National Constraints and Scale Shift in Current Transnational Activism

GIUGNI, Marco, BANDLER, Marko, EGGERT, Nina

Abstract

Since Charles Tilly’s path-breaking work on the emergence of the modern protest politics during the historical transformation from an old to a new repertoire of contention (Tilly 1984, 1986 and 1995), social movements have been conceptualised as being inherently national or sub-national phenomena. Now, things seem to have changed. Over the past few years, transnational contention has increased considerably and a new collective actor has emerged. This new collective actor – which is defined variously as the no-global movement, anti-globalisation movement, alter-globalisation movement, global justice movement (GJM), movement for a globalisation from below, among other labels – includes a wide range of groups, mobilises various social networks and addresses many different, albeit interrelated issues relating to the struggle against neoliberalism (Sommier 2003). The most salient issues bear on social and economic injustice, North-South inequalities, international trade rules and barriers, fair trade, global environmental problems, sustainable development and so forth.1 We use the label ‘global justice movement’ as [...]
Methodology and Theory of Transnational Social Movement Research
Chapter Eight

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Marco Giugni, Marko Bandler and Nina Eggert

Introduction

Since Charles Tilly’s path-breaking work on the emergence of the modern protest politics during the historical transformation from an old to a new repertoire of contention (Tilly 1984, 1986 and 1995), social movements have been conceptualised as being inherently national or sub-national phenomena. Now, things seem to have changed. Over the past few years, transnational contention has increased considerably and a new collective actor has emerged. This new collective actor – which is defined variously as the no-global movement, anti-globalisation movement, alter-globalisation movement, global justice movement (GJM), movement for a globalisation from below, among other labels – includes a wide range of groups, mobilises various social networks and addresses many different, albeit interrelated issues relating to the struggle against neoliberalism (Sommier 2003). The most salient issues bear on social and economic injustice, North-South inequalities, international trade rules and barriers, fair trade, global environmental problems, sustainable development and so forth.1 We use the label ‘global justice movement’ as we think that what unites the various organisations and groups mobilising on these issues is their willingness to bring about a new world order based on justice.

No matter how it is labelled, the growth of this kind of contention is undeniable and has been shown by a number of studies (e.g., Smith and Johnston 2002; Pianta 2004; della Porta et al. 2004; della Porta and Tarrow 2005; della Porta 2007). What is less clear, however, is the extent to which transnational contention is supplanting traditional patterns of claim-making and to which it oversteps the nation state. This chapter proposes to analyse the new form of contention represented by the GJM through the lenses of the classic social movement agenda for explaining contentious politics. This agenda represents the conceptual tools stemming from a synthesis of different approaches to the study of social movements. Each of the three core components of the classic agenda is adopted in order to ascertain their relevance for explaining transnational episodes
of popular contention. To what extent are the emergence and development of this movement dependent on political opportunities that are created at a level located beyond the state, rather than being nationally bounded? To what extent does it rely on transnational organisations and networks, rather than national ones? To what extent does it convey broader collective action frames that allow for cross-national coalitions to be set up rather than country-specific frames? These are some of the questions whose answers require a systematic analysis of the conditions under which the mobilisation of the GJM takes place and of the mechanisms through which it occurs.

Underlying many analyses of the GJM and transnational contention is the idea of the emergence of a ‘global civil society’. Thus, a certain number of scholars argue that the new (transnational) protest cycle attests to the emergence of a ‘movement of movements’ (Ceri 2002; Kaldor et al. 2003; Mertes 2004) and reflects a decline of the nationally based forms of contention. We are quite sceptical of this kind of argument. In our view, it overlooks the crucial impact of a number of domestic factors and overstates the idea of an emerging global civil society (Gobille 2005). In particular, every protest cycle rests on previous mobilising structures and episodes of contention (Agrikoliansky 2005). Nothing is reinvented from scratch. To a large extent, protest activities that occur at the transnational level, such as those carried by the GJM, rely on networks of actors that are embedded within national arenas of contention.

