American Allegory to 1900

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Abstract
Throughout its history in the Old World and the New, allegory has functioned in two dominant forms: as a style of writing or rhetoric but also as a way of reading, a hermeneutic. Literary allegory in America is bound up with philosophy to the point that Olaf Hansen, in his book on late nineteenth-century allegory, sees it as a substitute for America’s failure to develop a distinctive school of philosophy. But the transformations of American religion, as Puritan orthodoxy gave way to a diversity of churches and the emergence of a weak New England Unitarianism, also provide a forceful context for the development of both American allegorical hermeneutics and allegorical rhetoric. The major American writers of the mid-nineteenth century, designated in F. O. Matthiessen’s 1941 book American Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman (Emerson, Thoreau, Hawthorne, Melville, and Whitman), owed much to the colonial New England legacy of allegorical expression, particularly their desire to discover rhetorical means by which the word and the thing might become one. The course of this rhetorical discovery [...]
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The 1850s in American literature has famously been termed “the American Renaissance,” following F. O. Matthiessen’s 1941 book American Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman. That Matthiessen referred to an American renaissance, a rebirth, to describe what he saw as the coming to maturity of American literary culture, rather than the birth of American literature, owes much to the colonial New England legacy of allegorical expression. Matthiessen describes the period 1850 to 1855 as “one extraordinarily concentrated moment of expression,”1 united by a commonality of themes, and particularly by the desire of his designated writers (Emerson, Thoreau, Hawthorne, Melville, and Whitman) to discover rhetorical means by which the word and the thing might become one. The course of this rhetorical discovery took them back in time, to Puritan models of allegory and symbolism, and specifically to the typological style of rhetoric and interpretation that united object and referent, making God’s word a material or, to borrow Emerson’s parlance, “natural” fact. Together with typological rhetoric, the Puritan strain of Protestant theology, brought to the New World in the early seventeenth century by those who dissented from what they saw as the Anglican compromise of the Reformation’s revolutionary potential, had a formative influence on the nature and practice of American allegorical expression. In Matthiessen’s estimation, and the writer’s own reflections on their work, this great renaissance happened when it did because of the emergence of Romanticism in Europe and the development of a native American form of Romantic thought, Transcendentalism. The Romantic emphasis upon nature at the expense of civilization, on the individual rather than society, appealed to intellectuals in the new American Republic who were painfully self-conscious about the lack of history, culture, and “civilization” in the New World. What the United States had in abundance was raw, unformed nature and the residue of a revolutionary ideology concerning the primacy of the common man, his self-reliance, and democratic commitment to independence. This was also a period of increasing materialism in American society as the economy expanded and industrialization took hold. Increasingly, American religion was perceived as becoming more secular as the older Puritan doctrine was supplanted by a diluted form of Unitarian Calvinism, especially in the period following and in reaction to the excesses of the Great Awakening. The cultural scene was then set for the emergence of an American strain of Romantic aesthetics, which we find in the thought of Ralph Waldo Emerson and the school of Transcendentalists in the shaping of which he was instrumental.
The impact of Romantic aesthetics on American allegory

Emerson’s allegorical practice reflects not so much a break with late eighteenth-century American rhetorical styles as a shift in emphasis away from Enlightenment privileging of rational laws and processes. For example, much of Philip Freneau’s poetry that does not address the political consequences of the Revolutionary War and subsequent Independence is concerned with characterizing a fundamentally Romantic vision of landscape, where God inheres in Nature. The 1815 poem, “On the Universality and Other Attributes of the God of Nature,” for example, celebrates a God that no longer operates through the mechanism of Providence to guide natural life but is a part of that corporeal life. Natural laws are not simply the expression of divine causality but they incarnate, in earthly terms, that sacred intentionality. This view echoes the explanation given by Samuel Taylor Coleridge in *The Statesman’s Manual* (1816), that the mysterious correspondence between the mind of man and the laws of nature can only be resolved in the understanding of God as: “the one before all, and of all, and through all.”

It is in this context that Coleridge developed his well-known distinction between symbol and allegory. His suspicion that a literal interpretation of Scripture had undermined the power of the sacred text as the receptacle of inspired truths was shared by Romantics like Emerson, who saw the Bible being read as a historical allegory rather than as both historically real and also a symbolic vehicle of imagination, consubstantial with the divine truth to which it allows access. Coleridge criticizes allegory as working through similitude to express extrinsic meanings; symbolism, however, operates through a kind of incarnation to represent an intrinsic and potentially redemptive meaning.

