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Naming Feeling: Exploring the Equivalence of Emotion Terms in Five European Languages

Anna Ogarkova, Cristina Soriano and Caroline Lehr

Abstract:

Across various disciplines a number of methods have emerged that attempt to establish equivalence between various concepts that words in various languages point to. This study reports the results of a study that adopts a reference-based methodology which uses emotional situations to elicit emotion labels in four emotion categories (ANGER, SHAME, GUILT, and PRIDE). The similarities and differences in how five different lingual populations (English, German, French, Spanish, Russian) completed the task are assessed. The results are discussed in the light of differences in the lexicalization of specific emotion domains and cultural factors mediating the emotion-labelling process.

Keywords:

Anger, shame, guilt, pride, translation, mapping method, equivalence, labelling, emotion-eliciting events, cross-cultural differences.

1. Introduction

Understanding how language can serve as a powerful “toolbox for influencing social reality” (Fiedler, 2008) requires understanding how the process of making sense of the world is mediated by factors such as personality, gender, social status, and culture. The effects that culture has on the ascription of meaning and

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significance to phenomena and events and on the way those phenomena and events are labelled in various languages\(^2\) become central in the global world where communication between people of different linguistic, social and cultural backgrounds is burgeoning and where carefully elaborated culture-sensitive strategies to minimize the risks of misinterpretation become imperative.

This paper approaches these issues from an applied perspective. In particular, we focus on the ways in which people of different cultural backgrounds ascribe meaning to emotional situations by labelling the emotions they would experience in those cases. The study adopts a reference-based methodology to elicit emotion terms pertaining to four broad emotion categories (ANGER, SHAME, GUILT, and PRIDE\(^3\)) in five different lingual groups (English, French, German, Spanish, and Russian).

The aim of this study is two-fold. Firstly, we aim to assess to what extent the words used to label the emotions reported to be experienced in the same set of situations would converge across different languages, suggesting similarities in the appraisal and interpretation of those emotional situations. The second goal is to test if there are meaningful divergences in how the five language groups label emotional situations, and, if so, if those divergences could be accounted for by cultural factors.

We start with a brief overview of cross-lingual translatability and the relative equivalence of emotion words (Section 1.1). We then proceed with an outline of the two major groups of methods that emerged cross-disciplinarily to establish the relative equivalence between emotion words: the translation method and the mapping method (Section 1.2). The outline of the rationale of the present study, where the advantages of using emotional situations as evocative stimuli are discussed (Section 2), is followed by a detailed account of the methodology used (Section 3). Finally, we present our results concerning the assessment of the overall effectiveness of our method (Section 4.1), and the findings related to cross-cultural differences in how five lingual groups labelled emotional situations (Section 4.2).

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\(^2\) Our reference to conceptualization, on the one hand, and verbalization, on the other, should not be taken to imply we treat them as distinct and non-related processes. On the contrary, we largely agree with Rosch (1978) in that the outcomes of categorization / conceptualization of objects and events can be reliably assessed through the way people label those objects and events.

\(^3\) Following the convention in cognitive linguistics, emotion concepts will be capitalized. Italics are used for the specific emotion terms in a language.
1.1. Cross-lingual translatability and the equivalence of emotion terms as a domain of enquiry

Our study is concerned with the lexical equivalence of emotion terms. In the domain of comparative research on lexicons in general (Swadesh, 1952; Greenberg, 1952; Immler, 1991) and emotion vocabularies in particular (e.g., Russell, 1991; Hupka, 1999; Wierzbicka, 1999), the question of equivalence is frequently framed within the debate on universality vs. cultural-specificity of emotion conceptualization and expression.

Some evidence has been collected concerning regularities and similarities in how languages carve up the affective space. For instance, Wierzbicka (1999: 286-294) hypothesizes the universality of “anger-like”, “fear-like” and “shame-like” words (but see Goddard, 2001). Likewise, large-scale analyses of over 60 languages have attempted to establish a sequence with which emotion categories have evolved cross-lingually (Hupka, 1999), and evidence is provided on ANGER and GUILT being the first emotion categories to get encoded in any language that has words to denote affective states.

These and other studies seeking to establish if there are lexical or semantic universals in the emotion domain have been extensively challenged by another research orientation which defends the absence of emotional universals and the incommensurability of the existing emotion vocabularies in natural languages. Some of the arguments against universality have taken a statistical turn. Namely, it has been argued that whereas almost 7 thousand living languages (Crystal, 1977; Ethnologue, http://www.ethnologue.com/) have been cataloged in the world (of which 82% are spoken by populations of under 100 thousand people and of which 8% are nearly extinct), the best exemplars of research in the field consider the evidence from a maximum of 500 languages, and doubts have been raised as to the representativeness of any specific selection (Evans and Levinson, 2009).

Another influential source of evidence against universality has been the ethnographic and anthropological fieldwork on emotion terms in non-Western societies. First, it has been shown that some languages lack exact lexical equivalents of emotions glossed in English as joy, disgust, fear, surprise, depression or anxiety (Briggs, 1970; Levy, 1973; Wierzbicka, 1986; Jadhav, 1996; Leff, 1973; Leighton et al., 1960). Secondly, a variety of languages have been reported to not make a lexical distinction and, therefore, subsume under one single label two seemingly distinct terms (in English), like sadness and anger in Ilongot and Ifaluk (Lutz, 1982, 1988; Rosaldo, 1980), shame and embarrassment in the Pintupi and Indonesian languages (Myers, 1979; Lutz, 1988), or sadness and sympathy in Amharic (Amberber, 2001). Finally, quite a few languages have been reported to have emotion terms that are lacunae in other languages, such as toska in Russian, amae in Japanese, Schadenfreude in
German, *saudade* in Portuguese, or *przykro* in Polish, among numerous others (see, e.g., Russell, 1991; Pavlenko, 2005; Ogarkova, in press; Ogarkova et al., in press, for overviews).

Having said that, the fact that there seems to be no word-to-word match in the emotion lexicons of various languages does not necessarily entail that the meanings at stake cannot be translated from language X into language Y. The so-called “Strong Effability” and “Strong Translatability” hypotheses (Katz, 1976) claim just that. These views submit that anything that can be said [i.e., is effable] in one natural language can be translated exactly into another language (von Fintel and Matthewson, 2008) and that “every proposition can be expressed by a sentence in each natural language” (Katz, 1976: 36). Effability is largely assumed by modern semanticists; for example, van Benthem (1991: 25) suggests that “every useful meaning can be verbalized”. Similar views on translatability are voiced by translation scholars who argue that, despite obvious differences in linguistic structure (grammar, vocabulary, etc.) of different languages, meaning can still be adequately expressed across languages (Hatim and Munday, 2004: 15).

