The Global Justice Movement: How Far Does the Classic Social Movement Agenda Go in Explaining Transnational Contention?

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Abstract

Titre du projet: Mouvements de la société civile mondiale: Dynamique des campagnes internationales et de la mise en œuvre nationale

Reference

Contents

Acronyms ii

Summary/Résumé/Resumen iii
  Summary iii
  Résumé iv
  Resumen v

Introduction 1

The Global Justice Movement 3

The Classic Social Movement Agenda 7

Political Opportunities 10

Mobilizing Structures 12

Framing Processes 14
  Master frames and selective frames in the GJM 14
  Conceptions of democracy within the GJM 16

Conclusion 18

Bibliography 20

UNRISD Programme Papers on Civil Society and Social Movements 23

Tables
  Table 1: Phases of development of the European society and social movements 4
  Table 2: Central claims, privileged means of action and major impacts of social movements 6
  Table 3: Issues addressed by participants in two protests against the WEF meeting in Davos in 2004 by type of network 17
## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATTAC</td>
<td>Action pour la Taxation des Transactions Financières pour l’Aide aux Citoyens (Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G7</td>
<td>Group of 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>Group of 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GJM</td>
<td>Global Justice Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>New social movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMO</td>
<td>Social movement organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEF</td>
<td>World Economic Forum</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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Summary

This paper analyses the new form of contention represented by the global justice movement (GJM) through the lenses of the classic social movement agenda for explaining contentious politics. The paper takes up each of the three core components of the classic agenda (political opportunities, mobilizing structures and framing processes) in order to ascertain their relevance for explaining transnational episodes of popular contention. To what extent is the emergence and development of the GJM dependent on political opportunities that are created at a level located beyond the state, rather than being nationally bounded? To what extent does the movement rely on transnational organizations and networks, rather than national ones? And to what extent does it convey broader collective action frames that allow for cross-national coalitions to be set up, rather than country-specific frames? These are some of the questions whose answers require a systematic analysis of the conditions under which the mobilization of the GJM takes place, and of the mechanisms through which it occurs.

Underlying many analyses of the GJM and transnational contention is the idea of the emergence of a global civil society. Thus, a certain number of scholars argue that the new (transnational) “protest cycle” attests to the emergence of a “movement of movements”, and reflects a decline of nationally based forms of contention and the emergence of a global civil society. The authors of this paper are quite sceptical of this kind of argument. In their view, it overlooks the crucial impact of a number of domestic factors and overstates the idea of an emerging transnational civil society. In particular, they assert, every protest cycle rests on previous mobilizing structures and episodes of contention. Nothing is reinvented from scratch. To a large extent, protest activities that occur at the transnational level, such as those carried by the GJM, rely on networks of actors that are embedded within national arenas of contention.

After a brief historical overview of the emergence and mobilization of the GJM, the bulk of the paper is devoted to an analysis of the GJM following the classic agenda and its core explanatory factors—political opportunities, mobilizing structures and framing processes (including a discussion of the concept of democracy put forward by the GJM). This analysis makes use of empirical evidence drawn from existing studies as well as from an original dataset on participants in two protest events that occurred in Switzerland in 2004. The authors examine the role of political opportunities, mobilizing structures and framing processes for this movement in an attempt to show that the national context remains crucial even for transnational forms of contention, such as those staged by the GJM. They argue that the GJM acts within a multilevel political opportunity structure in which national contexts still impinge in important ways on its mobilization. Country-specific contextual aspects, such as the degree of openness of the political system, the configuration of political alignments, the presence of powerful allies, the prevailing strategies of the authorities toward the movement, but also the presence of pre-existing social networks in which movement participants are embedded, explain why the characteristics and mobilization of the GJM may vary from one country to another. At the same time, the creation of common ways of framing the issue makes the gathering of a variety of different organizations, groups and networks possible.

In the light of the discussion, the authors argue, the classic social movement agenda goes quite far in explaining transnational contention. Of course, it must be adapted to some extent, for example, by taking into account supranational political opportunities in addition to national ones. At present, however, the imprint of the national context and characteristics seems so strong, after centuries of state formation, that even a genuinely transnational movement such as the GJM remains partly imprisoned in the cage built by the nation-state. It is perhaps a semi-freedom status of imprisonment, but still a status of imprisonment.

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Switzerland; Marko Bandler is an assistant in the Department of Political Science of the same university. This paper was commissioned under the UNRISD project on Global Civil Society Movements: Dynamics in International Campaigns and National Implementation. The project is led by Kléber Ghimire, with assistance from Santiago Daroca, Britta Sadoun, Anita Tombez and Murat Yilmaz, and is funded by a grant from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and by the UNRISD core budget.

Résumé

Ce document analyse la nouvelle forme de contestation que représente le Mouvement pour la justice mondiale (MJM) par rapport au schéma du mouvement social classique pour expliquer la contestation sous l’angle politique. Il reprend chacun des trois éléments essentiels du schéma classique (opportunités politiques, structures de mobilisation et modalités d’articulation) pour vérifier dans quelle mesure ils permettent d’expliquer les épisodes transnationaux de contestation populaire. Dans quelle mesure l’émergence et la croissance de ce mouvement, au lieu de se limiter au territoire national, dépendent-elles des opportunités politiques qui se situent au-delà de l’État? Dans quelle mesure le mouvement s’appuie-t-il sur des organisations et réseaux transnationaux plutôt que nationaux? Et dans quelle mesure véhicule-t-il des modèles d’action collective non pas spécifiquement nationaux mais plus larges, permettant l’établissement de coalitions transnationales? Ce sont là des questions auxquelles on ne peut répondre sans procéder à une analyse systématique des conditions dans lesquelles le MJM se mobilise et des mécanismes de cette mobilisation.

A l’origine de nombreuses analyses du MJM et de la contestation transnationale se trouve l’idée de l’émergence d’une société civile mondiale. Ainsi, un certain nombre d’intellectuels font valoir que le nouveau “cycle de contestation” (transnational) atteste de l’émergence d’un “mouvement des mouvements”, et traduit un déclin des formes de contestation nationales et l’émergence d’une société civile mondiale. Les auteurs de ce document considèrent avec beaucoup de scepticisme ce genre d’arguments qui, à leur avis, négligent l’effet crucial d’un certain nombre de facteurs nationaux et surestiment une société civile transnationale en formation. Ils affirment en particulier que tout cycle de contestation repose sur les structures de mobilisation et les épisodes de contestation qui l’ont précédé. Rien n’est réinventé à partir de zéro. Les manifestations organisées au niveau transnational, telles que celles du Mouvement pour la justice mondiale, s’appuient sur un réseau d’acteurs bien établis sur la scène nationale.

Après un bref aperçu historique de l’émergence et de la mobilisation de ce mouvement, l’essentiel du document est consacré à une analyse de la conformité du mouvement, conformément au schéma classique, et aux principaux facteurs qui l’expliquent—opportunités politiques, structures de mobilisation et modalités d’articulation (et traite de l’idée que se fait le MJM de la démocratie). Cette analyse se sert de données empiriques empruntées à des études déjà parues, ainsi qu’à des données originales recueillies sur les participants à deux manifestations qui ont eu lieu en Suisse en 2004. Les auteurs examinent le rôle joué par les opportunités politiques, les structures de mobilisation et les modalités d’articulation pour ce mouvement en tentant de montrer que le contexte national demeure capital, même lorsqu’il s’agit de manifestations transnationales comme celles qu’organise le Mouvement. Ils font valoir que le Mouvement exploite les opportunités politiques qui se présentent à divers niveaux et que, dans cette conjoncture, les contextes nationaux influencent encore largement sa mobilisation. Des aspects spécifiques du contexte national, tels que le degré d’ouverture du système politique, la configuration des alliances politiques, la présence de puissants alliés, les stratégies des autorités à l’égard du mouvement, mais aussi la présence de réseaux sociaux préexistants dont font partie les participants au mouvement, expliquent pourquoi les caractéristiques et la mobilisation du Mouvement mondial peuvent varier d’un pays à l’autre. En même temps, la création de modalités communes d’articulation des questions permet à des organisations, groupes et réseaux très divers de se rassembler.
Selon les auteurs, l’étude montre que le schéma du mouvement social classique va relativement loin dans son explication de la contestation transnationale. Bien sûr, celle-ci doit s’adapter quelque peu, par exemple en tenant compte des opportunités politiques qui se présentent au niveau supranational, et pas seulement au niveau national. Toutefois, pour le moment, l’empreinte du contexte national et de ses caractéristiques semble si forte, après des siècles passés à développer l’État, que même un mouvement authentiquement transnational comme le Mouvement pour la justice mondiale reste en partie enfermé dans le moule conçu par l’État national. Il est peut-être en semi-liberté, mais reste emprisonné quand même.

