Speaking Through Someone Else's Mouth. Free Indirect Discourse, Contexts and Narratives

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. What is free indirect discourse?

Free indirect discourse (henceforth: FID) is a literary device by which a speaker/narrator reports the speech or thought of another character in a certain way, which results in a “dual voiced” or “polyphonic” effect on the reader. This is so because FID blends two different perspectives into one single report: the speaker-related perspective that characterizes standard indirect discourse (SID), and the character-related perspective that is the hallmark of direct discourse/quotation. Consider the following examples, taken from Virginia Woolf's To the Lighthouse:

(1) Had she known that he was looking at her, she thought, she would not have let herself sit there, thinking.

(2) She was quite ready to take his word for it, she said.

The examples above both contain FID sentences (which I represent slanted), the content of which is not the narrator's but one of the main protagonists of the novel, Mrs. Ramsay. Indices indicate that the referent of the pronouns within the FID parts are co-indexed with the referent of the parentheticals (“she thought”/“she said”).

FID differs from quotation and standard indirect discourse in several ways. While in quotation, a report is made with the speaker pretending he's the author of the speech/thought event being reported, it is not the case in FID. This difference is realized grammatically: in FID, the present perfect is switched into a past perfect form, and the indexical pronoun I is replaced by the 3-SG form. This is, however, exactly what happens in standard indirect discourse as well: tenses and pronouns are shifted from the time of the utterance to the time of the report, and from the original speaker to the reporting speaker. For the sake of clarity, I will then adopt the following nomenclature: the term “speaker” will refer to the individual making the report (the “matrix speaker”), and the term “origo” (Latin for “source”) for the individual whose speech/thought is being reported (the “embedded speaker”).

What distinguishes FID and SID reports, then? Consider another example from Woolf, this time from Mrs. Dalloway:

(3) a. There was always something cold in Clarissa, he thought. (FID)
    b. “There is always something cold in Clarissa”, he thought. (Quotation)
    c. He thought that there was always something cold in Clarissa. (SID)

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*I thank Liliane Haegeman, Jacques Moeschler, and an anonymous reviewer for their acute readings and comments. All pertaining mistakes are irremediably my own.*
Notice first that there are syntactical constraints on the use of SID sentences that do not seem to apply to FID. First, SID always involves two distinct clauses: a matrix CP and an embedded CP introduced by a complementizer (*that*). Moreover, the matrix CP containing the attitude verb (*think*) cannot be dislocated to the right edge of the embedded CP, as (4) shows:

(4) *That there was always something cold in Clarissa, he thought.*

The SID sentence cannot contain subject-oriented material such as exclamatives, as in (5):

(5)  

a. Oh yes, Sally remembered. (*Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway*)  
b. *Sally remembered that oh yes.*

FID, on the other hand, can handle expressive elements denoting a form of affective response from the subject:

(6) There were roses; there were irises. *Ah yes* - so she breathed in the earthy garden sweet smell as she stood talking to Miss Pym who owed her help [...] (*Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway*)

(7) *Nonsense, nonsense!* she cried to herself, pushing through the swing doors of Mulberry's the florists. (*Ibid.*)

In the same vein, FID licenses self-addressed questions, as in (8), and other subject-oriented material such as evaluative NPs and adjectives, as in (9):

(8) The crush was terrific for the time of day. Lords, Ascot, Hurlingham, *what was it?* she wondered, for the street was blocked. (*Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway*)

(9) Cold, heartless, a prude, he called her. Never could she understand how he cared. But those Indian women did presumably - silly, pretty, flimsy nincompoops. (*Ibid.*)

FID sentences are also well known for displaying temporal or locational indexical NPs that are systematically interpreted in a non-indexical way, i.e. as referring to the time and place of the *origo* but not the speaker's:

(10) She remembered once throwing a shilling into the Serpentine. *But every one remembered; what she loved was this, here, now, in front of her; the fat lady in the cab.* (*Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway*)

Section 2 will examine in further detail the behavior of indexicals in FID.

Finally, let us note that, although parenthetical constructions are very common in FID, the parenthetical appositive clause need not be realized and can be inferred pragmatically, as this example from *To the lighthouse* shows:

(11) *Had he money enough to buy tobacco? Did he have to ask her for it? half a crown? Eighteenpence? Oh, she could not bear to think of the little indignities she made him suffer.*
As these examples show, FID sentences pertain to a certain type of expressions that do not convey the perspective of the speaker, but the one pertaining to the origo. Reinhart (1983) first mentioned the speaker/origo\(^1\) distinction to refer to a special kind of parenthetical clauses that block the transparent readings of their regular, non-parenthetical SID counterparts:

(12) a. Oedipus believed that his mother wasn’t his mother.
    b. # His mother wasn’t his mother, Oedipus believed.

In (12a), the DP “mother” is read “transparently” or *de re*; in (12b), on the other hand, the DP is read *de dicto*. Reinhart does not mention free indirect discourse, probably because she was then unaware that this kind of constructions were the hallmark of FID, a point later noted by Banfield (1982). She does point out, however, that in the case of subject-oriented parenthetical constructions, “it is not always grammaticality per se which is at issue here, but rather the appropriateness of a certain grammatical form to a certain context” (Reinhart 1983:176). In the spirit of this analysis, we could indeed say that FID is a way of making attitude reports that are characterized by a given number of grammatical features that, in appropriate narrative contexts, generate perspectival effects.