The Classic Social Movement Agenda

A few years ago, McAdam et al. (1996) saw an emerging consensus among students of social movements and revolutions toward three broad sets of explanatory factors: political opportunities, mobilising structures and framing processes.

More recently, three of the most prominent scholars in the field – Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly (2001) – have added a fourth aspect, suggesting that much work since the 1960s and 1970s has focussed on four key concepts that form what they call the classic social movement agenda for explaining contentious politics: (1) political opportunities, (2) mobilising structures, (3) collective action frames, and (4) repertoires of contention. These four aspects are seen as mediating factors between social change (the ultimate origin of all contention) and contentious interaction (the outcome of such a change).

Although this synthesis has recently come under attack (Fillieule 1997; Mathieu 2002; Goodwin and Jasper 2004) and alternative explanatory factors have been proposed, most studies remain anchored to one or more of the three main aspects stressed by the classic agenda. Before they are applied to the analysis of the GJM, each of them will be introduced more precisely.2

Political opportunities can be defined broadly as ‘consistent but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national signals to social or political actors which
either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements’ (Tarrow 1996: 54, emphasis removed). More specifically, they refer to all of those aspects of the political system that affect the possibilities that challenging groups have to mobilise effectively. As such, they have to be conceptually separated from the internal aspects of those groups that may also increase the likelihood of observing collective action. In this vein, Koopmans (2004: 65) has redefined opportunities as ‘options for collective action, with chances and risks attached to them, which depend on factors outside the mobilising group’.

Although in the course of time, the concept of political opportunity structures has come to include an increasing number of different dimensions (Gamson and Meyer 1996) – indeed, nearly everything but the kitchen sink – the most influential works have focussed upon one or more of the four following aspects: (a) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system; (b) the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity; (c) the presence or absence of elite allies; and (d) the state’s capacity and propensity for repression (McAdam 1996: 27). These are the dimensions of the political opportunity structures that, starting from the basic idea that ‘political opportunity structures influence the choice of protest strategies and the impact of social movements on their environment’ (Kitschelt 1986: 58), have been used by various authors to explain the emergence of social movements, their development over time, their levels of mobilisation, and their forms of action or their outcomes.

While the emergence and mobilisation of movements depend on political opportunities, they do not emerge from scratch. Mobilising structures refer to ‘those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilise and engage in collective action’ (McAdam et al. 1996: 3, emphasis removed). This aspect was initially introduced by resource mobilisation theory (see, for instance, Oberschall 1973; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978) as a criticism of the then dominant collective behaviour explanations that tended to see social movements as a (sometimes irrational) reaction to feelings of deprivation and grievances arising from social stress and change (see, for instance, Turner and Killian 1957; Kornhauser 1959; Smelser 1962; Gurr 1970). Against a view that saw collective action as a result of anomie and disorganisation, resource mobilisation theorists have stressed the role of organisation and the capacity of aggrieved groups to gather and mobilise various kinds of resources (for example, financial, human or symbolic).

Two basic types of mobilising structures can be distinguished: formal organisations – for example, the Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens (Attac) and informal networks – that is, the web of interpersonal contacts and exchanges among movement activists and participants. Both represent crucial resources for any kind of collective action – whether contentious or not – that constitute the infrastructure of all social movements. Indeed, they are a component of the very nature of social movements, which can
be defined as ‘(i) informal networks, based (ii) on shared beliefs and solidarity, which mobilise about (iii) conflictual issues, through (iv) the frequent use of various forms of protest’ (della Porta and Diani 1999: 16). To what extent the GJM finds such resources at the transnational rather than at the national or local level is the empirical task considered below.

This definition introduces us to the third main component of the classic social movement agenda and that captures the cultural dimensions of social movements: framing processes. This is the most loosely defined among the three core concepts of the classic agenda for explaining contentious politics, as it has been used with such a varied array of meanings as to virtually become synonymous with culture. According to McAdam et al., in its original formulation, in the work of David Snow and his collaborators (see, for instance, Snow et al. 1986; see also Gamson et al. 1982; Gamson 1992 and 1995), it refers to ‘conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action’ (McAdam et al. 1996: 6, emphasis removed). However, since then, the framing perspective has evolved and today it ‘focuses attention on the signifying work or meaning construction engaged in by social movement activists and participants and other parties (e.g. antagonists, elites, media, countermovements) relevant to the interests of social movements and the challenges they mount’ (Snow 2004: 384).