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**Resumen**

Este documento analiza el nuevo tipo de enfrentamiento que representa el movimiento por la justicia global (GJM, por sus siglas en inglés) usando el enfoque clásico de los movimientos sociales para explicar los conflictos políticos. El documento aborda cada uno de los tres componentes principales del programa clásico (oportunidades políticas, estructuras movilizadoras y procesos de enmarcado) para investigar su pertinencia a efectos de explicar episodios transnacionales de conflictos populares. ¿Hasta qué punto depende la aparición y desarrollo del GJM de oportunidades políticas que se crean en un ámbito de mayor alcance que el estatal en comparación con el nacional? ¿Hasta qué punto ese movimiento depende de organizaciones y redes transnacionales en vez de las nacionales? ¿Hasta qué punto conlleva esquemas colectivos de acción más amplias que permiten la creación de coaliciones internacionales, en vez de estructuras específicamente nacionales? Estas son algunas de las preguntas cuyas respuestas requieren un análisis sistemático de las condiciones en las que se produce la movilización del GJM, y de los mecanismos de ese proceso.

Un elemento subyacente en varios análisis del GJM y de contenciones transnacionales es la idea de la aparición de una sociedad civil global. Por lo tanto, algunos académicos piensan que el nuevo “ciclo de protesta” (transnacional) da fe del surgimiento de un “movimiento de movimientos” y refleja el decline en las formas de contención basadas en el ámbito nacional y el surgimiento de una sociedad civil global. Los autores de este documento se muestran muy escépticos respecto de esta posición. Desde su punto de vista, no tiene en cuenta el efecto crucial de varios factores nacionales y da demasiada importancia a la idea de una sociedad civil transnacional emergente. En especial, argumentan que cada ciclo de protesta se apoya en estructuras de movilización previas y episodios de conflicto. Nada sale de nada. En gran parte, las actividades de protesta que ocurren a nivel transnacional, como las del GJM, dependen de redes de actores que están ubicados dentro de áreas nacionales de conflicto.

Tras una breve perspectiva general del crecimiento y movilización del GJM, la mayor parte del artículo se dedica al análisis del GJM según el programa clásico y sus factores explicativos clave: oportunidades políticas, estructuras movilizadoras y procesos de enmarcado (incluido un examen del concepto de democracia presentado por el GJM). Este análisis usa datos empíricos sacados de estudios anteriores y de una base de datos original sobre los participantes en dos eventos de protesta que ocurrieron en Suiza en 2004. Los autores examinan el papel de las oportunidades políticas, las estructuras movilizadoras y los procesos de enmarcado en este movimiento para intentar demostrar que el contexto nacional sigue siendo crucial aún en el caso de las formas transnacionales de conflicto, como las organizadas por el GJM. Sostienen que el GJM actúa dentro de una estructura de oportunidad política de múltiples niveles en la que los...
contextos nacionales siguen influyendo de forma importante en su movilización. Los elementos particulares del contexto nacional, como el grado de apertura del sistema político, la configuración de las alianzas políticas, la presencia de aliados poderosos, las estrategias predominantes que adoptan las autoridades respecto del movimiento, así como la presencia de redes sociales preexistentes en los que los participantes en el movimiento están involucrados, explican porqué las características y la movilización del GJM varían según los países. Al mismo tiempo, la creación de formas comunes de enmarcar el problema hace posible la unión de una variedad de organizaciones, grupos y redes.

A la luz de este debate, los autores argumentan que el programa clásico de movimientos sociales explica bastante bien los conflictos transnacionales. Por supuesto, tiene que adaptarse un poco, por ejemplo teniendo en cuenta las oportunidades políticas supranacionales además de las nacionales. Actualmente, sin embargo, la influencia del contexto y las características nacionales parece tan fuerte, tras siglos de formación del Estado, que incluso un movimiento trascultural auténtico como el GJM permanece parcialmente encarcelado en la jaula construida por el estado-nación. Goza tal vez de un estatuto de “semilibertad”, pero sigue siendo prisionero.

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**Introduction**

Let us begin with three episodes of contention that took place in different places and at different times.

First episode(s): Britain, 1758.

The third year of war with France and the second of the Newcastle-Pitt coalition ministry, 1758 was also a year of high food prices and rising war taxes. The year’s contentious gatherings featured not only the mutiny of pressed sailors at Portsmouth, but also window-breaking celebrations of the king of Prussia’s birthday, struggles over fishing in the Thames, a fight between smugglers and troops, a brawl between sailors and owners of gamecocks, the collective pulling down of unsafe houses, crowd looting of a pastry shop, an assembly of farmers in favor of legalizing broad-wheeled carriages, another meeting to nominate a candidate for Parliament, as well as attacks on plundering soldiers, on a child molester, on a pawnbroker, and on surgeons who tried to carry off for dissection the bodies of criminals hanged at Tyburn. In 1758 direct action—often violent—dominated the events that qualified as contentious gatherings. Physical retaliation against malefactors and moral menaces occurred frequently, competitors often came to blows or worse, and decorous public meetings rarely occurred (Tilly 1995:74).


On August 28, 1963, between 200,000 and 500,000 (depending on who made the estimate of the crowd size), marched on Washington, D.C., to lobby for the civil rights bill that President John F. Kennedy sent to Congress on June 19. It was the largest political demonstration in the United States [US] to date. Although this massive protest was dubbed the ‘March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom’—thus combining civil rights and economic demands—the recent civil rights mobilizations in Birmingham gave demands for freedom much more emphasis than those for jobs. The march had been organized at a meeting held on July 2 at New York’s Roosevelt Hotel, attended by the leaders of the six major civil rights organizations. After two months of intense preparation, everything was ready for the march. Tens of thousands of participants, most of whom came on buses charted by local branches of the movement, gathered at the Washington Monument and assisted at a morning entertainment featuring several singers sympathetic to the movement, among them Bob Dylan and Joan Baez. Then, before noon, demonstrators began to march heading to the Lincoln Memorial, the stage of the main rally and a highly symbolic site for the organizers on the centennial of the Emancipation Proclamation. Notwithstanding the authorities’ fear of a riot—among other precautions, 15,000 paratroopers were put on alert—the event went on peacefully through speeches and songs heard by the huge audience (Giugni 1999:xviii).


The ministerial conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which aimed to prepare the launching of a new negotiation round—the so-called Millennium Round—took place between 30 November and 3 December. An unexpected mobilization of a variety of organizations and groups—non-governmental organizations (NGOs), social movements, unions, students, among others—expressed disagreement and tried to block the city centre for several days in quite a disruptive fashion in order to prevent the WTO meeting from taking place. What was to become known as the Battle of Seattle has come to represent a high point of a new form of protest, addressed against an “enemy” far beyond the local context and even beyond the nation-state. Seattle has become the symbol of the struggle against neoliberalism and for a “democracy from below”.
These are only three examples among thousands of protests that have occurred and continue to occur every day throughout the world. Yet, they are typical of the way in which popular unrest has expressed itself in different epochs. The first example shows an episode of contention—or contentious gathering—that fittingly represents the old repertoire, which was local (territorially and politically), patronized (by local elites) and reactive (aiming to preserve existing rights and privileges) (Tilly 1986). The second example is typical of the new repertoire (the modern repertoire), which is national, autonomous and proactive (Tilly 1986). The third example perhaps best exemplifies the supposedly emerging transnational repertoire of contention in the era of globalization. In other words, if the rise of the nation-state has brought about the modern (national) social movement, we might ask whether globalization has produced a postmodern (transnational) movement, or at least a form of contention.

From an explanatory point of view, another fundamental shift, that from “breakdown theories” to “solidarity theories” of collective action (Tilly et al. 1975), has resulted in what some have called the classic social movement agenda for explaining contentious politics (McAdam et al. 2001). This agenda results from a synthesis of three decades of work that has stressed three main factors: (i) political opportunities; (ii) mobilizing structures; (iii) and framing processes. In spite of varying definitions and uses of these three factors, existing explanations share a common characteristic: they are all based on a nation-centred view of social movements. Since Charles Tilly’s path-breaking work on the emergence of the modern protest politics during the historical transformation from an old to a new repertoire of contention (Tilly 1995, 1986, 1984), social movements have been conceptualized as being inherently national or subnational phenomena. Now, things seem to have changed. Over the past few years, transnational contention has increased considerably and a new collective actor has emerged. This new collective actor—which is defined variously as the no-global movement, antiglobalization movement, alter-globalization movement, global justice movement (GJM), movement for a globalization from below, among other labels—includes a wide range of groups, mobilizes various social networks and addresses many different, albeit interrelated issues, such as social and economic injustice, North-South inequalities, international trade rules and barriers, fair trade, global environmental problems, sustainable development and so forth. We use the label “global justice movement” as we think that what unites the various organizations and groups mobilizing around these issues is their willingness to bring about a new world order based on (national and transnational) justice.

