World-Weariness and Augustine’s Eschatological Ordering of Emotions in enarratio in Psalmum 36

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Abstract

Augustine’s homiletical exhortations display a strong eschatological emphasis in his approach to cultivating rightly ordered emotions. According to critics such as Hannah Arendt, Martha Nussbaum, and Thomas Dixon, this orientation risks denigrating the earthly life and its attendant emotions, promoting a crippling resignation to suffering. This paper discusses Augustine’s eschatological frame for ordering the emotions through a focused treatment of en. Ps. 36 (particularly the first homily) in conversation with Nussbaum’s critique in particular. In en. Ps. 36.1, Augustine deploys eschatological rhetoric to discourage the believer’s envious response to a prosperous, profligate neighbor. This entails disposing the believer in weariness toward life’s temporal disparities and exhorting the believer to work in love to alleviate suffering with a view to heavenly flourishing. In this sense, a disposition of “world-weariness” works in concert with eschatological hope to rightly order emotion and action in the earthly life.

Reference


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Augustine views the virtuous life as a rightly ordered one, which includes the ordering of emotions. Most of the scholarship on emotions in Augustine’s thought focuses (for good reason) on books nine and fourteen of *De ciuitate dei* (*ciu.*.) or the emotional upheavals of *Confessiones* (*conf.*).\(^1\) Looking beyond these foundational texts to Augustine’s treatment of emotion in *Enarrationes in Psalmos* (*en. Ps.*.) amplifies our understanding of this aspect of his thought through the affective “therapy” his homilies offer.\(^2\) In this paper, I examine how Augustine’s

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\(^1\) With the notable exception of Paul R. Kolbet, *Augustine and the Cure of Souls: Revising a Classical Ideal* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010), which focuses on Augustine’s “Christianizing” of the classical traditions of psychagogy as evident specifically in his homiletic practice.


See also note 41 for the scholarship on Augustine and Stoicism.

eschatological vision frames his view of the virtuous emotional life through a focused discussion of *en. Ps. 36*, particularly the first homily.³ Throughout *en. Ps.*, Augustine exhorts his readers to cultivate an attitude toward this world coloured by world-weariness and longing for eschatological fulfilment. *En. Ps. 36* provides an illustrative window onto Augustine’s eschatological frame for ordering emotions in a particular instance that recurs a number of times in *en. Ps.*: the envious, indignant response to a prosperous, profligate neighbor.

The envious indignation over the wicked, prospering neighbor is an illness that the Psalm may cure: do not secretly envy the wicked, for they are like the grass that thrives in winter but will wither in the summer of judgment day. Augustine likens believers to trees, whose root of charity holds them through winter that they may blossom in summer.⁴ Augustine urges his reader to let the Psalm soothe the envy that temporal disparity may elicit by turning their gaze in the right direction to the future in store.⁵ The anticipated future abundance must lead one to turn from evil and to do good by caring for the needy, loving the enemy, and sharing the true riches of the generous will.

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⁴ *en. Ps. 36.1.3* (CCL 38: 340, trans. Boulding, WSA, *Expositions of the Psalms* 33-50, III/16, 94): ‘modo ergo tempus est hiemis, gloria tua nondum apparet; sed si alta radix est caritatis tuae, sicut multarum arborum per hiemem, transit frigus, ueniet aestas, id est iudicii dies; tunc arescet uior fenæ, tunc apparebit arborum gloria.’

⁵ *en. Ps. 36.3.15* (CCL 38: 379).
This sermon is representative of Augustine’s preaching on how believers should reorient their emotional response to disparity. By placing this text in conjunction with well known passages from *ciu.* on ordering emotions, we may see how Augustine strives to reform his hearers’ emotional responses to profligate wealth in particular. Charity, not anger, must drive the outward movement in action, while eschatological hope in the midst of life’s trials directs virtuous emotion. In this sense, a disposition of world-weariness works in concert with eschatological hope to shape the affective life.

I use the term world-weariness to characterize a cluster of features typical of Augustine’s eschatologically oriented view of earthly life: the need to endure the toils of earthly life, its suffering and exhaustion, to resist its spiritual dangers and temptations, and to moderate responses to both its pleasures and its torments. Precisely this cluster of features has led many readers of Augustine to posit a deep, world-denying pessimism in his thought. For this reason it

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6 See *en. Ps.* 33.2.14-17, 25; 37.25; 39.28; 83.17; 91.7-14; 124.1-3, 8-10; 127.15-16 for similar discussions of envy and doubt prompted by the temporal dispensation of gifts to the just and the unjust alike. These are consistently accompanied by discussions of judgment and/or the anticipation of life in the heavenly homeland. See also *en. Ps.* 43.17; 48.2.3; 51.12; and 53.2-3, 9 for other images of the “root of charity” contrasted to the grass that flourishes in winter but withers in summer.

This group of texts on envying the evildoer is found within the pervasive and eschatological treatment of wealth and poverty in *en. Ps.* I chose to focus on this instance because the “therapeutic” approach to ordering emotions through eschatological exhortation is particularly clear.


8 *en. Ps.* 36.1.2 (CCL 38: 338-339); 36.1.8 (CCL 38: 342-343).

9 *en. Ps.* 36.1.6 (CCL 38: 341-342); 36.1.9-10 (CCL 38: 343-345).

10 *en. Ps.* 36.1.3 (CCL 38: 339-340); 36.1.9 (CCL 38: 343-344).

11 *en. Ps.* 36.1.5 (CCL 38: 341).


13 For example, Hannah Arendt, Martha Nussbaum, and Thomas Dixon; see below, pp. 9-13.
has also drawn a great deal of criticism to Augustine’s eschatological frame as particularly problematic for ethics. It seems to denigrate the present life (“Do not fix your gaze on things that belong to the present world (noli ad praesentia adtendere)”\textsuperscript{14}) and to undermine or instrumentalize human beings (the sinner is “straw [that] is burnt so that the gold may be refined”\textsuperscript{15}). This orientation risks denigrating the earthly life and its attendant emotions, promoting a kind of crippling resignation to suffering.

World-weariness, as I have characterized it, is a prominent feature of Augustine’s eschatological perspective that speaks directly to its affective impact. A rightly ordered eschatological orientation is integral to Christian righteousness and action.\textsuperscript{16} The eschatologically ordered emotive life should not gloss over earthly suffering or stoically mute emotional responses to suffering,\textsuperscript{17} and it should not curb the bitterness of suffering by falsely soothing it.\textsuperscript{18} Augustine directly condemns the idea that it is more virtuous to be emotionally unperturbed by suffering, for this would imply being unmoved by love and virtue \textit{consists in} the movement of love: being moved and moving rightly, by love.\textsuperscript{19} In this life, that movement of