It should be stressed, however, that none of the positions above require that the same meanings are realized in two languages at the same structural level. What in one language can be expressed by a word might require a rather complex expression in another language. As Fintel and Matthewson (2009: 144) formulate it, “what language X expresses simply is also expressible in language Y but at the price of some complexity”. For instance, while English is reported to lack an exact lexical equivalent of the Japanese emotion term *ijirashii* (Araki, 1994, cited in Pavlenko, 2005: 82, and Russell, 1991: 426), its meaning can be rendered into English descriptively as “a feeling of empathy and pity associated with seeing someone weak but praiseworthy overcome an obstacle or do a good deed”.

The above suggests that the best (or the only possible in some cases) translation across languages may involve a transition from one structural level in language X (e.g., a word) to another level in language Y (e.g., a paraphrase). Furthermore, if one considers the available evidence on how languages differ in the dominant grammatical categories encoding emotions (see, e.g., Pavlenko, 2005; Semin et al., 2002; Becher, 2003), it also seems reasonable to assume that in some cases a better translation of a word in language X can be a word of another morphological class in language Y. For instance, the Russian language has been reported to have “no noun corresponding to English *anger*” (Wierzbicka, 1998: 22), and some researchers assert that the closest equivalents to the English noun *anger* are the Russian verbs *serdit’sja* (“to be experiencing anger, to be actively cross, mad at someone”) and *zlit’sya* (“to be angry, mad, but not necessarily at a particular person”) (Pavlenko, 2008: 152).
Yet, most cross-cultural research on emotions is concerned with the comparison of items at the same structural level of language (i.e., words are compared to words, not to descriptions or paraphrases). More to the point perhaps, the grammatical class between the emotion labels compared is most typically preserved. Therefore, some researchers focus only on emotion nouns (e.g., Shaver et al., 1987; Storm and Storm, 1987), while others consider only adjectives (e.g., Galati et al., 2008). The rationale for such a specialization may well be justified, not least because the focus on a specific grammatical class of words can predetermine what actually is the object of comparison. For instance, while emotion adjectives (e.g., joyful) are widely held to be more easily associated with immediate emotional experience (Plutchik, 1980), emotion nouns (e.g., joy) are taken by many researchers to refer to an abstract store of representations separated from any contextual element (Conway and Bekerian, 1987). Nouns, rather than verbs or adjectives, are also assumed “to increase the psychological similarity of emotions to ‘objects’ in Rosch’s (1978) studies” (Shaver et al., 2001: 203) and, therefore, emotion nouns are mostly used in studies on emotion categorization across languages (e.g., Fehr and Russell, 1984; Shaver et al., 1987; 1999; 2001).

This advantage comes at a price. As argued earlier, nothing guarantees that the items compared (be they nouns, adjectives, or verbs) are either equivalent, or at least closer in meaning than other alternatives encoded by different grammatical categories or pertaining to other structural levels of language.

1.2. Methods to assess the relative equivalence of emotion terms

The concept of equivalence in lexical research on emotions largely resides on the fairly straightforward idea that two emotion words/expressions should share the same meaning to be considered equivalent. Yet, what exactly meaning is depends very much on the discipline in question, as a unified cross-disciplinarily consensual theory of meaning has not yet been developed. In linguistics, one could adopt a classical view of meaning as a combination of denotation and connotation (see, e.g., Besnier, 1999, for a short historical review), or a not less classical tripartite model of meaning as the union of the referential, the affective and the social (Lyons, 1977). Furthermore, meanings are also classified into prototypical/salient and peripheral/rare, literal and figurative, and meanings that are easily retrieved vs. those that require more complex processing. Whatever the classification, most semanticists agree that only a few, if any, meanings are context-invariant/insensitive, and that most combine a linguistic meaning with contextual inferences (see, e.g., Ariel, 2002). In psychology, the dominant approaches to define meaning rely on the position an item occupies on a set of general dimensions such as those captured by Osgood’s Semantic Differential
(Osgood et al., 1957), or equate meaning to a specific configuration of values on a vector of rating features (Fontaine et al., 2007).

Given the lack of interdisciplinary consensus, one of the possibilities to approach the issue of meaning equivalence in maximally general terms (so as to avoid a disciplinary bias) is to consider Frege’s well-known distinction (1960 [1892]) between the two meanings a word can have: the “sense” – i.e., the thought the word expresses – and the “reference”, the things or events to which a word points. When applied to the assessment of equivalence between emotion words, this theoretical dichotomy results in two major methodological orientations that have emerged in emotion research at large to assess the degree of similarity between cross-lingual groups (cf. Boster, 2005): the translation method, and the mapping method. In the following section, we will discuss these two groups of methods in greater detail.

1.2.1. Translation method

When the translation method is used to establish semantic equivalence, the focus of the analysis is on the semantic relationships among a set of emotion terms (Boster, 2005). One proceeds by first finding sets of emotion terms that are deemed equivalent in two (or more) languages. This is done with the help of lexicographic sources, sometimes complemented with a back-translation process carried out by a different translator. One then asks native speakers to judge the similarity of the meanings of the terms. More specifically, similarity judgments involve the participants placing all the emotion terms in a geometric 2- or 3-dimensional space, with dimensions being Arousal and Valence, as in Russell’s (1983; 1989; 1995) circumplex model, or the three classical dimensions in Osgood’s model – Evaluation, Potency and Activity (e.g., Osgood et al., 1957). Specific points occupied by individual terms in the dimensional space, as well as the distance between any of the two terms within a language, are then compared to corresponding points and differences in other language(s) (e.g., Romney et al., 1997; Russell, 1983; 1989; 1995).

It should be stressed, however, that in this method translation is a prerequisite to the rest of the analysis. That is, if one presents the participants with (relatively) equivalent emotion terms in two languages, it is hardly surprising that one then finds a fair degree of congruence in how emotion words in the two languages are placed in the dimensional space (Romney et al., 1997: 5489).

Therefore, the weakness of the method is that the degree of correspondence between emotion words cannot be assessed if one presumes to know the corresponding terms from the outset – in that case, one simply “discovers” one’s assumptions. In addition, even in cases when allegedly mutually translatable
terms in two languages appear to be judged very differently on dimensions, similarity judgments cannot inform the researchers about the reasons or criteria the speakers relied on when doing the rating.