No matter what we call it, the growth of this kind of contention is undeniable and has been shown by a number of studies. What is less clear, however, is the extent to which transnational contention is supplanting traditional patterns of claims-making and the extent to which it oversteps the nation-state. In this paper, we propose to analyse the new form of contention represented by the GJM through the lenses of the classic social movement agenda for explaining contentious politics. We take each of the three core components of the classic agenda in order to ascertain their relevance for explaining transnational episodes of popular contention. To what extent are the emergence and development of this movement dependent on political opportunities that are created at a level located beyond the state, rather than being nationally bounded? To what extent does it rely on transnational organizations and networks, rather than national ones? To what extent does it convey broader collective action frames that allow for cross-national coalitions rather than country-specific frames to be set up? These are some of the questions whose answers require a systematic analysis of the conditions under which the mobilization of the GJM takes place and of the mechanisms through which it occurs.

Underlying many analyses of the GJM and transnational contention is the idea of the emergence of a global civil society. Thus, a certain number of scholars argue that the new (transnational)
“protest cycle” (Tarrow 1989) attests to the emergence of a “movement of movements” (Mertes 2004) and reflects a decline of the nationally based forms of contention and the emergence of a global civil society. We are quite sceptical of this kind of argument. In our view, it overlooks the crucial impact of a number of domestic factors and overstates the idea of an emerging transnational civil society. In particular, every protest cycle rests on previous mobilizing structures and episodes of contention. Nothing is reinvented from scratch. To a large extent, protest activities that occur at the transnational level, such as those carried by the GJM, rely on networks of actors that are embedded within national arenas of contention.

The next section introduces our subject matter by providing a working definition of the GJM; trying to establish historical linkages with previous movements and waves of contention; and briefly showing its strength in Western democracies today—in particular, in Western Europe and the United States. Then we present in more detail the classic social movement agenda for explaining contentious politics and outline its basic components. The remainder of the paper is devoted to an analysis of the GJM, following the classic agenda and its core explanatory factors. This analysis makes use of empirical evidence drawn from existing studies as well as from an original dataset on participants in two protest events that occurred in Switzerland in 2004. In the conclusion, we return to our initial question in order to answer the question of how far the classic agenda brings us to an understanding of this new form of (transnational) contention.

The Global Justice Movement
The emergence of the GJM came unexpectedly. It is widely accepted that the GJM started in 1999 in Seattle with the protest against the third ministerial WTO meeting in preparation of the Millennium Round. The protest stood out not only for the attention it got from the media, but also for the impact it had on the meeting and negotiations. Furthermore, it gathered a wide spread of actors. Protesters ranged from human rights organizations to students, environmental groups, religious leaders, labour rights activists and other groups. All of these mobilized around such issues as the rejection of what they considered as the beginning of a new cycle of world trade liberalization; a better safeguard of environmental resources on a global scale; an improvement of social rights both in the Northern and Southern hemispheres; fair trade; and the lack of democracy of supranational organizations and institutions such as the WTO. The forms taken by the protest also varied. While the majority of the protesters were non-violent, small groups made use of more disruptive forms of action, which led the Seattle police forces to declare a state of emergency.

The Seattle events gave public visibility to the criticism of neoliberal globalization. However, the international character of the Seattle protest lies less in the composition of the protesters involved in it, as most of them were North Americans, than in the number of parallel protest events organized across the globe (della Porta 2003b). From that moment, a reference to a global movement has become current currency. Most importantly, since Seattle 1999, most intergovernmental gatherings, United Nations world summits and meetings of international organizations, such as the WTO, have been accompanied by (sometimes disruptive) protest events. In addition, parallel to the action in the streets, the GJM has brought to the fore new ways through which it tries to put forward its own agenda: parallel summits, social forums—such as the World Social Forum, the European Social Forum and, more recently, many national and local social forums—and global days of action. These types of events have witnessed an astonishing growth in the past few years. For example, both the number of parallel summits and the number of participants in these events have increased considerably since 1999 (Pianta 2004).

However, although the Seattle events were crucial to the visibility of the GJM—since then its activities have steadily increased, be it in the form of mass demonstrations, more disruptive protests or parallel summits such as the social forums—the origin of the movement is to be found in earlier times. Neither the protest activities against international organizations and
institutions, nor the parallel summits set up by civil society actors were new in 1999. On the contrary, the contention against the international financial or economic organizations such as the WTO, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the Group of 7/Group of 8 (G7/G8) was already present in the 1980s and 1990s, albeit on a smaller scale. The first such event occurred perhaps in 1984 during the G7 Summit in London, where a parallel event called The Other Economic Summit was organized by development, solidarity and environmental organizations (Passy and Bandler 2003). In this sense, therefore, the GJM can be seen as arising directly from the so-called new social movements (NSMs), which have formed the main form of contention over the past three decades in Western Europe (Kriesi et al. 1995).

We can try to put the GJM in an even broader historical perspective by confronting it with previous forms of collective action and social movements (Cattacin et al. 1997). Table 1 shows, in a synthetic way, the relations between social movements and the state since the seventeenth century, distinguishing between five main historical phases in the development of European society. Each period is characterized by a central social conflict around which political contention is structured, a main social movement (or “movement family”) involved in the conflict, and a type of state (and mode of state intervention) against which the movements’ demands are addressed.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions and periods</th>
<th>Central conflict</th>
<th>Main movements</th>
<th>Type of state and mode of state intervention</th>
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<tr>
<td>Seventeenth and</td>
<td>State expansion</td>
<td>Anti-tax revolts and other</td>
<td>Absolutist state; war/direct extraction of human and financial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eighteenth centuries</td>
<td></td>
<td>forms of resistance to state expansion</td>
<td>resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nineteenth century</td>
<td>Class struggle and poverty</td>
<td>Labour movement</td>
<td>Liberal state; rights, action frame</td>
</tr>
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<td>1900–1960</td>
<td>Distribution of welfare</td>
<td>Institutionalization of the</td>
<td>Welfare state; planning/nationalization</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>labour movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960–1990</td>
<td>Bureaucratization of society and risks linked to economic growth</td>
<td>NSMs</td>
<td>Welfare state; planning/ regulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Since 1990</td>
<td>Justice and democracy on a global scale</td>
<td>GJM</td>
<td>Multilevel governance; neoliberalism/loss of control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Cattacin et al. (1997).

The first phase in the history of (European) social movements covers, *grosso modo*, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This is the period during which the nation-state expanded, entering the life of the populations subject to its authority in more direct and intrusive ways. Thus, state expansion is the central conflict around which political contention was structured in this historical period. The main target of popular struggle was the dominant form of power at that time, namely the absolutist state engaged in war making. Therefore, the main kind of contention that flourished during these two centuries were forms of resistance to the expansion of the absolutist state (such as tax revolts), which relied on the direct extraction of human (conscription) and financial (taxes) resources in order to make wars on its enemies (usually other state makers). Here, we cannot yet speak of a genuine social movement, as contention was rather local in character, largely patronized by local elites and often reactive—

3 Of course, this synthetic characterization of the relation between the state and civil society provides a reductive picture of the wide variety of movements across the world. For example, the Civil Rights Movement is not included, although it was one of the major and more effective social movements in the United States (see McAdam 1982 and Morris 1984 for detailed analyses). Other American movements such as the Temperance Movement or the Free Speech Movement are also overlooked. While some of these movements can be assimilated to one of the categories we have outlined, others cannot. Thus, our picture applies, in particular, to the Western European context. Yet even here it largely simplifies the reality. For example, peasant, regional and foreigners’ movements are not part of our picture.
the three main characteristics of the old repertoire of contention singled out by Tilly (1995, 1986).4

The nineteenth century witnessed the consolidation of industrial capitalism, the creation of the proletariat and the rise of class conflict. Class struggle and poverty became the central social conflict, and the labour movement the main social movement engaged in collective action. Indeed, some consider the labour movement the principal protagonist of industrial society (Touraine 1984). Its struggle was addressed mainly to the liberal state, which was keen to grant civil rights, but less so to promote social rights and protection to the citizenry.