Now an Allegory is but a translation of abstract notions into a picture-language which is itself nothing but an abstraction from objects of the senses; the principal being more worthless even than its phantom proxy, both alike unsubstantial and the former shapeless to boot. On the other hand a Symbol ... is characterized by a translucence of the Eternal through and in the Temporal. It always partakes of the Reality which it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as a living part in that Unity, of which it is the representative. (*The Statesman’s Manual*, pp. 30–31)

Cognitive access to this “Unity” is reserved for the individual who, through the power of imagination, is able to receive this inspired meaning. Consequently, we find in Romantic rhetorical practice a shift of emphasis from objective to subjective authority within the interpretive act. No longer was the Church to dictate the meaning of Scripture to the inspired individual. This separation was a development of post-Reformation theology; however, it found a renewed theoretical focus in the influence of the Higher Criticism upon nineteenth-century biblical studies.

Hans W. Frei, in his study of nineteenth-century biblical interpretation, distinguishes between “precritical” and modern methods of reading the biblical text. The precritical reader “was to see his disposition, his actions and passions, the shape of his own life as well as that of his era’s events as figures of that storied world.” But the possibility of this reflection between self and biblical world was fractured by the emergence of modern techniques of reading to verify, rather than to access, the historicity of Scripture. This historicism reduced the Bible to one of many available forms of historical account (Frei, *Eclipse*, pp. 4–5). Philip Gura and Lawrence Buell have both addressed the influence of the Higher Criticism upon biblical studies in America. Gura describes the debates of the early nineteenth century that centered on whether the Bible is figurative poetry as much as it is objective truth, and so should be read not only in the context of belief but also in historical and philological contexts as well. Arising from this question of how the sacred text should be approached is the issue of how much authority should be attributed to the interpretive power of human reason, on the one hand, and the mystical authority of divine revelation, on the
other. Basically, the question to be answered was whether the Bible constitutes a unique kind of text and so requires a unique method of interpretation.

At the same time that this question was subject to debate, as Lawrence Buell notes, not only was the Bible’s privileged status under question but secular literature was increasingly seen to provide a legitimate expression of devotional experience. Buell refers to the claims made by commentators such as William Blake in England and Ralph Waldo Emerson in America (echoing Boccaccio centuries earlier) that Scripture is essentially poetry produced by the inspired, mystical vision of the poet. Buell sees this trend as a response to changes in demands made by congregations, in the period after the disestablishment of the churches was completed in 1833 when churches were obliged to compete for members and the financial support which the congregation provided. Buell also argues that this trend toward a more literary approach to religion, and to the Bible specifically, was also a response to changes in perceptions of how faith or belief is to be understood: “Secular literature acquired greater spiritual legitimacy as the propagation of religion came to be seen as dependent upon verbal artistry and as the record of revelation was seen to be a verbal artifact” (New England Literary Culture, p. 168).

What an overly close relationship between religion and secular literature risks, as Buell sees it, is the tendency to promote subjectification. This can lead to the identification of spirituality not with religious doctrine but rather with the subjective perception of what Scripture means. An extreme subjectivism threatens the validity of any objective referent for devotional experience, or indeed any other kind of experience that demands interpretation in terms of semantic and spiritual absolutes. This history of devaluation of biblical authority, and the rise of subjectivism in its place, produces such responses as Emerson’s revival of Neoplatonic allegorical cosmology, where the inspired individual assumes the privileged hermeneutic position previously held by Christ.

