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Abstract

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HOMOGENIZING “OLD” AND “NEW” SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: A COMPARISON OF PARTICIPANTS IN MAY DAY AND CLIMATE CHANGE DEMONSTRATIONS*

Nina Eggert and Marco Giugni†

We assess whether the distinction between old and new social movements still holds by examining the social class and value orientations of participants in old and new social movement protests. We argue that new cleavages have emerged from globalization, affecting not only electoral politics, but also contentious politics, and thereby having a homogenization effect on the structural basis of movements of the left. Moreover, we hypothesize that traditional cleavages, such as class mediate the homogenization effect of new cleavages. We look at participants in May Day and climate change demonstrations in Belgium and Sweden, two countries that differ in terms of strength of class cleavage. Results show that there is evidence of homogenization between old and new social movements and that this effect is more important when the class cleavage is stronger.

Although the issue is somewhat less salient today than it was in the 1980s and 1990s, there has been much debate about how new are “new” social movements and to what extent they are different from more traditional social movements, most notably the labor movement. 1 Basically, two camps have put forward arguments for or against drawing a clear-cut dividing line between “old” and “new” movements. On the one hand, new social movement theorists have stressed the specific characteristics of the movements that emerged in the second post-war period—in terms of social basis, organizational forms, action repertoires, and so forth—and how they made these movements substantially different from the labor movement (Dalton and Kuechler 1990; Eder 1993; Melucci 1989, 1996; Offe 1985; Touraine 1978, 1984; see Buechler 1995 and Pichardo 1997 for overviews). On the other hand, critical objections have been raised about the distinction between old and new movements (Brand 1990; Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, and Giugni 1995; Olofsson 1988; Plotke 1990; Tarrow 1991).

In a time marked by new social conflicts and new waves of contention that seem to cut across traditional cleavages, it is worth addressing this issue once again. The past decades have witnessed the emergence of new lines of conflict that have transformed the political space in Europe. For example, the shift from the old left/right cleavage to an opposition between left-libertarian and right-authoritarian politics (Kitschelt 1994) has led to the emergence of green parties as well as new social movements. Moreover, globalization has profoundly affected national politics, creating a new cleavage that opposes globalization’s winners and losers while also cutting across traditional cleavage structures (Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier, and Frey 2008). This transformation of the cleavage structures primarily affected the cultural dimension of the political space. A new class cleavage also emerged, characterized by a stronger divide between workers and the section of the new middle class

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that some have called the “social-cultural specialists” (Kriesi 1989). While both the social-cultural specialists and managers that comprise the new middle class are on the “winners” side of the new conflict, they are mainly divided by the cultural dimension as, following Kitschelt’s (1994) representation of the political space, the social-cultural specialists display a libertarian value orientation as opposed to an authoritarian one. Workers, as “losers” of globalization, tend to move to right populist parties, while social democratic parties attract the social-cultural specialists on the basis of the cultural dimension of the conflict (Kriesi et al. 2008; Oesch 2006; Oesch and Rennwald 2010).

While scholars have largely documented the impact of this restructuring of the political space on electoral politics, little has been said about its effects on contentious politics. Yet we have many indications of such an impact, in particular on the movements that can be said to belong to the left of the political spectrum. For example, the global justice movement, which has dominated the scene in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the more recent Indignados movement in Spain and elsewhere in Europe, and the various Occupy movements in the United States are all protest movements that seem to gather people from different social strata. They also seem to articulate a broad range of issues, although all of them can more or less be subsumed under the banner of the struggle against neoliberal capitalism and the resulting social injustice. Are these old or new kinds of protests? Among them one can see signs of both. For example, while all these movements mobilize strongly among the new middle class and more specifically the social-cultural specialists, who often are seen as the core constituency of the new social movements, they also mobilize sectors of the working class and raise issues relating to employment, wage equality, and economic redistribution.

It is against this background that we investigate the impact of the transformation of the political space on contentious politics, in particular on the movements of the left. This investigation addresses two main questions. First, since the recent waves of mobilization display features of both old and new movements, does this mean that the frequently stressed distinction between traditional movements and new social movements is no longer valid (if it ever was)? In other words, are old and new social movements as different as they are often depicted in the literature? More specifically, to what extent do participants in events that can be categorized under old and new social movements resemble each other, both structurally and culturally? By structurally, we refer to the social composition in terms of class. By culturally, we allude to the value orientations of participants. Thus, our first research question can be specified as follows: To what extent are participants in new and old social movement events different as regards their class composition and value orientations? While this might not have been true in the past, we expect the social basis of old and new movements today to be relatively similar, at least as they express themselves in demonstrations.