Social rights and, more specifically, the distribution of welfare is the central conflict of the third phase in this sketchy history of the relation between the state and social movements, which covers more or less the first half of the twentieth century. Although signs of emergence of new types of movements can be seen—for example, peace movements—the labour movement remains the principal collective actor during this period. However, it has become progressively institutionalized in almost all countries because the rise of the welfare state and the creation of national welfare systems has contributed to improving the condition of workers.

The period from the late 1960s to the early 1990s is typically the period of the NSMs (including the student movement of 1968).5 These movements have emerged as a form of resistance to the increasing bureaucratization of society, partly due to the creation and expansion of the welfare state, and to the risks linked to economic growth. Peace, ecology, antinuclear and women’s movements, among others, have all mobilized around this central conflict line and against an increasingly planning and regulating welfare state. In addition, issues relating to North-South imbalances, development aid and human rights have been carried by what some have called the solidarity movement (Passy 1998), which can also be considered as being part of this movement family, both in terms of its goals and its social basis.6

This was the situation around, say, 1990. Since then, as we mentioned, a new form of contention has perhaps emerged: the GJM and, more generally, transnational contention. This movement has emerged and mobilized around both distributive and emancipatory issues. Thus it may be argued that it combines aspects related to both the labour movements and NSMs. What differs is the scope of the conflict, which is no longer limited to the local and national level, but reaches the transnational and global level. Thus, global justice and democracy are the central conflicts here. These conflicts and the mobilization of the GJM relating to them are inscribed in a power structure in which the nation-state is losing control and must share its power with other actors within a system of multilevel governance. These other actors are other nation-states, subnational or supranational structures of governance, or economic actors within a neoliberal logic of resource distribution and policy regulation.

Thus, as Tilly (1995, 1986) has shown, the nature and characteristics of the main social movements that have arisen at each historical epoch are intimately linked to the process of state formation and, we should add, transformation. Every major transformation of the nation-state was accompanied by the rise of a new type of popular contention. This holds as well for the current—real or supposed—loss of sovereignty and autonomy of the state. Table 2 depicts in broad strokes the central claims, the privileged means of action and the major impacts of the four types of movements we have just singled out.

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4 Examples and analyses of the popular struggles typical of the ancien régime can be found in Hobsbawm (1959), Rudé (1981), and Tilly (1995, 1986), among others.

5 The inclusion of the student movement in the category of NSMs is not straightforward. In some aspects, it shares many of the characteristics of the NSMs; however, it also fundamentally differs from them, in particular concerning its central claims.

6 There is a large body of literature on NSMs; see Buechler (1995) for a review.
Table 2: Central claims, privileged means of action and major impacts of social movements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of movements</th>
<th>Central claims</th>
<th>Privileged means of action</th>
<th>Major impacts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-tax revolts and other forms of resistance to state expansion</td>
<td>Opposition to taxes and to the direct extraction of resources by the state</td>
<td>Local revolts</td>
<td>Local and temporary (often weak)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour movement</td>
<td>Improvement of work and living conditions/redistribution policies</td>
<td>Strikes/mass demonstrations</td>
<td>Institutionalization within the interest representation circuit/acceleration of the establishment of the welfare state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSMs</td>
<td>Diminution of risks in society/autonomy/peace</td>
<td>Mass demonstrations/direct actions/lobbying/media</td>
<td>Acknowledgment of the pluralism of society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GJM</td>
<td>Struggle against neoliberalism/promotion of democracy</td>
<td>Mass demonstrations/social forums/democratic deliberation</td>
<td>Democratization of society</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Ecological risks, technological risks, risks of war, etc. Source: Adapted from Cattacin et al. (1997).

The first three types of movements can be discussed very briefly. First, the various forms of resistance to state expansion were aimed, above all, to opposing the direct extraction of resources by the state and were manifested mainly as local (reactive) revolts whose impacts were at best local in scope and temporary in nature. Second, the central claims of the labour movement are the improvement of work as well as living conditions and are directed to redistribution policies. Strikes and mass demonstrations are its privileged means of action. Among its major impacts are its institutionalization within the system of interest representation (through the role of unions in policy networks and industrial relations) and the acceleration of the establishment of the welfare state. Third, the NSMs have mobilized for a diminution of risks in society, greater individual autonomy and peace as a *modus vivendi* even before doing so for a political goal. Mass demonstrations and public meetings remain the primary form of protest, but they are combined with more direct actions—for example, sit-ins, blockades and occupations, more institutional forms such as lobbying, when available, and a more self-conscious use of the media. Their major impact lies perhaps in the fact that they have demonstrated the strength and pluralism of civil society.

The GJM has a wide range of claims and mobilizes around many different issues. However, two of them can perhaps be considered its central claims: the struggle against neoliberalism and the promotion of democracy. More generally speaking, the GJM mobilized around issues relating to the redistribution of resources as well as notions of justice, solidarity and democracy on a global scale. For example, since the London G7 Summit in 1984, the G7/G8 summits are often accompanied by protests focusing on the North-South gap. The debt of the countries of the Southern hemisphere is seen as being both the symbol and the cause of this gap. Therefore, contention is extended to international economic institutions and organizations such as the World Bank, IMF and WTO, which are considered the main promoters of neoliberal globalization and its negative consequences.

Parallel to the struggle against neoliberalism, the GJM calls for greater participation of citizens in decision-making processes and arenas, both at the local and global level. Starting from a criticism of the democratic deficit in international institutions, organizations and, more generally, decision-making arenas, the promotion of democracy becomes a second “master frame” (Benford and Snow 1992; Tarrow 1992), in addition to the fight for alternative ways of conceiving globalization. This second general goal expresses itself in the movement’s very means of action. Thus, in addition to mass demonstrations, which remain a main strategic tool to put forward the movements’ central claims, two other means have appeared or, in any event,
increased in importance: social forums as well as increased participation in experiments with deliberative democracy.

Finally, concerning the major impacts of the GJM, given the present state of knowledge, it is much too early to conclude that the movement has succeeded in reaching its goals. What is certain is that it is contributing to the democratization of society precisely by putting forward alternative forms of participation. Whether the GJM has or will succeed, however, is not the focus of this discussion. We are more interested in examining its main component in more detail through the lenses of the classic agenda for studying social movements. It is to this task that we move next.

The Classic Social Movement Agenda

A few years ago, McAdam et al. saw an emerging consensus among students of social movements and revolutions toward three broad sets of explanatory factors:

(1) the structure of political opportunities and constraints confronting the movement; (2) the forms of organizations (informal as well as formal), available to insurgents; and (3) the collective processes of interpretation, attribution, and social construction that mediate between opportunity and action (1996:2).

In other words, explanations of the emergence and development of movements as well as episodes of contention have tended to be searched in political opportunities, mobilizing structures, framing processes or—more rarely—a combination of these three factors.

More recently, three of the most prominent scholars in the field—Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly (2001)—have added a fourth aspect, suggesting that much work since the 1960s and 1970s has focused on four key concepts that form what they call the classic social movement agenda for explaining contentious politics: (i) political opportunities; (ii) mobilizing structures; (iii) collective action frames; and (iv) repertoires of contention. These four aspects are seen as mediating factors between social change (the ultimate origin of all contention) and contentious interaction (the “dependent variable”). Most of the time, however, the latter aspect is conflated with contentious politics, that is, with what is to be explained.

As McAdam et al. (2001:17–18) have stressed, the classic social movement agenda for explaining contentious politics resulted from the questions that scholars regularly asked, linking the various aspects to each other:

- How does social change (however defined) affect: (i) opportunity bearing on potential actors; (ii) mobilizing structures that promote communication, coordination and commitment within and among potential actors; and (iii) framing processes that produce shared definitions of what is happening, and to what extent?
- How do mobilizing structures shape opportunity, framing processes and contentious interaction, and to what extent?
- How do opportunity, mobilizing structures and framing processes determine repertoires of contention—the array of means by which participants in contentious politics make collective claims, and to what extent?
- How do existing repertoires mediate relations between opportunity and contentious interaction, on one hand, and between framing processes and contentious interaction, on the other, and to what extent?

Although this synthesis has recently come under attack—see Goodwin and Jasper (2004b) for a discussion among proponents and critics—and alternative factors as well as conceptualizations
have been proposed, most studies remain anchored to one or more of the three aspects stressed by the classic agenda. Before we apply them to the analysis of the GJM, let us describe each of them in more detail.7

Political opportunities can be defined broadly as

consistent but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements (Tarrow 1996:54, emphasis in original).

