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Who Europeanizes parliamentary attention, on which issues and how?
A policy agenda perspective

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Abstract
This paper contributes to the literature on the Europeanization of national parliaments by looking at the behavioral dimension of Europeanization in the Swiss Parliament. We examine the differences in parliamentary interventions on EU-related issues over time, between types of instruments (agenda-setting versus control) and across parties. Moreover, we measure the attention devoted to various policy issues and the tone of parliamentary interventions. Empirically, we analyze with descriptive statistical tools EU-related parliamentary interventions introduced in the Swiss parliament over 30 years (1984-2014). Results show that parliamentary attention to the EU is strongly influenced by the activism of the Swiss People’s Party, a Eurosceptic party member of the Swiss governing "coalition".

Keywords: Europeanization, Parliament, issue attention, policy agenda, Switzerland
1. Introduction

The literature on the Europeanization of national parliaments has initially focused on the institutional and organizational responses to the challenges raised by European integration (e.g. Maurer and Wessels 2001, Raunio and Hix 2000, Raunio 2005, Saalfeld 2005, Smith 1996; for a review see Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008). More recent studies draw our attention to the behavioral and attitudinal dimensions of Europeanization and invite us to take a closer look at what political parties and national MPs really do and how they behave (e.g. Auel 2006, Auel and Benz 2005, Auel and Raunio 2014, Benz 2004, Pollak and Slominski 2003, Navarro and Brouard 2014, Palau 2012, Raunio 2009, Senninger forthcoming). We join this second stream of research by looking at the Europeanization of parliamentary activities in Switzerland. Concretely, we investigate who are the actors driving the Europeanization of attention in the parliamentary arena, how they do it and which policy issues are affected.

The paper builds on studies that have analyzed the impact of time, parties and institutional rules on the Europeanization of parliamentary questions. For instance, Navarro and Brouard (2014) show that the Europeanization of parliamentary attention is rather limited in France. In addition, they demonstrate that MPs from both opposition and government parties ask questions to the government to scrutinize the minister in charge of EU policy proposals. In a similar vein, Finke and Herbel (2015) compare the scrutiny activities at the level of parliamentary committees in eight EU countries (Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Slovakia and the United Kingdom). They confirm that not only MPs from the opposition engage in scrutiny activities, but also coalition partners that aim at avoiding a "ministerial drift" from the coalition agreement. Our study provides a more complete picture of the different mechanisms through which Europeanization affects the dynamics of parliamentary attention. First, we innovate by extending the analysis beyond parliamentary control (questions, interpellations) to include legislative proposals (initiatives, motions, postulates). The later allow capturing the pro-active agenda-setting activities of MPs. Second, we add a policy agenda perspective. We share the view that the amount of attention that political actors can devote to various policy issues is not unlimited. In the present context, we assume that Europeanization goes hand in hand with a concentration of attention on a limited number of issues, and hence tends to "crowd out" issues that may be salient domestically, but fail to be so in a Europeanized context. Third, we look at the role of partisan politics, by examining how and in how far parties contribute to the Europeanization of the parliamentary agenda. Finally, we also examine parties' policy positions by assessing the tone towards the EU of parliamentary interventions, and related variations between parties and evolution over time. This research strategy allows us to offer a novel and
more comprehensive understanding of how MPs mobilize parliamentary instruments and references to the EU to pursue both policy-seeking and vote-seeking strategies.

Empirically, we rely on a rich dataset of parliamentary interventions introduced in the Swiss parliament during 30 years (from 1984 to 2014). Switzerland is a country that lends itself well to an analysis of the Europeanization of parliamentary attention. On the one hand, Switzerland is not a member of the EU but has concluded a number of bilateral agreements with the EU during the last two decades and is, therefore, strongly integrated in the EU Single Market (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008). In that sense, it shares a number of similarities with – and can be compared to – EU member states (Haverland 2014). On the other hand, looking at the Swiss case helps to examine whether the effects of the European integration process are similar on both sides of EU borders (Haverland 2007). In addition, Switzerland also shares similarities with EU member states with respect to the transformation of the party system and rise of Eurosceptic parties. The popular rejection of Switzerland's membership in the European Economic Area (EEA) in 1992 provided the basis for the repeated electoral successes of the Swiss People's Party (Kriesi et al. 2005, Varone et al. 2014). Formerly a moderate, agrarian party and junior partner in the Swiss government, the Swiss People's Party has turned into a populist right and anti-EU party, and has become the first party in the National Council, the lower Chamber of Swiss Parliament. Finally, the Swiss parliament is an interesting case in a comparative perspective, since it is a kind of in-between case between a strong parliament of the German or Scandinavian type and a weak parliament typical of a parliamentary system or majoritarian democracy (e.g. UK, France or Ireland). On the one hand, it enjoys a strong institutional position vis-à-vis the government in terms of agenda-setting power, co-decision rights and control instruments (Lijphart 1999, Lüthi 2014, Siaroff 2003). On the other hand, it is very weak in terms of resources and related ability to exert its control function over the executive (Schnapp and Harfst 2005, Vatter 2014). As in other countries, the weakness of the Swiss parliament holds especially in foreign/European policy (Fischer and Sciarini 2013 and 2014, Sciarini 2015a).

The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we provide some background information regarding the Europeanization of Swiss politics and the characteristics of the Swiss parliament in comparative perspective. We then develop our research hypotheses regarding the evolution of parliamentary agenda-setting and control activities on Europeanized issues in the Swiss parliament. We present our data in section 3. Our empirical analyses, which are mainly based on descriptive statistics of the use of agenda-setting and control instruments among Swiss MPs, appear in section 4. The conclusion summarizes the results and discusses further the
analytical potentialities of our dataset, especially for a comparative study of parliamentary activities in EU and non-EU countries.