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\item \textsuperscript{14} \textit{en. Ps.} 36.3.15 (CCL 38: 379, trans. Boulding, WSA, \textit{Expositions of the Psalms} 33-50, III/16, 141): ‘noli ad praesentia adtendere.’
\item \textsuperscript{15} \textit{en. Ps.} 36.1.11 (CCL 38: 345, trans. Boulding, WSA, \textit{Expositions of the Psalms} 33-50, III/16, 100): ‘ardet palea, ut aurum purgetur.’
\item \textsuperscript{16} As Augustine asks in \textit{en. Ps.} 121.1, ‘sed uis nosse qualis amor sit? uide quo ducat.’ (CCL 40: 1801). On this front, note that Augustine’s lengthy discussion of emotions, will, and sin in \textit{ciu.} 14 concludes with the affirmation that the two cities are created by two kinds of love: ‘fecerunt itaque ciuitates duas amores duo, terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad contemptum dei, caelestem uero amor dei usque ad contemptum sui.’ \textit{ciu.} 14.28 (CCL 48: 451). Directly following, at the beginning of \textit{ciu.} 15, Augustine spells out the eschatological implications of this differentiation: ‘quas etiam mystice appellantus ciuitates duas, hoc est duas societates hominum, quorum est una quae praeestinata est in aeternum regnare cum deo, altera aeternum supplicium subire cum diabolic. sed iste finis est earum, de quo post loquendum est.’ \textit{ciu.} 15.1 (CCL 48: 453) ‘superna est enim sanctorum ciuitas, quamuis hic pariat ciues, in quibus peregrinatur, donec regni eius tempus adueniat, cum congregatura est omnes in suis corporibus resurgentes, quando eis promissum dabitur regnum, ubi cum suo principe rege saeculorum sine ullo temporis fine regnabunt.’ \textit{ciu.} 15.1 (CCL 48: 454)
\item \textsuperscript{17} See note 41 below regarding Augustine’s critique of the Stoic view of emotion in \textit{ciu.} 14.9.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Following Christ’s path entails suffering (see for example \textit{en. Ps.} 36.2.16 (CCL 38: 358)). Furthermore, this suffering may serve a pedagogical purpose, see for example \textit{en. Ps.} 60.3 (CCL 39: 766); \textit{en. Ps.} 36.1.1 (CCL 38: 337); and \textit{en. Ps.} 40.5 (CCL 38: 453). See also the discussion below, pages 20-25.
\item \textsuperscript{19} \textit{ciu.} 15.22 (CCL 48: 488): ‘unde mihi uidetur, quod definitio breuis et uera uirtutis ordo est amoris.’ See also \textit{en. Ps.} 31.2.3 (CCL 38: 228): ‘itaque si fides sine dilectione sit, sine opere erit. ne autem multa cogites de opere fidei,
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love is also wearying – wearying because one must journey arduously to its fulfilment,  
wearying because loving on earth exposes human beings to loss and suffering and grief,  
wearying because loving in this life is a constant struggle to align one’s will, love, and emotions to the source of love and life itself. But on the other side of weariness lies abundance, both heavenly and earthly, in love. Rightly ordered weariness and lament are necessary components of a virtuously perceptive – and therefore loving – response to the world.  

While a disordered world-weariness poses very real dangers (as we shall see in the text at hand), world-weariness itself is not a symptom of disorder. It cannot therefore be excised as a solution to a disordered affective life. Augustine’s eschatological orientation, including its characteristic world-weariness, is integral to the virtuous ordering of earthly emotions. Augustine uses the same eschatological rhetoric to dispose one in weariness toward life’s suffering as to exhort one to work in love to alleviate suffering. En. Ps. 36 illustrates the power of Augustine’s eschatological framework for the affective life and demonstrates elements both troubling and resourceful for ordering emotions.

adde illi spem et dilectionem, et noli cogitare quid opereris. ipsa dilectio uacare non potest. quid enim de quouquam homine etiam male operatur, nisi amor?  
20 The movement of love finds its rest in that “heavenly country” from which “we are at the moment exiles” the resurrected are “joined together in the highest concord and friendship, fused indeed into one will by a kind of spiritual fire of charity” trin. 3.9 (CCL 50: 135, trans. Hill, WSA, I/5, The Trinity, 132): ’sed hoc quia nondum est - oportet enim nos in hac peregrinatione prius mortaliter exerceri et per uires mansuetudinis et patientiae in flagellis erudiri -, illam ipsum supernam atque caelestem unde peregrinamur patriam cogitemus. illic enim dei voluntas qui facit angelos suos spiritus et ministros suos ignem ardentem, in spiritibus summa pace atque amicitia copulatis et in unam voluntatem quodam spiritali caritatis igne conflatis tamquam in excelsa et sancta et secreta sede praesidens uelut in domo sua et in templo suo.’ One runs toward God by the “two feet” of charity, the paired commandments of love of God and neighbor, see en. Ps. 33.2.10 (CCL 38: 289). But this journey is arduous; see for example en. Ps. 49.22 (CCL 38: 592).  
21 As evident in Augustine’s account of love and loss in conf.: the death of the unnamed friend, conf. 4.7-12 (CCL 27:43-46); the separation from his partner and the mother of his son, conf. 6.25 (CCL 27:90); the death of Monica, conf. 9.27-37 (CCL 27:148-154). As Wetzel writes, “A soul that loves nothing is beyond loss, but also beyond love.” Wetzel, “Augustine,” 359.  
22 “Good love, an expression of delight in the good, and good will, a resolve to work goodness, are naturally one only in God. For human beings, it takes a labor of love to bring together the two, whose usual separation feels like a split in will: wanting the good and not wanting it.” Wetzel, “Augustine,” 351.  
23 See my discussion in the final section of the paper “Heavenly Bliss, Earthly Charity” below, pages 25-28.  
24 cit. 14.7-9 (CCL 48: 421-430); en. Ps. 54.3 (CCL 39: 656-657).
Augustine and the Ethics of Emotions

The discussion of emotions in Augustine’s thought presents a challenge since he uses a wide range of terms, none of which are directly equivalent to the contemporary term. Augustine distinguishes between passions and affections, albeit in characteristically unsystematic fashion. He generally follows the classification of affections as higher, intellective, and voluntary movements by contrast to the passions as lower, appetitive, and involuntary movements of the soul. But he makes a point of troubling the way these distinctions function in the philosophical traditions he discusses by claiming that both body and mind may be sources of vicious emotional disturbances, an argument he elaborates at some length. The governing principle of the emotional life is not that the affections rule the passions but that will directs all emotions. When will is rightly or wrongly directed, emotions follow. Augustine tightly links emotions to will.

Will “is engaged in all [emotions]; in fact they are all essentially acts of will (uoluntates).” He also links will with love (amor) on the same principle of direction: “And so a rightly directed will is love in a good sense and perverted will is love in a bad sense [...] Consequently, these feelings are bad, if the love is bad, and good if the love is good.”

As Anastasia Scrutton writes, “Passiones, motus, motus animae, passiones animae, affectus, affectiones, libidines, perturbationes and libido are all Latin terms now generally translated ‘emotions’ or ‘feelings’ – translations which can negate the original implications of each term.” Scrutton, “Im/passibility,” 170. In Passions, Dixon resists the “over-inclusivity” of the “emotions” category in order to retrieve a more differentiated typology. Dixon, Passions, 2. I do not object to using the term “emotion” in relation to Augustine, since he himself does not maintain a precise typology.

Love (amor) is included among emotions but also transcends them. Amor is a motus in the general sense of the term and so assimilates motions like fear and desire (ciu. 14.7). It is also distinct from other emotions because it orders the affectiones in conjunction with will (ciu. 14.7, 9). So amor both is and is not an “emotion.”
determines the goodness of emotions.\footnote{When one’s “love (amor) is right, all these feelings (affectiones) are right in them.” \textit{ciu.} 14.9 (CCL 48: 426, trans. Bettenson, \textit{City of God}, 561): ‘et quia rectus est amor eorum, istas omnes affectiones rectas habent.’} His insistence on this point demonstrates that the “controlling” element in the emotional life is will.\footnote{Dixon and Scrutton both claim that despite this argument, in practice Augustine largely (or even entirely) supports the view of rational, virtuous affections governing unruly, vicious passions. See Dixon, \textit{Passions}, 50; Scrutton, “Im/passibility,” 171-2. Both of these accounts fail to take seriously Augustine’s insistence that will determines the moral quality of the whole emotional range, an insistence that coheres with his frequent discussion of the ordering of loves to God as the primary consideration for their goodness. Dixon and Scrutton both inaccurately re-impose the ancient distinctions onto Augustine’s thought.}

As Augustine details in \textit{conf.}, will, love, and emotions are not necessarily aligned – nor is will necessarily united itself. According to James Wetzel, Augustine’s apparent conflation of will (\textit{voluntas}) with love (\textit{amor}) reflects the reality of grace: “[g]ood love, an expression of delight in the good, and good will, a resolve to work goodness, are naturally one only in God.”\footnote{James Wetzel, “Augustine,” in the \textit{Oxford Handbook of Religion and Emotion}, ed. John Corrigan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 351.} For human beings, aligning will and love (and other emotions) is “a labor of love,” for under sin, human beings often experience their division – and only by grace may they work to unite them.\footnote{Ibid., 351.} Augustine’s description of a seamless alignment between will, love, and emotion depicts the \textit{graced} inner life, a harmonious order sought but never fully achieved in this life.