1.2.2. The mapping method

The second major methodological approach to establish equivalence and the relationship between emotion words is known as “the mapping method” and pertains largely to the group of reference-based methods. In this group, the major criterion for semantic equivalence is shared reference - that is, the two items at stake are deemed equivalent if they point at the same phenomenon “out there” in the extra-linguistic world. Therefore, in this method, the focus of the analysis is on the mapping of emotion terms to a collection of referents. One proceeds by presenting the same emotionally evocative stimuli to native speakers of (at least) a pair of languages. Then one asks the native speakers to identify the emotion expressed or evoked by the emotional stimuli. Finally, one assesses the degree to which speakers of different languages converge in how they label the stimuli. In the mapping method, translation is a consequence of the analysis.

The mapping method is the research tactic predominantly used in the cross-cultural comparison of color classifications (e.g., Berlin and Kay, 1969; Kay et al., 1997) and in ethnobiology (e.g., Boster et al., 1986; Boster and D’Andrade, 1989). One important difference between those domains and the field of emotions is that, in the former, actual items from the domain can be presented to an informant to be identified. That is, one can show informants an exemplar: an actual color, a bird, a fish, or a mammal, and ask them to name it. But emotions are notoriously difficult in this respect because emotions are not physical “objects” we can present for identification. We can only access emotions indirectly, by evoking their causes, effects, or long-term consequences. A fairly straightforward way to identify the “exponents” of emotion that can be used as reference points is to see what actually happens when one is said to “have” an emotion.

A widely accepted theoretical view on how an emotion “unfolds” (Plutchik, 1980; Lazarus, 1991) – largely in agreement with other theoretical models such as the Component Process Model (Scherer, 2009), as well as with the “commonsense” sequence linking events and actions in emotion identified by Ellsworth (1991) and with the “folk theory” of the mind (D’Andrade, 1987) – can be approximated as follows: stimulus › interpretation › affect › behavior. Therefore, potential candidates to be used as “reference points” in mapping tasks are (1) emotion-eliciting events; (2) thoughts (appraisals), (3) expressions (e.g., facial ones), and (4) actions (behaviors).
An example of the use of *emotional expressions* as referents is the emotional face-naming task reported by Boster (2005). In this experiment, 22 photographs of an actor and an actress expressing emotions were presented to native speakers of 5 languages (English, Spanish, Polish, Italian, and Shuar). Boster first identified those photographs that were labelled by the English terms *angry, fear, happy, sad,* and *surprised.* He then proceeded to see which terms in other languages where used to label those same photographs (Table 1). Finally, he made a note of those labels in the five languages under study that were mutually translatable (i.e., which were dictionary translations of the English terms). For instance, across the five languages that were analyzed only two (English and Polish) used mutually translatable labels for angry faces (*angry* and *złość*), whereas the labels elicited by happy and surprised faces yielded dictionary translation equivalents in 4 cases out of 5. The observations are summarized in Table 1 (asterisks mark the terms that are not mutually translatable with the rest of the words). On average, mutually translatable responses were obtained for three out of five languages (60%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>Spanish</th>
<th>Polish</th>
<th>Italian</th>
<th>Shuar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>angry</td>
<td>coraje*</td>
<td>złość</td>
<td>aggressiva*</td>
<td>kajeawai*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fear</td>
<td>impresionada*</td>
<td>strach</td>
<td>paura</td>
<td>sapijmiawai*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>happy</td>
<td>feliz</td>
<td>usmiech*</td>
<td>contento</td>
<td>warawai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sad</td>
<td>triste</td>
<td>żal*</td>
<td>piangere*</td>
<td>kuntuts*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>surprised</td>
<td>sopresa</td>
<td>zdziwienie</td>
<td>sorpresa</td>
<td>awakmamkai*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On drawing conclusions from his study, Boster remarks that “if one wants translation by shared reference to more precisely match the semantics of the terms […] one would need to use descriptions of emotional scenarios […] in order for the technique to produce something closer to translation equivalents” (p. 202).

This is exactly the possibility we explore in our study. More specifically, our study has two general aims: firstly, we investigate whether if indeed using emotional scenarios as stimuli would yield more mutually translatable lexical items than the use of emotional faces; secondly, we investigate whether the discrepancies established could on principle be explained by the attested cultural differences between the lingual groups examined.
2. The present study

2.1. The rationale

The use of emotional situations as stimuli for the elicitation of emotion labels has several important advantages.

The first one is related to the amount of information a stimulus is capable of evoking in the speakers. Facial emotional expressions are interesting, but robust evidence on their recognizability has only been provided for the few basic emotional expressions (Ekman, 1972; 1999), and it seems highly implausible that complex emotions like, for example, nostalgia, reverence, or awe would have facial expressions recognizable above chance even within one cultural group (and much less cross-culturally).

Secondly, it can be reasonably argued that the use of emotional situations as referents can suggest which emotion labels in language X are closest in meaning to an untranslatable emotion word in language Y. For instance, Japanese *ijirashii* is allegedly a culture-specific emotion word to which no lexicalized equivalent exists in other languages. Yet, if one presents Japanese speakers and speakers of other languages with the prototypical situation where *ijirashii* is reported to arise – that of seeing someone weak but praiseworthy overcome an obstacle or do a good deed – one will be able to see what emotion labels correspond to *ijirashii* in languages that lack a specialized lexical designation for this particular emotion.

The third reason why situations are particularly apt as reference points in a mapping task is that, in the conceptualization of emotions, emotion-eliciting events seem to be particularly salient. Anthropological and ethnographic work in culturally diverse populations, including Samoans (Gerber, 1975), Pintupi Aborigines (Myers, 1979), and A’ara speakers of the Solomon Islands (White, 1978; 1980), contends that the types of emotional events that give rise to various emotional experiences are a central factor involved in how emotions are categorized and taxonomized in those cultures. Rather than statements about one’s inner states, emotion words are reported to capture the relationship between a person and an event (particularly those involving another person) (Lutz, 1982: 113).