2. Europeanization of Swiss politics
As many studies in the field, we rely on the general definition of Europeanization put forward by Ladrech (1994: 69): "[an] incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy-making." Further, but still in line with most studies, our work is firmly anchored in the tradition of the "second image reversed" approach (Gourevitch 1978, Katzenstein 1985). Accordingly, we see Europeanization as the domestic consequences of the European integration process, and not as the process of European integration itself.

Switzerland is strongly influenced by the European integration process and did, therefore, not escape the effects of Europeanization (Gava et al. 2014). Since the referendum on the EEA in 1992, Switzerland's European policy has been on the top of the political agenda, and Swiss citizens have been repeatedly asked to vote on EU-related issues.¹ Still, we must cope with Switzerland's specific situation in Europe. As Switzerland is not member of the EU Europeanization takes different forms than in EU member states. As earlier studies have shown, there are two main forms of EU influence, a direct and an indirect form (Sciarini et al. 2004, Sciarini 2014). Direct Europeanization represents the most obvious mechanism of EU influence, as it results from an international negotiation between Switzerland and the EU, and related domestic legislative changes. During the last two decades, Switzerland and the EU have concluded more than fifteen bilateral agreements in various policy fields, such as immigration, education and research, energy, transportation, agriculture and taxation (Afonso and Maggetti 2007, Dupont and Sciarini 2001 and 2007). Indirect Europeanization, by contrast, occurs without formal negotiations with the EU. It refers to a situation where a non-EU member state adapts unilaterally to existing EU rules. In Switzerland, this form of adaptation is known as "autonomous adaptation" ("autonomer Nachvollzug" in German) (Gava et al. 2014, Sciarini et al. 2004). While indirect Europeanization is a less straightforward – and less easy to grasp – form of influence, it is presumably no less relevant than direct Europeanization, as it may potentially affect any piece of legislation. As a result of direct and indirect Europeanization, Switzerland has reached a level of integration that can be characterized as "customized quasi-

¹ Ironically enough, there have been more direct democratic votes on the EU in Switzerland than in any EU member-state (Sciarini and Tresch 2009 and 2011).
membership" (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008: 189). This, in turn, has had far-reaching consequences at the domestic level.

Several studies have attempted to measure how much Swiss legislation is Europeanized. According to an assessment of the euro-compatibility of the bills submitted by the Swiss Government to Parliament (Jenni 2014a and 2014b), a third of all legislative changes introduced from 1990 to 2010 are to some extent congruent with EU rules, whereby indirect Europeanization accounts for a larger share than direct Europeanization to compatibility with EU rules (three quarters and one quarter, respectively). In the context of a cross-national project, Gava and Varone (2012: 213-214) have explored the extent to which manifest references to the EU rules are identifiable in Swiss legislation. Based on a computer keyword search they find that from 1987 to 2007 6% of legal changes carried an explicit reference to the EU. Furthermore, this "EU footprint" has increased over time (from less than 1% during the 1987-91 legislative term up to over 13% for 2003-07), and varies sharply across policy domains (e.g., no references to Europe in defence policy, but up to 35% of Europeanized acts in immigration policy). Therefore, in the 2000s the level of Europeanization of Swiss legislation has not been much lower than in France (14%) (see Brouard et al. 2012). Comparing further the extent of "EU footprint" in primary legislation enacted by Parliament and in secondary legislation enacted by the executive, Gava and Varone (2014) find that the share of Europeanized legal reforms is systematically higher for the latter than for the former. Furthermore, manifest references to the EU in ordinances are mainly related to indirect Europeanization. This suggests that a non-negligible proportion of the Europeanization of Swiss policies takes place in the executive arena and cannot be linked to bilateral agreements.

3. Research hypotheses

Who Europeanizes parliamentary attention, on which issues and how? To answer this question, we formulate seven hypotheses on parliamentary interventions in Europeanized issues along five analytical perspectives: longitudinal (evolution over time); institutional (differences between MPs' agenda-setting and control activities); issue attention (differences between policy domains); partisan politics (differences between parties); tone of parliamentary interventions (negative, neutral, or positive towards the EU).

The growing importance of the EU for Swiss politics and the resulting Europeanization of Swiss policy-making mentioned in the previous section inform our first hypothesis. We assume that a similar development has taken place with respect to parliamentary interventions, that is, that the Europeanization of parliamentary interventions has increased over time (Hypothesis 1).
According to a widespread view, Europeanization tends to strengthen the Executive (i.e. government and public administration) and to weaken the Parliament (Moravcsik 1994, for a review see Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008). Several studies on political decision-making processes in Switzerland have confirmed this view (e.g. Fischer and Sciarini 2013 and 2014, Sciarini 2014, 2015a and 2015b, Sciarini et al. 2004). By modifying the distribution of political resources among domestic policy-makers Europeanization leads to "differential empowerment" (Börzel and Risse 2003). More specifically, it grants the government with an almost exclusive authority to control the political agenda, that is, the ability to introduce or, on the contrary, to block new policy issues. Moreover, the Executive benefits from an information asymmetry as its representatives take part in negotiations on the EU level and, therefore, have higher knowledge about the policy issues at stake. Additionally, the European integration process offers new ideological justifications that the government may strategically mobilize to legitimize policy reforms at home (i.e. credit claiming or blame shifting). Finally, the "take it or leave it" character of international agreements struck on the EU level severely reduces the leeway of Parliament in the ratification phase. The role of national MPs might thus be reduced to ask (symbolic) questions to their government in order to control intergovernmental bargaining at the European level.