Secondly, following a Rokkanian perspective, political mobilization rests on social and cultural cleavages (Bartolini 2000; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 1970). In this perspective, old and new social movements mobilize on the basis of distinct dividing lines in society (Kriesi 1993; Kriesi et al. 1995). The class cleavage, in particular, has come to play a crucial role in discussions about the “newness” of new social movements (Eder 1993; Laraña, Johnston, and Gusfield 1994; Olofsson 1988). While new cleavages emerge, traditional cleavages do not necessarily disappear. We think that the strength and salience of traditional cleavages, in particular the class cleavage, has an impact by mediating the homogenizing effect mentioned earlier. Our second research question, therefore, deals with cross-national differences in the class composition and value orientations of old and new movements due to the strength of the class cleavage. Specifically, we expect the fusion between the old and new protest sectors to be more important in countries where the class cleavage is strong and forms an important basis for political mobilization, as compared to countries where it is weak and less mobilizing. To address this question we compare two countries where this contrast obtains: Belgium (weak class cleavage) and Sweden (strong class cleavage).
We confront our research questions with original data on participants in May Day and climate change demonstrations. While the former is typical of old movement events—a ritualized form of mobilization by the labor movement—the latter deals with an issue that is central to claims of what some have depicted as the new social movement par excellence (Touraine 1984)—namely, the environmental movement. Emphasizing demonstrators means that we focus on the social basis of old and new movements as they appear in action. While this seems a reasonable choice given our aim, two caveats are in order. First, it means that we do not deal with other ways to address our questions, for example, by looking at the organizational forms or action repertoires of old and new movements. However, while scholarly discussions of the differences between old and new movements have also dealt with these other aspects, here we are mainly interested in comparing individual participants in social movement events—namely, demonstrations. Second, our focus on actual protesters means that we leave out people who are engaged in the two types of movements but in ways other than taking part in demonstrations. For example, our analysis does not deal with members of social movement organizations or simple sympathizers of the two kinds of movements. Yet, demonstrations today are the most typical form of expression of what some have called the social movement society (Meyer and Tarrow 1998) and one which has become a “normal” way of expressing dissent in contemporary Western democracies (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001).

NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THEIR SOCIAL BASIS

The new social movements have constituted the major mobilizing force from the late 1970s up to at least the early 1990s. This has been shown empirically by Kriesi and his colleagues (1995), although these authors also stress the fact that the strength of these movements varies across countries and depends on certain features of the social and political context—most notably, the salience of traditional cleavages. Beyond such a quantitative assessment, however, the key scholarly debate has focused on the extent to which the new social movements are qualitatively different from more traditional movements—most notably, the labor movement.

The new social movements are said to differ from more traditional movements on several counts, such as their goals, organizational structures, and action repertoires (see Pichardo 1997 for an overview). In particular, they would focus on cultural issues relating to symbolic resources and goods rather than on materialistic issues concerning welfare (re)distribution. More specifically, the new social movements mobilize along three main thematic lines: a criticism of the new risks and threats relating to economic growth and technological progress; the rejection of the bureaucratic control by public and private organizations over the individual; and identity-related claims about new lifestyles and the right to cultural difference. This is aptly expressed by the term “left-libertarian” that Kitschelt (1988) has used to characterize parties belonging to this political area. Furthermore, new social movements would be more loosely and less hierarchically structured than old movements, privileging horizontal over vertical forms of organization and communication. Finally, new social movements would have contributed to an expansion of the action repertoire by adopting new forms of protest, such as direct actions and a more extensive use of the media.

Yet perhaps the most distinctive characteristic distinguishing new from old social movements lies in their social basis. Kriesi and colleagues maintain that “the basic characteristic of a social movement is constituted by the position of its main constituency in the social structure” (1995: xviii; see also Raschke 1985). Accordingly, if we are to observe a difference between old and new social movements, it should appear in their social basis. Kriesi (1989, 1998) has argued in this vein that the new social movements are the expression of a division between two segments within the new middle class displaying different worldviews and value
orientations: the “left-libertarians” and the “right-authoritarians.” Let us quote his argument at length as it is important for ours.