More specifically, they refer to all those aspects of the political system that affect the possibilities for groups to mobilize effectively. As such, they have to be conceptually separated from the internal aspects of those groups, which may also increase the likelihood of observing collective action. In this vein, Koopmans (2004:65) has redefined opportunities as “options for collective action, with chances and risks attached to them, which depend on factors outside the mobilizing group”.

Koopmans’ reformulation is an attempt to avoid the structural bias decried, among others, by Goodwin and Jasper (2004a) in their harsh critique of the political process approach to social movements. Their critique was addressed mainly to the central concept of this approach, namely the concept of political opportunity structures. Although in the course of time, the concept of political opportunity structures has come to include an increasing number of different dimensions (Gamson and Meyer 1996)—indeed, nearly everything but the kitchen sink—the most influential works have focused on one or more of the four following aspects: (i) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; (ii) the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity; (iii) the presence or absence of elite allies; and (iv) the state’s capacity and propensity for repression (McAdam 1996). These are the dimensions of the political opportunity structures that, starting from the basic idea that “political opportunity structures influence the choice of protest strategies and the impact of social movements on their environment” (Kitschelt 1986:58), have been used by various authors to explain the emergence of social movements, their development over time, their levels of mobilization, their forms of action or their outcomes. These are the factors by which we must assess the mobilization of the GJM.

While the emergence and mobilization of movements depend on political opportunities, they do not emerge from scratch. Mobilizing structures refer to “those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action” (McAdam et al. 1996:3, emphasis in original). This aspect was initially introduced by the resource mobilization theory8 in the 1960s as a criticism of the then dominant collective behaviour explanations that tended to see social movements as a (sometimes irrational) reaction to feelings of deprivation and grievances arising from social stress and change.9 Against a view that saw collective action as a result of anomie and disorganization, resource mobilization theorists have stressed the role of organization and the capacity of aggrieved groups to gather and mobilize various kinds of resources—for example, financial, human or symbolic.

We can distinguish between two basic types of mobilizing structures: (i) formal organizations—for example, the Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens (ATTAC); and (ii) informal networks—that is, the web of interpersonal contacts and exchanges among movement activists and participants. Both represent crucial resources for any kind of collective action—whether contentious or not—that constitute the infrastructure of all social

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7 Helpful reviews of these three aspects of the classic social movement agenda can be found in the Blackwell Companion to Social Movements (Snow et al. 2004). See, in particular, the chapters by Hanspeter Kriesi on political context and opportunities, by Bob Edwards and John McCarthy on resources and social movement mobilization, by Mario Diani on networks and participation, and by David Snow on framing processes, ideology and discursive fields. See also Benford and Snow (2000) on framing processes.

8 For example, see McCarthy and Zald (1977); Oberschall (1973); and Tilly (1978).

9 For example, see Gurr (1970); Kornhauser (1959); Smelser (1962); and Turner and Killian (1957).
movements. Indeed, they are a component of the very nature of social movements, which can be defined as

1. informal networks, based on shared beliefs and solidarity, which mobilize about 2. conflictual issues, through 3. the frequent use of various forms of protest (della Porta and Diani 1999:16).

To what extent the GJM finds such resources at the transnational rather than at the national or local level is the empirical task that we consider below.

This definition introduces us to the third main component of the classic social movement agenda and which captures the cultural dimensions of social movements: (cultural) framing processes. This is the most loosely defined among the three core concepts of the classic agenda for explaining contentious politics, as it has been used with such a varied array of meanings as to virtually become synonymous with culture. According to McAdam et al., in its original formulation, which we owe to the work of David Snow and his collaborators,10 it refers to

\[
\text{conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action (1996:6, emphasis in original).}
\]

However, since then, the framing perspective has evolved, and today it focuses attention on the signifying work or meaning construction engaged in by social-movement activists and participants and other parties (e.g. antagonists, elites, media, countermovements) relevant to the interests of social movements and the challenges they mount (Snow 2004:384).

Thus, framing processes refer to the signifying work by challenging groups whose resultant products are collective action frames. This may include activities aimed at motivating people for action (motivational frames) or designed for identifying causes (diagnostic frames) and consequences (prognostic frames) of a given problem, but also, more generally speaking, discursive practices relating to collective action itself and to its relation to societal issues.

One feature of the classic agenda for explaining contentious politics is crucial to our present purpose: it is firmly grounded in a nation-centred perspective. This, of course, is particularly true for political opportunities, which have been defined mostly as national opportunity structures, but it holds as well for mobilizing structures and framing processes. As Smith recently pointed out in her review of transnational processes and movements,

\[
\text{[m]ost social movement research takes for granted that the national state defines the relevant political space for political contenders. However, if globalization is indeed amplifying the importance of remote decision-making arenas for local actors, then we must consider how global factors shape the political contests within states (2004:314).}
\]

Later in her review, Smith put forward an argument that underwrites our own view of the GJM:

\[
\text{[i]n many ways, the movement forms and dynamics we see in the transnational arena resemble their national and local predecessors, even as they are adapted to fit a transnational political context (2004:320).}
\]

In the remainder of the paper we try to elaborate on this argument, using the classic social movement agenda as a baseline and analytical framework.

10 Snow et al. (1986); see also Gamson (1995, 1992) and Gamson et al. (1982).
Political Opportunities

Students of social movements have used political opportunities in two basic ways. American scholars have tended to use it in a dynamic way to explain why and when protests arise at given times and given places (see, for example, McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1989). The concepts of expanding opportunities and window of opportunity are central to this approach. European students, on the other hand, have more often looked at opportunities following a cross-national perspective to show how the levels of mobilization and action repertoires of movements vary across countries as a function of differences in national political opportunity structures (see, for example, Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995).

When it comes to determining whether and to what extent political opportunities impinge upon the GJM, the main issue can be framed in these terms: to what extent are international or even transnational opportunities structures replacing national ones in explaining the mobilization, action repertoires and outcomes of the GJM—and those of other movements, for that matter? Here, we basically find what we may call an “optimistic” and a more “pessimistic” view of the impact of globalization processes on the opportunity structures for the political mobilization of social movements. The optimistic view holds that opportunities located at the supranational level are today at least as important—if not more so—than domestic opportunities. Therefore, transnational movements and forms of contention are emerging as a response to openings in such a supranational opportunity structure. The corollary of this thesis is that transnational contention, such as that staged by the GJM, is similar across space and time. The pessimistic—or, as we prefer to say, the more realistic view—maintains that national and even local opportunities maintain a strong influence on social movements, including transnational or global ones. The corollary of this thesis is that the mobilization of even the GJM varies depending on where it takes place.

Perhaps the best way to inquire into the impact of political opportunities on the GJM is to examine the relationship between traditional national opportunities and transnational ones. In this vein, looking in particular at the degree of openness or “closedness” of institutions, Sikkink (2005:156) has made a useful distinction between domestic and international opportunity structures, with the latter referring “mainly to the degree of openness of international institutions to the participation of transnational NGOs, networks, and coalitions”. The attraction of this approach is that it looks at how the national and the international context open up new opportunities for the mobilization of transnational actors, including the GJM, therefore acknowledging the fact that social movement in the era of globalization often participates in what she calls a “dynamic multilevel governance”. We can, therefore, think of the context of the GJM and other transnational movements as characterized by a multilevel political opportunity structure (Tarrow and della Porta 2005). The question is, then, to what extent supranational rather than national opportunity structures determine the mobilization of the GJM and to what extent the latter remain relevant.

Clearly, in the recent past new arenas have opened up at the transnational level, and the social movements—as well as other actors—can sometimes take advantage of these new opportunities and arenas (della Porta 2003b; della Porta and Kriesi 1999). However, the important point is to ascertain the extent to which they are able to take advantage of them and how this impinges upon their mobilization. The issue, in the end, is an empirical one. In other words, the above question can ultimately be answered only by looking at evidence coming from empirical research. In order to be assessed empirically, this broad question can be broken down into a number of more specific questions according to the various aspects of political opportunities. Thus, if we refer to the four main aspects we mentioned earlier, the task becomes one of determining to what extent supranational political arenas are accessible to the GJM, to what extent the movement can take advantage of the instability in political alignments, to what extent it finds influential political allies at the international level and to what extent supranational institutions have the capacity and propensity to exert repression on the movement.
Our view is that the national context plays a crucial role even for an eminently transnational movement such as the GJM. This view is shared by a number of authors who have recently asked, among other things, how national and local political opportunities influence the strategies of social movements active on global issues (Tarrow and della Porta 2005). Summarizing the chapters included in a recent edited collection devoted to transnational contention and global activism, the volume’s editors conclude on this point that

because we do not believe in a distinct transnational sphere, we think that these domestic factors are crucial determinants of the strategies of movements active transnationally (Tarrow and della Porta 2005:242).