According to this "de-parliamentarization" thesis, national parliaments have been qualified as losers, victims or, at the very best, latecomers in Europeanized policy-making processes. Several scholars, however, disagree and argue that "re-parliamentarization" has been at work, especially with respect to parliamentary scrutiny (for a review, see Goetz and Meyer-Sahling, 2008). As a matter of fact, several reforms have been implemented to achieve a better institutional balance of power between the executive and the legislative branches (Auel and Christiansen 2015, Raunio 2009, Winzen 2010). In most EU member states, “European Affairs Committees” have been created. In Switzerland, new consultation rights were granted to the Parliament in international matters (Lüthi 2007).

These recent trends towards "re-parliamentarization" notwithstanding, we may expect that the scrutiny function of the parliament is more developed than its agenda-setting function: The Europeanization of parliamentary proposals (initiatives, motions and postulates) should be lower, at any point in time, than that of instruments of parliamentary control (questions and interpellations) (Hypothesis 2).

Beyond this debate between the presumed decline and the organizational resilience of national parliaments, Europeanization is likely to shape parliamentary agendas in terms of policy content. Through a series of treaties, EU member states have transferred substantial decision-
making authority in diverse policy areas from the national to the EU level since the mid-1980s. In a similar vein, and as mentioned above, the bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the EU through which Switzerland adopts EU rules have covered an increasing number of policy domains. Moreover, in the absence of bilateral agreements, Switzerland often adapts to EU rules unilaterally.\textsuperscript{2} As the scope of direct and indirect Europeanization increases over time, a greater variety of policy domains shall be affected by EU rules. This leads us to expect that the issue concentration of Europeanized parliamentary interventions has decreased over time (Hypothesis 3).

Raunio (2009) argues that the increasing (scrutiny of the) Europeanized parliamentary agenda is not primarily shaped by organizational structures and procedural rules, but depends upon the behavior of political parties and their elected MPs. In other words, agency drives de- versus re-parliamentarization trends, and the activities and effective influence of parliament in EU affairs (Benz 2005: 516; Raunio 2009). Many empirical studies stress that political parties and individual MPs do not always have strong incentives to closely scrutinize the government's European policy. On one hand, several parties are less cohesive on Europeanized issues than on domestic issues and, at the same time, they have to protect the governmental coalition cohesion. On the other hand, parties are generally more supportive of EU policies than their voters. Both reasons imply that mainstream parties deliberately avoid launching public debates during plenary sessions about the government's EU strategy (Raunio 2009: 320). On the contrary, oversights and monitoring occurs rather behind closed doors, i.e. in parliamentary committees, through informal meetings with the responsible ministers, in internal party meetings, etc. (Raunio 2009: 328). The government's EU policies are subjected to a tight parliamentary scrutiny only "if the parliament is strong in domestic politics, and if the parties and/or the public are divided or skeptical of Europe" (Raunio 2009: 321).

Switzerland might be a case in point, as its stance towards European integration has remained a highly controversial topic during the last three decades. European integration is an essential component of the new "globalization cleavage", and it has strongly contributed to changes in cleavage structures, electoral competition and the party system all over Europe (see Kriesi et

\textsuperscript{2} The two trends are related, meaning that the growing number of bilateral agreements also fostered indirect Europeanization (Jenni 2014a and 2014b). On the one hand, a number of legislative changes arising from unilateral adaptation to EU rules were introduced in order to prepare subsequent bilateral negotiations. On the other hand, bilateral agreements prompted domestic legislative changes in related or adjacent fields.
al. 2008). The "globalization cleavage" is articulated by populist right and Eurosceptic parties, of which the Swiss People's Party is the main representative in Switzerland.

The Swiss party system has long been seen as a paradigmatic case of stability, with low electoral volatility, small changes in party strength across elections and the same government coalition form 1959 to 2003 (i.e. two seats for the Social Democrats, two for the Liberals, two for the Christian Democrats, and one for the Swiss People’s Party). However, the traditional religious and class cleavages have declined since the 1980s, and a new conflict between the “losers” (i.e., the working class and the old middle class) and “winners” (i.e., the new middle class and upper class) of globalization has emerged. This globalization cleavage translates into a conflict over the country’s desired level of openness to international cooperation and European integration — that is, a conflict over the openness/closeness dimension (Brunner and Sciarini 2002; Hug and Trechsel 2002; Kriesi et al. 2008).

This change went hand in hand with the programmatic transformation of the Swiss People’s Party that has turned into a populist right party since the late 1980s (Mazzoleni 2003; Oesch 2008; Skenderovic 2009). As a response to the growing political, ethnic, and cultural competition associated with globalization, the party has supported the isolation of the country with respect to European integration, the safeguard of Switzerland’s key institutions (i.e. neutrality, direct democracy, and federalism), and the tightening of the country’s immigration and asylum policy.

By so doing, the Swiss People’s Party differentiated from the other two right-wing governmental parties (i.e. the Liberals and the Christian Democrats). Indeed, the electoral rise of the Swiss People’s Party owes much to its new issues profile. The party vote share has more than doubled (from 12% to 29%) between 1991 and 2007. This came at the expense of both Liberals and Christian Democrats, as well as nongovernmental (mostly far-right) parties. Once considered the junior partner of the governing coalition, the Swiss People's Party has become the first party in the lower Chamber of Parliament, where it holds as many seats as the other two right-wing governing parties put together. Additionally, the rise of the Swiss People's party has also extended to "office-seeking". After a lively debate, the party gained a second seat in the Federal Council in 2003 at the expense of the Christian Democrats³.