Based on data such as these, I would like to suggest that the split within the new middle class constitutes a possible structural foundation for the “value cleavage” which this cleavage was lacking so far: on the one hand, there appears to be a particular segment within the new middle class—the social and cultural service professionals, who, on the basis of their daily experiences at work, develop “left-libertarian” values and come to constitute a potential for collective actors on the left, and who, as a result of their increasing involvement in collective actions organized by such actors, progressively reinforce their structural and cultural distinctiveness.

On the other hand, there appears to exist another segment within the new middle class—the managers, who, on the basis of their daily work experiences come to be mobilized by the political adversaries of the sociocultural professionals and, by way of their identification with this opposite camp also reinforce their social and cultural distinctiveness. (Kriesi 1998: 171-172)

Thus, the core of social movements is formed by social-cultural specialists who not only share a similar structural location in terms of social class but who also develop value orientations that some have called left-libertarian (Kitschelt 1988) and others have named post-materialist (Inglehart 1977). This sets the constituency of the new social movements apart from more traditional movements, such as the labor movement. The class composition of participants in demonstrations, which are the most typical form of action used by social movements, should reflect this difference. Specifically, at least in their core constituency, new social movements have been found to recruit largely among the social-cultural specialists who share the structural and cultural location described earlier (Kriesi 1993; Kriesi and van Praag 1987), while the social basis of the labor movement is traditionally comprised of mostly workers, especially craft and production workers. Therefore, demonstrations dealing with issues such as environmental protection and climate change, which are close to the thematic lines stressed by new social movements, should be populated by a large share of social-cultural specialists, who in contrast should be absent from demonstrations bearing on labor issues.

SOCIAL CLASS AND VALUE ORIENTATIONS IN OLD AND NEW MOVEMENTS

The logic detailed above applies to a world in which distinct social movement sectors mobilize with little exchanges among each other. The past two decades, however, have witnessed a wave of contention that has brought together sectors of society that were previously engaged in political struggles on more specific and, above all, different issues. We are referring in particular to the global justice movement, but also more recently to the movements of the Indignados in Europe and the Occupy movement in the United States.

The global justice movement, in particular, has been characterized as a very heterogeneous movement (della Porta 2007). Participants in this movement come from different sectors of society. Events held under the banner of the fight against neoliberal capitalism and its negative consequences, such as protest demonstrations and social forums, have brought together people from different social classes and generations. This can be seen, for example, in the sociodemographic characteristics of participants in the European Social Forums (della Porta 2009; della Porta, Andretta, Mosca, and Reiter 2006). Moreover, the global justice movement brings together organizations from old as well as from new movements, and its claims cut across the boundaries of old and new movements by putting at center stage the redistributive issues generally addressed by old movements. The global justice movement thus embodies a turn in protest politics in Western democracies, as it blurs the line separating old and new movements. As a result, it is an interclassist movement, certainly much more
than both the labor movement and the new social movements, which are traditionally based on narrower constituencies.

As a reaction to neoliberal globalization, the global justice movement is probably the first visible effect of a changing cleavage structure on contentious politics. While the movement might also have contributed to the shift in the political space in Western democracies described by Kriesi and his colleagues (2008), testing the relationship between protest and electoral politics and its effects on the new cleavage structures goes beyond the scope of this article. However, we consider this movement to be an indicator of a homogenization of the movements of the left.

Kriesi and his colleagues (2008) have shown how the cultural dimension became more important in structuring the contemporary European political space. The emphasis of left political parties on issues related to cultural integration weakens their appeal to the losers in economic terms of globalization (Hutter 2011). This community tends to support right-wing populist parties (Lachat 2008; Oesch and Rennwald 2010). We expect these changes in electoral politics will be reflected in contentious politics as well, in particular among movements of the left. In other words, we expect a similar realignment process to take place within contentious politics. The new conflict between the winners and the losers of globalization produced a cleavage, which led to the emergence of new parties as well as to a transformation of the political agenda of established parties into right-wing populist parties supported by the losers of the globalization process: unskilled workers and the less educated (Grande 2008; Oesch and Rennwald 2010). We argue that the realignment of the workers from the traditional left, and the fact that they did not move to the new left, has a homogenization effect on the structural basis of leftist movements, blurring the line between old and new movements.