The need to order emotions does not reflect a negative judgment on the strength of what we might call “feeling.” Augustine approves quite ardent and varied states of feeling insofar as they are rightly directed, that is, under the command of reason and will and “turned into the instruments of justice.”\footnote{\textit{ciu.} 9.5 (CCL 47: 254, trans. Bettenson, \textit{City of God}, 349): ‘deo quippe illa ipsam mentem subicit regendam et iuuandam mentique passiones ita moderandas atque frenandas, ut in usum iustitiae conviertantur.’} In \textit{en. Ps.}, for example, he describes believers blazing with love\footnote{\textit{en. Ps.} 7.14 (CCL 38: 45-46).}; groaning, yearning, and longing\footnote{\textit{en. Ps.} 26.2.23 (CCL 38: 167).}; bemoaning and rejoicing\footnote{\textit{en. Ps.} 31.2.1 (CCL 38: 224-225).}; feeling anger and distress.\footnote{\textit{en. Ps.} 33.2.19 (CCL 38: 294-295).}
Anger, grief, and fear are all possibly legitimate and appropriate earthly emotions, though unlike love and joy, they will not be part of the heavenly life.\textsuperscript{40}

Righteous persons must seek not to eradicate their emotions – as Augustine argues against the Stoics\textsuperscript{41} – but to direct them rightly. If virtue is rightly ordered love,\textsuperscript{42} and the ordering of love involves the ordering of emotions, then the believer must be concerned with the emotional life that a person of good faith ought to have. The human emotional life on earth will be characterized by inevitable loss, occasioning emotions that will not be present in heaven like grief and fear. It will also be characterized by inevitable \textit{perturbationes}, making the struggle to unite will, love, and motions (both inner and outer) ongoing.\textsuperscript{43} Augustine’s use of the term \textit{perturbationes} for both inner and outer movements reveals the continuity he sees between the corporeal and incorporeal human self, and thus between emotions and ethics.

Virtuous emotions are guided by the same aim that guides the virtuous life generally: the desire for the life of felicity.\textsuperscript{44} As Augustine details in \textit{De trinitate (trin.)}, rightly and truly desiring the life of felicity means desiring eternal life with God.\textsuperscript{45} A misperception of felicity will result in correspondingly misdirected will and attendant emotions. Rightly perceiving the goal of life and learning to respond accordingly are central to the Christian moral life in Augustine’s thought. Robert C. Roberts calls this “attunement to reality” and claims that it “must

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\textsuperscript{40} \textit{ciu.} 14.9 (CCL 48: 427-428): ‘proinde, quod fatendum est, etiam cum rectas et secundum deum habemus has affectiones, huius uitae sunt, non illius, quam futuram speramus, et saepe illis etiam inuiti cedimus.’
\textsuperscript{42} \textit{ciu.} 15.22 (CCL 48: 488): ‘unde mihi uidetur, quod definitio breuis et uera uirtutis ordo est amoris.’
\textsuperscript{43} \textit{ciu.} 14.9 (CCL 48: 425-430).
\textsuperscript{44} \textit{ciu.} 14.9 (CCL 48: 429): ‘quae cum ita sint, quoniam recta uita ducenda est, qua perueniendum sit ad beatam, omnes affectus istos uita recta rectos habet, peruersa peruersos.’
\textsuperscript{45} \textit{trin.} 13.10-12 (CCL 50A: 394-399).
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be to a large extent a matter of the emotional formation of our hearts. Attunement might be another way of describing what Augustine calls ordering.

Attunement to a certain view of reality results in a certain identity: for Augustine, that of a pilgrim. The Christian moral life is a pilgrimage undertaken under the instruction of the Holy Spirit, who not only teaches pilgrims to sigh and groan for heaven but also teaches them to see that they are in fact pilgrims. This God-given identity is the foundation for virtuous emotional ordering; when Augustine talks about those whose emotions are rightly ordered in *ciu*. 14.9, he describes them as “the citizens of the Holy City of God, as they live [following God] in the pilgrimage of this present life.” The affective life of these citizens on earth is defined by pervasive longing for their true home in heaven. Like much of Augustine’s writing, his call to cultivate the pilgrim’s disposition of world-weariness pervades *en. Ps.* 36.

A number of critics posit that Augustine’s anxiety over love’s disorder results in a devaluation of created realities. A number of Augustinian scholars have countered that Augustine’s order of love in fact upholds the rightful place of created objects of love. Debates

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47 *See Io. eu. tr. 6.2* (CCL 36: 53-4): ‘nec parua res est, quod nos docet spiritus sanctus gemere: insinuat enim nobis quia peregrinamur, et docet nos in patrimum suspire, et ipso desiderio gemimus...et quamdiu propter hoc gemit, bene gemit; spiritus illum docuit gemere, a columba didicit gemere...qui columbae? qui ea quae Christi sunt quaeunt.’
about Augustine’s order of love implicate his view of emotions, since the right ordering of emotions is tied to the right ordering of love. A prominent concern about Augustine’s order of love regards its eschatological nature. This is borne out in criticisms of his view of emotions.

Thomas Dixon and Martha Nussbaum both offer critiques of Augustine’s understanding of emotions on eschatological grounds. Dixon argues that Augustine’s order of love rigidly unifies will and dries up earthly affection: “The soul was to be unified in its turn towards God, not a drop of affection was to be spilled on barren earthly terrain...The key to understanding Augustine on this point is to remember that proper affections were part of a single movement towards God.” Dixon’s “barren earthly terrain” evokes Hannah Arendt’s critique that Augustine’s order of love makes a “desert of this world.” Like Arendt and Nussbaum (who draws heavily on Arendt), Dixon argues that this undermines the relationship to the earthly neighbor by funnelling all emotion toward God, sparing none for earthly goods or beings. Dixon cites Augustine’s discussions of grief over the unnamed friend in *conf.* 4 and the death of Monica on *conf.* 9 in support of this claim. Dixon interprets Augustine’s criticism of his grief as intolerance for “affective incontinence.”

Dixon fails to fully understand the nature of Augustine’s criticisms of his grief. In the case of the unnamed friend, his grief – like his love – was disordered by a failure to love the friend as the temporal being he truly was. With regards to his grief over Monica, Dixon neglects Augustine’s described movement from a public, theologically self-conscious and

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51 Dixon, *Passions to Emotions*, 55.
53 See ibid., 95-7; Nussbaum, *Upheavals*, 549-53.
54 Dixon, *Passions to Emotions*, 55.
55 For a more extended reading of the unnamed friend’s death in relation to Augustine’s order of love, see Sarah Stewart-Kroeker, “Resisting Idolatry and Instrumentalisation in Loving the Neighbor: The Significance of the Pilgrimage Motif for Augustine’s Usus-Fruitio Distinction,” in *Studies in Christian Ethics* 27:2 (May 2014): 202-221.
partially misdirected grief over his mother to a more rightly directed grief. Augustine grieves well over his mother when he considers not merely the earthly loss of her, but also her “origin and destiny in God.” Dixon misses the precise target of Augustine’s critique of his grief (among other things). The problem Augustine identifies with his grief is not that it is directed to earthly loss per se, which is real and worth mourning. The problem is that it fails to account fully for the nature of the earthly loss, which must be viewed in light of a person’s “origin and destiny.” Right grief, like right love, recognizes loss within the movement of creation, incarnation, and redemption.