That FID sentences trigger a subject-oriented reading seems not to be a mere matter of taste, but rather a mandatory reading required by the immediate context in order to maintain the internal coherence of both the speaker and the subject's beliefs. Experimental data confirms this: indeed, building on previous studies by Harris & Potts (2009), Kaiser (2015) conducted psycholinguistic experiments where the speaker/subject oriented readings were tested in different settings. The experiment involved epithets and epistemic adverbials and showed that, although there is a default preference for the speaker-oriented reading of these two categories, their presence in FID contexts trigger a change of “epistemic anchor” from the speaker/narrator to the origo (see Kaiser 2015 for results and discussion). Her conclusion is the following: “In a fictional narrative context, the characters are available to act as judges, and the narrator may not be very available to act as the judge” (Kaiser 2015:359). I think there is a very intuitive sense in which these results can be captured within linguistic theory: it amounts saying that FID involves a switch from the context of evaluation of the speaker to the context of evaluation of the origo, as will be argued in section 2.

1.2. Pronouns in FID

As we mentioned earlier, perhaps the most puzzling feature of FID sentences concerns the behavior of tenses and pronouns. Both are said to be *shifted*, i.e. adjusted from the perspective of the origo to the one of the speaker – something that sets FID apart from quotation. Consequently, pronouns and tenses are interpreted *de re*. While all of the linguistic material occurring within FID except pronouns and tenses reflects the perspective of the origo, one could legitimately ask the following: in what sense are pronouns and tenses, as grammatical categories, special? While we will not address the temporal issue in the present article, let us simply mention that the structural analogy between pronouns and tenses has been noted by many scholars in the field\(^2\), suggesting that an analogous solution could apply to tenses.

Moreover, if FID pronouns are interpreted *de re* (that is, transparently from the point of view of the speaker) and not *de dicto* (from the point of view of the origo), there is yet another reading of pronouns that needs to be accounted for. Consider (13):

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1 The “subject”, in Reinhart's terms.
What is important here is that the pronoun does not simply refer to Clarissa Dalloway as the agent of the thinking event, depicted in the FID clause, but as the experiencer of this thinking event from a first-person perspective. This reading is typically called, after David Lewis (1979), a *de se* reading. Beliefs one has about oneself are taken to be of a special kind—namely, involving what is called a “strong” epistemic relation between the belief and the belief-bearer. The indexical *I* is often taken to implement this relation within the faculty of language (Perry 1979), whence the possibility of rewriting our example in (13) with a quotation using the first-person pronoun. In other words, reference is not sufficient to evaluate the truth-conditionality of *de se* claims: there has to be some reflexive relation between the attitude and the self experiencing this attitude.

It is often assumed that a *de se* reading corresponds to the interpretation of a dedicated *de se* logical form. But sentences such as (13) can always have another, *de re* reading, in which nothing “first-personal” is said: the reading then obtained is the one in which Clarissa Dalloway thinks of a certain proposition that says something about Clarissa Dalloway, but with no self-ascribing relation holding between herself and the thought expressed. This is illustrated by Kaplan’s famous mirror example:

(13)  *Oh if she could have had her life over again!* she thought, stepping on to the pavement. (Woolf, *Mrs. Dalloway*)

(Context: Clarissa walks past a mirror that she mistakes for a shop window. Unbeknownst to her, her dress is on fire):

(Kaplan’s ex.) a. She said that her dress was on fire, but she did not realize it was her own. (SID)  
   b. # “My dress is on fire!”, she said, but she did not realize it was her own. (Quotation)  
   c. # Her dress was on fire, she said, but she did not realize it was her own. (FID)

In other words, a *de se* reading is “essentially” indexical, in the words of Perry (1979). FID sentences, we would like to argue, always favor the *de se* reading.

The questions to be answered at this point are the following:  
(i) Why are pronouns special? What is it in FID that allows them to shift from one perspective (the *origo’s*) to another (the speaker’s)? and  
(ii) Why are they systematically interpreted *de se*, i.e. Denoting a speaker/thinker different from the narrator in a “first personal” way?

Before attempting to provide these with an answer, we need to ensure that our approach to FID as a form of context shift is correct; however, this is far from obvious. The next section offers an overview of the two main approaches said to account for the FID phenomenon: the quotational analysis and the context-shift analysis.

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Although it is debatable—see Maier (2011). For a justification of dedicated *de se* LFs, see Percus & Sauerland (2003a & b) & Anand (2006). For an application to FID pronouns, see Sharvit (2008).
2. **Free Indirect Discourse: Direct or Indirect Reports?**

2.1. FID as mixed quotation

As mentioned above, FID possess many features that suggest it could actually be a special form of quotation. In adopting this line of analysis, however, one has to account for the fact that, to count as a genuine FID sentence, both tenses and pronouns have to be shifted from the perspective of the *origo* to the perspective of the speaker: otherwise, FID would simply amount to quotation without quotation marks⁴. Maier (2015; 2017) adopts such an approach. He proposes that the logical form of FID sentences such as (13) is something like the following:

(14) Oh if [she] [could have had] [her] life over again! She thought.

The LF represented in (14) displays some “punctured holes” that correspond to the shifted pronouns *she* and *her* and the shifted past participle tense form *could have had*. These “holes” indicate *unquotation*: the original thought of the *origo* is only *partially* quoted by the speaker, thus being “adapted” to the frame of the reporting context.