³ This additional governmental seat was offered to the charismatic party leader, Christoph Blocher. The other governing parties were irritated by the continuing opposition behavior of the Swiss People's Party and decided to
As a populist right and Eurosceptic party, the Swiss People’s Party is likely to heavily rely on parliamentary instruments both to oppose further integration of Switzerland into the EU (i.e. "policy-seeking" strategy) and to increase their visibility on the issues they "own" (i.e. "vote-seeking" strategy) (Varone et al. 2014).

Similarly, it has been argued that MPs from opposition parties are more prone to Europeanize the parliamentary agenda, as part of their strategy to demarcate themselves from government parties (Navarro and Brouard 2014, Raunio and Hix 2000). At a first glance, the distinction between government and opposition does not make much sense in the Swiss consensus democracy, since all major political parties are represented in government. On closer inspection, however, the distinction also matters in Switzerland. In the Swiss 'assembly-independent system' (Shugart and Carey 1992) votes of confidence and coalition agreements between parties do not exist. Therefore, parties do not need to behave loyally in government and may even play the double game of government and opposition. The Swiss People's Party forcefully relies on such a double game strategy, especially with respect to issues relating to its programmatic core, namely immigration and law and order (Varone et al. 2014).

In sum, in Switzerland – as in other countries – the distinction Eurosceptic vs pro- or neutral EU-parties and opposition vs government parties overlaps to a large extent. Our fourth and fifth hypotheses thus read as follows: *MPs from the Swiss People's Party introduce more Europeanized parliamentary interventions than MPs from other parties* (Hypothesis 4). Furthermore, *MPs from the Swiss People's Party introduce more Europeanized parliamentary interventions on its core issues* (Hypothesis 5).

If Euroscepticism is a key driver of the Europeanization of parliamentary agendas, this should be observable in the tone of parliamentary interventions. In general, the economic crisis of the late 2000s and the budgetary crisis in the Euro-zone have negatively affected the image of European integration. When it comes to Switzerland, the government's bilateral strategy of incremental and sectoral integration has met with resistance since the mid-2000s, as the EU has proven increasingly reluctant to accommodate Swiss demands for "à la carte" integration. This is likely to translate into a growing share of parliamentary interventions with a negative tone towards the EU over time.

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sanction the party leader. Consequently, the government changed again in 2007, when Parliament did not reelect Christoph Blocher, but opted instead for another member of the Swiss People's Party who was not supported by its own party.
Further, as suggested by Auel (2007: 500-504), Holzhacker (2002: 477) and Saalfeld (2005), the resort to parliamentary interventions by opposition-like parties such as the Swiss People's Party (SPP) in Switzerland fulfills a «political scrutiny» function. The Swiss People's Party is likely to challenge the government by criticizing the appropriateness of its European policy and by opposing bilateral agreements and autonomous adaptation to EU rules. By contrast, there are no strong electoral incentives for non-Eurosceptic governing parties (the Social Democrats –SDP–, the Christian Democrats –CDP– and the Radical-Liberals –RLP–) to politically scrutinize the Executive. These parties rather tend to focus on a «monitoring scrutiny» (Auel 2007), which consists in asking the Executive to inform, to clarify and to explain its policy strategy. This less intrusive scrutiny may seek to avoid a ministerial drift in EU matters (Navarro and Brouard 2014, Finke and Herbel 2015), to strengthen the bargaining position of the government at the EU level and to protect the government from Eurosceptic parties (Holzhacker 2002: 467). Consequently, the tone of parliamentary interventions introduced by non-Eurosceptic, governmental parties should be neutral or even positive towards the EU.

Based on the above, we expect the tone of parliamentary interventions on Europeanized issues to be increasingly negative over time (Hypothesis 6). In addition, we assume that Europeanized parliamentary proposal instruments (parliamentary initiatives, motions and postulates) have a more positive tone than Europeanized parliamentary control instruments (questions and interpellations) (Hypothesis 7).

3. Data

Our initial dataset includes all parliamentary initiatives, motions, postulates, questions and interpellations introduced in either Chamber of the Swiss parliament between 1984 and 2014, i.e. 40'592 parliamentary interventions. Parliamentary proposals (initiatives, motions, postulates) enable MPs to initiate legislative processes and hence fulfill agenda-setting functions. A postulate is easier to use than a parliamentary motion or initiative,⁴ but it is less constraining for the executive and more limited in effects. The postulate requires the Federal Council (the Swiss government) to write a report on a given issue. It is up to the government to decide whether that should lead to a legislative change. By contrast, a motion obliges the Federal Council to prepare a bill. The parliamentary initiative is even more powerful since it allows the Parliament to submit a bill and to control the decision-making process from start to

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⁴ A "postulate" must only be approved by the Chamber to which its author belongs, whereas a motion or an initiative must be approved by both Chambers.
finish, thus by-passing the executive. Parliamentary questions and interpellations are of more symbolic nature and mainly fulfill ex-post, control functions; they also serve as information gathering and communication channels towards the media and the public (Bailer 2011). Written questions can be introduced in both Chambers of Swiss Parliament. In addition, in the National Council (the lower Chamber of Swiss Parliament), there is a parliamentary question hour, which takes place at the beginning of the second and third week of each session, and are also used by MPs to voice the interests of their constituencies or interest groups, to draw attention to specific topics and to develop a competence reputation on these topics (ibid). In Switzerland, there are no legal limitations as to the number or the scope of parliamentary interventions that MPs can introduce. However, organizational peculiarities of the Swiss parliament do generate important limitations. According to the "militia" system at work in Switzerland, MPs' involvement is part-time and incidental to a principal professional activity. As a result, the Swiss parliament usually meets only four times a year, for three-week sessions (plus possible extraordinary sessions). Given that MPs can introduce parliamentary interventions during sessions only, this obviously limits the number of interventions.