Fourthly, the use of situations as referents for emotional labelling is advantageous because it can be expected to reveal cultural differences in how people speaking different languages interpret the same emotional situations. Prior research shows that a fair portion of variation in how emotional situations are interpreted across different lingual groups is mediated by cultural differences. Those cultural differences can be conceptualized in a variety of ways, including polarizations between “sociocentric” “East” vs. “egocentric” “West” (Ratner 2000), “Occidentalism” vs. “Orientalism” (Carrier, 1992;
“collectivism” vs. “individualism” (Hofstede, 1983; Triandis, 1987; Kusserow, 1999), “shame” vs. “guilt” cultures (Benedict, 1946), “horizontal” vs. “vertical” cultures (Triandis and Gelfand, 1998), “low” vs. “high context” cultures (Triandis, 1990), etc. Yet, one of the most widely and cross-disciplinary used dimensions of cultural variability, which has been robustly supported by empirical evidence, is that of individualism/collectivism, originally proposed by Hofstede (1984), and now employed in several theoretical models such as those by Triandis (1995) and Schwartz (1994). There is a substantial body of evidence suggesting that the domain of human affect – specifically, aspects pertaining to emotional event appraisal, conceptualization, expression, and regulation – is centrally mediated by the individualism/collectivism distinction and people’s self-construal style (Mesquita, 2001; Matsumoto et al., 2008; Triandis, 2001). In other words, a fundamental way in which culture shapes human behaviour is through self-construal style, i.e., how people define themselves and their relation to others in their environment (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995; Nisbett et al., 2001). Cultures deemed individualistic encourage the “independent self” construal, where people think of others as independent of each other and where self-expression, self-autonomy, and pursuit of individuality are emphasized. By contrast, collectivistic cultures are characterized by the “interdependent” self-construal style, which endorses thinking of people as highly interconnected to one another (“self-in-relation”) and where maintenance of social harmony and one’s belongingness to a group are favored over the assertion of individuality (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995, 2001; Nisbett et al., 2001).

While relatively few and rather weak cross-cultural differences have been established in prior research on European cultures (e.g., Scherer et al., 1986, 1988), the cultural groups we investigate in this study have nevertheless been reported to reflect the differences present on the collectivism/individualism dimension: Russian and Spanish have been reported as more collectivistic (Hofstede, 2001; Tower et al., 1997; Realo and Allik, 1999; Triandis and Gelfand, 1998; Tafarodi and Walters, 1999), while French, German, and English have been described as more individualistic (Hofstede, 2001). Therefore, it is pertinent to see if, and to what extent, these allegedly subtle cultural differences manifest themselves in the way people label emotional scenarios.

3. Methodology

3.1. Emotion-eliciting scenarios

The first step in the study was the construction of the situations featured in the questionnaire. The methodological approach used was the Facet Approach
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(Elison, 2005; 2007), a method elaborated within the framework of Facet Theory (Guttman, 1959). Facet Theory relies on the idea that most socio-behavioral concepts, including emotion concepts, involve multiple variables, and therefore, their study requires a systematic design for defining observations. These observations can be captured by what is defined within the theory as a mapping sentence. A mapping sentence, a basic device of Facet Theory, contains a set of variables (i.e., facets) that capture important components of an emotional situation, like the various Actors involved, the possible existence of Disadvantaged persons, the Actions carried out, as well as other important parameters such as the existence of Intention, and the Control one may have had over the action. To identify the potentially relevant facets for ANGER, SHAME, GUILT and PRIDE scenarios, and in view of the fact that it is important to sample situations as broadly as possible by including scenarios that originated from very different cultural regions, we did a facet analysis of the ISEAR\textsuperscript{4} database (Wallbott and Scherer, 1986; 1988; Scherer and Wallbott, 1994), which contains free-format accounts of emotional situations provided by over 3000 student respondents in 37 countries when cued with emotion words. The construction of the SHAME and GUILT situations was complemented by psychology studies on self-conscious emotions (shame, guilt, humiliation, among others) (Let Dillen and Johnny Fontaine, personal communication). Additionally, we derived several facets from the relevant literature surveys on ANGER and PRIDE (Tangley, 1995; Tangley and Dearing, 2002; Tafarodi and Walters, 1999; Wranik and Scherer, 2010).

These three steps produced the facets and their varieties summarized in Table 2. Since most of the predicted variation between the lingual groups under study concerns differences in the type of self-construal, we elaborated a more nuanced format for the Actor/Disadvantaged Person facets by including the presence of “others” (kin, friends, communities, or countries), who could be construed as an intrinsic part of the self in more collectivistic communities (Table 2, Facet C). Furthermore, attempts were made to account for a social aspect of meaning by introducing the power and social status relationship of the actors in ANGER situations (Table 2, Facets A and C2). Given the widely accepted distinction made in the literature between emotions that are likely to relate to the entire “self” and emotions that are linked to specific types of acts, or behavior (e.g., Lewis, 1971), the Action facet was expanded to include an “episodic” (action-related) and a “dispositional” (quality, feature, or state-related) variety.

\textsuperscript{4} International Survey on Emotion Antecedents and Reactions.
Table 2. Facets used in the construction of ANGER scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACET</th>
<th>FACET ELEMENTS</th>
<th>VARIETIES OF FACET ELEMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Actor</td>
<td>1. I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. someone else</td>
<td>2a superior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2b equal/inferior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. non-person/no one</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Action</td>
<td>1. action/no due action</td>
<td>1a one-time (non)action, “episodic”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1b repeated (non)action , “dispositional”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Disadvantaged person/party</td>
<td>1. I</td>
<td>1a. self proper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“body”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“abstract”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“property”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1b. self-image</td>
<td>1c “extended” self kin, friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>community, country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. someone else</td>
<td>2a “not capable of self-defense”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2b “capable of self-defense”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Type of threat/violation</td>
<td>1. moral</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. social</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. competence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Intention</td>
<td>1. with intention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Control</td>
<td>1. in control</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. out of control</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Audience</td>
<td>1. Large</td>
<td>G1 Audience reaction a. Positive (congratulations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. Negative (disapproval)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Small</td>
<td>c. No reaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. No audience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All the facets mentioned in this table were also used for the construction of SHAME, GUILT, and PRIDE scenarios (except in evident cases when a facet did not apply, e.g., THREAT/VIOLATION in PRIDE situations). Due to space constraints, only additional facets for those groups of scenarios will be illustrated below.
In the construction of SHAME and GUILT scenarios, the major difficulty was to decide on the facets that would reliably differentiate between these two emotions. The very distinction between SHAME and GUILT, after over a century of theoretical and empirical work, has not yet been consensually settled (cf. Deonna and Teroni, 2008; Elison, 2005; Fessler, 2004, for overviews). In classical terms, prototypical shame events focus on a concern with others’ actual or imagined negative evaluations, often stemming from a violation of a relatively important social standard, and they are characterized by feeling small, wishing to avoid being seen by others, and placing little or no emphasis on reparations or penance (in comparison to guilt). On the other hand, guilt-like events typically involve emphasis on remorse or regret, often stemming from inflicting harm on another person; they often involve a desire to compensate the victim, apologize, and/or punish oneself; they involve little or no emphasis on whether the failure at stake was public or not, and there is no evidence of a desire to avoid visibility (Barrett, 1995; Lazarus, 1991; Tangney, 1995; Wallbott, 1998; Wallbott and Scherer, 1995).