This approach, though very convincing, has one major flaw: it is said by Maier himself to overgenerate. As such, it cannot account for what he calls the “puzzle of free indirect discourse”, namely, the fact that in FID, *only* pronouns and tenses are shifted from the *origo* to the speaker, and nothing else. To explain this fact, Maier proposes that the semantics of FID sentences obeys constraints imposed by the two following pragmatic principles:

**Attraction:** when talking about the most salient speech act participants, use indexicals to refer to them directly.

**Verbatim:** in direct discourse, faithfully reproduce the linguistic form of the reported utterance.

**Attraction** forces the reporting speaker to refer to the original speech event participants by using directly referential indexicals such as *I* or *you*; **Verbatim**, on the other hand, forces her to reproduce the form of the speech event faithfully. The consequences of these two principles are straightforward: when applied to FID, the verbatim constraint forces the speaker to carve her report exactly (or, as faithfully as possible) after the way the *origo* produced the utterance or thought. But this would imply, as we have seen, that the speaker uses the same indexicals we suspect the *origo* used to refer to himself when producing the thought. This is impossible, however, since indexicals *I* and *you* (among others) are taken to be rigid designators and denote the speaker of the context of utterance, not the *origo*⁵. The only alternative for the speaker is then to adjust pronouns and tenses to the participants in presence, using the *unquotation* device aforementioned. To see how this works, here is first an example of present, first-person speaker FID, given in Maier (to appear):

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⁴ Quotation reports without marks – that is, direct discourse with no shifting of pronouns or tenses – are very common in Woolf’s novels, indicating that the two can co-occur within the same narrative context.

⁵ That indexicals are directly referential – i.e. are rigid designators – was one of Kaplan’s (1989) famous theses about the behaviour of demonstratives in language. Rigid in the Kaplanian-Kripkean sense means that the referent of any rigid expression *e* picks out the same referent in any given possible world. More on this below.
This woman left me a voice mail, asking all kinds of questions about you. How well do I know you? Where have we met? Have I ever noticed anything strange about you?

This is a genuine example of FID in a present/first-person narrative. Doubtlessly, the original sentence produced on the phone by the woman was something close to (15):

(16) “How well do you know her? Where have you met? Have you ever noticed anything strange about her?

In FID, however, the indexical 2-SG and the referential 3-SG-FEM are shifted by the speaker to adapt her reporting frame, answering both the Verbatim and the Attraction constraints. Since in this case, the addressee in the original utterance has now become the speaker, the you is switched into an I, respecting the indexical preference of Attraction; the same applies to the female individual under discussion, who was not a salient entity in the original report, but is now the addressee, thus being referred to with 2-SG.

Let us now consider the more familiar, past tense/third-person narratives, which are most common in novels making use of the FID technique. In these cases, the results of the Attraction constraint are different: since the origo is not present in the context of the report, that is, it cannot be taken to be either the speaker or the addressee, a third-person pronoun has to be used in the report. This is, arguably, what happens for cases such as (1)-(3) and related examples: the speaker, who is some kind of “omniscient” entity (the term being used in a non-technical sense, meaning that the speaker has access to the thoughts of the protagonists), is taken to be reporting the story from a different context, where the speech/thought event is taken to have preceded the report (hence the past tense) and where the origo is not present.

Nevertheless, it seems that these two constraints are too strong. Let us first consider Attraction. Although this device might work for day-to-day utterances, it faces problems when applied to narratives. Consider the following excerpt, from Michel Butor’s Second Thoughts (La Modification):

(17) “Assis, vous étendez vos jambes de part et d’autre de celles de cet intellectuel qui a pris un air soulagé et qui arrête enfin le mouvement de ses doigts, vous déboutonnez votre épais manteau poilu à doublure de soie changeante, vous en écartez les pans, découvrant vos deux genoux dans leurs fourreaux de drap bleu marine, dont le pli, repassé d’hier pourtant, est déjà cassé [...].”

“Now sat, you stretch your legs on both sides of this intellectual who seems now relieved and has finally stopped playing with his fingers, you unbutton your thick hairy coat with a silky underlining, you open the two facets of it, uncovering your two knees in their marine blue sheath, whose fold, although ironed the day before, is already broken [...].”

In this case, what we are presented with are the thoughts of the main protagonist of the story, Léon Delmont, which is being referred to with the 2-SG indexical you. Applying attraction here would amount to say, as Maier (2017:18) says, that the most salient speech act

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6 It is unclear, however, if this is a genuine instance of past tense. Since FID sentences display sequence-of-tense phenomena, it should probably be analyzed on the same basis, that is, with the T head of the FID sentence bearing an uninterpretable past feature ([u\textsc{INF}\textsc{F}PAST] that is valued by the attitude verb contained in the parenthetical. See i.a. Zagona (2014) and Bjorkman (2015) for syntactic implementations of sequence-of-tense phenomena.
participant, the protagonist, attracts the second-person indexical. However, positing an addressee in this case would require a speaker: in our example though, the speaker/narrator is entirely absent from the narrative setting. I conclude that this rather experimental technique of storytelling suggests a different path of analysis, which is self-talk. Thus, in *La modification*, the thoughts of Léon Delmont could be analyzed as a form of free indirect discourse where the *origo* addresses himself: thus, the protagonist referred to with the 2-*pl* politeness indexical form is some kind of “fake addressee”. This is balanced, however, by the fact that Butor uses the French politeness form 2-*pl* *vous* that renders self-talk unlikely and forces the reader to identify another addressee: himself⁷. Maier's *attraction*, however, cannot account for this type of self-talk effects and fails to distinguish genuine from fake speech acts participants, something very common in fiction.

Another problem that faces the *attraction* device is posed by cases of *speaker intrusion* in 3-*rd* person narratives, as illustrated in (18):


“Aurélien couldn't have told if she was blonde or brunette. He hadn't been looking at her carefully. She left a vague and general impression on him, an impression of boredom and annoyance. He even asked himself why. It was disproportionate. Rather short, pale, *I believe*... Had her name been Jeanne or Marie, he wouldn't have given it a second thought. But Bérénice. Funny superstition. This is precisely what irritated him.”