The revival of Neoplatonic allegorical cosmology in the thought of Emerson

The work of Emerson, the multifaceted New England scholar, essayist, poet, philosopher, and social commentator, is characterized by two kinds of rhetoric: what Coleridge would call either allegory or symbolism. The more conventional style of allegorical rhetoric that Emerson uses is derived from the traditional Christian homily, where an image stands for some abstract concept. This kind of figurative language marks the entire Christian tradition of preaching and in America this rhetorical style was perhaps made most famous by Benjamin Franklin’s many published homilies. The second and more interesting style of rhetoric used by Emerson is a mystical Neoplatonic style of expression, where an image incarnates some ideal form of itself. In a journal entry dated October 5, 1835, for example, Emerson confesses that:

    [t]he deepest pleasure comes I think from the occult belief that an unknown meaning & consequence lurk in the common every day facts & as this panoramic or pictorial beauty can arise from it, so can a solid wisdom when the Idea shall be seen as such which binds these gay shadows together.⁶

Here Emerson is describing a Neoplatonic relationship between shadows and reality, or the ideal and the real, together with an understanding of knowledge as an incremental process that is motivated by beauty. The culmination of this process is “a solid wisdom” of the Ideal to which material signs point and with which they form correspondences. This journal entry can be seen as an early expression of the theory of symbolic correspondence that Emerson explores in his 1841 essay, “The Over-Soul.” There he writes: “We live in succession, in division, in parts, in particles. ... Meantime within man is the soul of the whole; the wise silence; the universal beauty, to which every part and particle is equally related; the eternal ONE.”⁷ Here, the perception of nature,
including human nature, as an emblematic network of material signs is enhanced by the mystical understanding of the power of the soul to facilitate an absolute unification of creation: “the act of seeing and the thing seen, the seer and the spectacle, the subject and the object, are one” (“The Over-Soul,” p. 160). Emerson echoes Coleridge’s understanding of the symbol as an inspired sign that “partakes of the Reality which it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as a living part in that Unity.” But the site of unity is the individual human soul, which functions through imagination as both receiver and revealer of Truth. Emerson places at the center of his network of rhetorical correspondences not the divine unity or godhead but the inspired human subject.

This is an inspired subject conceived in a particular way: in the essay “History” Emerson explains that because one divine mind is common to all individual men, human history is but the record of the works of the universal mind. This thought is not unfamiliar to anyone who understands the Calvinist doctrine of predestination that so shaped New England Puritanism. According to this idea of predestination, all of human history was brought into being at the Creation and, although history appears to us to unfold in a linear chronology, in God’s view all of history occurs simultaneously. In each event of human history the divine mind expresses itself, but in human terms this history is experienced as human. Consequently, for Emerson all history is subjective and, as he famously asserts: there is no history, only biography. Emerson displaces the divine intelligence of Protestant providential history and in the place of God situates the inspired individual. In this way, Emerson revives the Platonic system of symbolic correspondences between the real and the ideal. The inspired individual perceives the human world of the real as an allegory of the realm of spirit, of the ideal: he is, as Emerson describes, “true to his better instincts or sentiments, and refuses the dominion of facts, as one that comes of a higher race, remains fast by the soul and sees the principle, then the facts fall aptly and supple into their places; they know their master, and the meanest of them glorifies him.” Facts are subsumed by imagination, as is the real by the ideal. History is governed by the human subject in its mystical dimension of imagination and the universal mind, together; and it is the divine mind that dictates the writing of history through the inspired medium of human imagination:

The universal nature, too strong for the petty nature of the bard, sits on his neck and writes through his hand; so that when he seems to vent a mere caprice and wild romance, the issue is an exact allegory. Hence Plato said that “poets utter great and wise things which they do not themselves understand.” (“History,” p. 19)

The inspired individual through whom the universal mind communicates is Emerson’s privileged figure of the poet, who mediates among God, Scripture, natural history, and the human soul. The poet stands at the interpretive center of Emerson’s system of mystical correspondences. Through his mediating power, the poet takes the place occupied by Christ in conventional Christian doctrine. This quasi-divine status is described by Emerson, within the context of a reconstituted Trinity, in the essay “The Poet” (1844):

For the Universe has three children, born at one time, which reappear, under different names, in every system of thought, whether they be called cause, operation, and effect; or, more poetically, Jove, Pluto, Neptune; or, theologically, the Father, the Spirit, and the Son; but which we will call here, the Knower, the Doer, and the Sayer. These stand respectively for the love of truth, for the love of good, and for the love of beauty. These three are equal. Each is that which he is essentially, so that he cannot be surmounted or analyzed, and each of these three has the power of the others latent in him, and his own patent. The poet is the
sayer, the namer, and represents beauty. He is a sovereign, and stands on the center.\(^9\)

In Emerson’s Romantic reworking of the concept of the divine Trinity, the poet as “the namer” takes over both Christ’s function as the privileged interpreter of the divine will and also Christ’s status as the normative meaning of sacred history. Emerson claims: “All that we call sacred history attests that the birth of the poet is the principal event in chronology” (“The Poet,” p. 7). But it is the role of Christ as the mediator of meanings, from the divine to the human, rather than as the object of divine knowledge, that is assumed by Emerson’s figure of the poet.