Thus, framing processes refer to the signifying work by challenging groups whose resultant products are collective action frames. This may include activities aimed at motivating people for action (motivational frames) or designed for identifying causes (diagnostic frames) and consequences (prognostic frames) of a given problem, but also, more generally speaking, discursive practices relating to collective action itself and to its relation to societal issues.

One feature of the classic agenda for explaining contentious politics is crucial to our present purpose: it is firmly grounded in a nation-centred perspective. This, of course, is particularly true for political opportunities, which have been defined mostly as national opportunity structures, but it holds as well for mobilising structures and framing processes. As Smith has recently pointed out in her review of transnational processes and movements: ‘[m]ost social movement research takes for granted that the national state defines the relevant political space for political contenders. However, if globalisation is indeed amplifying the importance of remote decision-making arenas for local actors, then we must consider how global factors shape the political contests within states’ (2004: 314). Later in her review, Smith puts forward an argument that underwrites our own view: ‘[i]n many ways, the movement forms and dynamics we see in the transnational arena resemble their national and local predecessors, even as they are adapted to fit a transnational political context’ (2004: 320). In the remainder of the chapter, this argument is elaborated using the classic social movement agenda.
Political Opportunities

Perhaps the best way to inquire into the impact of political opportunities on the GJM is to examine the relationship between national and transnational opportunities. In this vein, looking in particular at the degree of openness or ‘closedness’ of institutions, Sikkink (2005: 156) has made a useful distinction between domestic and international opportunity structures, with the latter referring ‘mainly to the degree of openness of international institutions to the participation of transnational NGOs, networks, and coalitions’. The attraction of this approach is that it looks at how the national and the international context open up new opportunities for the mobilisation of transnational actors, including the GJM, therefore acknowledging the fact that social movements, in the era of globalisation, often participate in what Sikkink (2005) calls a ‘dynamic multilevel governance’. Therefore, the context of the GJM and other transnational movements can be characterised as a multi-level political opportunity structure (Tarrow and della Porta 2005). The question is, then, to what extent supra-national rather than national opportunity structures determine the mobilisation of the GJM and to what extent the latter remain relevant. This question can ultimately be answered only by looking at evidence coming from empirical research. In order to be assessed empirically, this broad question can be broken down into a number of more specific questions according to the various aspects of political opportunities available. Thus, referring to the four main aspects mentioned earlier, the task becomes one of determining to what extent supra-national political arenas are accessible to the GJM, to what extent the movement can take advantage of the instability in political alignments, to what extent it finds influential political allies at the international level and to what extent supra-national institutions have the capacity and propensity to exert repression on the movement. Our view is that the national context plays a crucial role even for an eminently transnational movement such as the GJM.

A first, although somewhat raw, indicator of the impact of national political opportunity structures on the mobilisation of the GJM is provided by the varying participation (intensity, type, etc.) and level of disruption of the movements’ protest activities (often in the form of overt violence). These two aspects vary significantly according to the type of event. Here, the two main forms that mobilisations of the GJM take may be distinguished: mass demonstrations and protest activities addressed against governmental institutions or private organisations, on the one hand, and social forums, which are meetings and exchanges about different issues relating to globalisation, on the other (on counter summits see chapter 2, on social forums see the chapters 1, 3, 4, and 5 in this volume). Comparing the same type of events, substantial differences both across countries and within countries can be observed. For example, certain protests against international organisations, such as the one against the G8 Summit in Genoa in 2001, have been significantly more violent than others, and this is at least in part
due to the different behaviours of the state and the police in particular vis-à-vis the protesters. Similarly, certain events taking the form of social forums, such as the 2002 European Social Forum (ESF) in Florence, have mobilised a much higher number of participants than others. Furthermore, compared with the ESF that took place the following year in Paris, there are important differences in the type of actors mobilised (Agrikoliantsky and Sommier 2005).