Martha Nussbaum cites more expansive consequences to Augustine’s view of the emotional life. She argues that Augustine’s emphasis on lamentation and otherworldly longing undermines not only this-worldly compassion but also this-worldly ethics and politics. Nussbaum’s criticism has several prongs: Augustine’s view of grace and its implications for human agency, his expression of vengeful anger toward sinners and heretics, and his isolating longing for heavenly bliss. These three criticisms are interrelated, just as Augustine’s views of

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56 **conf. 9.29-33 (CCL 27: 150-152, trans. Boulding, WSA, The Confessions, I/1, 231-233).** As Werpehowski demonstrates, Augustine thinks it is possible to sorrow in a misdirected way just as it is possible also to sorrow and to weep “well.” See Werpehowski, “Weeping,” 179-187.


58 Dixon says, for example, that “Augustine even went so far as to describe his grief for his mother as a sin” (Dixon, Passions to Emotions, 55). But Augustine’s statement on which Dixon bases this claim is actually a defense of his grief, and must be understood in the context of a culture that prizes self-mastery and apatheia: “Let anyone read it who will, and judge it as he will, and if he finds it sinful that I wept over my mother for a brief part of a single hour—the mother who for a little space was to my sight dead, and who had wept long years for me that in your sight I might live—then let such a reader not mock, but rather, if his charity is wide enough, himself weep for my sins to you, who are Father to all whom your Christ calls his brethren.” **conf. 9.33 (CCL 27: 152, trans. Boulding, WSA, The Confessions, I/1, 233): ‘legat qui uolet et interpretetur, ut uolet, et si peccatum inuenerit, fleuisse me matrem exigua parte horae, matrem oculis meis interim mortuam, quae me multos annos fleuerat, ut oculis tuis uiuerem, non inrideat, sed potius, si est grandi caritate, pro peccatis meis fleat ipse ad te, patrem omnium fratrum Christi tui.’** Emphasis added. In other words, if one considers these tears sinful, let one then respond as a Christian should: with compassionate tears!

59 In **en. Ps. 36.2.8,** Augustine writes that believers are being prepared for something great – a vision of surpassing beauty – through the trials and temptations of life (CCL 38: 352): ‘noli mirari, quia in laboribus pararis; ad magnum aliquid pararis.’

60 Nussbaum, Upheavals, 527-556.
election and reprobation, moral formation, providence, and eschatology are interrelated. The impact of Augustine’s view of grace and human agency may be seen in how he addresses the particular roles of anger and longing in the virtuous emotional life.

Invoking Nietzsche, Nussbaum argues that Augustine’s otherworldly emphasis is morally soporific. In one devastating sentence Nussbaum summarizes the danger of too much this-worldly attention to otherworldly bliss: “The aim of slipping off into beatitude distracts moral attention from the goal of making this world a good world, and encourages a focus on one’s own moral safety that does not bode well for earthly justice.” Longing for heavenly fulfilment as the ultimate aim of human life leads to passivity in the present, rendering death and suffering irrelevant. Waiting on the realization of grace in redemption quashes human agency.

Further, Nussbaum finds Nietzsche’s appraisal of Christianity as a vengeful religion substantiated in Augustine’s “disturbing emphasis on anger.” Though Nussbaum does not tie this anger directly to his otherworldliness, I suggest that this is the other side of her interpretation of Augustine’s eschatological longing. As we shall see in Augustine’s providential view of the persecutor as “straw for burning” in the service of the believer’s refinement, Augustine’s anger against “heretics, pagans, unbelievers, Jews” has its source in the doctrine of reprobation. While longing for redemption may lead to passivity, a vivid imagination for eschatological condemnation may lead to a stern moralism that does not bode well for earthly compassion or modern pluralism.

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61 See below for a brief discussion of this interrelation.
62 “Nietzsche claimed that this attitude toward this-worldly virtue would inspire lassitude. Longing for the other world puts people to sleep in this world.” Ibid., 553.
63 Ibid., 553.
64 Ibid., 552.
65 Ibid., 548.
66 Ibid., 548.
67 See my discussion below, pp. 18-24.
68 Ibid., 548-549.
Both of Nussbaum’s criticisms regard the impact of an eschatological framework on earthly life. On the one hand, the discontinuity between heavenly bliss and earthly suffering is seen as incapacitating. On the other hand, the anticipation of eternal judgment is wrongly vented in the present, imposing continuity where we cannot know any exists. Nussbaum’s criticisms target Augustine’s eschatologically determined eudaimonism, which defers flourishing into the next life, and his Christian eschatology of reprobation, which imports eternal judgment into the present in an overly determinative way. Her criticism is compelling, and at least partially right.

My treatment of Augustine’s eschatological, world-weary framework for ordering emotions might appear to be precisely the sort of reading that threatens an earth-positive account of love’s ordering and the integrity of the earthly moral life. Certainly, if one takes an earth-positive account of the emotional life to look more like a free embrace of the “tumultuous sea” of the inner life, like Tolstoy’s Count Vronsky who prizes readiness “to surrender unblushingly to every passion,” then Augustine’s view is an impossible one. For Augustine, the emotional life must be subject to scrutiny and discipline. As with every other aspect of the earthly life in Augustine’s thought, there are no earthly “ends in themselves,” no emotion valuable simply for

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69 Nicholas Wolterstorff challenges Nussbaum’s identification of Augustine as a eudaimonist who innovates on the classical framework in his approach to the emotions. Wolterstorff argues that in fact Augustine’s discussion of compassion in City of God 14.9 signifies his decisive break from ancient eudaimonism. This challenge reflects Wolterstorff’s contention that eudaimonism cannot serve as a framework for a theory of rights, which is at the heart of his account of justice. See Nicholas Wolterstorff, Justice: Rights and Wrongs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). Wolterstorff acknowledges that in light of his aim to “develop a systematic theory of rights, more is at stake for me in the systematic claim, that eudaimonism as I describe it cannot serve as a framework for a theory of rights, than in the historical claims.” (Ibid., 150). Setting the stakes in this way results in a restrictive definition of eudaimonism and its possible forms. Wolterstorff concludes that “the worth of persons and human beings has no place in [the eudaimonist’s] scheme.” (Ibid., 179) Wolterstorff claims that “to add the idea [of the worth of persons] is to give up eudaimonism.” (Ibid., 179) I see no reason for this limitation of the scope of eudaimonism outside of Wolterstorff’s stated systematic claim, on which he rests his theory of rights. I concur with Joseph Clair that Wolterstorff “has mischaracterized the possible varieties of eudaimonism.” (Joseph Clair, “Wolterstorff on Love and Justice: An Augustinian Response,” in Journal of Religious Ethics (2013) 41:1: 138-167, 141).

70 An ancient image for the passions that Augustine frequently invokes in cit. 9.4-6 (CCL 47: 251-255), and echoes in his discussion of the first sin in cit. 14.12 (CCL 48: 433-434).

71 Anna Karenina, Part I, chap. 34, cited in Roberts, Emotions, 179.
its own sake. The morally soporific danger lies not in the eschatological ordering of emotions as such, however, but in the quality of its ordering – or disordering, as the case may be. While Augustine does not escape disordering at certain points (in keeping with his own view of human fallenness), Augustine’s primary goal is to release anger and cultivate charity (in keeping with the Epistles).

**Envy’s Eschatological Cure**

It is fitting to take a cue on the ordering of emotions from the Psalm commentaries, because for Augustine, the psalms offer a kind of “therapy for human affective life.” Augustine exhorts his readers to follow the psalm’s invocations, seeking to heal his readers’ dispositions accordingly. In Augustine’s hortatory reflections on the psalms, the “therapeutic” movement is doubled. In *en. Ps.* 36.1, Augustine focuses on moderating destructive earthly emotions like jealousy and anger prompted by the material affluence of the wicked. He raises this prospect twice. Both times, he employs an eschatological mode to encourage a right emotional response.

