Tourism and nationalism in the former Yugoslavia

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Abstract

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INTRODUCTION

This chapter looks at the links between tourism and nationalism by analysing war heritage touristification in the young states of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Reflecting the widely shared assumption that the memory attached to the wars of the nineties in the former Yugoslavia are often associated with nationalist narratives, it maintains that tourism can also be considered as a vector for nationalism, especially when it is related to cultural heritage.

Two views are generally put forward when cultural heritage is at issue. On the one hand it can be conceptualized as a form of legacy from the past: what contemporary society chooses to inherit or to pass on. (Graham et al, 2000) But it can also be looked on as a production of the present, fulfilling present-day purposes. (Lowenthal, 1998) Following this second interpretation, the main argument advanced here is that cultural heritage can serve various contemporary needs, among them tourism development or the production of a place image, but also others, such as the diffusion of nationalist discourses. As stated by Pierre Nora (1989), heritage can be considered as a relic of a time gone by, but it may also be transformed and assume a particular value for a community. The narratives associated with heritage can thus serve to transmit certain values, like patriotism, bravery or heroism, that can be specifically associated with a national group. By looking at some case studies in ex-Yugoslavia, the objective is to determine if the narratives produced in the tourism sector can lead to a shared vision of the history of the war or on the contrary produce a unilateral interpretation of it, enhancing the nationalist dynamics already at work in the region.

A study of the new states of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia offers a particularly interesting context in this regard. These two countries are now experiencing strong nationalist currents, especially in politics and in the media, following their independence a little more than 20 years ago. Nationalist trends were previously repressed by Marshal Tito until his death in 1980. The 1980s saw the emergence of important nationalist currents leading to the wars of independence in several republics of the former Yugoslavia. This chapter will first examine how nationalism, war heritage and tourism can interrelate. It will then look at the specific context of the former Yugoslavia, focusing on two specific case studies: the tourism promotion of the town of Vukovar in Eastern Croatia and the museum dedicated to the first president of Bosnia-Herzegovina - Alija Izetbegović – in Sarajevo.
TOURISM, WAR AND NATIONALISM

If war, and particularly wars of independence, can generate nationalist dynamics in the post-conflict development of tourism sectors, these trends can also be observed in non-war related settings. Examples such as the Scottish National Portrait Gallery or the Mount Rushmore monument certainly represent a type of nationalism expressed in tourism, by featuring elements attributed to the greatness of the Scottish or the American nation. Yet, when a country has to reconstruct itself after a war, or if a country is born following a war (e.g. wars of independence), nationalist trends are even more likely to appear in various elements of society, such as school curricula, textbooks, political programs, newspapers, museums or monuments.

Benedict Anderson describes nations as ‘imagined communities’ and points to different elements contributing to their development, such as maps, censuses and museums. However, if the latter represent a major object of tourism, the links between tourism and nationalism have been little explored, especially where war heritage is at issue.

Bui et al. (2011) have studied the role of heritage in the construction of national identity, looking at national museums in Vietnam. They present these institutions, and particularly the Ho Chi Minh Museum, as ‘guiding fictions’ (Shumway, 1991). For them, national museums are agents of nationalism and the presentation of national heritage is thus an ideological process. In a similar vein, Pretes (2003) analysed the heritage site of Mount Rushmore, demonstrating that monuments can serve as a means to representing something shared by citizens, especially in contexts where diverse cultures coexist. This is confirmed by Hall (2001: 100) who points out that this process is likely to accompany the creation of a new state: ‘the resurgence of nationalist expression alongside a (re-)creation of new state systems has encouraged some countries to employ the heritage industry as a means of reinforcing national or particular ethnic identity.’

The issue of inclusion (and exclusion) is therefore fundamental when looking at case studies in the former Yugoslavia, where various national groups share a territory. It is stated here that if heritage sites like monuments or museums can help popularize a hegemonic nationalist message of inclusion (Pretes, 2003), some citizens can identify with – and be included in - these national narratives, while others are excluded and even stigmatized as the ‘other’. In some places of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, the war memory often points out the bravery of one group, in opposition to the barbarianism of the ‘others’. This can partly represent what Doss (2010) conceptualizes as the nationalisation of bodies. Through memorial practices like tourism and museum production, the dead and some of the living are mobilised to fulfil national imperatives.

