offered to social movements to influence the state (Kriesi et al. 1995). A strongly decentralized and open state, coupled with a long tradition of integration of nonstate actors, facilitate the emergence of conflictual cooperation as a type of interaction. France is also a paradigmatic case, but in the opposite sense, making collaboration with social movements more difficult.

The characteristics of social movements also influence the interaction with powerholders. In particular, conflictual cooperation depends on the type of issues. While both ecology and solidarity movements can collaborate with the state because they raise issues that do not threaten the political authorities in a fundamental way, we can nevertheless make a distinction between these two movements. As our illustration suggests, the solidarity movement has established a stronger cooperative relationship with the government, as compared with the ecology movement. This holds true above all for the SMOs that intervene in development-aid policies. Policy implementation and task delegation involve SMOs of the solidarity movement to a greater extent than environmental SMOs. This difference, at least in part, is due to the type of issues raised by the two movements. Development aid is less threatening for the political authorities than environmental issues. Challenges regarding certain environmental issues, such as nuclear energy and the building of national routs, do threaten the core state interests and, therefore, are subject to opposition and protest rather than consensus and cooperation.

The other hypotheses concerning the influence of social movement features on the emergence of conflictual cooperation also found some support. First, SMOs that collaborate with the state, such as the WWF, Caritas, or Swissaid, are more formalized and professionalized than those that are excluded from this kind of interaction. Second, SMOs that collaborate with the state tend to have moderate goals and to adopt moderate forms of action. Third, SMOs that collaborate with the state display specific knowledge, both theoretical and practical, that is often instrumental in bringing solutions to new emerging problems in given policy areas. In sum, although the quality, scope, and intensity of cooperation are substantially different in France and Switzerland, the examples of solidarity...
and ecology movements suggest that social movements engage in cooperative interactions in addition to contentious interactions.

Implications

The emergence of cooperation—specifically, conflictual cooperation—between social movements and the state has a series of implications for both these collective actors. Repercussions for social movements are threefold. First, with regard to the organizational structure of movements, cooperation presupposes the existence of well-structured and competent SMOs, but, in turn, it induces the concentration and conglomeration of movement resources. To engage in collaborative interactions with the state is very demanding in terms of resources (Büschi and Cattacin 1994). Thus, movements that enter a cooperative relationship with the state tend to become bigger in size, more professionalized, and more bureaucratized.

Second, regarding the nature of movements, cooperation implies a social recognition of SMOs by the state, but one that can also change their characteristics and role. On the one hand, in order to engage in a cooperative relationship with the state, SMOs need to moderate their actions and goals, for the state tends to avoid collaboration with radical SMOs. Cooperation, in turn, produces moderation. Cooperation means that a compromise must be reached. Therefore, the actors involved need to moderate their goals. The distribution of power among the various actors will determine who has to grant more concessions. Social movements, even when they are integrated in the structures of the state and even if they possess knowledge useful for state agencies, obviously have much less power than the state. This does not mean that the latter will not have to make concessions, but it will do so to a lesser extent. Thus, SMOs in a cooperative relationship tend to moderate their goals. On the other hand, incorporation into the state challenges the movements' identities. Even when they collaborate with the government, SMOs are critical toward official policies. They try to promote their goals and find new opportunities to influence existing policies, but the state makes the rules of cooperation. This provokes not only a moderation of movement goals, but also the shifting away from a critical role toward the action of the state. SMOs carry a social conflict that they help to politicize and bring a critique of the action (or inaction) of the state in given areas; once they begin to cooperate with the state, their identity as social movements changes. The search for a compromise becomes the underlying logic of movements that look for cooperation with state agencies and bureaucracies. Two options are available at this stage. SMOs can adapt to their new function and alter their identity, to the point of becoming semistate organizations (Linder 1987) or, alternatively, they can keep their movement identity and take part in a form of collaboration with the state that, following Evers, we have called conflictual cooperation.

Finally, cooperation with the state affects the levels of mobilization of social movements. If collaborating opens up new institutional channels for SMOs, it also has a negative impact on the amount of protest events produced by movements and the volume of participation in those events. On the one hand, SMOs tend to shift from mobilization to interest representation. In other words, they concentrate their energy and resources toward the obtaining of their goals within institutional arenas, thus neglecting their typical means (street demonstrations, political campaigns, etc.). In doing so, they lose public visibility and the potential for recruiting new members, who provide them with legitimacy and negotiation power to be used in collaborative interactions with the state. In the worst situation, this will lead them to be cut off from their social support. On the other hand, cooperation with the state may deepen the fragmentation within the movement. The incorporation of the movement's moderate wing may increase the conflicts with its radical wing. In fact, integration is often used by political authorities as a strategy to weaken a social movement (Karstedt-Henke 1980). The moderates become even more moderate due to their integration within conventional arenas, while the other wing radicalizes even further. This worsens the internal conflicts and eventually leads to the movement's demobilization.

Conflictual cooperation also has a series of implications for the state. A first set of repercussions has to do with the internal organization of the state. To begin with, cooperation affects the efficacy of the state in two opposing ways. On the one hand, negotiations with social movements slow down the decision-making process. Consultation and the search for compromise with external actors makes the decisional process longer and more complex, hence also less efficient. Switzerland is a good example (Linder 1987). However, the efficacy of policy implementation increases, especially in states that have a weak administrative body. When the state delegates the implementation of programs to external actors, administrative costs diminish and the effectiveness of implementation carried by more knowledgeable actors increases. The Swiss state's delegation of the implementation of development projects to the solidarity movement provides an illustration of this process. In the area of development aid, state actors often are less competent than SMOs, some of which had projects in the Third World long before the creation of the SDC. Therefore, they have developed valuable skills and knowledge, an experience in the field, and structures in Third-World countries, allowing for a better implementation of programs. The Swiss state still lacks these capabilities. Therefore,
the delegation of tasks represents an important advantage in terms of efficiency of policy implementation.