In order to capture whether a parliamentary intervention is Europeanized, we relied on a keyword search with terms making reference to European integration. Between 1984 and 2014, out of the 40'592 parliamentary interventions we identified 2'388 interventions dealing with a Europeanized issue. For this set of parliamentary interventions we manually coded their

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5 According to the Federal Law on Parliament of 2002, the treatment of the parliamentary initiative involves two stages. When a proposal is made, the corresponding Parliamentary Committee first decides whether it will proceed with this proposal. If not, the process stops. If yes, the parliamentary committee is then responsible for the legislative work, which must eventually be approved by the Plenum of both Chambers.

6 Note that questions do not give rise to any debate in Parliament. The Federal Council (the Swiss government) responds directly to the MP who raised the question. However, if the Swiss government responds during the "questions hour", the MP who raised the question is allowed to ask a "follow-up" question.

7 The only exception regards parliamentary committees, which may introduce motions or initiatives whenever they want. Empirically, the number of such interventions is however relatively low.

8 We relied on a computer keyword search based on regular expressions. The list of EU-related keywords comes from the cross-national "Delors' Myth project" (Brouard et al. 2012: 10). Terms include: European Union, European Community, European Economic Community, Common Market, Single Market, European Market, European Coal and Steel Community, European Atomic Energy Community, European Monetary Union and European Monetary System, European Directive, Community law, European law, and their acronyms. As done in the past, we relied on the French version of the texts and included "Schengen" and "European Economic Area" for Switzerland (Gava and Varone 2012: 207).
respective issue domains. In addition, we also coded the issue topic of a subset of parliamentary interventions dealing with a domestic issue, which were introduced from 1995 to 2003. Thus, while our analysis of Europeanized parliamentary interventions covers 30 years (1984-2014), for the period 1995-2003 we can compare parliamentary interventions dealing with Europeanized and with domestic issues.

Issue domains were coded (by hand) in accordance to the categories of the "Policy Agendas Project" (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Green-Pedersen and Walgrave 2014). This coding scheme comprises 20 major topic categories and more than 200 subcategories. In the present paper we concentrate on the major categories. For some analyses, we aggregate the 20 categories into six larger categories: economics ("banking, finance, and domestic commerce", "agriculture" and "space, science, technology and communications"), environment ("environment", "energy", "transportation" and "public lands"), foreign affairs ("foreign affairs", "foreign trade" and "defense"), government ("government operations" and "macroeconomics"), immigration/law and order ("civil rights, minority issues, and civil liberties", "immigration and refugee issues" and "law, crime, and family issues") and welfare ("labor and employment", "health", "education", "social welfare" and "community development and housing issues").

The dataset includes information on MPs’ parties, which allows assessing the role of partisan moderators in parliamentary activities. When breaking the analysis down to the level of parties, we will focus on the four largest, governing parties: The Social Democratic Party, the Christian Democratic Party, the Radical-Liberal Party and the Swiss People's Party. These parties together hold more than 80% of the seats in the Swiss parliament, and they also authored more than 80% of all parliamentary interventions between 1984 and 2014 (and even more than 85% of all Europeanized parliamentary interventions).

Last, but not least, we also manually coded the tone towards the EU integration process of Europeanized parliamentary interventions. The tone refers to MPs’ positions and attitudes towards the EU and towards the impact of the EU at the domestic level. Based on the title and full text of parliamentary interventions, the manual coding captures the Europhile (positive), Eurosceptic (negative) or neutral character of MPs’ statements. For instance, interventions calling for the deepening of policy integration with the EU or the unilateral adaption of EU rules were coded as positive (1); interventions requesting information on the state of bilateral negotiations with the EU, on the governments’ European policy more generally, or on the cost of participation of Switzerland in EU programs and initiatives were coded as neutral (0); and interventions criticizing the impact of EU immigrants on the labor market were coded as
negative (-1). The mean of the scores obtained through this coding is the *average tone* towards the EU.

### 4. Results

The seven research hypotheses presented above allow us to assess variations in the Europeanization of parliamentary interventions over time (H1), between types of parliamentary instruments (i.e. proposals/agenda-setting versus control/scrutiny) (H2), in issue concentration of the parliamentary agenda (H3), between political parties (H4 and H5), and in tone (H6 and H7). In addition, we cross these various analytical dimensions, whereby we must cope with data limitations, meaning that the small number of observations prevents multiple crossings.

The first hypothesis anticipates an increase in the Europeanization of parliamentary attention over time. It is partly confirmed (see Figure 1). The graph on the top of figure 1 shows the absolute number of Europeanized parliamentary interventions introduced in a year, whereas the graph on the bottom shows the share of EU-related interventions as a proportion of all parliamentary interventions introduced in a year. The number of Europeanized interventions has constantly increased since the early 1980s. So has the relative share of Europeanized interventions during the first third of the period under consideration, namely from 1984 to 1992. This strong increase has been triggered by the Single Market project and the related negotiation on the European Economic Area between EU and countries members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). However, the share of Europeanized parliamentary attention has remained relatively stable since then. While the number of parliamentary interventions dealing with a Europeanized issue has continued to grow, Swiss MPs have also introduced an increasing number of parliamentary interventions on domestic policy issues, which accounts for the stability of the amount of Europeanized interventions in relative terms.\(^9\)