Since it was not economical (if possible at all) to try to capture all the abovementioned distinctions with a set of facets, we relied on Deonna and Teroni’s (2008) philosophical analysis of SHAME and GUILT to see which distinctions between the two emotions would be “constitutive” of the emotions (in their terminology), rather than simply typical. Two key oppositions pertaining either to the evaluative focus or the formal object of the emotions have survived the authors’ scrutiny of the literature on SHAME and GUILT: (a) while the evaluative focus in SHAME is the self, in GUILT it is behaviour; (b) while the formal object for SHAME is an undermined value, the formal object for GUILT is a flouted norm. This led us, therefore, to nuance the Action facet in SHAME and GUILT situations so that in the former the action was construed as the flouting of a value, whereas in the GUILT situations the action involved the violation of a norm (Table 3).

Table 3. Additional facets used in the construction of SHAME and GUILT scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACET</th>
<th>FACET ELEMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B1. Action construed as violation of</td>
<td>1. Norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Audience</td>
<td>1. Large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. No audience</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the construction of PRIDE scenarios, we nuanced the Action facet into achievement/no achievement types, and the former into a yet subtler distinction between an achievement one can have over external challenges and an achievement one attains over oneself (Table 4).

Table 4. Additional facets used in the construction of PRIDE scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACET</th>
<th>FACET ELEMENTS</th>
<th>VARIETIES OF FACET ELEMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B. Action</td>
<td>1a achievement</td>
<td>1a external (external challenges)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1b no achievement</td>
<td>1b internal (over the self)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2. Method and materials

Twenty emotion-eliciting situations, five per emotion category (ANGER, SHAME, GUILT, and PRIDE) were constructed on the basis of the facets outlined above. Groups of native speakers of Russian (N=17), Spanish (N=17), French (N=12), German (N=17), and English (N=11) filled in the questionnaire. The questionnaire was administered in English (see Section 4.1.2. on the control for one-language bias). The respondents were asked to free-list the emotion terms (nouns, adjectives or both) in their native language that would best capture the way they would feel in each of the situations.

For each language sample, the analysis unfolded in several stages. First, the words offered in each scenario were grouped and counted; nouns and adjectives of the same lexical root (e.g., guilt and guilty) were grouped together as a single type or root. The total numbers of tokens (words) and types (roots) were calculated for each scenario, as well as the proportion of adjectives and nouns for each lexical root. This first analysis produced 20 lists of terms per language (one per scenario in the questionnaire). Secondly, 4 global lists were compiled for each language collapsing the scenario-based lists to gather all the labels used in the entire questionnaire for each of the emotion categories (ANGER, SHAME, GUILT, and PRIDE). Since the participants did not know which emotion category was targeted by any of the scenarios and were free to list whatever emotion term they thought appropriate, the third step was to separate in each of the lists (scenario-based and global) the on-target responses (i.e., words pertaining to our targeted lexico-semantic groups, ANGER, SHAME, GUILT, and PRIDE) from off-target ones (i.e., words from other emotion categories, e.g., sad or disappointed).

Fourthly, the words in all lists (partial and global) were reorganized in decreasing order of frequency of appearance. Finally, separate notice was taken

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6 The situations are available from the first author.
of the total number of tokens and types of words used in each of the emotion categories.

4. Results

Our results fall into two groups: those pertaining to the assessment of the overall effectiveness of the mapping method, and those related to cross-cultural divergences in how the five lingual groups labelled emotional situations.

4.1. Assessing the mapping method with scenarios as evocative stimuli

The first stage of analysis focused on the assessment of the mapping method with scenarios as referents. The assessment was made in three steps meant to test (a) the validity of the instrument, (b) the absence of a cultural bias, and (c) the overall effectiveness as compared to a face-naming task. We will now proceed with a brief description of each of these steps.

4.1.1. Validity of the instrument

The key criterion to be met to guarantee the validity of the instrument was that the most frequent label elicited by a set of scenarios should belong to the emotion category we targeted when constructing that set of scenarios. Consistent with our expectation, all the groups of scenarios were most frequently labelled with terms pertaining to the four emotion categories under study (Table 5). The only exception from the general pattern is that in Russian and Spanish the top frequent labels used to label GUILT scenarios were not guilt-, but shame-related words (Russian styd “shame”, Spanish vergüenza “shame/embarrassment”). However, this exception need not mean that GUILT scenarios failed to capture the essential features of situations where people are likely to experience guilt (see Section 5.2. for a more detailed discussion).
Table 5. The most frequent words used to label the four groups of emotional situations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RUSSIAN</th>
<th>SPANISH</th>
<th>FRENCH</th>
<th>GERMAN</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANGER</td>
<td>razdrazhenie</td>
<td>rabia</td>
<td>colère</td>
<td>Wut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[irritation]</td>
<td>[anger]</td>
<td>[anger]</td>
<td>[anger/fury]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAME</td>
<td>styd</td>
<td>vergüenza</td>
<td>honte</td>
<td>Scham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[shame]</td>
<td>[shame/embarrassment]</td>
<td>[shame]</td>
<td>[shame]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUILT</td>
<td>styd</td>
<td>vergüenza</td>
<td>culpabilité</td>
<td>Schuld</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[shame]</td>
<td>[shame/embarrassment]</td>
<td>[guilt]</td>
<td>[guilt]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIDE</td>
<td>gordost’</td>
<td>orgullo</td>
<td>fierté</td>
<td>Stolz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[pride]</td>
<td>[pride]</td>
<td>[pride]</td>
<td>[pride]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1.2. Absence of a cultural bias

To control for a possible cultural bias in the instrument, it had to be ascertained that the scenarios did not appeal to only one of the lingual groups, so that speakers of that language labelled all situations with their respective anger-, shame-, guilt-, or pride-related terms more robustly and more systematically than respondents from other lingual groups. The descriptive statistical way we used to rule out this possibility was to check if the ratios of the total number of anger-, shame-, guilt, and pride-related words to the total number of the words from other emotion categories used to label each of the groups of scenarios were not significantly higher across the emotions only in one of the language samples. As expected, no single language emerged as having the highest ratio of on-target vs off-target responses for all emotion categories (Table 6), so the instrument is not biased (i.e., particularly oriented) towards any single group of participants. The ratios, nevertheless, offer some tentative descriptive information. They suggest that ANGER scenarios were most recognizable to the Russian-speaking group, SHAME and GUILT situations elicited a higher proportion of shame responses in French-speaking and German-speaking participants, respectively, and it was the German participants who reacted in a most on-target way to PRIDE scenarios.
Table 6. Ratios of the total number of on-target words to the total number of off-target words used to label the four sets of scenarios in the five languages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RUSSIAN</th>
<th>SPANISH</th>
<th>FRENCH</th>
<th>GERMAN</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANGER</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAME</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUILT</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIDE</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1.3. Effectiveness