The prospect of this prosperous evildoer may elicit not only jealousy but also doubt in God:

> But what really troubles you (*sed reuera hoc te perturbat*), a Christian, is to see persons of evil life happy, wallowing in plentiful possessions, glowing with health, strutting proudly in their exalted rank, boasting of their secure homes, their pleasures, their obsequious hangers-on, and their powerful influence. No sadness breaks in on the lives of such persons. You observe their profligate lives, and you plainly see their affluent fortunes; and your heart tells you that there is no such thing as divine judgment, and that all things are randomly tossed about by the winds of chance (*omnia casibus ferri et fortuitis motibus uentilari*). If God were really taking account of human affairs, you say, would that fellow’s iniquity be allowed to flourish, while my innocence has such a hard time?**

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72 See for example Eph. 4:31 and James 1:20.  
74 *en. Ps.* 36.1.3 (CCL 38: 339-340): ’sed reuera hoc te perturbat hominem christianum, quia uides male uiuentes felices, rerum i starum copia circumfluere, sanos esse, superbis dignitatis eminere, incolu men habere domum, gaudia suorum, obsequia clientium, excellentissimas potencias, nihil triste interpellare uiam ipsorum; mores nequissimos uides, facultates copiosissimas perspicis; et dicit cor tuum nullum esse diuinum iudicium, omnia
Augustine’s ethical evaluation of the believer’s emotional response is rhetorically embedded in his description. The beginning of this passage (sed reuera) marks an abrupt shift from a preceding discussion of sinners’ warranted terror at the prospect of the “last day (nouissimus dies)”\(^{75}\) to this unwarranted agitation over the wealthy neighbor. The eschatological frame marks the ethical evaluation of this emotional response.

Augustine’s use of *perturbat* and *motibus* in the passage above is particularly notable, for these are loaded terms in the emotional lexicon. As we know from Augustine’s discussion of the *perturbationes* in *ciu.\(^{76}\)* being “disturbed” by involuntary affections is not desirable (if to some extent unavoidable).\(^{77}\) His description of the believer as *perturbed* by the wealthy evildoer already implies that this is a less than ideal response. As for his use of *motibus*, the perception of being “tossed about by the winds of chance” evokes the ancient image of the emotions as a “stormy sea,”\(^{78}\) but it also reflects James 1:8, which compares the one who doubts to “a wave of the sea, driven and tossed by the wind.”\(^{79}\) As Augustine claims in this passage, there is a link between perception of motions in the world and the affective motions of the soul in response.

Augustine evokes this image to point out that the believer has surrendered to doubt in God by perceiving the self to be helplessly “tossed about.” Under the influence of envy, the believer feels the sting of deprivation, and bitterly blames the randomness of chance. But for

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\(^{76}\) *ciu.* 8.17 (CCL 47: 234-235); 9.3-5 (CCL 47: 250-255); 14.5 (CCL 48: 419-420); 14.9 (CCL 48: 425-430).

\(^{77}\) *ciu.* 14.9 (CCL 48: 428): ‘quocircum illa, quae απαθεια Graece dicitur (quae si Latine posset inpassibilitas diceretur), si ita intellegenda est (in animo quippe, non in corpore accipitur), ut sine his affectionibus uiuatur, quae contra rationem accident mentemque perturbant, bona plane et maxime optanda est, sed nec ipsa huius est uitae.’

\(^{78}\) See *ciu.* 9.6-7 (CCL 47: 255-256) where he repeatedly cites Apuleius’s use of this image, expanding upon his example of the Stoic shaken by the storm at sea taken from Gellius’ *Attic Nights* in *ciu.* 9.4 (CCL 47: 251-253). He echoes the image in his description of human emotions after the fall in *ciu.* 14.12 (CCL 48: 433): ‘et per hanc subiaceret et morti ac to et tantis tamque inter se contrariis perturbaretur et fluctuaret affectibus.’

\(^{79}\) James 1:8.
Augustine, the believer’s virtuous emotive life will be guided not by the perception of being moved randomly by the winds of chance but by the perception of God’s providential work in holding all things together. In response, believers direct their course to the homeland and allowing themselves to be borne by the wind of the cross over the sea of the present world. Right emotions (motus) are tied to right perception of the movements (motibus) of the world and one’s own right movements in the world. Perceiving oneself (inaccurately) as “tossed about” by fortune, then, conduces to disordered emotions.

Augustine characterizes the believer’s response to the evildoer’s prosperity as an illness of the soul, for which one requires the “remedial potion” of Scripture: “Do not secretly envy people of wicked intent, nor be jealous of those who commit iniquity; for they will wither swiftly like grass, and quickly fall like plants in the meadow.” The emotional illness receives an emotional and perceptual remediation. The sickened believer receives instruction concerning both the immediate emotional state (do not be envious, do not be jealous) and the eschatological reality that underlies it (the iniquitous will perish along with the evil that defines their loves).

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80 See for example Gn. litt. 4.12.23 (CSEL 28.1: 108-110); 8.20.39 (CSEL 28.1: 258-259).
81 beata u. 1.1 (CCL 29: 65); en. Ps. 54.24 (CCL 39: 674-675).
82 trin. 4.20 (CCL 50: 187); Io. eu. tr. 2.4 (CCL 36: 14).
83 See for example en. Ps. 39.9 (CCL 38: 432-433), where Augustine pictures the world as a sea (‘hoc saeculum mare est’) that the faithful must cross (invoking Peter, the ‘mariambulam’), whose waves of tribulation and storms of temptation (‘fluctus tribulationum, tempestates tentationum’) cannot drown believers who look to and call on Christ, who leads through this sea. Another example may be found in en. Ps. 45 (CCL 38: 523), where Augustine describes the city of God being overjoyed in the ‘fluminus impetus’ – despite the raging waves – for ‘manifestum est fluminis illos impetus de spiritu sancto intellegendos, quo sanctificatur omnis pia anima credens in Christum, ut fiat cuius ciuitatis dei.’ See also en. Ps. 64.9 (CCL 39: 832), where he pictures believers as in the stormy sea of this world but caught in the nets of faith, and enjoins them to be happy that they are secure in those nets and to live well.

The interpretation of the watery tumult may be quite different (the sea of the world vs. the river of the Spirit), but in both cases bears on the right perception of God’s action in the world and one’s affective and active response by faith.
84 en. Ps. 36.1.9 (CCL 38: 343, trans. Boulding, WSA, Expositions of the Psalms 33-50, III/16, 97): ‘morbus ille est, bibe contra: ne subaemuleris eum qui prosperatur in uia sua.’
86 As Stephen C. Barton writes, the eschatological emotional regime has a strong cognitive-evaluative framework. It is an “emotional regime linked integrally with a ‘gospel’ or ‘word of the Lord’ with a clearly defined, cognitive
The second time Augustine mentions the flourishing “scoundrel” neighbor, he elaborates on the dangers of such envy: “Curb your anger, and calm your indignation over the one who commits iniquity. Do you not realize where this anger is carrying you? It is on the tip of your tongue to tell God that he is unjust.” Augustine makes explicit the implication of the believer’s bitter appeal to the random winds of chance in the passage above. The perception of being “tossed about” indicates doubt in God’s justice, and correlates to the envious anger at the evildoer’s prosperity. As we know from *ciu.* 14.9, there is a righteous anger, a righteous jealousy – but this is not it. This envy, anger, and indignation troubles (*perturbat*) faith. Augustine seeks to curb these emotions by invoking the eschatological long view.