Here we are faced with a clear-cut of *speaker intrusion*: a 1-*sg* appears in the middle of the FID sequence, suggesting that the narrator and the *origo* are actually one and the same. If *attraction* was applying, this wouldn't be possible, since, being the *origo*, the narrator would be forced to use a 1-*sg* uniformly through the report. Yet, this is not what happens. It consequently appears that the FID 3-*sg*-*masc* pronoun has some distinctive interpretive features and cannot just be interpreted as a plain, referential 3-*rd* person pronoun (see below). In the above example, it is clearly used as a perspectival device, denoting a change of point of view from the narrator *qua origo* to the narrator *qua* speaker reporting his own words or thoughts.

Let us now turn to *Verbatim*. First, nothing ensures that the report is made using exactly the same terms as the original thought or utterance – it might well only share some form of resemblance with it. *Verbatim* then, would be too coercive. As pointed out by Eckardt (2012), in many occurrences of FID, strictly *nothing* of the original utterance material is reported as such: everything has to be unquoted, i.e. adapted to the speaker's perspective. Consider the following example from Eckardt (2012:201):

*Gefiel er mir? Würde ich ihn einstellen?*  
'Peter looked at me. He was nervous.  
*Did he please me? Would I hire him?*

⁷ The analysis of self-talk is out of the scope of this article: see Holmberg (2010) for an approach in the light of binding theory.
In (19), the full content of the FID sentences is “unquoted” to fit the speaker’s perspective. The original, unquoted report would likely have the form “Gefall ihr Ich? Wird sie mir einstellen?”. Accordingly, in the first sentence Gefiel er mir?, the verb Gefiel (“please”) has a PAST feature, and the original sie (“her”) has been unquoted into the 1st SG mir (“me”). What remains quoted, then? Perhaps the clause type itself, that is, the question operator. Is it possible, however, to quote something that is not realized morphophonologically? That seems very hard to defend: one cannot just assume that only a “grammatical skeleton” is quoted.

The second problem concerns quoted pronominal forms that nevertheless are interpreted as unquoted. As Reboul & al. (2015) and Delfitto & al. (2016) have pointed out, Maier's approach does not seem to account for the following examples:

(20) I drew out of my pocket the “report” I had signed. So she was living in the square de l’Alboni. I knew that place because I had often got down at the nearest underground station. No problem that the number was missing. With the name: Jacqueline Beausergent, I would manage. (Patrick Modiano, Accident nocturne)

(21) Before he left for the holidays, he [Frédéric] had the idea of a picnic, to close the Saturday meetings. He was cheerful. Mme Arnoux was at her mother’s in Chartres. But he would soon meet her again and would succeed at becoming her lover. (Gustave Flaubert, L’Éducation sentimentale)

In (20), we are faced with a past/first-person narrative: as we saw, it amounts saying that, in that case, the speaker and the origo are one and the same, the speaker reporting his own utterances and thoughts. Since the speaker and the origo here refer to the same individual, the narrator, they are both referred to with an I. The question is: are these two Is referentially similar? As Reboul et al. note, they obviously are not. In (20), the Is occurring in the non-FID sentences refer to Modiano qua speaker, reporting the different actions he then performed, such as drawing the report out of his pocket. But it appears that the Is occurring in the slanted FID sentences do not refer to the speaker, but to Modiano qua origo, the source of the reported thoughts he then had.

The difference is subtle, but extremely important: are the indexical pronouns in these sentences unquoted or quoted? If they were unquoted to fit the perspective of the speaker, who could tell, since in this case the speaker and the origo are extensionally equivalent - they denote the same person? By Attraction, they need to be referred to by using the same indexical 1st SG.

Moreover, what characterizes the slanted indexicals in our example is that they refer to the origo, ascribing to him the property of having a thought of the form “No problem that the number is missing. With the name: Jacqueline Beausergent, I will manage”. As I see it, a mixed quotation/unquotation approach cannot account for the crucial difference introduced here. Even when confronted with FID cases where the speaker

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8  Note that I am not identifying the narrator with the author, which would be a serious mistake (see Recanati 2000 for philosophical arguments, based on previous works on literary fiction by Ducrot (1984)). Likewise, the “narratee” and the reader should be distinguished on the same basis.
and the *origo* refer to the same individual at different points in time, there is nonetheless a crucial difference between them: while the former is merely reporting the speech or thought, the latter is linguistically depicted as *experiencing* it.

The same line of reasoning applies to (21), where the speaker/narrator, this time distinct from the *origo* (Frédéric), uses the same $3^{SG-MASC}$ to refer both to Frédéric as a salient masculine entity in the discourse, and to Frédéric as the experiencer of the thoughts depicted in the FID part, where he expresses the desire of meeting Mme Arnoux again and becoming her lover. The crucial point is that, in the story, *he never does so*: thus the FID sentences depict a thought event the experiencer Frédéric had at a given point in time $t$, but was never realized.

One way to account for these puzzling examples is quite simple: one must postulate that what the FID sentences actually express needs to be evaluated relative to a different context. This has been a cornerstone of some of the most prominent FID analyses up to this day, which are the topic of the next section.

### 2.2. FID as attitude reports involving context shifts

#### 2.2.1. Introducing contexts

A traditional way to analyze indirect discourse statements in semantics, dating back to Hintikka (1969), is to consider them as *attitude reports*, that is to say, describing the content of an utterance $s$ by a speaker $A$, reporting the words or thoughts of some other speaker $B$ (the subject). This is done so by using an attitude verb, i.e. a verb included in the class of the *verba dicendi* (denoting a speech event) or *verba cogitans* (denoting a mental event), such as *say*, *think*, *assert*, *reply*, *communicate*, *tell*, etc. These verbs act as logical operators over the embedded CP they select: they introduce a new set of possible worlds, in which the proposition expressed by the *origo* is evaluated. Thus, when $A$ reports $B$'s thought or words (be it directly or indirectly), the truth or the falsity of the proposition expressed by $B$'s thought or words is not evaluated in the actual world $w$, but in the set of worlds $\{w_1, w_2, w_3, \ldots\}$ (simply noted $w'$) corresponding to $B$'s set of *doxastic alternatives*. $B$’s doxastic alternatives are the set of worlds where the propositions that $B$ holds to be true in $w$ are true.