A first, although somewhat raw, indicator of the impact of national political opportunity structures on the mobilization of the GJM is provided by the varying participation and level of disruption of the movements’ protest activities taking place in different countries. To be sure, most of the protests that occurred in recent years addressing international organizations such as the IMF, the World Trade Organization or the G8 have witnessed unprecedented levels of disruption, often in the form of overt violence. In addition, both the number of participants and the disruptiveness of mobilizations vary, depending on the very type of event. Here, we may distinguish between the two main forms taken by the mobilization of the GJM: mass demonstrations and protest activities addressed against major international governmental or private institutions or organizations on the one hand, and social forums on the other. However, if we compare the same type of events, we observe substantial differences across countries. Thus, certain protests against international organizations, such as the one against the G8 Summit in Genoa in 2001, have been significantly more violent than others, and this is at least in part due to the different behaviours of the state and the police in particular vis-à-vis the protesters. Similarly, certain events taking the form of social forums, such as the 2002 European Social Forum in Florence, have mobilized a much higher number of participants than others.

The impact of political opportunity structures on the mobilization of the GJM can also be assessed indirectly at the individual level by looking at the participation within the movement. Research undertaken by della Porta and collaborators on two GJM events that occurred in Italy relatively close in time—the protest against the G8 Summit in Genoa and the European Social Forum in Florence in November 2002—gives us a clue to cross-national variations in certain individual characteristics of participants in the GJM coming from different countries. Their findings confirm the role of the political resources and opportunities peculiar to each country. Specifically, they stress the movement’s greater appeal in countries characterized by closed political opportunity structures, especially in terms of configuration of power, which seem to create a broad front for opposition (della Porta 2005a). They also point to the traditions of the national social movement sectors in the countries from which participants came. Just to mention a few examples, NSM and environmental activists were much more present among British or German participants than among French ones. In contrast, French participants were characterized by a strong union component to a much greater extent than German or Spanish ones. Similarly, the identification with the GJM varied among participants in the same event. For example, the percentage of people strongly identifying with the movement was much higher among British participants than for other nationalities, whereas those not identifying or identifying only a little with the movement were more numerous among German and Italian participants (della Porta 2005a).

Although systematic research on the impact of political opportunity structures on the mobilization of the GJM remains to be done, these few examples suggest that the movement behaves in different ways, depending not only on the type of event staged, but also on the place where it is staged, be it a protest action or a social forum. National political opportunities may be responsible for a large part of such cross-national variations. At a minimum, it would seem possible to distinguish between cases in which national characteristics and traditions of

11 The surveys were conducted by handing out individual questionnaires to participants in the two events. See Andretta et al. (2002); della Porta (2005a, 2003a, 2003b); and della Porta and Mosca (2003).
contention are more important and thus strongly condition the movement’s mobilization from countries in which they are less central and therefore have a more limited impact on the GJM. A similar argument can be put forward with regard to the organizational networks, an issue which we address at more length in the next section.

Mobilizing Structures

As we mentioned earlier, mobilizing structures refer to the collective vehicles that allow mobilization to take place (McAdam et al. 1996). Basically, they consist both of formal social movement organizations (SMOs) and informal networks of movement activists and participants. Since social movements, unlike political parties and interest groups, are loosely organized collective actors (see also the definition above), special attention must be paid to the networks of organizations and individuals that form the GJM. While the networks upon which the mobilization of movements that arose in previous cycles of contention was based—for example, labour movements, student movements and NSMs—were anchored in local and/or national contexts, those of the GJM are local, national and especially transnational in scope.

A growing number of international NGOs and SMOs have emerged in the past few years. For example, Johnson and McCarthy (2005) show that the density of national environmental SMOs has increased steadily between the mid-1960s and the early 1990s, but has since declined, whereas the density of international SMOs has continued to grow throughout the 1990s. This led them to conclude that “expansion of the transnational environmental population comes later than growth in the population of national environmental SMOs” (Johnson and McCarthy 2005:85). This trend, however, should not be overstated, as the number of national SMOs remains far higher than that of international ones, and the founding pace of the latter has also slowed down between 1995 and 2000.

A similar and perhaps even stronger trend can be observed for SMOs more directly addressing global justice issues. Indeed, since Seattle 1999 and the rising protest cycle against neoliberalism as well as for global justice and democracy, a dense network of organizations and groups has emerged, as attested by several emblematic SMOs. For example, ATTAC, the leading GJM organization created in France in 1998, is now present in more than 51 countries (George 2004). Similarly, less formalized groups such as Reclaim the Street, People’s Global Action and Indymedia (the alternative media) represent a large network of activists in many countries, and action campaigns such as Jubilee 2000 have mobilized strongly, for example, to ask for the cancellation of the debt of developing countries. At the same time, nationally specific networks have also emerged, such as Solidaires, Unitaires, Démocratiques in France or the Lilliput Network in Italy. This new kind of organization and network, which are very loosely structured, decentralized and horizontal, cohabit with older ones within the GJM.

These examples convey the picture of a GJM formed by a network of organizations and groups that cross-cuts national borders, or at least that is part of a transnational cycle of contention in which actors from various parts of the world are involved. To be sure, there is a striking resemblance among the various protests arising across the globe and targeting supranational organizations or intergovernmental summits. Such a resemblance can also be seen in the use of widely shared slogans such as “Another World is Possible” (George 2004). However, it is at best too early to conclude that we are witnessing the emergence of a single world protest movement or the creation of a global civil society. In our view, these arguments overlook the crucial impact of a number of domestic factors on the GJM and the variation in the forms that this movement takes in different places. First of all, every protest cycle rests on previous mobilizing structures.

12 Gerlach and Hine (1970) have coined the term SPIN, which is an acronym for Segmented, Polycentric, Informal Networks, to point to the unstructured nature of social movements.

13 Jubilee 2000 was created for the G8 protest in Birmingham in 1998. Set up by Christian associations and various NGOs, the aim of this campaign was to put pressure on Northern countries to obtain the cancellation of the debt of Southern countries by the Christian Jubilee of the year 2000.
and episodes of contention. To a large extent, therefore, transnational protest is carried by networks of actors that are embedded within national arenas of contention and whose strength vary from one country to another. Furthermore, transnational protest also depends on the work of core activists who have been engaged in previous movements and SMOs. For example, some have shown that, contrary to what one might think, the Battle of Seattle did not gather a very heterogeneous and international network of actors, but rather was dominated by US activists (Levi and Murphy 2002). Similarly, others have shown that most of the activists in Seattle were Canadians or Americans and were mainly trade unionists (Lichbach and Almeida 2001). These examples show that the supposedly “global civil society” mobilized in Seattle was in fact the result of a number of networks deeply rooted in the national or even local context in which the mobilization took place.

We can again borrow some findings from recent empirical research on participants in the GJM to show how its mobilization relies on structural and institutional factors. We can look at, in particular, certain characteristics of the networks involved in the movement’s mobilization. This allows us to demonstrate the importance of national traditions of contention in the multi-organizational field of the GJM. Specifically, a comparison of the organizational networks involved in the movements points to the impact of two factors on the mobilizing structures of the GJM. First, the types of organizational networks that become involved in the movement depend very much on the pre-existing networks formed in other movements and during previous waves of contention (Passy and Bandler 2003), which in turn reflect the existing cleavage structure in a given country (Kriesi et al. 1995). Second, the movement’s activities rest on different kinds of networks depending on the type of activity, that is, depending on whether it is a protest-oriented action such as a confrontational demonstration, or rather a more “propositive” activity such as a social forum.