In so doing, Augustine addresses the implicit *errors* that these emotions reveal. Emotions are not only tied to perception but also to the evaluation of the world, and therefore indicate judgements about reality. While Augustine distinguishes between intellective and appetitive movements, *all* of these are accountable to will and must be in agreement with reason if they are to be virtuous. The believer’s reflective judgement is implicitly involved in the emotions of jealousy, envy, and anger. By envying the prosperous evildoer, one implicitly questions divine justice. This is not necessarily explicitly reflective. In fact, Augustine is deliberately *demonstrating* the judgments implicit in such emotions. These emotions perturb the order of

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*ciu. 9.4-5 (CCL 47: 251-255); 14.9 (CCL 48: 425-430).*

believer’s will.\footnote{By contrast to Dixon’s claim that Augustine proposes a “coercive rather than persuasive” (51) therapy for \textit{perturbationes}, \textit{en. Ps.} 36.1 clearly illustrates that a simplistic assignment of the problem to the lower parts and the solution to their coercion by the higher parts of the soul is misrepresentative. \textit{En. Ps.} 36 is an exercise in persuasion, seeking to convert his audience to see and respond to the world differently, by re-ordering desire.} This perturbation extends pervasively to one’s view of the world and of God. For Augustine, the goal is to embrace God’s order, God’s view, and God’s judgment of the world. Sin manifests as the desire to assert an autonomous order.\footnote{See for example Augustine’s discussion of the first sin in \textit{cit.} 14.12-14 (CCL 48: 433-436).} This results in divisions in perception, desire, judgment, and, ultimately, will. Believers may affirm divine justice and judgement, but when their jealousy rises up at the sight of the prosperous evildoer, a conflict between pride and faith in divine justice reveals itself – requiring a Psalmsic therapy.\footnote{The problem of conflicting emotions is addressed in various ways in the scholarship on emotions. Roberts distinguishes emotion from judgment on the basis of its propositional content. See Roberts, \textit{Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology}, 85-89. While emotions “assert” something, they may conflict with the “subject of the emotion,” and that agreement “would be required for the emotion to be a judgment of the subject.” Roberts, \textit{Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology}, 89. Roberts therefore calls emotions “construals” rather than judgments, in order to retain an accuracy to judgment that emotions do not necessarily have (see p. 89). But this distinction depends, as Scrutton points out, on a narrow view of the propositional nature of judgment and a high view of its coherence. Scrutton, \textit{Feeling}, 61-65. Scrutton asserts that one may hold conflicting beliefs and judgments, which accommodates the possibility of conflicting emotions (or a divided will) \textit{without} divorcing emotion from evaluation and judgment. This coheres with Augustine’s treatment of how the believer’s jealousy entails implicit judgments that are in conflict with their professed faith.} 

Anger and jealousy over the evildoer’s prosperity reveal two underlying and related errors. One error concerns happiness, the other justice. Both errors concern the nature of human flourishing. First, the error about happiness: the jealous indignation over another’s worldly prosperity involves a misplaced expectation of happiness. Envying prosperity reveals humanity’s worldly desires: human beings want to live comfortably, to be healthy, to be exalted, secure, affluent. Not all of these desires – such as for health and security – are necessarily wrong, but they may become disordered. More fundamentally, when one covets the goods of those who may be forfeiting eternal happiness for temporal prosperity, one implicitly mistakes the \textit{source} of happiness. This is a serious misperception, which derails the order that guides the whole aim of moral and affective formation. As discussed above, for Augustine, God is the source of
happiness. But God does not promise earthly happiness. Christ’s earthly life demonstrates just how little one may expect in the way of worldly comforts, but also how great one’s anticipation may be for the divine life to come, if one enters into suffering solidarity with him.\textsuperscript{94}

The other source of the believer’s troubled response is the apparent injustice: why do the wicked prosper and the righteous suffer? This second error is related to the first, in that the lack of a discernible pattern of divine judgment on earth calls into question the promise of happiness. It challenges the faith and hope in the life of felicity that orders the believer’s earthly life. But just as God promises no earthly happiness, so too earthly prosperity is given to the good and the evil alike.\textsuperscript{95} The prospect of divine judgment at the last day is meant to offer an alternative view of human fulfilment. In Augustine’s account, judgment and redemption are closely paired. The beatitude of the redeemed is inextricable from the condemnation of the reprobate, for redemption and condemnation \textit{both} rest upon the final judgment.

This pairing does not mean that the believer is encouraged to cultivate a kind of gloating attitude. Augustine aims to \textit{curb} envy, anger, indignation, and resentment over the perception of earthly injustice in deference to an eternally just judgment. The solace offered is not meant to promote a vengeful jubilee over others’ anticipated punishment, for human beings cannot discern the eternal fates of others (“Human eyes see the public face, but God knows the heart”)\textsuperscript{96}. One must never pass judgment on the eternal fate of another in this life.\textsuperscript{97} The earthly human solace in


\textsuperscript{95} Augustine frequently draws on Mt 5:45. See \textit{en. Ps.} 35.8 (CCL 38: 327); 39.4 (CCL 38: 427), 39.27 (CCL 38: 444); 42.2 (CCL 38: 474); 54.4 (CCL 39: 658); 55.16 (CCL 39: 689-690); 61.16 (CCL 39: 785); 62.14 (CCL 39: 802); 66.4 (CCL 39: 861); 70.2.6 (CCL 39: 964); 77.22 (CCL 39: 1083); 78.14 (CCL 39: 1108); 94.2 (CCL 39: 1332); 99.5 (CCL 39: 1396); 103.3.21 (CCL 40: 1517); 120.12 (CCL 40: 1798); 144.12 (CCL 40: 2097).


\textsuperscript{97} \textit{en. Ps.} 36.2.11 (CCL 38: 354): ‘de nullo enim uiuente desperandum est... ceterum de nullo pronuntiandum est in
eternal divine justice cannot find its consolation in a specific person’s judgment. On Augustine’s terms, the believer may take a righteously ordered solace in the whole of divine justice – redemption and condemnation both – while resisting a self-satisfied anticipation of an enemy’s punishment.

Still, for Augustine, the condemnation of the wicked is scripturally attested and a key component of divine justice and providence. Augustine does not think it is wrong to be dismayed by the prosperity of the wicked; after all, the psalms repeatedly express such dismay. But Augustine thinks believers should not let it corrode their spirits through envy and anger. Envy reveals the state of one’s loves, and what one loves shapes the self. Envying the wicked risks an implicit mimesis, for desire begets imitation: “Do not secretly vie (subaemuleris) with the wicked by acting viciously yourself, as though you wanted to imitate someone who by vicious behavior contrives (maligne faciendo) to flourish for a time.” Augustine orients the believer away from a misdirected aspirational gaze.

**Providential and Eschatological Views of Suffering**

Augustine also draws more troubling lessons from this confidence in God’s ordering of time toward eternal judgment. Notably, he portrays God using sinners providentially to test, chastise, and refine believers. The “straw is burnt so that the gold may be refined, and likewise

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98 *See for example trin. 8.9 and 10.7-8. In trin. 8.9 Augustine discusses the conformation by love that makes it possible for an unjust person to become just. He writes that for a person who is not just, ‘quod unde esse poterunt nisi inhaerendo eidem ipsi formae quam intuentur ut inde formentur et sint iusti animi...? et unde inhaeretur illi formae nisi amando?’ trin. 8.9 (CCL 50: 283). In trin. 10.7-8, Augustine discusses how the mind may be deformed by love of lesser things: ‘tanta uis est amoris ut ea quae cum amore diu cogitauerit eisque curae glutino inhaeserit attrahat secum etiam cum ad se cogitandam quodam modo reedit.’ trin. 10.7 (CCL 50: 321) ’errat autem mens cum se istis imaginibus tanto amore coniungit ut etiam se esse aliquid huismodi existimet. ita enim conformatur eis quodam modo non id existendo sed putando, non quo se imaginem putet sed omnino illud ipsum cuius imaginem secum habet.’ trin. 10.8 (CCL 50: 321)

the sinner does his worst so that the just person may be tested...To this sinner due punishment
will be meted out (reddetur quod debetur), yet he has been used to further the progress of the
devout and the downfall of the ungodly.” Here Augustine extracts a more deliberate
pedagogical gain from the evildoer’s earthly prosperity and, more broadly, earthly suffering at
the hands of sinners. The believer is encouraged not only to moderate destructive emotional
responses to temporal disparities and injustice, but to interpret them as occasions for moral
testing and improvement under divine chastisement. This encourages the believer to read
temporal suffering and injustice through the lens of providential pedagogy. This is potentially
more dangerous.