This applies to any form of speech or thought report, and quite straightforwardly extends to our FID case. However, as Kaplan (1989) showed, if possible worlds are sufficient parameters in order to evaluate the truth or the falsity of a *proposition*, they are not sufficient regarding the evaluation of sentences, that is, propositions realized as speech or thought occurrences. In order to do so, we have to evaluate sentences relative to a context.

The main argument for doing so is provided by the behavior of indexical terms: in the same world $w_1$, the proposition *I am a philosopher* might receive different truth-values depending on who the indexical *I* refers to. If Mary is a philosopher and John is not, the proposition will be true in the first context $c_1$ where Mary utters the sentence and false in the second context $c_2$ (where it is John that utters it), so that

\[
\llbracket I \text{ am a philosopher} \rrbracket^{g, c} = 1 \text{ iff the speaker is a philosopher in } c, 0 \text{ otherwise.}
\]

In the standard notation used here, $g$ refers to the assignment function that maps the content of the bracketed expression (the interpretation function) to the individuals restricted by the function $g$, which here ranges over contexts. Contexts are semantically conceived as indices containing a speaker $s$, an addressee $a$, a world $w$ and a location $l$ (possibly a time variable as well, although we will ignore it in the present study). What is important here is the
fact that, in order to determine the truth-value of an utterance (conceived as a proposition someone thought or uttered), we need to evaluate it respectively to both a world and a context.

2.2.2. Context of thought and context of utterance

Now consider our case in point, free indirect discourse. As we established, one of the characteristic features of FID is the fact that this mode of report gives rise to a feeling of “double-voicing”, since in FID sentences, the narrator seems to adopt the perspective of the origo. In order to account for this fact, Schlenker (2004; 2011), building on previous insights by Edith Doron (1991), proposed that FID sentences need to be evaluated relative to two different contexts: a context of thought \( \theta \), which defines the point where the content of the thought originates, and a context of utterance \( \upsilon \), which is the point where the thought is “articulated” or uttered. Each context comes with its own set of variables: the \( \theta \)-context possesses a time variable \( t_\theta \), a location variable \( l_\theta \), and a world variable \( w_\theta \); the \( \upsilon \)-context possesses a time variable \( t_\upsilon \), a location variable \( l_\upsilon \), a world variable \( w_\upsilon \), a speaker variable \( s_\upsilon \), and an addressee variable \( a_\upsilon \). This allows us to understand why FID displays tenses and pronouns the way it does: these are variables that have been assigned values from different contexts.

In order for this system to work, the lexical entries of tenses and pronouns always come with the two context-sets of variables, in the following fashion (for convenience, I will adopt the Sharvit/Eckardt notation in the remainder of this study, therefore referring to the context of thought \( \theta \) with \( c \), and to the context of utterance \( \upsilon \) with \( C \)):

(22)   She remembered once throwing a shilling into the Serpentine. But everyone remembered; what she loved was this, here, now, in front of her; the fat lady in the cab.

\[ [She]^{g,C,c} = g(i) \text{ iff } g(i) \text{ is a female individual distinct from the speaker in } C \text{ and the addressee in } C; \text{ undefined otherwise} \]

\[ [\text{past}]^{g,C,c} = g(i) \text{ iff } g(i) \text{ is an event that occurred before } t_C, \text{ undefined otherwise.} \]

\[ [\text{Here}]^{g,C,c} = l_c \]

\[ [\text{Now}]^{g,C,c} = t_c \]

These entries stipulate that the assignment function \( g \) will pick up the referents of both the 3\( ^{\text{SG-FEM}} \) and the past tense relative to \( C \), i.e. the context of utterance. Everything else, including the locational and temporal indexicals like here and now, is interpreted relative to \( c \), the context of thought.

Note that, since each context-set of variables \( <c,C> \) contains a world variable \( w \), this variable shifts alongside the others. This means that coherently with our proposal, the FID sentence is compositionally interpreted relative what the agent believes in \( w_c \) – the world of the origo – as any attitude report would\(^9\). The main difference with traditional belief

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\(^9\) I have assumed that communication verbs like say receive the same semantic treatment as cognitive verbs such as think, employing the cover term attitude verbs for both. This is warranted by their syntactic (they all select CPs as complements) as well as their semantic behaviour (they all map propositions to sets of worlds), even though the precise lexical entry for say is slightly different from the one of believe (see Pearson (to appear) for an account of the distinction).
ascriptions generated by standard indirect discourse is that FID reports do not shift locational and temporal indexicals such as here and now.

This is one of the main features of FID, which provides, as Recanati (2000) says, an internal perspective that is gained when the world shift is accompanied by a context shift. The context-shift allows for the location and time variables referred to by here and now to be the ones of \(c\), and not of \(C\).

The alert reader will have noted that so far, our proposal stipulates that every lexical entry have to be generated from the lexicon as carrying two different sets of contextual variables (a point explicitly made in Eckardt 2012). Of course, this leaves unanswered the question as to how the reader is able to interpret these lexical entries relative to one context or another – a point that must be left for the pragmatics to decide\(^{10}\).