\(^9\) Note that there are no observable effects of the electoral cycle on the degree of Europeanization, meaning that there are not more Europeanized parliamentary interventions in election years.
On average across the whole period under study, the share of Europeanized parliamentary interventions amounts to 5.9% (7.2% for questions/interpellations and 3.9% for initiatives/motions/postulates).\textsuperscript{10} This seems like a rather high share in comparative perspective, especially bearing in mind that Switzerland is not an EU-member. For example, the average share of Europeanized questions is substantially higher in Switzerland (7.1%) than in France (3.7% between 1988 and 2007 according to Navarro and Brouard 2014: 100-101). In addition, while in France the degree of Europeanization of laws is far higher than that of parliamentary questions (more than 10% against less than 4%), there is no such difference in Switzerland, where between 1987 and 2007 the share of Europeanized laws has also amounted to 6% (Gava

\textsuperscript{10} The overwhelming share (more than 90%) of parliamentary interventions on both Europeanized and domestic issues were introduced in the National Council. This result is in line with earlier results showing the far more intense agenda-setting and control activities of that Chamber, in comparison with the Council of States (e.g. Sciarini 2007).
and Varone 2012: 209). By contrast, in Switzerland there is a marked difference in the degree of Europeanization between parliamentary questions or laws, on the one side, and bills introduced by the Swiss government, on the other. For bills (legislative proposals), the degree of Europeanization has amounted to 12% between 1987 and 2007 (Gava and Varone 2012: 212). This result is in line with the view that the government leads the tango in Europeanized policy domains (Gava and Varone 2014, Sciarini 2015b).

The second research hypothesis states that, when it comes to Europeanization, MPs are likely to show a stronger preference for scrutiny activities, than for agenda-setting activities. This expectation is borne out by the data (see Figure 2).

*Figure 2: Share of Europeanized parliamentary interventions (controls and proposals) per year (1984-2014)*

With the exception of a single year (1999), the share of Europeanized questions and interpellations (control or scrutiny function) has been systematically higher than the share of Europeanized parliamentary initiatives, motions and postulates (proposal or agenda-setting function). However, until the late 1990s the difference in Europeanization between the two
parliamentary functions was rather small. It has become larger since then. In several years the degree of Europeanization of control instruments is twice as high as that of agenda-setting instruments.

Turning to the analysis of differences in issue attention over time, we can assess the degree of issue dispersion on Europeanized issues by calculating Shannon’s H, a measure of information entropy (e.g. Jennings et al. 2011: 1011). In our study, we distinguish between 20 policy topics categories: entropy scores range thus from 0 to the natural log of 20 (3.0), with lower scores indicating that attention is concentrated on a few policy issues and higher scores that attention is more equally distributed between a large number of policy issues. Given that the number of Europeanized interventions per year is small, we calculate the entropy score for periods of eight years (seven years for the most recent period).

According to our third hypothesis, we should observe a decreasing issue concentration of parliamentary interventions on Europeanized issues over time. This expectation is partly supported by the data: attention is slightly more equally distributed for the last two periods than for the first two periods under investigation (see Table 1). However, there is no linear increase in dispersion over time. In addition, the difference in issue concentration between periods is not large. A closer look at the attention devoted to specific issue topics shows that attention to issues relating to "foreign policy" in general has almost halved (from 29% to 16%). The relative decrease in attention has been even higher with respect to "transportation" (from 12% to 5%). By contrast, the share of parliamentary interventions dealing with "immigration" has more than tripled during the period under study (from 4 to 13%).

Table 1: Dispersion of issue attention of parliamentary interventions on Europeanized issues across time (entropy scores, N between parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europeanized issues</td>
<td>2.52 (167)</td>
<td>2.54 (566)</td>
<td>2.67 (768)</td>
<td>2.65 (887)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic issues</td>
<td>2.83 (4'880)</td>
<td>2.82 (4'409)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This said, the most striking result is perhaps the overall low level of issue concentration of parliamentary interventions on Europeanized issues. A tentative comparison with issue concentration of parliamentary interventions on domestic issues confirms this view. As already mentioned, data on issue attention of parliamentary interventions on domestic issues is available for a sub-period only, i.e. from 1995 to 2003. This nevertheless allows us to calculate entropy
scores for the years 1995-1999 and 2000-2003, and thus to – partly – cover two of the four periods appearing in table 1. During these two sub-periods, the entropy score for parliamentary interventions on domestic issues amounts to 2.82-2.83. Parliamentary interventions are thus more evenly distributed across issues for domestic issues than for Europeanized issues, but the difference is small. The fairly high issue dispersion of Europeanized parliamentary interventions contrasts with the limited range of issues covered by the two sets of bilateral agreements with the EU. This suggests that the Europeanization of Swiss politics goes far beyond the issue topics addressed in these bilateral agreements. In fact, in addition to the so-called direct form of Europeanization, which takes place when Switzerland concludes bilateral agreements with the EU, we have already mentioned that Europeanization also occurred indirectly, when Switzerland adapts unilaterally to EU rules (Sciarini et al. 2004, Fischer and Sciarini 2014, Gava et al. 2014). The issue dispersion of parliamentary attention on Europeanized issues is arguably the result of this indirect form of EU influence on the Swiss law-making process.\(^\text{11}\)

The next hypotheses (4 and 5) focus on partisan politics. More specifically, they conjecture about the different strategies followed by the non-Eurosceptic parties (Social Democrats, Christian Democrats and Radical-Liberals) and the major Eurosceptic and opposition-like party (Swiss People's Party). The fourth hypothesis stipulates that MPs from the Swiss People's Party introduce more Europeanized parliamentary interventions than MPs from other parties. Empirical results are overall in line with this expectation (see Table 2). First, the overall share of Europeanized interventions (last row) is slightly higher among MPs from the Swiss People's Party than among its right-wing or left-wing competitors. While the differences are small, they are in the expected direction. Second, MPs of the Swiss People's Party have authored 23% of all Europeanized interventions introduced during the 1984-2014 period in the Swiss Parliament. This is a fairly high share, especially in comparison with the electoral strength of that party, which has remained stable around 12% until 1995, and has peaked to 29% in 2007.\(^\text{12}\)

Table 2 additionally shows some interesting differences between proposals and control activities across parties. The degree of Europeanization of control instruments is higher for the

\(^{11}\) An additional analysis, not reported here, confirms that dispersion is systematically higher for indirectly than for directly Europeanized issues. However, the difference between the two types of issues has decreased over time, as a result of an increase in dispersion of directly Europeanized issues.