These processes can join forces with other dynamics particular to tourism, such as trivialisation and simplification, enabling history to fit into specific nationalist narratives. As stated by Ashworth (1991), when nationalistic ideology is at stake, trivialisation can lead to selective simplification in order to present a sanitized and idealized past. Adopting a historical perspective, Rodriguez (2014) has shown how nationalism can be diffused through the tourism sector with some cases dating as far
back as the First World War. She demonstrates how during the Great War, French authorities were already promoting a kind of 'Battlefield tourism' invested with a strong sacred and patriotic dimension: ‘they have to be named “French battlefield pilgrimages. Furthermore, the discourses of the guides have to demonstrate the spirit of the national defence. Thus, it is a matter of showing “our bravery” against “German Barbary”.' (Rodriguez, 2014: 3)\(^1\) The battlefield descriptions appearing in the same period in the famous Michelin guidebooks are also seen as unilateral: ‘Acts of violence are essentially attributed to the German army, which allows the tourism sector to occupy an important place in the nationalist arsenal used by the French state for its patriotic propaganda.’ (Idem: 7)\(^2\)

Still in the context of the Great War, some authors (Carlyon, 2001; Inglis, 2005; Winter, 2011) have also discussed the importance of the First World War events in the construction of the Australian nationality. For Inglis (2005), although most of the Australians were killed on the Western front, it is the Gallipoli peninsula campaign in Turkey that is now central in Australian popular war remembrance, an event conceptualized as ‘Australia’s Homeric tale’ by Carlyon (2001). Finally, later in the 20\(^{th}\) century, the tourism authorities of General Franco’s Spain invited tourists from all over Europe to visit Spain in order to discover the tranquillity and prosperity of the regions conquered by the General, allowing the battlefields to enter the ‘heroic narrative of European civilisation’ (Rodriguez: 2014). These various examples demonstrate the selections and adaptations of war history through its touristification, mechanisms that enable the construction of specific nationalist narratives.

**NATIONALISM AND THE POST-YUGOSLAV ARENA**

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the question of national identity became significant in the region (Smith & Puczkó, 2011) and Eastern European countries are now often seen as paradigmatic cases when nationalism issues are paramount. Appadurai (1996) mentions for instance that in the United States, Bosnia-Herzegovina is almost always designated as the main symptom revealing that nationalism is ‘alive and sick’. However, he warns us against this fascination with Eastern Europe, which some consider is the illustration of the complexity of all nationalisms. As Appadurai states, scholars need to be sceptical when experts claim to have encountered ideal types in actual cases. (1996: 21)

Nevertheless, Smith and Puczkó (2011: 39) demonstrate that in the post-communist era, political, cultural and tourism agencies face the challenging task of deciding how to redefine their nation and determining which cultural elements to select and promote. Moreover, after the bloody wars of the 1990s, countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Kosovo are now confronted with dissonant types of heritage (Tunbridge & Ashworth, 1996). In this contentious setting, an increasing number of scholars are considering the management of the past as a new battlefield (Baillie, 2011; Viejo-Rose, 2011: Naef, 2014), where symbolic wars are going on in places conceptualized by Ashplant et al. (2000) as ‘commemorative arenas’. They define these arenas as socio-political spaces in which particular memories of various social actors with different experiences and political agendas are propagated.
Several authors (Szilagyi, 2014; Duijzings, 2007) use the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial Centre & Cemetery to illustrate the concept of ‘commemorative arena’. The commemoration of the collective suffering and martyrdom nurtured by many Bosnian Muslim nationalists confronts the Bosnian Serb counter-commemorations often associated with the relativisation and even denial of the Srebrenica massacre (Szilagyi, 2014: 74). Miller (2006) for instance criticizes the one-dimensional narrative produced by Bosnian Muslims which turns the massacre of Srebrenica into a ‘Bosnian Muslim Holocaust’: ‘[It] seems to me to be manufacturing a fixed and didactic narrative that leaves little room for exploring the broader context of both the recent war and of Bosnian history in general.’ (Miller, 2006, In: Szilagyi, 2014) War memories and commemorative narratives can be selective and hegemonic and, as stated by Ashplant et al. (2003: 10), they produce ‘patterns of exclusion and inclusion that determine which aspects of the collective and individual experience are acceptable for public recall and commemoration.’

The case of the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial Centre & Cemetery can be enlightening in the context of this chapter, as the site is now also associated with tourism. The former Potočari UN military base is now a museum centre where photographs and personal items belonging to the victims are exhibited (refer Figure 1) and a small boutique proposes some souvenirs. Some survivors of the massacre act as local guides. More than 100,000 people visit this memorial site every year and many tour operators in Sarajevo offers day trips from the capital.

![Figure 1: Photographic exhibition in the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial Centre](image)

If several dynamics – mourning, commemoration, tourism - characterize the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial Centre & Cemetery, tourism entrepreneurs are included in the arena and are therefore also present in the front lines of these conflicts over memory. Tourism as a memorial practice thus constitutes a key dimension in the production of narratives associated with nationalism; tourism entrepreneurs are producing specific discourses on the war and on the nation, depending on their identity and their role in the wars.