How can this proposal handle the cases that were problematic for the quotational approach? Let us consider them in turn. Recall the Modiano example in (18), where the speaker and the origo are actually one and the same. We saw that, although they refer to the same individual, the indexical \(I\) could not be taken to have the same meaning in the non-FID part and within the FID sentence. Now, the context-shift approach answer to this is the following: the second \(I\) is interpreted relative to \(c\), and not to \(C\). This seems highly plausible, since we saw that, in \(c\), Modiano-qua-origo thinks he will manage to find Jacqueline Beaussergent with her name only. The crucial point is that, within the narration context \(C\), he does not find her. Consequently, the proposition I will manage to find Jacqueline Beaussergent, which corresponds to our FID sentence, is evaluated as true in \(w_c\), but as false in \(w_C\), the context in which the non-FID, speaker-oriented sentence is evaluated. The same is true for our Flaubertian example in (19): here, the first \(he\) refers to Frédéric as described by the speaker, a supposedly distant narrator, and the second \(he\) refers to Frédéric as the experiencer of a first-person thought, occurring in \(w_c\).

This is however a problem, since we stipulated in our lexical entries for both pronouns and tenses that they will be evaluated relative to \(C\), the context of utterance, and not relative to our thought/FID context \(c\). This is coherent with the Schlenkerian system, but fails to handle the cases discussed by Reboul & al.

But there is another problem. As Doron (1991) first noted, it is not always the case that pronouns get interpreted in the context of utterance. Sometimes, on the contrary, they reflect the origo's beliefs about the referents. This can be pointed out in gender identification error scenarios, such as the following (recast many times in the literature, notably in Schlenker 2004 and in Reboul 2017):

\[(\text{Context: Mary wrongly believed that Robin was male. In fact, Robin was a woman})\]

\[(23)\] Where was \(he\) this morning, for instance? (Mary wondered)

Obviously, the pronoun \(he\) in (23) is read de dicto, from the origo's perspective and thus, according to the present line of analysis, interpreted in \(c\). But it seems now we are facing a contradiction: since our lexical entry for pronoun (as well as tenses) stipulates that the assignment function will apply relative to \(C\), and not to \(c\), the pronoun should be interpreted in \(C\), thus yielding the speaker's perspective on Robin's gender. But very intuitively, it does not. How can our context-shifting hypothesis can account for this fact?

There is a simple proposal that was first sketched in Delfitto & al. (2016), but not pursued further to my knowledge: to assume a feature-decomposition account of pronouns.

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\(^{10}\) See Eckardt (2012), chapter 3, for a proposal in terms of “story update”, in which the reader updates her stalnakerian “common ground” with the information provided during the story, conceived as a restriction over a set of possible worlds from an initial state \(\text{STORY}_0\).
This approach amounts to analyzing pronouns as the morphosyntactic realization of a set of grammatical features, called φ-features, which are central to the interpretive component of grammar. Pronouns, on this view, are carriers of the PERSON, GENDER, NUMBER and CASE features. I assume that they are all realized on the pronoun itself, leaving aside the precise syntactic implementation of features.

Now, it is possible to define the lexical entry and its interpretation function for each feature, just as we did with pronouns above. We thus obtain the following (leaving aside the case feature):

**Number**

\[ \text{SG}_{i}^{g,C,c} = g(i) \text{ iff } g(i) \text{ is a singular entity in } c; \text{ undefined otherwise.} \]

\[ \text{PL}_{i}^{g,C,c} = g(i) \text{ iff } g(i) \text{ is a plural entity in } c; \text{ undefined otherwise.} \]

**Gender**

\[ \text{FEM}_{i}^{g,C,c} = g(i) \text{ iff } g(i) \text{ is a female individual in } c; \text{ undefined otherwise.} \]

\[ \text{MASC}_{i}^{g,C,c} = g(i) \text{ iff } g(i) \text{ is a male individual in } c; \text{ undefined otherwise.} \]

**Person**

\[ \text{[1]}^{g,C,c} = g(i) \text{ iff } g(i) \text{ is the speaker in } C; \text{ undefined otherwise.} \]

\[ \text{[2]}^{g,C,c} = g(i) \text{ iff } g(i) \text{ is the addressee in } C; \text{ undefined otherwise.} \]

\[ \text{[3]}^{g,C,c} = g(i) \]

We see that, contrary to the GENDER and NUMBER features, the [1] and [2] PERSON features are resolved within C. There is a principled reason for this: in English, *I* and *you*, as well as *we* (inclusive plural), are rigid indexicals that cannot be interpreted in the context of the embedded clause: they must refer to the speaker and the addressee of C, respectively. If they weren't, that is, if they instead referred to the speaker and the addressee of c, then FID would simply amount to quotation without marking, something we denied above on an empirical basis. But what about the [3-PERSON] feature, then? Note that the assignment function provides no restriction whatsoever about what referent it could actually pick up in the discourse. This is fundamentally different from what happens with [1-PERSON] and [2-PERSON], respectively: here, the feature triggers a presupposition that it has to target the speaker in the first case, and the addressee in the second case. This is Cooper's (1983) classic treatment of gender features, extended here to person features (see also Heim (2008) for a similar account). But the [3-PERSON] is left completely undefined, and thus encodes no presupposition. It gets the right reference by a pragmatic mechanism intertwined with the semantic component, called maximize presupposition (see Sauerland 2003; 2008):

MAXIMIZE PRESUPPOSITION: Presuppose as much as possible in your contribution to the conversation.