In brief, we suggest that, as a result of the transformation of the political space that occurred in Europe and as expressed in the mobilization of the global justice movement as well as of similarly heterogeneous movements, movement sectors that were previously quite distinct are today getting closer to each other. This state of affairs leads to a blurring of the lines between old and new movements, at least when it comes to protesting in the streets. Applied at the level of individual participants in demonstrations, this means that the two movement sectors gather people from a rather similar social and cultural background, at least more than has been the case in the past or more than new social movement theories have suggested.

However, as Kriesi and his colleagues (1995) have shown, the mobilizing potential of the new social movements varies considerably across countries as a result of the salience of the traditional cleavages upon which the mobilization of old movements rests. They argue in particular that the potential for the political mobilization of the new social movements results from a sort of zero-sum game: the more salient the traditional cleavages upon which the mobilization of old movements rests, the narrower the space for mobilization on new issues. Thus, for example, in France, where the class cleavage and other traditional cleavages have remained strong, the new social movements have found less space for mobilizing than in the other three countries they studied (Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland). As a result, the homogenization among the two social movement sectors should have gone further in countries where the class cleavage is stronger. In other words, we should observe a higher share of socio-cultural specialists in demonstrations on old issues in countries where the class cleavage is stronger than in countries where it is weaker. In addition, since this constituency displays left-libertarian value orientations, we should observe a higher share of such values in these contexts.

In sum, we expect the difference between demonstrations on old and new issues, in terms of the social characteristics (social class and value orientations) of participants, to be smaller than depicted in the literature—and perhaps than was previously the case—as a result of the restructuring of the space of political contention. In addition, we expect the strength of the class cleavages to have an impact on the extent to which the social characteristics of partici-
pants in demonstrations on old and new issues are similar, which should be larger in countries in which the class cleavage is strong.

**DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATION**

The data we use in our analyses comes from the Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualizing Contestation (CCC) project, a cross-national research endeavor aimed at studying the impact of contextual variation on demonstration participation. In line with the focus of this special issue, as well as with our research questions, we compare May Day (MD) and climate change (CC) demonstrations. While the former is typical of old protest events, albeit a very institutionalized and ritualized one, the latter represents the mobilization of the new social movement par excellence—namely, the environmental movement.

We compare MD and CC demonstrations in Belgium and Sweden. These two countries differ in the importance of the class cleavage. Using two common measures (the Alford index and the kappa index), we find that the class cleavage is quite strong in Sweden, and it is weaker in Belgium. Therefore, we expect the hypothesized homogenizing effect to be weaker in Belgium. In other words, participants in MD and CC demonstrations should be more similar across the two kinds of events in Sweden than in Belgium, both in structural (social class) and cultural (value orientations) terms.

The data were collected through questionnaires handed out at demonstrations focused on the two aforementioned issues. The overall sample consists of 1,075 respondents: 559 for MD (216 in Belgium and 343 in Sweden) and 516 for CC (334 in Belgium and 182 in Sweden). This includes data from five demonstrations: one MD in Belgium, two MD in Sweden and one CC in each country. The demonstrations covered are the following (response rates between parentheses): the Climate March in Copenhagen on December 12, 2009 (31 percent); the Left Party May Day in Stockholm in 2010 (20 percent); the Social Democratic Party May Day in Stockholm in 2010 (40 percent); the Climate Change March in Brussels on December 5, 2009 (40 percent); and the May Day in Antwerp in 2010 (26 percent). Short, face-to-face questionnaires distributed at the demonstrations allow us to check for non-response biases as their return rate is close to 100 percent.