Perhaps Augustine simply means that just as sin itself is a scourge that makes human
beings perceive their wretchedness and long for healing, so too every sinful act committed by
sinning human beings. Fair enough. Sin cannot be treated only in the abstract; sin is suffered
through particular acts. But taking direct instruction from events by discerning God’s
providential reprimands and identifying the way God is “using” evildoers in specific instances is
at best an extremely delicate task and mostly beyond the powers of human perception. The
emotional effects of the providential view cited above may be quite insidious. While it is a
legitimate possibility for a believer to interpret his or her experience of suffering as an instance
of providential refinement, the lesson of this passage risks generalizing that discernment into a
rule for interpreting suffering – a slippery slope if there ever was one. Furthermore, interpreting
the “sinners” as the “straw” burnt for one’s refinement threatens to undermine Augustine’s
prohibition against identifying the reprobate in this life.

100 *en. Ps. 36.1.11 (CCL 38: 345, trans. Boulding, WSA, *Expositions of the Psalms* 33-50, III/16, 100)*: ‘ardet palea,
ut aurum purgetur; sic saeuit impius, ut iustus probetur...peccatori illi hoc reddetur quod debetur; et tamen factum est
de illo unde proficiat pius, unde deficiat impius.’ In addition to the explicit links to Mt 25:41, there is some
continuity here with Augustine’s reading of 1 Cor 3:12-15, see for example *ench.* 68 (CCL 46: 86-87).
Earlier in the exposition Augustine does not interpret any divine intent toward the sufferer behind suffering. This shifts the implications of the emotive ordering significantly. If suffering is an occasion for testing, chastisement, and refinement, Augustine suggests that it may serve as a goad to the individual to strive, penitentially, to “be better.” This risks placing the burden of that suffering squarely on the individual’s shoulders. On this reading, one has legitimate cause to worry about the soporific or vengeful effects on the pursuit of earthly justice and compassion that Nussbaum fears. Attributing suffering primarily to divine teaching rather than to earthly injustice that cries out for remediation may encourage resignation. This view of suffering risks undermining lament, which might drive the pursuit of justice, and replacing it with a purely personal penitence. At the same time, the view of the sinner as “straw” risks channelling the initial anger directed at God into a warped affirmation of “faith” in the form of vindictive anticipation of punishment.

Augustine seeks not merely to explore the (imagined) affective response to a challenging circumstance, but to reorient that response. One of his strategies for reorientation is to invoke the divine gaze, despite its obscurity to human beings. Augustine seeks to communicate a sweeping providential and eschatological view of the redemption of creation, which on his doctrinal terms includes the ultimate reprobation of the unrepentant. Recall that right emotions require right perception of the movements of the world; this includes the movements of divine providential action. The passage above seeks to draw the individual into the expansive *providential* perspective on suffering. It is tempting to blame the risks of the above reading on its providential, rather than eschatological, emphasis. This has some basis, for providence concerns God’s activity in time, whereas eschatology concerns God’s activity at time’s end. The identification of one’s suffering and the “sinner” causing suffering as an occasion of divine
chastisement concerns primarily God’s providential, rather than eschatological, action. But the distinction between providence and eschatology does not allow us to isolate them.

God’s activity in time orders human activity to the end of time. Providence and eschatology are distinct but integrally connected areas of Augustine’s thought. The eschatological future is pursued in the providential present. Providence and eschatology are connected through their relationship to election and final judgment. As I noted above, the God-given identity of pilgrims – their election into the Christian life of pilgrimage – is the basis of the virtuous emotional life. The election of believers for the journey to the patria is worked out providentially in the process of moral and affective formation on the earthly uia. Election, moral and affective formation, providence, and eschatology are all structurally connected.

There are two ways in which Augustine’s eschatological frame offers some resistance to disorder. First, while the passage may be read as shifting the interpretation of suffering inward, it may also be read as contextualizing the believer’s affective response in a broader context. The pilgrim’s movements (moti), both inward and outward, belong not merely to temporal movements in the human historical sense, but are part of a cosmic movement of creation to redemption that transforms the very meaning of temporal and historical human existence. This is the power, for good and ill, of the affective ordering Augustine seeks to prompt. God’s providence culminates in salvation (eschatology).101

Second, Augustine repeatedly claims that this providential view does not authorize the believer to judge their afflicter’s eschatological fate. Elaborating constructively on his earlier claim that human beings cannot know the hearts of others on earth, Augustine upholds a different response to the sinner in the second and third homilies on Psalm 36: “we should hope that those

through whom we are being whipped may be converted, and whipped along with us."102 Though the image of being a child whipped by God (God “whips every child he acknowledges as his (recipit)”) jars the current Western reader, it is a Biblical image.103 Augustine considers this a form of loving parental care in the form of discipline.104 The disciplines of love often entail suffering, as Christ’s enactment of love reveals. The image of providential discipline remains, but Augustine also upholds an eschatological hope that emphasizes solidarity with Christ (who is not spared this whipping105) and charity among sinners. This shifts away from a potentially self-gratifying view of oneself as a righteous innocent sufferer at the hands of the evil persecutor, for only Christ was truly innocent, and he is not spared the scourging. Even as one feels the refining scourge of divine discipline in imitation of the suffering Christ, one hopes for the ultimate redemption of the one serving as scourge. This affirms Augustine’s position that any earthly perception of a person as an evildoer is provisional. This curtails the potentially vindictive judgment of the oppressor as straw for burning. One may affirm that God’s providence culminates in a just eschaton (which for Augustine includes reprobation), but no human being may judge another person’s eschatological end – and indeed, one should seek to draw all into heavenly love.106

104 See also for example ep. 153.17 (CSEL 44: 415-416) on how love requires discipline and thus failing to discipline may entail failing to love well.
105 en. Ps. 36.3.9 (CCL 38: 374): ‘et quoniam flagellat omnem filium, quem recipit, nec unico pepercit, in quo delictum non inuenit.’
106 It is worth noting that Augustine’s affirmation of the sinner’s condemnation does not preclude sorrow and lament over the lost. Augustine thinks human beings must grieve over the lost (ciu. 14.9) and love enemies as friends in the attempt to make them eternal friends. See en. Ps. 36.2.1 (CCL 38: 347), 36.2.5 (CCL 38: 350); see also ep. Io. tr. 1.9 (PL 35: 1984-1985), 10.7 (PL 35: 2059).
I do not suggest that this resolves all of the troubling implications of the affective response guided by a providential pedagogy of suffering. But it shows that Augustine offers another avenue for an affective response to suffering other than soporific penitence or vindictive anticipation of judgment: solidarity with Christ and human friendship. Augustine exhorts his listeners to shift their eyes from material riches to see the “future in store” with the eyes of faith and so be incorporated into Christ the Head of the body, the city of Jerusalem singing praise to God in unending bliss. Augustine urges believers to do good in the face of evil and also opens up the possibility of delighting rightly in earthly pleasures as they proleptically anticipate heavenly ones.