When MP applies to [3-PERSON], it forces the assignment function to pick up a referent that is not a participant in the present discourse context, C. Otherwise, [1-PERSON] or [2-PERSON] would have been used. This is very similar to Maier’s attraction principle, but explicitly triggered by the φ-feature PERSON. Consequently, the [3-PERSON] can then either be attributed a de re interpretation (in the case the referent is distinct from the speaker), or either a de se interpretation, when the referent conflates with the speaker in c. Which reading is chosen is left to the pragmatics of narration. A choice is possible given the flexibility of the assignment function on [3-PERSON].
2.3. Indexical shift

We saw that, in FID, the indexicals here and now shift from C to c. But it is not the case that every indexical can undergo shifting. Notably, we saw that if the lexical entries for here and now in our system refer to c, this doesn't apply across the board to every indexical item: I, for instance, needs to pick up the speaker in C as its referent – even if it appears within the FID sentence. In other words, using the first-person indexical, the speaker and the origo must always be extensionally equivalent. It thus seems that the indexical I is considerably more rigid than the other indexicals, which Recanati (2000) calls orientational indexicals, and which take as referents the temporal and spatial coordinates of the origo. We must now ask the following question: are some indexicals more rigid than others, in Kaplan’s sense? More precisely, the question is the following: are all indexicals insensitive to context-shift to the same extent? Is there anything we could learn from the behavior of these expressions when embedded in a FID clause?

We already saw that it is probably not the case that every indexical expression is rigid in the same sense. The behavior of here and now in (18) is a first piece of evidence for this claim. Of course, we can find more occurrences throughout literary samples:

(24) He looked always as if he were on duty, thought Peter, a privileged, but secretive being, hoarding secrets which he would die to defend, though it was only some little piece of tittle-tattle dropped by a court footman, which would be in all the papers tomorrow. (Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway)

(25) There was a puppy. They had a puppy. Who was looking after the puppy today? (Woolf, To the lighthouse)

(26) Something, she meant, is immune from change, and shines out (she glanced at the window with its ripple of reflected lights) in the face of the flowing, the fleeting, the spectral, like a ruby; so that again tonight she had the feeling she had had once today, already, of peace, of rest. (Ibid.)

In the above examples, the temporal indexicals tomorrow, today, and tonight all refer to some point in time surrounding the moment of the thought or utterance in c, and it seems impossible for them to be interpreted in the speaker’s context C. Perhaps this sensitivity to context-shift is due to the fact that the range of potential referents assigned to them by our function g is broader than the ones for items such as I or you. This seems plausible, since after all, tomorrow can refer to any point in time which occurs after the day of utterance, and today and tonight to any point in time comprised in the interval between “day” and “night”.

Moreover, this behavior of locational and temporal indexicals seem not to be restricted to their uses in FID, as this famous example by Predelli (1998) shows:

(27) I am not here now (on a recording machine).

What about other indexicals, such as I and you? It seems that, at least in English, these are perfectly rigid: no matter what, they need to refer to the speaker in C. We saw that they can occasionally refer to the speaker-origo of c in certain FID cases, but only if the two are actually extensionally the same – that is, if they refer to the same individual in the same world, but in different contexts (and times). This is what allowed Kaplan to make his famous statement about the impossibility for indexicals to be bound by a context-shifting operator: an indexical indulging in binding would irremediably be deemed to be a “monster”, an expression not pertaining to natural languages. This empirical claim has since been
challenged by a growing body of studies about alleged cases of “monstrous shift”. We now present two cases of indexical use that patterns the behavior context-sensitive expressions display in FID sentences: “fake” or bound indexicals, and shifty indexicals.

2.3.1. Fake indexicality

It is standard to assume that regular 3rd person pronouns can either be interpreted referentially, when referring to another R-expression provided by the salient context of utterance, as in (28), or bound, as in (29):

(28) (Talking about John) I saw him.
(29) I saw John, but he didn't see me.

On readings such as (28), the pronoun he is interpreted as bound by a lambda-abstractor that turns the pronoun he into a variable that can be co-indexed with John. But, as it has been noted by Partee (1989), Heim (1994) and Kratzer (1998) (a.o.), it appears that such a reading is available for 1st and 2nd person indexicals as well, as in (30)-(32):

(30) I am the only one around here who can take care of my children.
(31) Only I got a question that I understood.
(32) Only you eat what you cook.

On bound variable readings, examples such as these yield a “nobody else” reading, such as “Nobody else can take care of their children”.

We have the following lexical entries for the three occurrences of pronouns in (30)-(32) (Kratzer 2009):

\[
\begin{align*}
\llbracket he \rrbracket^{cc} &= g_i \text{ if } g_i \text{ is a single male, undefined otherwise} \\
\llbracket I \rrbracket^{cc} &= \text{the speaker in } c \text{ (indexical reading)} \\
\llbracket I \rrbracket^{cc} &= g_i \text{ if } g_i \text{ is the speaker in } c, \text{ undefined otherwise (bound reading)}
\end{align*}
\]

This is unproblematic for the 3-SG he: if the salient context provides a viable referent for variable i (a single male), then he will pick out this particular individual as a referent. This will yield the referential reading. If the context does not provide such a referent, the variable will be assigned by the assignment function g to the closest c-commanding antecedent, which has the features [+SINGLE, +MALE]. This is the bound reading. However, this second reading will not be available for indexicals such as I: in these cases, a contextually salient referent will always be available, since g_i has to be assigned to the speaker. But, contrary to fact, the bound readings in (29)-(31) seem not to be interpreted indexically: on the contrary, they are genuinely bound. Kratzer (2009) explains this data by postulating that these pronouns are not genuine, but rather what she calls minimal or zero pronouns, born with an incomplete set of phi-features in the syntax and consequently, not interpreted at LF. Another account is proposed by von Stechow (2002) and Sharvit (2008), who propose that the binding operation deletes the feature on the bound pronouns, a process called feature deletion under agreement. See also Wiltschko (2016) for other “fake forms” that may have the same origin.