The second part of this chapter will focus on two case studies, in Sarajevo and in Eastern Croatia, in order to examine in more detail how the tourism sector can support nationalist narratives.

**Vukovar: Symbol of a Nation**

Vukovar is a small town situated in Slavonia, next to the Serbian border, a region devastated during the Croatian War. In 1991, Vukovar was besieged for three months by the Yugoslav federal army and Serbian paramilitary groups. During the siege, the local population, a majority of Croats cohabiting with other national groups including Serbs, defended the city with minimal means until they surrendered on 18 November 1991. This struggle, often compared to David against Goliath, transformed
Vukovar into a symbol of heroism, martyrdom, and independence. (Vukovar was the last place reclaimed by Croatia after the country took back the territories it had lost in the beginning of the 1990s.) Today, many museums and memorials on the last war characterize this town of less than 30,000 inhabitants where a majority of Croats share the territory with a large Serbian minority. For Baillie (2011a), Vukovar and Slavonia contain the most monuments associated with the Croatian War. (refer Figure 2)

Figure 2: Memorial to the Croatian soldiers facing the Republic of Serbia on the other side of the river Sava.

This effervescence in memorial construction is certainly due to the traumatic siege the town lived through, but it can also be linked to the symbolic dimension Vukovar acquired, just as Srebrenica now represents the ‘Bosnian Muslim Holocaust’ in some nationalist narratives. Images and mentions of Vukovar are present in many elements of Croatian society and culture (stamps, banknotes, popular songs, street names, Hip-hop music, etc.), and are also heavily featured in the local tourism promotional efforts.

In 2013, the Croatian tourist website ‘Croatia at a Glance’ described the sacred status of Vukovar, ‘acquired by the selfless sacrifice of its defenders’, as part of its promotion of Slavonia as a wine-producing and archaeological region, but also as an important place of memory. (Naef, 2013) Furthermore, the tourism office produced a free leaflet for visitors portraying different aspects of Vukovar such as nature, history or architecture. Two pages focused specifically on memories of the war, showing pictures of ruins and memorials; a Croatian flag floating on the rear of a boat illustrated the back of the brochure. The pictures of these sites of memory were also associated with a poem dedicated to the glory of the town: Vukovar is a miraculous town… Vukovar is pride… Vukovar is defiance… It is a tear in one’s eye, sorrow in one’s heart… And a smile on one’s lips… Vukovar is both past and future. (Vukovar Tourist Board, 2006: 3).

Another particular feature of Vukovar tourism promotion is the involvement of Croatian veterans. In 2011, free maps of the town available to visitors in the local tourism office bore the logo of the Croatian Association for Prisoners in Serbian Concentration Camps, one of the main Croatian veteran groups in the region. (Naef, 2013) The same group is also in charge of the Ovčara Memorial Centre, a heavily promoted detention and execution site where recent history and tourism intertwine, and also one of the most visited sites in Vukovar. (refer Figure 3) Finally, this veterans group also triggered an initiative in 2003 to build a ‘Homeland War’ Memorial Centre, an institution managed by the Croatian army and the Ministry of Defence since its construction in 2007. This site proposes, in a former military barracks, exhibitions, a documentation centre, some replicas of Serbian concentration camps and a simulation of a battlefield. All the diploma ceremonies of military cadets take place here and the main public target seems to be essentially military, although the Ministry of Defence would like to open it to a wider audience:
‘The purpose of the centre is to connect the military with civilian society, principally through education means and with other Croatian institutions which would study the material or show interest in the usage of that space.’ (Ministry of Defence, 2009: 45)

In Vukovar city centre, a sign presents a map of the town and some historical information on its recent and bloody history. The war is described as a ‘Serbian aggression’ aimed at creating ‘Greater Serbia’. Limiting the causes of the Croatian War to the creation of ‘Greater Serbia’ illustrates an important mechanism of simplification within the framework of nationalist narratives. It also represents a one-sided interpretation of memory, especially if one looks back at the history of the country and its first president Franjo Tuđman’s objective of creating a ‘Greater Croatia’. This simplification process is also obvious in other sites of memory in Vukovar. The Ovčara Memorial Centre is described as follows:

‘The Serb Aggressors turned those hangars into concentration camp for non-Serbian prisoners that were captured in Vukovar. At the camp, the uniformed members of the Yugoslav People’s army (JAN) and of paramilitary Chetnik’s formation who were drunk and out of control […] Even the mayor of Vukovar, a Serb S. Dokmanović, beat his fellow-citizens.’