It is the poet’s capacity to unite the real with the ideal that Emerson values as the poet’s interpretation of the symbolic language of nature. Those individuals who are not gifted with the power of imagination, as is the poet, are unable to penetrate beyond the surface of nature, its appearance, to access the spiritual dimension of nature as a symbolic language: “We are symbols, and inhabit symbols ... [but] being infatuated with the economical uses of things, we do not know that they are thoughts” (“The Poet,” p. 12). The cognitive dimensions of nature are inaccessible to all except the poet who is able to liberate them, through imaginative reinterpretation, into a new life. “The expression is organic, or, the new type which things themselves take when liberated” (“The Poet,” pp. 14–15). What appears to the uninspired individual as a superficial appearance in nature is, by the poet, re-presented as an inspired poetic symbol and, more than this, a mystical access to a multiform world of symbolic Truth.

In Emerson’s account, the exegetical function of Scripture is supplanted by poetic imagination. The poet has made available to human interpretation the symbolic language of nature as an effective substitute for the interpretive authority of scriptural revelation. The interpreting human subject is no longer brought to a condition of identity with the revelation of Scripture through the mediating power of Christ; rather, it is the poet-as-Christ who reveals this mystical identity by interpreting the nature as a Neoplatonic allegory, as a system of correspondences between the real and the ideal, each of which reveals metonymically the ideal of which it is a real part. Both nature and Scripture are characterized by this rhetorical structure of correspondence: natural and biblical figures both refer metonymically to a mystical ideal, or divine mind, that directs the movements of history from outside the realm of temporality. For instance, the “Language” chapter of “Nature” describes this metonymic relationship of correspondence between the human and the ideal worlds, where a secularized concept of God, embodied in language, enables this correspondence:

Man is conscious of a universal soul within or behind his individual life, wherein, as in a firmament, the natures of Justice, Truth, Love, Freedom, arise and shine. This universal soul, he calls Reason: it is not mine or thine or his, but we are its; we are its property and men. And the blue sky in which the private earth is buried, the sky with its eternal calm, and full of everlasting orbs, is the type of Reason. That which, intellectually considered, we call Reason, considered in relation to nature, we call Spirit. Spirit is the Creator. Spirit hath life in itself. And man in all ages and countries, embodies it in his language, as the FATHER.\(^{10}\)

Emerson is here proposing a radically intrinsic form of mystical reference that is found both in words and in things. Emerson asserts an intrinsic correspondence between nature and human thought, where it is in nature that the origin of all the spiritual significances possessed by words is to be found. But it is here that Emerson betrays a nostalgic impulse; he laments the loss of an original semantic unity, lost as secondary naming relationships come into the ascendant. All spiritual facts are represented by natural facts, which function as “emblems,” Emerson asserts, in “Nature.” But when the desire for riches, pleasure, power, and praise compromises the power of
nature as the interpreter of the human will, words must be “perverted to stand for things which they are not” (”Nature,” p. 20). Then, mechanistic form replaces organic form, and the power of metonymic referentiality is replaced by an arbitrary and metaphoric referentiality. Emerson opposes the crisis of modern reference to an understanding of language that owes much to the Puritan legacy of sacramental referentiality. In the New England mind, to borrow Perry Miller’s phrase, divine providence operates directly through material signs such as nature and language to act upon the individual soul. The precise meaning of the providential intervention is determined by reference to Scripture and with the guidance of ministers, who perform a crucial mediating function. The divine will is made present to human understanding through the sacramental power of earthly signs. It is against this sacramental inheritance that Emerson stages the modern alienation of words, as names, from a divine origin. Emerson’s ceaseless quest for a unitary point of meaning is symptomatic of his perception of nineteenth-century American culture as undergoing a referential crisis. The primary consequences of Emerson’s Romantic quest for transcendental meaning were, first, the separation of symbolism from allegory within American literary culture and, second, the alienation of allegorical interpretation from the earlier biblical context of Puritan allegorical practice.