Social-class and value orientations were operationalized as follows. Social class is an eight-class scheme. This class scheme shifts the focus from hierarchical divisions to horizontal cleavages. Indeed, the middle class is increasing in size and becoming more heterogeneous. A structural cleavage appears to separate the salaried middle class between professionals in the social and cultural services, on one hand, and technical experts and managers, on the other (Kriesi 1989). To capture this heterogeneity, a social-class scheme has been developed that discriminates hierarchically between positions within labor markets and production units on the basis of Erikson and Goldthorpe’s (1992) scheme and horizontally between different work logics in which employees evolve (Oesch 2006). The unit of analysis is the individual rather than the household. Respondents are allocated to different classes based on their employment status (distinction between employed and self-employed) and their past or present occupation measured by the British standard occupational codification codes (SOC1990). Full-time students are left out of the analysis as our data does not allow for retrieving their social location. Since we are interested in the structural basis of old and new demonstrations, we focus on demonstrators that can actually be located in the class scheme. Three classes compose the salaried middle class: managers, technical (semi-) professionals, and sociocultural (semi-) professionals. The working class includes clerks, craft, and production workers, as well as interpersonal service workers. Finally, self-employed professionals are the traditional bourgeoisies and a last class is composed of small business owners.

Value orientations of demonstrators are operationalized using four items with five response categories ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Two items measure the
socialist/laissez faire dimension, while two other items capture the authoritarian/libertarian dimension (Heath, Evans, and Martin 1994). Respondents were asked to what extent they agree with the following statements: “Government should redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well off” and “Even the most important public services and industries are best left to private enterprise.” The authoritarian/libertarian items are “Children should be taught to obey authority” and “People from other countries should be allowed to come to my country and live here permanently if they want to.”

FINDINGS

In order to test our two hypotheses with the data, we look at the distributions of demonstrators on the social class and value orientations variables both across the two types of demonstrations (MD and CC) and the two countries (Belgium and Sweden). We first compare the distributions across the two types of demonstration regardless of the country (first hypothesis). We then do the same analysis for each country in order to determine whether differences between demonstrations vary according to the salience of the class cleavage (second hypothesis).

Table 1 shows the social class of participants in MD and CC demonstrations in the two countries. If the hypothesis of a homogenization of protest of the left holds, we should observe a similar distribution of social classes in the two kinds of demonstrations. This is indeed what we observe. Of course, the distributions are not exactly the same, as attested by the significant Cramer’s V coefficient, but if we look more closely at the data, we can see that overall the structural location of participants is similar. First of all, except for three specific cases (craft and production workers, interpersonal service workers, and small business owners), the differences are not statistically significant. Secondly and most importantly, the social-cultural specialists are overrepresented not only in CC (“new”) demonstrations, but also in MD (“old”) demonstrations. In fact, they are even more numerous among participants in the former kind of protest events. In contrast, crafts and production workers and interpersonal service workers (the working classes) have a significantly greater presence in MD demonstrations. Although the latter have become largely routinized events and the unions as well as social-democratic parties attract more members from the new middle class than in the past, the presence of workers remains higher than in a typical new social movement demonstration in comparative perspective. This suggests not only that a homogenization of protest has indeed occurred, but also that this is due to the “colonization” of traditional kinds

| Table 1. Social Class of Participants in May Day and Climate Change Demonstrations (%) |
|------------------------------------------|-----------------|
| **May Day**                              | **Climate Change** |
| Managers                                 | 14.4            | 12.5            |
| Technical (semi-)professionals           | 9.6             | 10.1            |
| Sociocultural (semi-)professionals       | 37.3            | 41.2            |
| Clerks                                   | 13.3            | 12.5            |
| Craft and production                     | 8.4             | 4.1             |
| Interpersonal service                    | 11.1            | 5.4             |
| Self-employed professionals              | 2.1             | 1.7             |
| Small business owners                    | 3.9             | 12.5            |

N (Total %) 467 (100%) 296 (100%)

Notes: Chi square = 31.96 (p = .000). Cramer’s V = 0.20 (p = .000). Significant differences indicated with ↔ (adjusted residuals ≥ ± 1.96).
of events by “new social movement people.” One possible interpretation is that, as a result of the loss of strength of the class cleavage during the last decades, the proportion of “new social movement people” looking for spaces for mobilization around old issues is larger than the inverse.

According to cleavage theory, the structural location of people should be reflected in their cultural location. So, what about the value orientations of participants in MD and CC demonstrations? Do they experience a homogenizing effect similar to the one observed for social class? The core values of people traditionally mobilizing around old movements are different from those mobilizing for new ones. In particular, according to students of new social movements, the latter display a blend of leftist and libertarian values, while the labor movement conveys leftist, but not necessarily libertarian values (Kriesi 1989, 1998).