In this narrative, that Serbian prisoners were detained and killed in Serbian detention camps is something that is omitted. Moreover, as mentioned by the director of the Ovčara Memorial Centre himself: ‘among those killed at Ovčara there were five Serbian people… Five Serbians were also executed there.’ Serbian victims do not fit in the frame of Croatian nationalist narratives, where they are depicted only as ‘aggressors’, ‘drunks’ or ‘Chetniks’.

These examples demonstrate that a simplification process appearing alongside touristification and musealisation leads to the production of uniformed and clear-cut categories of victims and perpetrators. These categories are linked to national groups and only a little space is left for nuance. The Serbian community is associated with notions like ‘Greater Serbia’, ‘aggression’, and ‘concentration camps’ and the Croatian community with opposite elements, such as ‘heroism’, ‘bravery’ and ‘resistance’. Although these latter qualities could also be attributed to all those Serbian individuals who defended the city with the Croatian resistance, this interpretation does not fit into the hegemonic discourse on the war in Eastern Croatia. Thus, some members of the Serbian community who chose to stay in Vukovar during the siege, and were among the victims of the paramilitaries who besieged their city, are now victims of conflicts over memory and are stigmatized as bloody and drunk barbarians. Finally, the status of memorial entrepreneurs managing these sites of memory is also fundamental to understanding some of the mechanisms involved in the production of these unilateral narratives. In Vukovar, the army and the veterans are still deeply implicated in memory enterprises.
The Alija Izetbegović Museum: Between Nationalism and Multiculturalism

The capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina is presented as a multicultural city and most of the tourism actors remind the visitor that Sarajevo comprises a Catholic church, an Orthodox church, a mosque and a synagogue within a few hundred metres of each other. Although a multicultural image of the city is promoted in marketing material, in guides’ discourses and in some museums, other institutions tend to present a more unilateral interpretation of history, especially when the recent war years are evoked.

The structure of Sarajevo’s touristscape hampers the diffusion of different points of view. Bosnia-Herzegovina is divided into two entities: The Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina administered by Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims, and the Serbian Republic ruled by Bosnian Serbs. An invisible demarcation line also runs through Sarajevo; the historical core of the city is part of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the eastern suburbs are part of the Serbian Republic. Most of the governing bodies are divided and tourism is administered by different ministries and organisations, depending on the entity concerned. In this divided context, all the main museums are located in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and therefore administered without the Serbian authorities’ participation. The establishment of a state institution that would implicate the three main national groups in the interpretation of war heritage seems far away. A Bosnian museum curator describes the complex situation of some of Sarajevo’s museums in 2011:

The problem with projects related to the siege is linked to the politics issued from Dayton agreement. The state is very reluctant to support such projects because half of our state has been given to the people that attacked us. And they do not want to accept anything related to the history of the siege. That is why the Tunnel Museum is private. So the Siege Museum is going to be also a private initiative. And this is unfortunate because it is history and we cannot close our eyes on it. The tunnel Museum could go to the cantonal level, but never to the state level because the Serbs would never accept it.\(^5\)

This view is confirmed by a tour guide, Zijad Jusufović, who also insists on the impossibility of creating a state-owned war museum and criticizes the funding mechanisms in cultural heritage management: ‘A big war museum will never be established, because Serbs will never allow it. I call it money cleaning. Projects, projects, projects... And the result is nothing. It is easy to get money from the budget to... do money.’\(^6\)

However, half a dozen museum projects associated with the history of the last war are present in the Bosnian city, managed privately or at the level of the Canton of Sarajevo (dependent of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina). In the following lines, the objective is to analyse one of them – the Alija Izetbegović Museum – as it relates to the multicultural image promoted in the local tourism sector. Can this multiculturalism narrative persist in the context of war museums or does a unilateral and hegemonic discourse emerge when war memory is at issue? Makas (2012: 13) supports the idea that the museums of Sarajevo, in reaction to the various nationalisms in the country, tend to develop a multicultural discourse on the city: ‘Even within the exhibits focused specifically on these violent political ruptures and conflict within the city, curators at Sarajevo museums in the past decade have
managed to insert narratives or include content that reinforces this idea of a multicultural Sarajevo.'