The afterlife of Protestant allegory in American literary culture

All allegories are characterized by a twofold function: allegory is simultaneously an interpretation (biblical, historical, natural, and so on) and also a metacritical statement that regulates interpretation. So in allegory two kinds of truth are compounded: the truth that is the meaning of the allegorical text and the truth that is formulated by the allegorical text as the interpretation of some external text. Consequently, allegory is marked by hermeneutic circularity. The Puritan understanding of Scripture as self-validating draws on this circularity in the idea that the truth of Scripture and the truth of one’s reading of Scripture should be mutually validating. But if allegory is not to appear tautological then authority must be invested in a third interpretive factor. One of the primary shifts engendered by the Reformation was the redirection of interpretive authority away from the Church towards the individual soul. In Puritan New England, this legislative authority was located in the individual sanctified soul, supported by the ministry.

Protestant exegesis was motivated by the desire for a direct communion with God. The effect of grace on the individual soul could not be validated by the ecclesiastical institution. The site of validation shifts, in Protestant allegory, to the immediate relationship between soul and Scripture. This is exemplified in the changing attitude towards the crucial question arising from the doctrine of predestination: how can I know that I am a member of the elect? While for the early Calvinist Church the assurance of election was closely bound to the Church as well as to Scripture and the sacraments, through time the individual was increasingly driven to self-examination, in order to find assurance of grace in the events of their own life histories. So assurance of grace, like evidence of election, became a matter for the individual to ascertain. This shift away from the objective means of grace towards individual subjectivity wrought a fundamental change in the nature of allegory after the Reformation and, through the legacy of New England Puritan allegorical practices, shaped American literary rhetoric in very precise ways.

Protestant allegory valorizes uncertainty in interpretation. Human understanding cannot comprehend the pure reality of God, that vision of history occurring all at once, so no claim to absolute knowledge is possible. What is at stake in Protestant allegory is quite different from patristic interpretations of Scripture that involve gaining or losing salvation. Protestant interpretation questions the certitude of election, and seeks positive signs of the workings of grace in the soul. The search for such certainty is perhaps most explicitly sought in Puritan spiritual autobiography, and this search is most dramatically conducted in the genre of captivity narratives. These stories of abduction by Native American tribes were particularly popular in the later
seventeenth century. Many were transcribed, edited, and promoted by Cotton Mather, the influential writer and minister of Boston’s original North Church, as part of his campaign to restore the power and privilege of the New England Puritan ministry. These narratives are all written using the interpretive paradigm of typology. Historically, typology dates from the early exegetes of the New Testament who interpreted the relations between the Old and New Testaments as one of promise and fulfillment. The Old Testament was read as offering symbolic promises of the new Christian dispensation to come, and which would be fulfilled in the events set down in the New Testament. Thus, Jonah’s time spent in the whale’s belly was seen as the symbolic “type” of Christ’s Harrowing of Hell, the rhetorical “antitype.” The figure of Moses leading his people out of bondage and into the Promised Land was interpreted as Christ’s liberation of the redeemed soul from the Law into a new dispensation of Grace. For colonial American Puritans, this style of allegorical rhetoric also offered a way of articulating their own escape from Anglican persecution and liberation into the Promised Land of New England. The typological parallel was interpreted not only as a repetition of biblical events but also as a part of the same divine providential scheme. By colonizing New England they were fulfilling the divine scheme of history. The relationship between lived events and a biblical precedent allowed Puritans to determine whether they were of the elect or preterite, though this knowledge was not static and had continually to be rediscovered.

In captivity narratives such as Mary Rowlandson’s *Sovereignty and Goodness of God* (1682), an account of her experiences as the hostage of Narragansett Indians during the winter of 1676, the first-person autobiographical narrator continually searches for biblical models against which to measure her experiences. In particular, she is concerned to discover whether her suffering is a form of punishment, meted out by God to one of his chosen people in order to chastise Mary, or whether this life in the wilderness is an image of her own lost, unredeemed spiritual condition. The narrative plays on the double meaning of the word “redemption” – to signify both salvation and the release of a hostage after the payment of a ransom – so that, even after her return to her family and community in Boston, Mary remains unsure whether she may be punished again in the future for sins she is unknowingly committing. She never knows with certainty that she is a member of the elect, though she confesses that before her captivity she had foolishly wished that God would indeed single her out for suffering as a sign that she was one of His chosen. This punitive style of allegorical rhetoric, like typology more generally, shares with Protestant allegory the privileging of a direct mystical relationship with Scripture. Alone in the wilderness, captives like Mary Rowlandson would pore over their Bibles, searching for typological clues to the meaning of their experience, which would also function as clues to their spiritual destiny.