\(^{12}\) These figures correspond to the shares of seats the Swiss People's Party has received the National Council, the lower Chamber of Swiss Parliament. In the Council of Sates (upper Chamber), the Swiss People's Party has never held more than 15% of seats.
Swiss People's Party than for the Radical-Liberal Party and, even more so, for the Christian Democratic Party or the Social Democratic Party. By contrast, the share of Europeanized proposals is higher for Radical-Liberals and Christian Democrats than for the Swiss People's Party – but it is even lower for Social Democrats.\textsuperscript{13} While for all four governing parties questions and interpellations account for the bulk of parliamentary interventions on Europeanized issues, this holds especially so for the Swiss People's Party.\textsuperscript{14} For this party the share of questions and interpellations amounts to 84% of all Europeanized interventions, which is 10 to 15 percentage points more than for the other three governing parties. In other words, the Swiss People's Party has strongly contributed to the Europeanization of parliamentary attention, especially through control instruments.

\textit{Table 2: Share of Europeanized parliamentary interventions by party (1984-2014)}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Controls (questions and interpellations)</th>
<th>Proposals (parliamentary initiative, motions and postulates)</th>
<th>All parliamentary interventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Swiss People's Party</td>
<td>9.7% (458)</td>
<td>4% (89)</td>
<td>7.9% (547)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical-Liberals</td>
<td>9.2% (348)</td>
<td>5.3% (118)</td>
<td>7.7% (466)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democrats</td>
<td>7.3% (241)</td>
<td>4.3% (109)</td>
<td>6% (350)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democrats</td>
<td>6.5% (447)</td>
<td>3.5% (129)</td>
<td>5.5% (576)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown in Figure 3, when looking at the data by time periods, the Swiss People's Party is the party that has paid increasing attention to the EU over time. Consequently, it has taken the lead from the Radical-Liberals during the last time period (2008-2014). Interestingly enough, the degree of Europeanization of parliamentary interventions has decreased during the most recent period (2008-2014) for all parties except for the Swiss People's Party, for which it has continued

\textsuperscript{13} We calculated two sample tests for differences in proportions and confirm that the Swiss People's Party is the only party for which the difference between the share of Europeanized control instruments and the share of Europeanized proposal instruments is statistically significant.

\textsuperscript{14} A comparison with parliamentary interventions on domestic issue confirms the specificity of Europeanized parliamentary interventions: In contrast to the latter, the former do not show similar differences across parties; the Swiss People's Party has not introduced a higher share of control interventions on domestic issues than the three other government parties.
to grow, reaching 8.8%. This is more than 2 percentage points more (or more than 30% in relative terms) than the Radical-Liberal Party.
The fifth hypothesis combines the party dimension with the issue attention dimension. Our theoretical expectation is that MPs of the Swiss People's Party introduce more Europeanized parliamentary interventions on its core issues, namely on immigration/law and order issues, than MPs from other parties. This hypothesis is strongly supported by Figure 4, which reports the differences in issue attention between parties for six groups of issues: (1) economics, (2) environment, (3) foreign affairs, (4) government, (5) immigration/law and order, and (6) welfare state. For the whole period under study, parliamentary interventions on issues dealing with immigration/law and order amount to 21% of the total attention that the Swiss People's Party devotes to Europeanized issues. The corresponding figure is far lower for the other governing parties (about 12%). In addition, a closer look at the data shows that this result is entirely due to control instruments (i.e. questions and interpellations). By contrast, the share of proposals regarding this group of issues is quite similar across all parties. Finally, it should be noted that the interventions introduced by the Swiss People's Party on issues belonging to its programmatic core contribute to about 42% of the total parliamentary attention to these issues.
(i.e. 277 parliamentary interventions in total). This result is again all the more impressive, if one takes into account that during the period under study the Swiss People’s Party has held between 12% and 29% of the seats in the National Council— and far less in the Council of States. A previous study based on a content analysis of electoral manifestoes found that the Swiss People's Party has increasingly focused on its key policy issues (immigration/law and order) between 1979-87 (10%) and 1991-2007 (18%) (Varone et al. 2014: 109). The present results suggest that once elected MPs from the Swiss People's Party have translated these electoral pledges into parliamentary activities.

Figure 4: Share of Europeanized interventions by policy domain and party (1984-2014)

Reading example: The average share of attention devoted to foreign affairs amounts to 26%. The corresponding share is 7 percentage points lower for the Christian Democratic Party and about 4% higher for the Social Democratic Party.

Moving to the analysis of the tone of Europeanized parliamentary interventions, in line with our sixth hypothesis we observe a clear trend towards more negativism over time (see Figure 5). In the initial period (1984-91), the average tone of all parliamentary interventions was
The average tone of parliamentary interventions introduced by MPs of the Swiss People's Party already differed significantly from that of the three other government parties in the 1990s.