The surveys, mentioned earlier, on the protest against the G8 Summit in Genoa in June 2001 and the European Social Forum in Florence in November 2002 allow us to address the first aspect. More generally, these surveys suggest a number of findings concerning the participants’ embeddedness in organizational networks at these events that support our argument. Four aspects are worth mentioning in this respect. First, we can see that the GJM, indeed, mobilizes a rather heterogeneous network of participants. Some networks are overrepresented in both contentious gatherings (for example, NGOs and voluntary associations), while others are much more weakly involved (for example, religious movements). Thus, certain types of networks seem to be prevailing, while others are more marginally involved. Second, substantial differences exist between the two events. Specifically, the mobilizing structures represented by NGOs, environmental organizations and sports or entertainment organizations were more important in Florence than in Genoa. This can at least in part be explained by a fundamental difference in the nature of the two events: the first one was a protest-oriented mass demonstration with confrontational tones, whereas the second one was a more “reflexive” meeting aimed at mobilizing consensus. Third, in general, the membership of any kind of network was significantly more important in the Florence Social Forum than in the G8 protest. This can be explained by the fact that the Florence event was largely made of workshops and meetings, which are more likely to attract large numbers of people who are members of social networks. The transaction costs, risks and resources required for a propositive event such as a social forum are lower than those necessary for a more confrontational event such as a demonstration against the G8. Therefore, participation tends to be higher in events that are more focused upon discussing issues and proposing solutions rather than protesting in a narrower sense. And fourth, these findings suggest that the mobilization of the GJM depends on the national structure and implementation of existent social forces in the country. For example, political parties have traditionally patronized the social movement sector in Italy. Therefore, we find that they represent an important part of the mobilizing structures of the GJM in this country. Furthermore, student groups, which are also overrepresented in the network structure at the base of these two events, are also important in the Italian social movement

14 See Andretta et al. (2002); della Porta (2005a, 2003a, 2003b); and della Porta and Mosca (2003).
sector. This suggests that national mobilizing structures play an important role even for a transnational form of contention such as the GJM.

A similar survey conducted by a team of French and Swiss researchers on participants at the protest against the G8 Summit in Evian in June 2003 points in the same direction (Fillieule et al. 2005). The survey shows that French and Swiss participants at that event were embedded in different organizational networks. Specifically, GJM organizations were more present on the French side. This can be explained by the fact that France is one of the birthplaces of the GJM in Europe; for example, ATTAC was founded and has a strong presence there. No equivalent SMO exists in Switzerland in terms of size, while environmental SMOs, for example, are much larger in Switzerland than in France (Kriesi et al. 1995). Furthermore, NSM organizations—that is, environmental, humanitarian, human rights and peace SMOs—were much more present on the Swiss side. Again, here we see the impact of the national context. In particular, the mobilizing structures in the protest against the G8 in Evian reflect the strength of NSMs in Switzerland, as opposed to their weakness in France (Kriesi et al. 1995). Therefore, although the GJM certainly presents new features as compared to former movements or movement families, its novelty does not bear so much on the types of organizations involved or the profile of activists and participants as on the scope of its mobilization (Bandler 2005; Bandler and Sommier 2003).

These examples give some support to our argument about the relevance of the national context and structures even for a transnational form of contention such as the GJM, whose mobilization largely depends on national factors. In other words, a movement may have a transnational or global nature, but the structures on which its mobilization relies still vary according to the very place in which the protest occurs. Although it is clear that heterogeneity is one of the main characteristics of the GJM and, more generally, of the protest cycle around global issues, national structures and the particular history of the social movement sector in a given country have an impact. Therefore, although countries such as France and Italy have a long tradition of political mobilization, they are characterized by a weak presence of the NSM family. This impinges upon the organizational structure of the GJM, but also has implications for the collective action frames conveyed by it, as we try to show in the next section.

**Framing Processes**

**Master frames and selective frames in the GJM**

In dealing with framing processes, we shift from the structural to the cultural aspects of contention. Broadly defined, (cultural) framing processes refer to “the collective processes of interpretation, attribution, and social construction that mediate between opportunity and action” (McAdam et al. 1996:2). The result of this process of attribution and social construction are collective action frames. Building collective identities to be mobilized for contention is part of this process. Therefore, “identity frames” are a particular and important kind of frame (Gamson 1995). Another kind is what we may call “substantive frames”, that is, frames bearing on more or less specific issues raised in political contention. Our discussion focuses upon these two types of collective action frames within the GJM. In addition, we use the distinction between identity and substantive frames are only two among a wider variety of collective action frames one can find in the literature. For example, Snow and Benford (1988) distinguish between diagnostic (problem identification and attribution of blame), prognostic (problem resolution) and motivational (recruitment and mobilization) frames. In a similar fashion, della Porta (1999) distinguishes between four types of frames according to their function: (i) protagonist field definition; (ii) antagonist field definition; (iii) diagnosis; and (iv) prognosis. Focusing more on what movement participants feel than on the strategic efforts by movement leaders aimed at consensus formation (Klandermans 1988), Gamson (1995) speaks of identity, injustice and agency frames. Finally, in a more dynamic and strategic perspective, Snow et al. (1986) identify four main "frame alignment" processes—that is, four basic ways in which social movement activists and organizations present their message in a way that is congruent with prevailing views of certain social problems: (i) bridging; (ii) amplification; (iii) extension; and (iv) transformation.
between “specific frames”, which refer to particular issues and goals and “master frames”, which are more general and encompassing (Snow and Benford 1992; Tarrow 1992).

As we mentioned earlier, the struggle against neoliberalism is one of the central claims of the GJM. It can be considered what Snow and Benford (1992) call a “master frame”, that is, a symbolic construction of a public problem that allows many individuals, organizations and networks to get involved in a movement. The struggle against neoliberalism and the construction of this “master frame” began with the protest against the G7 Summit in London in 1984 (Massiah 2003). It has continued, with the campaign against Bretton Woods agreements since 1994 (Fougier 2004). The Zapatistas have played an important role in this process, as this was probably the first mass uprising against neoliberalism (Le Bot 2003). Since then, numerous issues, including country-specific matters, have been added to the GJM. For example, mobilization in Italy is very much focused upon the promotion of democracy from below (della Porta 2005b). However, although it represents the common denominator of all those involved in the GJM, not all organizations and groups consider the struggle against neoliberalism to be a sufficient motivation to mobilize. The heterogeneity of the GJM does not allow us to conclude that this common claim accounts for the presence of many different networks in the same movement or even in the same protest cycle. However, it would also be mistaken to assume that every network joins the protest because of a single and specific issue. However, the gathering of such a variegated range of groups can hardly take place in the absence of shared beliefs about the “world out there” and the creation of common meanings about the situation, which are brought about by “the collective processes of interpretation, attribution, and social construction” stressed by framing theorists. We suggest that there are “mid-range” or intermediate-level frames that link the struggle against neoliberalism to more specific issues and claims and which allow for the mobilization of many different kinds of networks. In other words, we suggest that specific networks participate in a protest not simply because their own claims and the issues they raise resonate with the master frame of the GJM, but also because there are selective frames stemming from this master frame that mediate between specific issues and the more general ones of the GJM. By selective frames we mean particular issues stemming from and made available by the more general ones of the master frame (Passy and Bandler 2003).

The framing perspective has taught us that a process of construction of the “problem” is necessary to activate the identities and motivations of actors to form social movements. However, this process is constrained and limited by previous mobilizations and ideas already expressed by previous social forces, most notably by previous social movements. In this view, the values and issues of the GJM do not differ fundamentally from those of the wave of contention that has preceded it, namely those of the NSMs. Indeed, although there are certainly several novelties in the nature and mobilization of the GJM—which we outlined above—it’s values, issues and claims are not entirely new and have been to a large extent brought about by the NSMs. North-South solidarity, for example, is a typical NSM issue. In addition, we also find more traditional claims. The very struggle against economic liberalism is indeed a typical claim of Marxist-oriented groups.

Thus, strands of the Old Left and the New Left—traditionally divided in their actions between a revolutionary and a reformist left—find a common ground within the GJM movement. We suggest that this common ground is found through the activation of “selective frames” that are resonant with the “master frame” represented by the struggle against neoliberalism and that allow for the gathering of many different networks for a common cause (Passy and Bandler 2003). As the NSMs are in many respects at the origin of the GJM, it is likely that their values are the main values carried in the mobilization of the GJM.

To examine this argument, we can use a third dataset built in a fashion similar to the two mentioned earlier. The data come from research conducted during two protest events against
the World Economic Forum (WEF) meeting in Davos, Switzerland, in January 2004. They allow us to show the different values of activists according to the network they belong to. In Table 3, which shows the issues addressed by participants in these protest events by type of network, the two principal issues are core issues of the GJM: to establish democratic forms that provide an alternative to the state and to abolish capitalism (with the last column taking into account all types of networks). To strengthen international law and to break radically with current models of economic development come next in the priority ranking. Indeed, most of the issues mentioned by participants were already addressed by the NSMs. Most importantly, when we compare the distributions across types of networks, we see that, whatever the type of network they belong to, participants privilege certain issues over others. This means that these issues resonate with the master frame. In addition, the more the issues are vague and abstract, the more they meet the preference of participants.