Given the reasons provided in Section 2.1. as to why emotional situations are more informative, contextualized, and nuanced types of stimuli than emotional faces for emotion recognition, it can be reasonably predicted that the application of the mapping method with situations as evocative stimuli should overall yield better results than a face-naming task in the cross-lingual match between the terms obtained for the situations (reference equivalents) and their mutual dictionary translations. It should be noted, however, that the only available study that could be used to test this prediction – the one conducted by Boster (2005) – was different from ours in a number of important ways, some of which could in principle improve (and others worsen) the cross-lingual translation equivalence of the terms obtained in his study in comparison to ours. Among the factors that would decrease the probability of a high level of congruence of reference equivalents to dictionary translations in Boster’s study, if compared to ours, was the fact that the lingual groups in his analysis included speakers of a non Indo-European language (Shuar). Among the factors that could be reasonably expected to increase the probability of a high level of congruence of reference equivalents to dictionary translations in Boster’s study was the fact that Boster targeted the facial expressions of the so-called basic emotions (ANGER, SADNESS, FEAR, JOY, SURPRISE), while our study includes only one basic emotion category (ANGER), the remaining ones being the so-called self-conscious, or social emotions (SHAME, GUILT, PRIDE). The widely shared assumption is that basic emotions are allegedly shared by all human societies (cf. Ortony and Turner, 1990; see also Ekman, 1999: 53, for the complete list of criteria for the basic emotions), while social emotions involve complex self-evaluative processes (Tangney and Dearing, 2002; Tracy and Robins, 2004a) and a greater cross-
cultural variability (Scherer, 1994: 175). Another reason to expect greater accuracy in Boster’s study is that the sample sizes were larger than in our study⁷.

With these limitations in mind, we will now consider the findings. ANGER situations (Table 7, dictionary translation equivalents in bold) elicited the lowest number of mutually translatable words. Three of the situations (3, 4 and 5) were labelled with equivalent words only in two out of five cases, the remaining two situations were labelled with equivalent words only three times out of five.

### Table 7. The most frequent on-target words⁸ used to label ANGER emotional situations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>RUSSIAN</th>
<th>SPANISH</th>
<th>FRENCH</th>
<th>GERMAN</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>obida</td>
<td>rabia</td>
<td>colère</td>
<td>Wut</td>
<td>anger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[resentment]</td>
<td>[anger]</td>
<td>[anger]</td>
<td>[anger/fury]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>razdrazhenie</td>
<td>molestia</td>
<td>agacement</td>
<td>Ärger/Wut</td>
<td>annoyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[irritation]</td>
<td>[mild anger]</td>
<td>[irritation]</td>
<td>[anger/ fury]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>gnev</td>
<td>rabia/ indignación</td>
<td>colère</td>
<td>Wut</td>
<td>rage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[justified anger]</td>
<td>[anger/indignation]</td>
<td>[anger]</td>
<td>[anger/fury]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>dosada</td>
<td>rabia</td>
<td>énervement</td>
<td>Ärger</td>
<td>frustrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[vexation]</td>
<td>[anger]</td>
<td>[irritation]</td>
<td>[anger]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>razdrazhenie</td>
<td>enfado</td>
<td>colère</td>
<td>Wut</td>
<td>angry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[irritation]</td>
<td>[mild anger]</td>
<td>[anger]</td>
<td>[anger/fury]</td>
<td>insulted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** terms that are dictionary translations of each other are in bold. # marks the number of the situation

Our data also suggest that GUILT scenarios were labelled less consensually than SHAME ones (Tables 8 and 9, respectively). In the former, the percentage of reference equivalents that were mutually translatable ranged from 40% (situation 5) to 80% (situations 3 and 4). By contrast, the majority of SHAME situations (namely, situations 1, 2, and 5, Table 9) produced mutually translatable words in all the languages.

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⁷ Only the Shuar group was comparable (N=19), the rest of the groups had many more subjects (118 of English, 61 of Spanish, 33 and 29 for Polish and Italian, respectively).

⁸ It should be noted that in some of the situations, the most frequent labels used were off-target words. We interpret these cases in more detail Section 4.2. If two words were equal on frequency, they are given in the tables with a slash.
### Table 8. The most frequent on-target word(s) used to label GUILT emotional situations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>RUSSIAN</th>
<th>SPANISH</th>
<th>FRENCH</th>
<th>GERMAN</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>nelovkost'</td>
<td>vergüenza</td>
<td>culpabilité</td>
<td>Schuldgefühle</td>
<td>embarrassed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[uneasiness]</td>
<td></td>
<td>[guilt]</td>
<td>[guilt]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>styd</td>
<td>culpable</td>
<td>honte</td>
<td>Schuldig</td>
<td>guilty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[shame]</td>
<td></td>
<td>[shame]</td>
<td>[guilty]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>styd</td>
<td>vergüenza</td>
<td>embarras</td>
<td>Scham</td>
<td>ashamed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[shame]</td>
<td></td>
<td>[shame/embarrassment]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>vina/styd</td>
<td>vergüenza</td>
<td>honte</td>
<td>Scham/</td>
<td>ashamed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[guilt/shame]</td>
<td></td>
<td>[shame]</td>
<td>[ashamed]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sozhalenie</td>
<td>vergüenza</td>
<td>culpabilité</td>
<td>Scham</td>
<td>guilty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[regret]</td>
<td></td>
<td>[guilt]</td>
<td>[shame]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** terms that are dictionary translations of each other are in bold.

### Table 9. The most frequent on-target word(s) used to label SHAME emotional situations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>RUSSIAN</th>
<th>SPANISH</th>
<th>FRENCH</th>
<th>GERMAN</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>smuschenie</td>
<td>vergüenza</td>
<td>embarras/</td>
<td>Peinlichkeit</td>
<td>embarrassed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[embarrassment]</td>
<td></td>
<td>Honte/Gène</td>
<td>[embarrassment]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[shame/embarrassment]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>styd</td>
<td>vergüenza</td>
<td>honte</td>
<td>Scham/</td>
<td>ashamed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[shame]</td>
<td></td>
<td>[shame]</td>
<td>[peinlich]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[shame/embarrassed]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>styd</td>
<td>culpabilidad</td>
<td>honte</td>
<td>Scham</td>
<td>guilt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[shame]</td>
<td>[guilt]</td>
<td>[shame]</td>
<td>[shame]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>styd</td>
<td>vergüenza</td>
<td>honte/</td>
<td>Beschämt</td>
<td>ashamed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[shame]</td>
<td></td>
<td>embarras</td>
<td>[ashamed]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[shame/embarrassment]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>styd</td>
<td>vergüenza</td>
<td>honte /gène</td>
<td>Scham</td>
<td>embarrassed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[shame]</td>
<td></td>
<td>[shame/embarrassment]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** in bold are the terms that are dictionary translations of each other.
When labelling PRIDE scenarios, speakers in all the groups and for all the scenario variations reported they would experience pride.