Table 2 compares the means of participants in MD and CC demonstrations on the four items referring to left/right and authoritarian/libertarian value orientations. The results show a statistically significant difference between participants in the two kinds of demonstrations on the left/right dimension, but not on the authoritarian/libertarian dimension. Specifically, MD demonstrators tend to be more leftist than CC demonstrators, although the difference is not very large. This can be seen in the fact that the former support the government’s redistribution of wealth to a greater extent than the latter, and that they more strongly disagree that public services should be left to private enterprises.

Table 2. Value Orientations of Participants in Demonstrations (means)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May Day</th>
<th>Climate Change</th>
<th>T-test</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government redistribution</td>
<td>4.42</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>6.02***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.811)</td>
<td>(.933)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children should obey authority</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>-0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.150)</td>
<td>(1.034)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public services left to private enterprise</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>-2.34**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.812)</td>
<td>(1.092)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People from other country allowed to live in my country</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.080)</td>
<td>(1.006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Notes: Scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Standard deviations in parentheses. * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001

These results support our first hypothesis about the homogenization of protest with regard to the cultural location of demonstrators. If mobilizations around old and new issues would form distinct protest sectors, we should clearly observe different value orientations across the two kinds of demonstrations. This should be most visible on the authoritarian/libertarian dimension, because it is here that the constituencies of the labor movement and of new social movements traditionally differ, although they are both leftist. Yet it is precisely on this dimension that we do not see any significant difference. Of course, this is in part due to the fact that the social-cultural specialists form the largest group in both MD and CC demonstrations. 7 In a way, the structural dimension of social-class location precedes the cultural dimension of value orientations, the latter being determined by the former.

Moving to our second hypothesis, we expect the homogenizing effect to be stronger where the class cleavage is stronger, therefore forming an important basis for political mobilization. Finding less space for mobilizing on new issues, the typical new social movement constituency should “colonize” demonstrations around old issues. We should therefore find a stronger presence of the new middle class and, more specifically, of the social-cultural specialists in MD demonstrations in Sweden, leading to a reduction in the difference across the two kinds of demonstrations there. This should also be reflected in the larger presence of
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left-libertarian values among participants in such demonstrations. When the class cleavage is weaker, in contrast, there is more room left for new social movement issues and demonstrations. As a result, we expect the social-cultural specialists to be more focused on CC demonstrations, which should be seen in a significant difference across the two kinds of demonstrations there. Again, this should be reflected in the distribution of left-libertarian values.

Table 3 shows the results for social class. We find a statistically significant difference in the social basis of participants in the two types of demonstrations in both countries. In Belgium, as expected, sociocultural specialists are more present in CC than in MD demonstrations. Moreover, we also find a significantly higher share of the working class in old demonstrations. However, once again, the sociocultural specialists are most represented in both types of demonstrations. In Sweden we observe a different pattern. Indeed, contrary to what we expected, we find a significant difference in the social basis of demonstrations, as the sociocultural specialists have a more significant presence in MD demonstrations, which is quite surprising. Here the “colonization” of the old protest sector by people belonging to the new one apparently has gone very far. We also find statistically significant differences in the social basis of participants in the two types of demonstrations in Belgium. For our argument the most important difference concerns the sociocultural specialists, who have a greater presence in CC demonstrations in Belgium, while in Sweden they have a greater presence in MD demonstrations. In addition, we observe a significant difference in the presence of craft and production workers (the traditional social basis of the labor movement) in Belgium. Thus, the working class is not absent from MD demonstrations in Sweden, but MD primarily mobilizes the socio-cultural specialists.

Table 3. Social Class of Participants in Demonstrations by Country (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May Day Climate</td>
<td>Change May Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical (semi) professionals</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural (semi) professionals</td>
<td>29.6 ↔ 42.4</td>
<td>41.9 ↔ 39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks</td>
<td>22.7 ↔ 14.1</td>
<td>7.6 ↔ 10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft and production</td>
<td>12.5 ↔ 5.1</td>
<td>5.8 ↔ 2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal service</td>
<td>8.5 ↔ 3.4</td>
<td>12.7 ↔ 8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed professionals</td>
<td>1.7 ↔ 2.3</td>
<td>2.4 ↔ .8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small business owners</td>
<td>2.3 ↔ 7.9</td>
<td>4.8 ↔ 19.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N (Total %) 176 (100%) 177 (100%) 291 (100%) 119 (100%)

Notes: Chi square = 23.17 (p = .002) for Belgium and 28.21 (p = .000) for Sweden. Cramer’s V = .25 (p = .000) for Belgium and .26 (p = .000) for Sweden. Significant differences are indicated with ↔ (adjusted residuals ≥ ± 1.96).