Second, conflictual cooperation affects the legitimacy of the state. Following the participatory approach to democracy (Pateman 1970), according to which citizens are “ideal citizens”—that is, we-thinkers (Barber 1984) naturally oriented toward the production of the public good—cooperation between organized sectors of the civil society and the state can be seen as contributing to a more legitimate democracy. In this perspective, states that have created structures (relational programs, in Willke’s terminology) to promote or facilitate cooperation with external actors, such as SMOs, add to their legitimacy by inciting participatory democracy. In contrast, following the liberal approach to democracy, according to which citizens have their own definition of the public good, are free agents making free choices (Gould 1988), and are not naturally oriented toward “the” public good, an increase in the number of external actors raises the problem of the balance between private or particular interests within the state and the definition of the public good. In this perspective, states ground their legitimacy on neutrality and on the existence of institutional procedures that allow for the regulation of private interests (Gianni 1994). The intrusion of various private actors who pursue their own interests within the state raises the problem of the redefinition of institutional procedures in democratic states in order to define the public good. If, at least in theory, democracies must provide for universal access (Willke 1991), in practice, access is not the same for everybody. Certain organized actors have more resources and greater access than others. Moreover, the distribution of power among these actors when they are in a relationship of collaboration with the state varies. Swiss democracy provides a good illustration of that to the extent that neo-corporatist arrangements not only exclude certain actors but are also unbalanced with regard to the actors who participate (Kriese 1982). The problem of access raises the question of the legitimacy of decisions taken by state actors. The state no longer is the defender of the public good. Furthermore, with the intrusion of private actors, the state runs the risk of fragmentation. Due to the incorporation of organized groups of the civil society into the state aimed at pursuing sectoral interests, the state risks becoming more fragmented, losing a global view of the society, and, as a result, modifying its action.

Third, cooperation with social movements entails some organizational adaptations by the state. The political authorities develop several structures aimed at controlling the implementation of programs and public policies and at institutionalizing the cooperation with external actors. As we have seen, both the French and the Swiss administrations have developed structures of coordination in the areas of development aid and environmental protection.

Finally, and perhaps most important, conflictual cooperation produces a transformation of the role of the state. As we have pointed out at the outset, modern democratic societies are increasingly complex and differentiated. The state is less and less capable of warranting the governability of complex democracies. As Willke (1991) has underscored, the civil society includes many organized actors who compete for the piloting of society. Social movements participate in this competition. In order to face the growing complexity and differentiation of society, the state relies on these actors. Their incorporation and the cooperation thus established improve the flexibility and adaptability of the responses to the complexity of society (Willke 1991), but, at the same time, change the role and nature of the state. Its traditional role, whereby the state has the upper hand over the piloting of society, is transforming, and this task tends to be shared with other actors. In addition, collaboration between the state and organized groups in society—that is, an increasing interpenetrating of the state and the civil society—helps to stabilize the conflictual relations between them (Evers 1990). This calls for a different way of ruling the power and a different type of state, which becomes a regulating state that looks for compromises, or even consensus, in order to pilot an increasingly complex society.

Conclusion

This implication suggests to us some final considerations about the impact of movements on social change. First of all, the emergence of cooperative interactions between social movements (particularly, new social movements) and the state in certain policy areas raises the question of whether we are witnessing a traditional process of institutionalization of challengers, or, on the contrary, whether this is a qualitatively new form of incorporation of noninstitutional actors into the political system. As we have hinted in our discussion of the differences between the traditional models of interest intermediation and conflictual cooperation, we think there are good reasons to see the outline of a new type of incorporation. Differences between traditional trajectories of institutionalization and conflictual cooperation as to the content of the exchange, the sharing of goals, the dialogical nature of the exchange, the place of agency, and the self-reflexive character of society suggest that new social movements have undergone a process of incorporation into the political system that is substantially distinct from the one labor movements have followed decades before. Whether this is only a temporary condition of movements or a
permanent trait of the contemporary society is impossible to ascertain. It could well be that, once the knowledge of social movements has been transferred to the state, the latter will not need them anymore and the process described here will come to a stop. Or maybe it will continue even in the absence of a practical need of knowledge and expertise by the state.

Only the future can tell us which way will eventually be followed. The important point, however, is that, at some point in the history of modern societies, important sectors of a family of social movements that see their raison d’être in contentious political actions have begun to engage in cooperative interactions with political authorities and state structures. This has had two main consequences. On the one hand, it has expanded the range of actions displayed by social movements. In a way, in addition to a repertoire of contention, one could now speak of a repertoire of cooperation when referring to new social movements. Just as somewhere around the mid-nineteenth century the old action repertoire was replaced by a new action repertoire that gave birth to the modern social movement (Tilly 1986, 1995a), perhaps the end of the twentieth century will have witnessed a second broad transformation in the modalities of interaction between the political power and the civil society.

Thanks to the example of conflictual cooperation, we can see the role that social movements play in the transformation of society. Far from simply being a result of large-scale social changes, movements contribute to its transformation through their presence and actions. In our case, their impact is on the structure of the state and on the political process itself. However, we cannot draw a firm causal arrow in one or the other direction. As della Porta (forthcoming) has shown in the case of the public discourse over the policing of protest, there is no simple causal nexus between movement actions and social change. Rather, social movements and change go hand in hand, mutually influencing each other, as in conflictual cooperation, whereby movements are part of a process of change that might result in a transformation of the nature of the state and its relation with the civil society.

Notes

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1. For a similar definition, see Tarrow (1994a).