The impact of political opportunity structures on the mobilisation of the GJM can also be assessed indirectly at the individual level by looking at the participation within the movement. Indeed, the type of organisational participation of demonstrators reflects the protest traditions specific to each country, which depend in turn on the cleavage structures. Research undertaken by della Porta and collaborators on two GJM events that occurred in Italy relatively close in time to each other – the protest against the G8 Summit in Genoa in June 2001 and the ESF in Florence in November 2002 – provides evidence to understand cross-national variations in certain individual characteristics of participants in the GJM who are coming from different countries. Their findings confirm the role of the political resources and opportunities peculiar to each country. Specifically, they stress the movement’s greater appeal in countries characterised by closed political opportunity structures, especially in terms of the configuration of power, which seem to create a broad front for opposition (della Porta 2005a). For example, in Italy and Spain, the centre-right governments, by adopting neoliberal positions, seem to favour broader coalitions within the movement as well as a stronger mobilisation than in Britain under a leftist government. The characteristics of the institutional Left also seem to have an impact on the mobilisation capacity of the movement. Indeed, where the Left is divided, such as in Italy, France and Spain, the movement is more present in the streets through mass demonstrations than in other countries, where it is much less visible (della Porta 2007).

They also point to the traditions of the national social movement sectors in the countries from which the participants came. For example, new social movement (NSM) and environmental activists were much more present among British or German participants than among French ones. In contrast, French participants were characterised by a strong union component to a much greater extent than German or Spanish ones. Similarly, the identification with the GJM varied among participants in the same event. For example, the percentage of people strongly identifying with the movement was much higher among British participants than for other nationalities, whereas those not identifying or identifying only a little with the movement were more numerous among German and Italian participants (della Porta 2005a).

Findings stemming from another research (Fillieule et al. 2004), conducted during the 2003 anti-G8 protest and reproduced in Table 8.1, show that during a transnational mobilisation taking place at the same time on both sides of the
Swiss-French border, opportunity structures play a critical role in the political composition of participants moved by the same issues. Thus, the setting-up of networks mobilised against the G8 summit reflects both the French and the Swiss political opportunity structures as already explored and pointed out by Kriesi et al. (1995). The Swiss mobilisation relies mostly on the NSM sector (ecologists, humanitarians, pacifists), while French activists stem mainly from the left wing political sector (unions, political parties).

Although systematic research on the impact of political opportunity structures on the mobilisation of the GJM remains to be done, these few examples suggest that the movement does not behave in the same way depending not only on the type of event staged, but also depending on the place in which it stages that event, be it a protest action or a social forum. National political opportunities may be responsible for a large part of such cross-national variations. A similar argument can be put forward with regard to the organisational networks, an issue that is addressed at more length in the next section.

Table 8.1. Organisational Networks of Participants in the Protest Against the G8 Meeting in Evian in 2003 (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
<th>All nationalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GJM organisations</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecologists</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarians</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against racism</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unions</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacifists</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth organisations</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social help</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminists</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious movements</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood associations</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing rights</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gays and lesbians</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other networks</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>836</td>
<td>862</td>
<td>2280</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mobilising Structures

A growing number of international NGOs and social movement organisations (SMOs) have emerged in the past few years. For example, Johnson and McCarthy (2005) show that the density of national environmental SMOs has increased steadily between the mid 1960s and the early 1990s, but has since declined, whereas the density of international SMOs has continued to grow throughout the 1990s. This led them to conclude that ‘expansion of the transnational environmental population comes later than growth in the population of national environmental SMOs’ (Johnson and McCarthy 2005: 85). This trend, however, should not be overstated, as the number of national SMOs remains far higher than that of international ones, and the founding pace of the latter has also slowed down between 1995 and 2000.