Therefore, the general pattern suggested by our data is that most variability occurred in the ANGER category vs. PRIDE (which is the least variable category). Why would people, consistently across the five different languages, report experiencing a wider diversity of anger-related emotions in ANGER situations, while in PRIDE situations the consensus was exceptionally high? There are two possible explanations for this finding. First, the possibility stands that when divergently labelling the same ANGER situations, people with different cultural backgrounds were indeed experiencing different emotions. That is, one could assume that cultural differences in the appraisal of an event could lead to “phenomenally” different emotional experiences – labelled as a consequence by different terms. The second possibility is that the divergence in labelling is explained by the culture-specific display rules (Matsumoto et al., 2008; Averill, 1980). If so, one would assume that people across all groups would be feeling in the same (or very similar) way, but that their choice of labels (ranging from, for example, irked to outraged in English) was constrained by internalized cultural norms as to what types of disapprobation (term after Hupka et al., 1999) is socially sanctioned for overt referencing (see also Section 4.2.1). The design of our study precludes the possibility of conclusively determining which of these two alternative explanations is more likely to account for the divergence in labelling. However, in an admittedly indirect and speculative way, one of the findings reported above (Table 7) suggests that the second possibility (culture-specific display rules) might be a better explanation. The specific finding is that people across all groups used a higher number of on-target words vs. off-target words to label ANGER situations than they did to label PRIDE ones. This seems to suggest that people were able to identify the key emotion – that of ANGER – fairly well, but despite this, still used different words to label the situations across languages.

A possible third factor intervening in the observed variability of labelling ANGER scenarios is the existence of a “language-based bias”: more terms could have been offered by the participants to label ANGER because the languages themselves provide the speakers with more lexical choice to convey this emotion. That is, the data can be interpreted as indirectly suggestive of anger as a more lexicalized emotion category than PRIDE across our 5 languages, at least in terms of easily remembered and used terms pertaining to the working emotion lexicons (Schrauf and Sanchez, 2004) of ordinary language users. This hypothesis is further corroborated by the number of distinct types (i.e., morphologically distinct lexemes) in the ANGER, SHAME, GUILT and PRIDE categories that were used to label the scenarios. Table 10 presents the total number of lexical types in the 5 languages. An observable pattern is that more types of emotion words are used by the participants to label the scenarios in the
ANGER category (with the exception of Russian). At the same time, PRIDE has the lowest number of lexemes (except in Spanish).

Table 10. Number of types of emotion words used to label the four groups of scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RUSSIAN</th>
<th>SPANISH</th>
<th>FRENCH</th>
<th>GERMAN</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANGER</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAME</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIDE</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUILT</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But why would ANGER be more lexicalized than PRIDE? A fairly straightforward explanation can be derived from the research on emotion labels that supports the prototype model of emotion categorization (e.g., Rosch, 1978; Fehr and Russell, 1984; but see Alvadaro, 1998). This research on emotion terms in English (e.g., Shaver et al. 1987, Storm and Storm, 1987) and emotion words in other languages (e.g., Church et al., 1998; Shaver et al., 1999, 2001; Alonso-Arbiol et al., 2006) has shown that ANGER, alongside four other emotions (LOVE, JOY, SADNESS, and FEAR) is a basic-level emotion concept that crowns a broader cluster of terms (e.g., fury, wrath, outrage, spite), whereas pride pertains to the subordinate level of categorization normally subsumed under the basic category of JOY (Shaver et al., 1987: 1067). What this also entails is that emotion lexicons in natural languages seem to be apt to encode important, albeit subtle, distinctions between different degrees of intensity, associated to one’s angry feelings (irritation vs. anger), as well as feelings of power, control, or social status associated with it (indignation vs. being irked, zlost “being cross with sb” vs. gnev “righteous indignation”). On the contrary, PRIDE is a relatively narrower emotion concept focused on joy and achievement, most commonly conceptualized in psychology as “a pleasant, sometimes exhilarating, emotion that results from a positive self-evaluation” (Lewis, 2002). Labelling one’s emotion as “pride” is thus self-explanatory in a way: there seems to be no need for any further specification.

4.2. Culture-specific tendencies in labelling emotion-eliciting events

The results of our study also yielded several interesting regularities that are interpretable in the light of cultural variability in the conceptualization and expression of emotion in collectivistic (Russian and Spanish) vs. individualistic (French, German, English) cultures. More specifically, the observed differences provide evidence that is consistent with prior cross-cultural research which showed that, in contrast to more individualistic Western societies, collectivistic cultures (1) have a more pronounced tendency to repress the open manifestation
of socially disruptive negative emotions like anger (Cole et al., 2002); (2) exhibit a greater group-bias orientation in assessing an emotional situation (e.g., Nisbett and Masuda, 2003); (3) tend to construe a violation of a social norm as leading to shame rather than guilt (Hofstede, 2001); and (4) attenuate self-related appraisal and achievement in pride (Tracy and Robins, 2008). In the following, we will present the findings related to each of these features.

4.2.1. Culture-specific traits: repression of the open manifestation of ANGER in collectivistic cultures

A distinctive feature of collectivistic cultural groups is the tendency to repress socially disruptive emotions like ANGER for the sake of harmony within the group, as collectivistic cultures tend to emphasize the fundamental relatedness of individuals to each other. For instance, anger has been reported to be discouraged in Asian collectivistic societies because it signals self-assertion and threatens authority and social harmony (Cole et al., 2002). By contrast, individualistic societies are generally reported to be more tolerant to the overt expression of anger if it serves the purpose of self-assertion and protection of individual rights (Shaffer, 2009).

In our data, this prediction has been confirmed by several findings. First, the prototype ANGER word in Russian (that is, the most frequently used to label all the ANGER situations as a whole) was razdrazhenie “irritation”, which signals a lower degree of intensity of the experienced emotion than the equivalent zlost “anger”. Importantly, the frequency of this lexeme (36 occurrences in the total sample of 143 words as compared to 19 occurrences of the second most frequent word) was significantly higher than the frequency of any other ANGER-related word and any other word from other emotion categories (for both cases, p≤0.001, Fisher exact).