These findings suggest that the class cleavage indeed affects the social composition of old and new social movement demonstrations. The strength of the cleavage seems to mediate the homogenization effect on the structural location of demonstrators. The little space left to new social movement issues in Sweden results in a more important presence of their core constituency in MD demonstrations. In addition, in such a context, the working class seems to desert the old left, perhaps moving their support to the populist and radical right, as shown by a wealth of studies (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Kriesi 1998; Oesch and Rennwald 2010). Here the left, be it old or new, mainly mobilizes the new middle class. In contrast, when the
cleavage is weaker, as in Belgium, the new middle class is mainly found in new social movement demonstrations. Here the old left, although it also mobilizes the new middle class, does so to a less extent and still mobilizes the working class. Thus, the distinction between old and new social movements, as well as the differences in the social classes mobilized, seems to hold when the class cleavage is weaker.

Table 4 shows the value orientations of demonstrators in the two countries. The results differ from those observed when aggregating the data for the two countries. Basically, while we find significant differences on values between demonstrations in Belgium, no such differences are observed in Sweden. In Belgium, MD demonstrators are more leftist than CC demonstrators on one of the two items on the left/right dimension and they are also more authoritarian than CC demonstrators. This result provides further support to our hypotheses, as in Sweden there is no difference between MD and CC demonstrators, while we observe the opposite in Belgium. Again, there probably is a compositional effect to the extent that, as we have seen, MD demonstrations are “colonized” by social-cultural specialists in Sweden to a greater extent than in Belgium, and the latter carry left-libertarian values.

Table 4. Value Orientations of Participants in Demonstrations by Country (means)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>T-test</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>T-test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May Day</td>
<td>Climate Change</td>
<td></td>
<td>May Day</td>
<td>Climate Change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government redistribution</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>4.99***</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.8496)</td>
<td>(.9743)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.7811)</td>
<td>(.8645)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children should obey authority</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>4.16***</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.9565)</td>
<td>(.9619)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.0340)</td>
<td>(9346)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public services left to private enterprise</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>-.88</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>-.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.019)</td>
<td>(.9735)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.6240)</td>
<td>(.6711)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People from other country allowed to live in my country</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>-2.40*</td>
<td>4.01</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>-.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.1508)</td>
<td>(1.0046)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.9368)</td>
<td>(.9239)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Standard deviations in parentheses. * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001

CONCLUSION

Social movement theory usually draws a rather stark distinction between old and new social movements. Sometimes quite uncritically, scholars tend to agree that these form two distinct movement families or protest sectors. On the one hand, there are movements mobilizing on traditional cleavages and stressing materialistic issues relating to the (re)distribution of welfare. The labor movement is obviously the archetypical example. On the other hand, the new social movements have mobilized along new lines of conflicts, stressing issues concerning the risks of economic growth, individual autonomy vis-à-vis bureaucratic organizations, and identity and cultural differences and lifestyles.

In this article we have challenged such a dichotomy, arguing that this distinction is no longer so clear-cut, if it ever was so to begin with. More precisely, based on works that show the impact of the transformation of the political space as well as of the cleavage structures in Europe and the resulting realignment process in electoral politics, we have argued that similar processes have occurred in the field of contentious politics. In other words, we have advanced
the hypothesis that the restructuring of the space of political contention has produced a homogenization of protest on the left of the political spectrum.

Using original data on participants in old and new demonstrations, we have provided evidence that this is actually occurring. Furthermore, we have shown that such a homogenizing effect has gone further in countries where the class cleavage is stronger and therefore forms an important basis for political mobilization. In such contexts, the narrower space left for the mobilization of the new social movements leads the core constituency of these movements, which is formed by the new middle class and more specifically by the so-called social-cultural specialists, to “colonize” demonstrations traditionally “reserved” for another social basis, namely, the working class. Our comparison of Belgium and Sweden provide support for this hypothesis.