A similar and perhaps even stronger trend can be observed for SMOs that are more directly addressing global justice issues. Indeed, since Seattle 1999 and the rising protest cycle against neoliberalism as well as for global justice and democracy, a dense network of organisations and groups has emerged, as attested by several emblematic SMOs. For example, Attac, created in France in 1998, is now present in more than 51 countries (George 2004). Similarly, less formalised groups such as Reclaim the Street, People’s Global Action and Indymedia represent a large network of activists in many countries, and action campaigns such as Jubilee 2000 have mobilised strongly, for example, to ask for the cancellation of the debt of developing countries. At the same time, nationally specific networks such as SUD (Solidaires, Unitaires, Démocratiques) in France or the Lilliput Network in Italy have also emerged. These new kind of organisations and networks, which are very loosely structured, decentralised and horizontal (della Porta et al. 2006), cohabit with older ones within the GJM.

These examples convey the picture of a GJM formed by a network of organisations and groups that crosscuts national borders or at least that is part of a transnational cycle of contention in which actors from various parts of the world are involved. To be sure, there is a striking resemblance among the various protests arising across the globe and targeting supra-national organisations or intergovernmental summits. Such a resemblance can also be seen in the use of widely shared slogans such as ‘Another World is Possible’ (George 2004). However, it is at best too early to conclude that we are witnessing the emergence of a single world protest movement or the creation of a global civil society. In our view, these arguments overlook the crucial impact of a number of domestic factors on the GJM and the variation in the forms that this movement takes in different places. First of all, every protest cycle rests on previous mobilising structures and episodes of contention. To a large extent, therefore, transnational protest is carried by networks of actors that are embedded within national arenas of contention and whose strength varies from one country to another. Furthermore, transnational protest also depends on the work of core activists...
who have been engaged in previous movements and SMOs. For example, some have shown that, contrary to what one might think, the ‘Battle of Seattle’ did not gather a very heterogeneous and international network of actors, but rather was dominated by US activists (Levi and Murphy 2002). Similarly, others have shown that most of the activists in Seattle were Canadians or from the US and were mainly trade unionists (Lichbach and Almeida 2001). This shows that the supposedly global civil society mobilised in Seattle was in fact the result of a number of networks deeply rooted in the national or even local context in which the mobilisation took place.

Recent empirical research on participants in the GJM shows how its mobilisation relies on national structural and institutional factors. In particular, a look at certain characteristics of the networks involved in the mobilisation of the movement, shown in Table 8.2, allows us to show the importance of national traditions of contention on the multi-organisational field of the GJM. Specifically, a comparison of the organisational networks involved in the movements points to the impact of two factors on the mobilising structures of the GJM. First, the types of organisational networks that become involved in the movement depend very much on the pre-existing networks formed in other movements and during previous waves of contention (Passy and Bandler 2003), which in turn reflect the existing cleavage structure in a given country (Kriesi et al. 1995). Second, the movement’s activities rest on different kinds of networks depending on the type of activity, that is, depending on whether it is a protest-oriented action (for example, a demonstration) or rather a more ‘propositive’ activity (for example, a social forum).

Table 8.2. Organisational Networks of Participants in Two GJM Events (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Protest against the G8 summit in Genova, June 2001</th>
<th>ESF in Florence, November 2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unions</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students organisations</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>57.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social centres</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious movements</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecological associations</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social volunteers associations</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>51.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport or entertainment organisations</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>2384</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The surveys, mentioned earlier, on the protest against the G8 Summit in Genoa in June 2001 and the ESF in Florence in November 2002 point to a similar direction (see Andretta et al. 2002; della Porta 2003a, 2003b and 2005a; della Porta and Mosca 2003). These surveys show a number of findings concerning the embeddedness in organisational networks of participants in these events that support our argument. Certain aspects are worth mentioning in this respect. First of all, it is obvious that the GJM mobilises a rather heterogeneous network of participants. Some networks are overrepresented in both contentious gatherings (for example, NGOs and voluntary associations), while others are much more weakly involved (for example, religious movements). Thus, certain types of networks seem to be prevailing, while others are more marginally involved. These findings also suggest that the mobilisation of the GJM depends on the national structure and implementation of existent social forces in the country. For example, political parties have traditionally patronised the social movement sector in Italy. Therefore, they represent an important part of the mobilising structures of the GJM in this country. Furthermore, student groups, which are overrepresented in the network structure of these two events, are also important in the Italian social movement sector, while they constitute a less developed organisational network in other countries, in particular in Switzerland. This suggests once more that national mobilising structures play an important role in the mobilisation of the actors that form the GJM.