The fact that the ranking of issues is the same for every kind of network suggests that networks do not mobilize around specific frames, but around selective ones that are linked to the master frame. In other words, we see that networks mobilize, above all, around thematically close issues or issues directly derived from the master frame (that is, those issues that we call here “selective frames”), while more specific issues relating to less abstract and ideal claims (that is, those issues that we call here “sectorial frames”) mobilize less.

This brief analysis of collective action frames in the GJM shows that, no matter where they come from, participants in this movement are able to put aside their specific identities in order to join the movement, displaying a very similar priority order of issues. Indeed, sectorial issues such as homosexuals’ rights, mine clearance and education are not considered as priorities because they are too “specific”. In contrast, global issues are much more general and encompassing.

**Conceptions of democracy within the GJM**

Following Snow (2004), we previously defined framing processes as the signifying work or meaning construction by social movements that produce collective action frames. Among the central frames of the GJM, there is a specific conception of democracy, namely new forms of participative and deliberative democracy. In this section we would like to briefly discuss this issue.

Indeed, as we said earlier, the promotion of democracy has been one of the central claims of the GJM since the very beginning. The criticism of international organizations and institutions, particularly the financial institutions, is largely based on the lack of democracy and transparency in their functioning. The GJM calls for more accountability of these organizations and institutions as well as, related to that, a deeper inclusion of citizens in decision-making processes. The latter aspect points to a specific conception of democracy, whereby representative democracy and vertical organizational structures are rejected in favour of a promotion of horizontal forms of organization in which there are no formal leaders and in which decision making includes as many people as possible. Furthermore, this participatory conception is complemented with a view of democracy that puts deliberative forms of decision making at centre stage. Such a participatory and deliberative conception of democracy is present both in the discourses and in practices. Indeed, the GJM experiments with these models of democracy both in their internal structure and in its interaction with political institutions (della Porta 2005b).

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17 This survey follows the same approach as the ones mentioned earlier. It was conducted during two events addressed against the WEF—one in Zurich on 17 January and the other in Chur on 24 January 2004.

18 The selective frames identified by Passy and Bandler (2003) in the protest against the G8 Summit in Evian were very similar to these.
Table 3: Issues addressed by participants in two protests against the WEF meeting in Davos in 2004 by type of network (per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>NSMs</th>
<th>Traditional organizations</th>
<th>Political parties</th>
<th>Unions and unemployed workers/organizations</th>
<th>No organizational affiliation</th>
<th>All networks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen international law</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform financial and economic international institutions</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abolish financial and economic international institutions</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involve the NGOs more in international decisions</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform capitalism</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abolish capitalism</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen a larger state intervention in economic and social fields</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop participative democracy</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish a world parliament</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish democratic forms alternative to the state</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Break radically with current models of economic development</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 235 107 35 46 116 411

Note: Question: "What should be done, in your opinion, to really change the society in depth?" Respondents were asked to mention the three most important issues from a finite list of items. Percentages do not add up to 100 per cent because of multiple responses.

Source: Authors' data.

The criticism of representative democracy and the practice with other models of democracy is not just a peculiarity of the GJM. Certain NSMs, such as the peace and women’s movements, have already put forward and experienced forms of participatory democracies (della Porta 2005b). What is new with the GJM is perhaps the emphasis on deliberative democracy. Participatory democracy focuses on direct intervention in decision making and aims to replace representation and competitive voting in formal elections by decision making by leading to consensus (Cunningham 2002). Deliberative democracy goes a step further by defining certain rules for reaching consensus as well as the conditions for rational communication and consensual decisions (Benhabib 1996; Habermas 1979). As della Porta puts it,

we have deliberative democracy when under conditions of equality, inclusiveness and transparency, a communicative process based on reason is able to transform individual preferences and reach decision orientated to the public good (2005b).

An ongoing comparative research project focuses on forms of deliberative democracy as they are developed “from below” and implemented both in the internal organization of social movements and in experiments of participatory decision making. In particular, the project analyses the issue of active democracy as it emerges in the theorization and practices of the movements that have recently mobilized around the issues of globalization, suggesting patterns
of “globalization from below”. A pilot study on internal practices of democracy conducted in Italy shows the centrality of deliberative democracy in the GJM. Different organizations include elements of deliberative democracy such as inclusiveness, publicity, reason and consensus in their statutes and try to implement deliberative democracy in their internal practices. These organizations focus on general assemblies that are open not only to members, but also to outsiders; frequent consultations; open meeting places—for example, as mentioned in the Charter of the World Social Forum; consensus and other features of participatory and deliberative ways of conceiving the democratic process. The study shows that the GJM seems to have succeeded in building collective identities that can be presented as plural and tolerant, but at the same time it is still experimenting and looking for more democratic forms of internal organization.

Starting from these preliminary findings, the best we can do at this stage is to suggest some hypotheses concerning democratic discourses and practices within the GJM that remain open to empirical investigation. The first and most general one concerns the impact of certain characteristics of the national context on the conceptions of democracy in the movement. As we tried to show above, the GJM, in spite of its transnational character, remains embedded in different national political contexts. Furthermore, its practices of democracy are inherited from previous movements—in particular, the NSMs—and are still very much a “work in progress” (della Porta 2005b). Democratic discourses and practices are, therefore, likely to vary across countries, as national political cultures provide different opportunities to GJM activists and organizations to frame the democratic issue in terms of deliberation as well as to involve them in experiments of participatory or deliberative democracy.

**Conclusion**

We began our journey of the analysis of the GJM with three examples of protest that occurred in different places and, especially, during different epochs. We did so in order to recall that, as Tilly (1995, 1986) has shown, the repertoires of contention have changed much over the past centuries. Accordingly, we asked whether the GJM and, more generally, transnational contention, are not witnessing a new change in the ways people make claims.

After having put the GJM in a broader historical context, we have tried to apply the classic social movement agenda for explaining contentious politics to the analysis of this movement. Thus, we examined the role of political opportunities, mobilizing structures and framing processes for this movement in an attempt to show that the national context remains crucial even for transnational forms of contention, such as those staged by the GJM. In a nutshell, we have argued that the GJM acts within a multilevel political opportunity structure in which national contexts still impinge in important ways on its mobilization. Country-specific contextual aspects, such as the degree of openness of the political system, the configuration of political alignments, the presence of powerful allies, the prevailing strategies of the authorities toward the movement, but also the presence of pre-existing social networks in which movement participant are embedded, explain why the characteristics and mobilization of the GJM may vary from one country to another. At the same time, the creation of common ways of framing the issue makes the gathering of a variety of different organizations, groups and networks possible.

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19 This is the DEMOS project (Democracy in Europe and the Mobilization of Society), conducted within the Sixth European Union Framework Programme. The research, focusing on six European countries—France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom—and the European Union level, consists of an analysis of documents pertaining to both movements and public institutions, Web sites, semi-structured interviews with NGOs and public administrators, surveys of movement activists, participant observation of movement groups and analyses of the experiences of participatory decision making. The project is coordinated by Donatella della Porta of the European University Institute. Scientific researchers are: Isabelle Sommier, Centre de Recherches Politiques de la Sorbonne; Dieter Rucht, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung; Donatella della Porta, European University Institute; Manuel Jimenez, Instituto de Estudios Sociales de Andalucía; Marco Giugni, Université de Genève; Chris Rootes, University of Kent at Canterbury, and Mario Pianta, Università degli Studi di Urbino. See the project’s Web site for more information at http://demos.iue.it.
Among the common ways of framing the issues, the struggle against neoliberalism is perhaps the most important one. Another common frame within the GJM lies in the promotion of participative and deliberative forms of democracy, whose extent and effectiveness remain to be assessed. In particular, conceptions of democracy within the GJM are expected to reflect the national political opportunities and traditions of contention, as well as the very characteristics of the movement in a given country, which, in turn, is itself influenced by the national structure of political opportunities and other national characteristics, in addition to emerging supranational opportunities.

In the light of our discussion, it looks like the classic social movement agenda could explain transnational contention to a certain extent. Of course, it must be adapted to some extent, for example, by taking into account supranational political opportunities in addition to national ones. As of today, however, the imprint of the national context and characteristics seems so strong, after centuries of state formation, that even a genuinely transnational movement such as the GJM remains partly imprisoned in the cage built by the nation-state. Even though it is partly free, it is still, in a way, imprisoned.
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