The emphasis placed upon subjectivity by Protestant (and especially Puritan) allegorists led, in the nineteenth century, to a radically subjective style of interpretation. We have seen how Emerson shifted hermeneutic authority towards the gifted individual – the poet possessed of Romantic imagination. However, Emerson’s vision of the poet is based upon a fundamentally benevolent view of the universe. In the more skeptical allegorical practice of Nathaniel Hawthorne and Herman Melville, this assumption that the power of imagination must always be benign is challenged. The character of Roger Chillingworth in Hawthorne’s *The Scarlet Letter*, for example, is possessed of the kind of imaginative capacity that Emerson attributes to the Poet. Chillingworth is able to look into the visible signs of nature and read their secrets, which endow him with almost mystical powers. He is able to read the mystery of Hester’s adulterous lover and identify him as the minister, Dimmesdale. Further, Chillingworth uses his medicinal knowledge of nature and his insight into the emotional history that surrounds him to torture the young minister to death and so satisfy his desire for vengeance, as Hester’s cuckolded husband. While Chillingworth is able to penetrate the secrets of nature and to harness what is seen by others as an almost supernatural knowledge, this evil is set against the pervasive ambiguity that characterizes all other attempts at interpretation in the narrative. This is dramatized in the opening scene when Hester emerges from the prison, holding her illegitimate baby daughter, to confront the judgment of the crowd who have
gathered to witness her public humiliation on the scaffold. Each of the voices that is transcribed by
the narrator offers a different interpretation of Hester, her situation, and how she should be judged.
This cacophony of voices is symptomatic of the attitude towards interpretation revealed throughout
the narrative. Each individual subject interprets on his or her own terms; there is no consensus
concerning truth, justice, or law. Indeed, where Hester believes that in her relationship with
Dimmesdale she has conformed to the dictates of the law of nature, Dimmesdale condemns the
relationship as violating the law of God. Nature and spirit, the real and the ideal, are
incommensurate in Hawthorne’s atomized world of individual subjective interpreters.
Commentators have viewed this attempt to confront and move beyond the limitations imposed upon
interpretation by the absence of some objective legislative authority as fundamental to the fiction
written by Hawthorne and by Herman Melville. *Moby Dick* can be seen as Melville’s response to
Emerson’s belief that through the power of sacramental rhetoric the exegete can access and
reconcile a mystical dimension of meaning. Ahab, the crippled captain of the whaling ship that
pursues the quasi-mythical white whale, seeks to break through what he calls the “pasteboard”
masks of the visible world, to access and possess some mystical relationship with an absolute point
of origin, some point of semantic unity that will redeem his world of superficial appearances.

Allegorical practice in nineteenth-century America developed in response to increasing
skepticism toward institutional authorities such as the Churches and the mystical authority of the
Bible itself. In the course of the century, this produced a new privileging of secular literature, as we
have seen in Emerson’s description of the figure of the poet. The poet, inspired by the artistic
imagination, took the place of the divinely inspired interpreter in Romantic allegorical practice. The
emphasis placed upon private and individual agency, rather than collective and structural
prescriptions for interpretation, generated in large part the sense of a cultural crisis of meaning that
is now identified as “modernity.”

NOTES

1. F. O. Matthiessen, *American Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and
p. 3.
5. Lawrence Buell, *New England Literary Culture: From Revolution Through Renaissance*
6. Ralph Waldo Emerson, *The Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks of Ralph Waldo
7. Ralph Waldo Emerson, *The Collected Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson*, vol. II, Essays:
First Series, ed. Joseph Slater, Alfred R. Ferguson, and Jean Ferguson Carr (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press,
8. Ralph Waldo Emerson, ibid., p. 19.
Slater, et al., pp. 18–19.