While it is still not clear what exactly causes this phenomenon, and what kind of account is needed for the behavior of morphosyntactic features in those cases, it seems that we are here presented with a genuine counterexample to the prohibition against shifting.
2.3.2. Amharic & Co. shifty indexicals

The second major problem for Kaplan's theory of indexicals comes from the following data. Several languages, among which Amharic (Schlenker 2003), Engenni, Aghem, Zazaki & Slave (Anand & Nevins 2004), Nez Perce (Deal 2013; 2017a; 2017b) and Uyghur (Sudo 2012) display what has been called indexical shifting, a most intriguing phenomenon illustrated in (33) with an example from Amharic (from Schlenker 2003):

(33) jon jagna na--n--n yil-all
    John hero I-am says-3.sg.m
    “John says that he is a hero”

Literally, (31) means that John, the origo of the report, thinks that he is a hero: the speaker of the matrix clause is merely reporting his statement. In other words, the embedded indexical refers not to the speaker, but to the origo. By contrast, the same sentence is wildly ungrammatical in English:

(34) * John; says that I, am a hero.

In Amharic, the two readings are available; that is, I can refer either to the speaker or to the origo. As Anand & Nevins (2004) point out for the Zazaki and Slave data, the indexical shift occurs when a 1st or 2nd person pronoun is bound by an operator in the matrix clause. They list different kind of operators that trigger different shifts, but always obey the two following constraints:

SHIFT-TOGETHER: The indexicals in Zazaki & Slave show shifting under certain modal verbs, but cannot shift independently.

WITHIN-LANGUAGE VARIATION IN INDEXICAL SHIFTING: In Slave, the same indexical shifts obligatorily, optionally, or not at all, depending on the modal verb it is under.

The shift-together constraint stipulates that, if a shift occurs in a given context, then every indexical that falls under the scope of the same operator has to shift alongside it. The Within-language variation stipulates that different attitude verbs license different types of shift on the indexicals they bind (cf. also Deal 2017a; 2017b. for an extension of this proposal to Nez Perce).

The shift-together rule is of high interest for our FID case, since it has been claimed that FID context-shifts obey the same constraint. Eckardt (2012:44) states it as follows: “Moreover, we predict that all shiftable indexicals will always shift together, and refer to the same internal context of speech or thought. They will all share the same shifted speaker, the same shifted now, the same shifted world, the same shifted addressee etc.” This is fully coherent with our proposal: the double context theory predicts that all shiftable indexicals (leaving aside the issue if the 1SG pronoun I is effectively part of that set) will shift within the FID clause and get interpreted relative to c, and not to C.

In sum, not every type of indexical can be shifted in FID: while it is very common to find examples of shifty locative and temporal indexicals, it does not seem to be possible to come up with an example displaying a genuine first person shift, apparently for the reasons sketched above. However, a related type of shift might be at stake in the Reboul cases
discussed above, where it could be argued that it is actually a different temporal “self” of the speaker that is actually referred to.\footnote{Gruber (2012) develops an argument in a similar fashion: based on Blackfoot and Dutch data, she indeed argues that the morphosyntactic structure of indexical pronouns contain functional projections that encode the spatial and temporal coordinates of the speech event. Whether or not this line of reasoning could be applied to the present work is left for future research.}

Concerning the shift-together constraint, one more interesting thing shall be noted. Deal (2017b) notes that, across the languages that display indexical shift, a generalization can be proposed: languages that display locative and temporal shift will always display first and second person shift, suggesting that a hierarchy can be established across shifty items: 1st<2nd<temporal<locative. Surprisingly, we observe the mirrored hierarchy for FID indexicals. The reasons for that are still unclear, and since FID has only been observed in languages that possess a literary tradition, it could very well be a parametric variation, as suggested by Anand & Nevins (2004) in order to account for cross-linguistic variation regarding to shifting phenomena. The answer could also lie in what FID is used for: as we suggested above, leaving all indexicals unshifted would amount to quotation, something the narrator obviously doesn’t want to achieve. We saw that an author such as V. Woolf purposely uses both techniques in her novels, thus blurring the frontiers between the two contexts. Contrary to everyday communication, where the speaker wants to achieve maximum clarity in conveying her message, the narrator has a different purpose entirely: her aim is to create an affective response from the reader, a purpose well served by the referential ambiguities that arise in FID.

CONCLUSION

In this article, I argued for the binary context hypothesis regarding free indirect discourse, according to which FID sentences are to be evaluated relative to two contexts. The first is the context of utterance $C$, which correspond to the speaker's/narrator's, in which the person features of pronouns (as well as tenses) are to be interpreted. The second is the context of thought $c$, the context of the origo or character of the fictional context, in which everything else is interpreted. This gives rise to the famous “dual voiced” effect that characterizes FID as a narrative form of attitude reports. The split of $\phi$-features regarding interpretation is a consequence of the rigid indexicality of first- and second-person features in English, and the relatively undefined character of third-person features. 3-PERSON, when interpreted using the “maximize presupposition” principle, allows us to identify who the speaker in $c$ is, hereby designating FID as a fine-grained interface phenomenon between semantics and the pragmatics of narratives.

Moreover, I showed that, although it seems both simpler and intuitive, the quotation/unquotation approach to FID faces a number of problems that its proponents still have to address, problems that the dual context approach can handle quite effortlessly – although at the price of abandoning Kaplanian orthodoxy about contexts in natural language. Fake indexicals, as well as indexical shift, are two natural language phenomena that suggest this line of inquiry might very well be on the right track.

REFERENCES