The *Alija Izetbegović Museum* was established in memory of the first president of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It opened its doors on 19 October 2007, four years after the president’s death. Initially managed by the city and the Canton of Sarajevo, the museum became independent in 2012. Its focus is entirely on the former president, describing his life, his implication in the war and his political involvement through the presentation of explanatory boards and memorabilia. One of the museum consultants insisted in 2011 on the importance of highlighting the multicultural dimension of the first president of the nation: ‘*We want to show the multi-ethnic politics he developed. He is the most important person in the creation of Bosnia and he was a multi-ethnic president, representative of the three communities.*’

This multicultural reference can also be observed on the museum’s website describing the architecture of the edifice built between the Ploća and Širokac towers: ‘the symbolism of the tower wall makes the visitors sense the struggle of good against evil; the feelings which permeate the work of Izetbegović. This symbolism speaks of his constant commitment to connect people, nations and cultures.’ However, good and evil are also clearly defined and this Manichean dichotomy is present in other parts of the museum narrative:

The war in Bosnia was not a classical war, if we consider that to be a clash of two armies. It was the attack of one powerful military machinery against the bare-armed people. The goal: creation of the Greater Serbia.

We are the moral winner! There are no military victors. We have both won and lost.

In opposition to Bosnian Muslim bravery, Serbs are assimilated with ‘Chetniks’, a ‘genocide threat’ and ‘aggressors motivated by Nazi propaganda’.

Of course, responsibilities have to be acknowledged and a major part of Sarajevo besiegers were of Serb origin, or at least identified themselves with a Serbian identity. Nevertheless, victims were of all origins during the Bosnian war and all three national groups involved were perpetrators of atrocities. Moreover, as in the case of Vukovar, many Serbians stayed in Sarajevo during the siege (unofficially about 12%) and some defended the city, as for example the former Bosnian Serb General Jovan Divjak who fought in the front lines against besiegers. Yet, references to a share of guilt or opponent victims are completely absent in a museum dedicated to the father of the nation, as well as any solidarity expressed by those supposedly seen as the enemy. If this is not particularly surprising or unique in the context of a war museum, it contradicts the multicultural dimension advocated by the managers of the site.

In a specific reference to the *Alija Izetbegović Museum*, Makas (2012: 13) acknowledges the multicultural dimension of the museum: ‘Multiculturalism is a privileged theme even in the museum dedicated to *Alija Izetbegović*, a highly controversial figure in Bosnia associated quite specifically with the Bosnian Muslims’. The thematic of multiculturalism is certainly present in this museum. But the question remains whether the objective is to enhance coexistence between national communities or to valorise Izetbegović’s personality. In regard to the present
analysis, the recurrent stigmatisation of the Serbian community and the unconditional glorification of Bosnian Muslims seem to leave little room for promoting a real dynamic of coexistence. As in the case developed by Bui et al. (2011) in Vietnam, the museum presents a particular interpretation of history, together with specific values, in order to propagate a Bosnia-Herzegovina nation-state narrative. By ‘showing some elements and not showing others’ (Ashley, 2005 cited in Bui et al., 2011), the museum participates in the dissemination of a hegemonic discourse of inclusion and exclusion.

CONCLUSION

Tourism can be seen as a means to alleviate community tensions by supporting cooperative projects and enhancing qualitative contacts among groups. On the other hand, it can also be seen as a weapon in conflicts over memory; a means to propagate nationalist discourses of hate. Where war heritage is concerned, one of the main challenges is to manage to strengthen people’s identification with a nation while at the same time integrating groups considered as antagonistic into the commemorative arena.

This chapter presents only some of the elements of the touristic and museum landscape in the former Yugoslavia, and some institutions certainly support cultural coexistence. However, the tourism promotion of Vukovar and the Alija Izetbegović Museum cases show that in two cities often represented as multicultural, when war heritage is involved, the tourism sector can produce strong nationalist narratives. In both cases, a simplified and hegemonic discourse presents victims and perpetrators in clear-cut categories often associated with specific national groups. A myth of national bravery confronts another of national guilt.

The objective here was to throw light on certain mechanisms associated with nationalism and tourism, especially in relation to war heritage. Simplification, very often present in tourism narratives, leads to categorisation; a form of essentialism that produces groups of victims -- Barbarians, heroes, etc., and contributes to creating the ‘guiding fiction’ outlined above. With the de-individualizing of victims and perpetrators, a great national narrative is fabricated, strengthened by the transformation of places (Vukovar) and figures (Izetbegović) into symbols.

References


By ‘showing some elements and now showing others’


1 Translated from French by the author.
2 Translated from French by the author.
3 Illustrated information booklet provided at the Ovčara Memorial Centre.
4 Interview realized by the author in Vukovar. (August 2011)
5 Interview realized by the author in Sarajevo. (July 2011)
6 Interview realized by the author in Sarajevo. (July 2011)
7 Interview realized by the author in Sarajevo. (August 2011)
9 Museum’s desciption boards.