In labelling individual situations, a similar tendency to use low-intensity labels was found. More specifically, in contrast to other languages, where words to refer to anger were reported, the situation of an unjustified and public reprimand by a superior was labelled by the Russian-speaking group as eliciting obida (“resentment”), an internalized type of anger which is rarely openly manifested and is much lower in intensity and associated feelings of power and dominance than the Russian dictionary equivalent of the term used in other languages (zlost “anger”).

Apart from the general collectivistic tendency to mitigate the overt expression of other related negative emotions, prior research suggests that people from collectivistic cultural groups are less likely to experience and show ANGER to in-group members, as compared to members outside of their group. For instance, several studies provide evidence that the collectivistic Chinese are
less likely to report experiencing anger at a person they were acquainted with than Americans (Leung, 1988), or that anger situations for Chinese respondents significantly more frequently involved a person outside their immediate circle of acquaintance than members of the group (Stipek et al., 1989). Congruent with these findings on cultural display rules, our data reveals that in a situation where one’s country is being ridiculed by one’s colleague at a party, French, German and English participants report intense types of anger (colère, Wut and angry/insulted) as the dominant emotion one would feel, whereas Russian and Spanish speakers report a lower-intensity anger (razdrazienie “irritation” and enfado “mild anger”).

One more interesting finding concerning anger pertains to the Spanish sample. In the overall number of Spanish words used to label anger scenarios the lexeme impotencia (“impotence” / “powerlessness”) was as frequent as the most frequent anger word, rabia (“anger”). Moreover, when labelling individual situations, in three out of five cases impotencia was, descriptively, more frequently used than any anger-related word. In other words, apart from reporting feeling anger proper, Spanish respondents also reported the culturally-motivated impossibility to act on one’s angry feelings (as signaled by their use of impotencia “impotence” / “powerlessness”).

4.2.2. Greater group-orientation bias in appraisal of emotional situations

Another distinctive feature of individualistic cultures is that they are reported to place more value on independence and individuality than collectivistic societies, resulting in an attentional bias towards individual objects, with less regard for context and relationships among items. In contrast, collectivistic cultures emphasize interdependent relationships and monitoring of context, resulting in an attentional bias towards a contextual, relational processing of information (Nisbett and Masuda, 2003). Consistent with this, our data shows that in situations where multiple emotional responses were possible, the respondents from collectivistic cultural groups emphasized more of an in-group rather than an out-group orientation. For example, in a situation where one’s child is being bullied at school, Spanish and Russian respondents reported they would feel anxiety” and “worry” (Russian bespokoistvo, Spanish preocupación), i.e., concern about the in-group member, more frequently than any variety of anger. By contrast, French, German, and English speakers used anger-related lexemes (anger towards the out-group wrongdoers) (Table 11).
Table 11. Most frequent responses to ‘threat to kin’ emotional scenario

<table>
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<tr>
<th>RUSSIAN</th>
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<tr>
<td>bespokojstvo</td>
<td>preocupación</td>
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<td>[anxiety]</td>
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4.2.3. Construal of a norm violation as leading to SHAME rather than GUILT feelings in collectivistic cultures

A bias to appraise a norm transgression as shame- rather than guilt-eliciting is frequently posited as one of the features that distinguish between “individualistic” vs. “collectivistic” cultures. All the actions in GUILT scenarios in our questionnaire included a norm transgression as the Action facet (i.e., action that violated social norms or standards). More specifically, individualistic cultures are reported to construe a norm transgression as leading to guilt feelings, whereas “collectivistic” cultures construe it as leading to shame (cf. Hofstede, 2001). In agreement with the above, our results indicate (Figure 1) that, when labelling GUILT scenarios, French, German and English speakers used guilt-related words (culpabilité, Schuld, guilty, black bars on Figure 1) most frequently, whereas in the Russian and Spanish samples the top frequent labels were shame terms (styd “shame”; vergüenza “shame, embarrassment”, black bars on Figure 1).

Figure 1. Percentage of the most frequent on-target (black bars) vs. off-target (grey bars)
4.2.4. Self-effacing and attenuation of self-related pride in collectivistic cultural groups

Finally, cross-cultural differences have been attested as to how cultures that differ on individualism/collectivism assess the emotion of pride. With personal achievement being among the most valued and socially rewarded goals in individualistic societies (Triandis et al., 1988), the overt manifestation of pride is highly acceptable in those societies. Conversely, in collectivistic societies self-esteem is dependent on social harmony, and, as a consequence, individuals accept and expect the expression of pride for an achievement that benefits others and not only the person (Stipek et al., 1998). The experience of group pride is also present in individualistic societies (individual pride is also present in collectivistic societies), but its elicitation depends on the activation of collective self-representations, which are more salient in collectivistic societies (Tracy and Robins, 2008).

In agreement with the personal pride attenuation of collectivistic cultures, in Russian and Spanish the most frequent labels in the emotional scenarios reporting personal success refer to mere “satisfaction” (удовлетворение and satisfacción, respectively), whereas in French, German and English the emotional scenarios reporting personal success were labelled by PRIDE words. Regarding group achievement, all groups report feeling JOY/HAPPINESS, but collectivistic Russians report more “pride” that “joy” in a situation where their national team has achieved success.

In a more tentative way, an interesting nuance suggested by the data is that the difference between the use of pride- vs. joy/satisfaction-related words when labeling PRIDE scenarios is less pronounced in Russian and Spanish samples than in German and French (Figure 2).

![Figure 2](image-url)
Without making any definitive claim of this finding, it however may suggest a certain conflation of pride with joy/satisfaction words in collectivistic groups as compared to more individualistic samples – an interesting possibility to explore in more detail in future cross-cultural research on emotions.

5. Conclusions

This paper reported the results of a situation-labelling task designed to investigate the ways in which people from different linguistic and cultural backgrounds ascribe meaning to emotional events through the language they use to label their emotional experiences in those cases. We considered only four emotion categories – ANGER, SHAME, GUILT, and PRIDE – with the help of a relatively small-scale instrument applied to only European cultural groups.

Despite this, the method of mapping where emotion situations were used as evocative stimuli has proven to be sensitive enough to capture basic differences between the cultural groups under study for all the emotion categories investigated, and in a fashion that was fairly consistent with prior research in the field. More specifically, the approach has shown that it is able to capture the cultural factors mediating the emotion-labelling process, to reveal the differences in the degree of lexicalization of emotional domains, and to show with a fair degree of precision how the differences of individualistic and collectivistic cultures are reflected in language and language use.

Taken together, the results of the study are suggestive of the utility of an approach where emotional situations are used for emotion term elicitation, and they further support the argument that emotions can only be studied in their context.

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