In sum, both at the structural level of social class and at the cultural level of value orientations, the distinction between old and new social movements seems less self-evident than previous work has maintained. Thus, while we seem to already be in a social movement society (Meyer and Tarrow 1998) characterized by a normalization of both the protest and the protester (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001), we might be heading toward a homogenization of protest.

Of course, ours is only a tentative test of the homogenization hypothesis, and we should be careful about reaching general conclusions too quickly. First of all, our analysis only deals with two issues and movements (labor and environmental protection). We do not know if we would observe similar patterns for other issues and in other social movements. Second, our empirical basis is quite narrow as it is limited to one demonstration for each issue in two countries. Again, we cannot generalize our findings beyond these two countries. Third, our analysis is largely exploratory and speculative. Our aim was not to provide a strong test of hypotheses, but rather to open up an avenue of inquiry that challenges previous accounts of social movements as being clearly distinct from each other and based on different interests and identities. Against this quite simplistic view of political contention, we suggest that protesters today move more easily from one movement to the other, albeit most likely within a similar political area.

In this sense and in even more speculative fashion, we would like to suggest, without having the means to prove it even tentatively, that the process that we have described has a self-reinforcing dynamic. While the transformation of the cleavage structures and of the political space resting on them is responsible for the changes we have been discussing, we would like to suggest that the homogenization of protest that we observe among old and new movements is also a result of the shared experiences of mobilization within the global justice movement and similarly heterogeneous movements, as well as of the common goals and targets of protest participants in these movements. If this is true, we should not only observe a similar social composition of old and new movements, but also an increase in such similarity over time, most notably after the protest wave carried by the global justice movement in the 1990s and 2000s. Further analyses should implement a research design to test this hypothesis.

NOTES

1 In the following, when we use the term “old” movements we refer to the labor movement and its organizations (labor unions, leftist parties). Of course, there are many other social movements that can be qualified as old or that mobilize on traditional cleavages. Here, however, we are interested in the impact of the class cleavage, upon which the mobilization of the labor movement rests.

2 The Alford index is 22.7 for Sweden and 10.6 for Belgium, whereas the kappa index is .826 in Sweden and .617 in Belgium (Knutsen 2010).

3 Two May Day demonstrations traditionally taking place in Sweden: one organized by the Left Party, conveying typical new social movement issues (feminism, environmentalism) and weakly linked to trade unions and another one organized by the Social Democratic Party that is closer to trade unions.

4 The Climate March in Copenhagen was included as part of the Swedish dataset, considering that a large number of
participants came from Sweden. However, this should not alter our findings too much with regard to the class cleavage, which is also quite salient in Denmark (the Alford index equals 12.3 and the kappa index equals .735). Since it was a transnational event, we dropped all respondents not living in Sweden, Denmark, or Norway.

5 The class scheme by Oesch (2006) represents a modification of the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarrero (EGP) classification. In comparison to other new class schemes, such as the Güveli (2006) scheme, both try to adjust the EGP to post-industrial stratification and partly draw on the same sources, notably Hanspeter Kriesi (1989) and Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1993). While Güveli makes a two-fold horizontal distinction in the service class (technocrats vs. social and cultural specialists), Oesch divides the salaried middle class into three categories: managers, technical specialists, and socio-cultural professionals. Accordingly, the two classifications overlap to a large degree. The more fine-grained categories of the Oesch scheme seem better suited for the purpose of our study as they allow us to clearly distinguish different categories within the middle class.

6 Since the two MD demonstrations mobilize different constituencies (Peterson, Wahlström, and Magnus Wennerhag 2012), we run the analysis separately for each May Day in Sweden. The results (available upon request) show little differences and tend to confirm our expectations.

7 We found a statistically significant relationship between social class and the two items concerning the authoritarian/libertarian value orientation.

REFERENCES


Güveli, Ayse. 2006. *New social classes within the service class in the Netherlands and Britain. Adjusting the AGP class schema for the technocrats and the social and cultural specialists*. Nijmegen: ICS-dissertation.


The Homogenization of “Old” and “New” Social Movements