**Heavenly Bliss, Earthly Charity**

Augustine gives voice to suffering in order to curb the spiritually corrosive emotions it may prompt. He also goes to great rhetorical lengths to cultivate a longing for fulfilment. To counter the disordered vision clouded by anger, indignation, and envy, Augustine seeks to animate desire for peace and happiness in the heavenly city. In the final section of *en. Ps. 36.1*, Augustine contrasts the delights of the heavenly Jerusalem to those of that prosperous neighbor. People may be delighted on earth by “abundant gold, abundant silver, a multitude of slaves, even an abundance of baths, roses, wine-drinking and the most sumptuous and luxurious of banquets.” But is this the abundance you really want, he asks? It will wither like the grass in summer. In the heavenly Jerusalem, “[p]eace will be your gold, peace will be your silver, peace will be your

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107 *en. Ps. 36.3.15* (CCL 38: 378-379).
108 *en. Ps. 36.3.4* (CCL 38: 370): ‘felix in perpetua pace et salute, laudans deum sine fine, beata sine fine.’
109 I follow Verheijen in affirming that Augustine’s order of love supports an anticipation of heavenly love and delight on earth. Since the order of emotions is governed by the order of love, broadly speaking, a similar grammar is operative here. See Verheijen, “Un traité de ‘télicologie’ biblique,” 169-187.
broad estates, peace your very life. Your God will be your peace. Peace will be for you whatever you long for (quidquid desideras, pax tibi erit).”\(^{110}\)

Augustine reorients the reader’s sense of delight, from sensual worldly pleasures to peace in God, the end of longing. The prosperous neighbor’s possessions may afford them some measure of earthly pleasure, but Augustine presents a strong and enticing image of abundance in heaven. There is no hunger, no thirst, no blindness, no weakness: God fills all needs.\(^{111}\) Augustine moves from the more immediate, physically imaged satisfaction to a more mystical vision of wholeness and union:

He will possess you whole and undivided, as he, your possessor, is whole and undivided himself. You will lack nothing with him, for with him you possess all that is; you will have it all, and he will have all there is of you, because you and he will be one, and he who possesses you will have this one thing, and have it wholly.\(^{112}\)

Augustine seeks to counteract the potent lure of worldly goods with an extravagant description of intimacy with God. Augustine describes a kind of union that pushes the boundaries of earthly understanding. To be one with God is to be wholly fulfilled; this union is complete, and completely satisfying. It is a beautiful passage, and it is meant to inspire an eschatologically oriented desire – desire that reflects a longing for the wholeness and unity that one lacks on earth.

Augustine paints an eschatological picture of flourishing that applies both to the

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\(^{111}\) *en. Ps. 36.1.12* (CCL 38: 346, trans. Boulding, WSA, *Expositions of the Psalms* 33-50, III/16, 101): ‘deus tuus totum tibi erit. manducabis eum, ne esurias; bibes eum, ne sitias; illuminaberis ab eo, ne sis caecus; fulcieris ab eo, ne deficias.’

\(^{112}\) *en. Ps. 36.1.12* (CCL 38: 346, trans. Boulding, WSA, *Expositions of the Psalms* 33-50, III/16, 101): ‘possidebit te totum integrum, totus integer. angustias non ibi patieris cum eo cum quo totum possides; totum habebis, totum et ille habebit; quia tu et ille unum eritis, quod unum totum et ille habebit qui uos possidet.’
individual believer and to the holy city. He pictures the believer as a tree, whose “root of charity” will lead to blossoms in the summer of judgment, by contrast to the wilting, shallow-rooted grass. In the meantime, Augustine writes, do not be envious or jealous of these shallow-rooted grasses and their fleeting prosperity.

But does this vision of heavenly flourishing and the affective ordering it enables abet or hinder the earthly practice of love? Does the healing of all wounds in heaven have any bearing on the earthly striving to help the needy? Or does this vision of otherworldly glory have, as Nietzsche and Nussbaum claim, a soporific effect on emotions that should prompt action? Is the lesson of heavenly bliss simply to resign our earthly ambitions to “damage control in dystopia”?

While aspects of the eschatological frame may disorder emotions, the complementary role that Augustine’s eschatology plays for his ethics is evident even within the circumscribed focus of this article on en. Ps. 36, in keeping with his reading of the Gospels. Alongside the encouragements to take the eschatological long view in relation to suffering, illness, and temptation, en. Ps. 36 is peppered with exhortations to do good: to feed the hungry and help the needy, to do good work, to take action, to live well. Just as Augustine reorients the

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113 en. Ps. 36.1.3 (CCL 38: 340, trans. Boulding, WSA, Expositions of the Psalms 33-50, III/16, 94): ‘intus est radix; ubi radix nostra, ibi et uita nostra; ibi enim caritas nostra.’
114 en. Ps. 36.1.3 (CCL 38: 340): ‘uilia quaedam sunt, et superficiem terrae tenentia, altam radicem non habent. proinde per hiemem uirent; at ubi sol aestatis feruescere coeperit, arescent... sed si alta radix est caritatis tuae, sicut multarum arborum per hiemem, transit frigus, uniet aestas, id est iudicii dies; tunc arseet uior fen, tunc apparebit arborum gloria.’
117 See for example his repeated and closely linked references to Mt 24:40 and Mt 25:42 in en. Ps. 36.1.2.
118 en. Ps. 36.1.2.
119 en. Ps. 36.1.4, 8.
120 en. Ps. 36.1.6.
121 en. Ps. 36.1.1.
vision of temporal riches to heavenly ones, he makes a contrapuntal movement that reimagines
temporal riches in light of heavenly ones. Mercy, charity, generosity, kindness: these are true
riches. A good will is never empty, but seeks some way to love and serve others. Augustine
redefines temporal riches in terms of the abundantly generous will in which earthly goods are
shared, as all goods shall be in the heavenly city.

The eschatological shift does not simply render earthly life barren. The world-weary turn
heavenward opens the believer’s eyes to the riches of neighborly love. These are riches not only
for those who receive but also for those who give, for one of the earthly joys of the righteous that
Augustine notes in *ciu.* 14.9 is that “they feel gladness in good works.” The believer must not
only turn away from their envious examination of the evildoer’s material riches, but also turn to
the needs of others. Rightly ordered emotions spring from the root of holy charity, and this leads
to good work and generous giving. This generous will may respond to need in myriad ways (not
only material), by giving kindness, advice, help, prayer. Augustine reorients will from earthly to
heavenly wealth. The heavenly-rooted riches of charity open one’s heart to those in earthly need.
In this way Augustine’s world-weary vision of earthly life that drives the gaze heavenward
complements his exhortations to work in the world to love and serve others.

**Conclusion**

Augustine’s view of earthly suffering does not undercut the possibility of real, if
incomplete, acts of just love. Augustine seeks to animate his readers’ imaginations for beatific
life, and in so doing, reorient the root of their emotions such that it pervades their affective
earthly life. The disposition of world-weariness and corresponding longing for heavenly peace is
an alternate emotive mode for the pilgrim who begins to feel jealousy and anger in response to

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the worldly prosperity of others. This very world-weariness is part of the affective ordering that roots the believer in heavenly charity, which they then enact on earth. This is not to say Augustine’s affective therapy is entirely unproblematic. There is fodder here for a disordered world-weariness that could lead to the soporific and vengeful affects Nussbaum fears. I locate this danger primarily in the providential ordering of suffering to its eschatological end as a form of divine testing and chastisement. However, Augustine’s eschatological frame and its affective order also offer avenues for resisting this danger. Broadly, his eschatology emphasizes the cosmic collective: the body of Christ, in suffering solidarity, guided by a longing for heaven that demands heavenly love on earth.

Nussbaum fears that Augustine is all too captive to his eschatological imagination in ways that stifle earthly life and human agency and that wrongly vent eschatological judgment in the present. Augustine, by contrast, fears that the human imagination is all too captive to the fallen, earthly realities in which human beings live and breathe. He seeks to expand the human imaginative range and in so doing to order the emotional life to a heavenly vision, in the hopes that one might return to notions of human nature, life, and action altered for the better by eschatological imaginings of a life of blossoming charity. Rejecting the eschatological frame is not the answer to the eschatological dangers of passivity and vindictiveness voiced by Nussbaum. The potency of the eschatological imagination for the earthly life is that the redemption of earthly life is present, in glimpses, in the here and now – even as it eludes. The love that may be wearying in the present may be revived by the proleptic glimpse of its heavenly fruit.