A slight majority of parliamentary interventions are still neither in favor of nor in opposition to the EU, but we observe a strong increase of EU-critical interventions (21%) and a slight decrease of EU-supportive interventions (26%).

The average tone of parliamentary interventions introduced by Social-Democrats was significantly more positive than those of the two moderate right parties (Liberals and Christian-Democrats) already in the second period under investigation (from 2000 to 2007), and has remained so in the most recent period.
Finally, our data also lends support to our seventh and last hypothesis (see Figure 6). The tone of parliamentary questions and interpellations (control instruments) is more negative, on average, than the tone of parliamentary initiatives, motions and postulates (proposal instruments). This is not really surprising as we already noted that the Swiss People's Party relies more than other parties on control instruments (see Hypothesis 4), and adopts a more negative stance than other parties (see Hypothesis 6). In sum, MPs of the Eurosceptic party have strong incentives to resort to control instruments and to use them to blame the government for its European policy. Raising critical questions and interpellations arguably increases the visibility and "newsworthiness" of their parliamentary interventions and, therefore, contributes to the vote-seeking strategy of the Swiss People’s Party. Figure 6 further shows that the increase in negativism (or decrease in positivism) over time holds for both control instruments and, even more so, for agenda-setting instruments. The drop in positive tone of parliamentary questions

Note: This figure distinguishes only three periods due to low N before the 1990s.
and interpellations has been especially spectacular during the last period under study (2008-2014).

A closer look at the data shows the following examples of interventions from MPs of the Swiss People's Party with a negative tone: fight against initiatives promoting Swiss membership in the EU, willingness to limit immigration from the EU, criticism against the effects of the free movement of persons with the EU on the Swiss labor market (e.g., rise of unemployment), complaints about the loss of national sovereignty and identity due to deeper integration and collaboration with the EU, call for stopping negotiations for further integration and collaboration with the EU in specific areas (e.g., agricultural products), grievances against the negative effects of the unilateral adoption of EU directives and standards into Swiss legislation. By contrast, examples of interventions with a positive tone introduced by Social Democrats include demands to promote Swiss membership in the EU, to participate in various EU programs and initiatives (e.g., Schengen, RAPEX), to unilaterally adapt domestic legislation to EU directives and standards in different areas (e.g., consumer protection and safety, transportation, environmental and health issues), to invest in programs aimed at promoting citizen knowledge about the functioning of the EU and its institutions, to invest more in the representation of national interests in Brussels, or to align with the EU position in international affairs.
5. Conclusion

Based on a rich collection of all parliamentary interventions dealing with EU-related issues from 1984 to 2014, we have analyzed the Europeanization of parliamentary agenda in Switzerland. Our findings are overall in line with our research hypotheses and they tell a fairly consistent story. First, we find that the Europeanization of parliamentary interventions has increased over time in absolute figures and it has also initially increased in relative terms, before stabilizing on a comparatively high level. Second, on Europeanized issues Swiss MPs use parliamentary instruments more as control tools than as agenda-setting devices, which mirrors the institutional and political balance of power between the executive and the legislature. Third, from the perspective of issue attention our results display a more complex but not less interesting picture. On the one hand, the empirical evidence shows a slight increase in issue dispersion over time, which is consistent with the broadening of the scope of issues covered by
the direct and indirect forms of Europeanization. Issue dispersion is in fact surprisingly high, which suggests that the EU influence has spread to a wide range of policy domains. On the other hand, we have also witnessed important changes in terms of issue attention to some specific issues. More specifically, we find that the main Eurosceptic party, the Swiss People's Party, has increasingly focused its parliamentary activities — and more specifically its scrutiny activities — on the "core issues" of its political program (immigration/law and order).

As it turns out, the Swiss People's Party has been the main driver of the aforementioned changes over time. By the same token, it has also played a leading role in the increasingly negative tone of parliamentary interventions on EU-related issues. The behavior of the Swiss People's Party is coherent with the broader programmatic change of that party, i.e. to its drift to the far right, and the result of a vote-seeking strategy. In that sense, the Europeanization of parliamentary activities has not only been driven by policy-seeking strategies but also — and perhaps primarily — by considerations relating to domestic electoral competition.

While this article has offered important insights into the Europeanization of Swiss parliament, it has some limitations, which relate to its focus on Europeanized parliamentary interventions and to its descriptive and single country character. First, the limited information regarding issue topic for parliamentary interventions on domestic issues (for the 1995-2003 period) has prevented us from systematically investigating the differences in the allocation of attention across issues in Europeanized and in domestic issues. True, our results show that issue dispersion of Europeanized interventions is higher than expected, which at first glance goes against the view that Europeanization "crowds out" issues that are salient domestically but do not make their way on the international arena. However, we cannot be sure whether and to what extent Europeanization is associated with a concentration of attention, unless we systematically compare issue attention in Europeanized and domestic issues. That will be a natural step forwards, but will first require additional coding of parliamentary interventions on domestic issues for the years 1984-1992 and 2004-2014.

Second, to go beyond the mainly descriptive perspective used in this study, we wish to adopt a comparative perspective across countries. Given its peculiar status of "non-EU member", Switzerland may serve as a control case in cross-national inquiries about the consequences of Europeanization (Haverland 2007). With respect of economic integration into the European Single Market, however, Switzerland's "customized quasi-membership" (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008) renders it amenable to comparisons with EU countries (Haverland 2014). Comparing the Europeanization of the parliamentary agenda in Switzerland with that in EU countries might provide important insights into the role of EU-membership, but also of other institutional factors.
such as the government system, the party system or the degree of consensus versus majoritarian democracy.

References


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