Thus, a movement may have a transnational or global nature, but the mobilising structures on which its mobilisation relies still vary according to the very place in which the protest occurs. Although it is clear that heterogeneity is one of the main characteristics of the GJM and, more generally, of the protest cycle around global issues, national structures and the particular history of the social movement sector in a given country have a prevailing impact on the organisational structure of transnational mobilisations. For example, although countries such as France and Italy have a long tradition of political mobilisation, they are characterised by a weak presence of the NSMs. Therefore, the national traditions of contention impinge not only on the type of organisations present at events occurring in a given country, but also express themselves in the organisational membership of activists coming from other countries, who tend to ‘export’ their own tradition of contention when they mobilise outside of their country. This influence on the organisational structure of the GJM also has implications for the collective action frames conveyed by it.

Framing Processes

In dealing with framing processes, we shift from the structural to the cultural aspects of contention. Building collective identities to be mobilised for contention is part of this process. Therefore, ‘identity frames’ are a particular and important
kind of frame (Gamson 1995). Another kind is what may be called ‘substantive frames’, that is, frames bearing on more or less specific issues raised in political contention. The following discussion focuses upon these two types of collective action frames within the GJM. In addition, it endorses the distinction between ‘specific frames’, which refer to particular issues and goals, and ‘master frames’, which are more general and encompassing (Snow and Benford 1992; Tarrow 1992).

As mentioned earlier, the struggle against neoliberalism is one of the central claims of the GJM. It can be considered what Snow and Benford (1992) call a ‘master frame’, that is, a symbolic construction of a public problem that allows many individuals, organisations and networks to get involved in a movement. The struggle against neoliberalism and the construction of this master frame began with the protest against the G7 Summit in London in 1984 (Massiah 2003). It has then continued since 1994 and the campaign against the Bretton Woods agreements (Fougier 2004). The Zapatistas have played an important role in this process, to the extent that they have constituted the first mass uprising against neoliberalism (Le Bot 2003). Since then, numerous issues have been added to the GJM, and country-specific matters have appeared. For example, mobilisation in Italy is very much focused upon the promotion of ‘democracy from below’ (della Porta 2005b). Although the issue of democracy from below is addressed also on the local and transnational levels, it has a particularly important place in the claims and decisional processes within the movement in Italy. However, although it represents the common denominator of all of those involved in the GJM, not all organisations and groups consider the struggle against neoliberalism to be a sufficient motivation to mobilise. The heterogeneity of the GJM does not allow us to conclude that this common claim accounts for the presence of many different networks in the same movement or even in the same protest cycle. However, it would also be mistaken to consider that every network would join the protest based on a single issue. The gathering of such a variegated range of groups could hardly take place in the absence of shared beliefs about the ‘world out there’ and the creation of common meanings about the situation, which are brought about by the collective processes of interpretation, attribution and social construction stressed by framing theorists. We think that there are mid range or intermediate level frames that link the struggle against neoliberalism to more specific issues and claims and that allow for the mobilisation of different sectors. In other words, specific networks participate in a protest not simply because their own claims and the issues they raise resonate with the master frame of the GJM, but also because there are selective frames stemming from this master frame that mediate between the specific issues and the more general issues of the protest (Passy and Bandler 2003). For example, in Italy, Spain and France, the issue of global justice is linked to the struggle against neoliberalism on the national level, while in Germany and Switzerland the issue of global justice is mainly associated to North-South solidarity (della Porta 2007).
The framing perspective has taught us that a process of the construction of the ‘problem’ is necessary to activate the identities and motivations of actors to form social movements. However, this process is constrained and limited by previous mobilisations and ideas already expressed by previous social forces, most notably by previous social movements. In this view, the values and issues carried by the GJM do not differ fundamentally from those of the wave of contention that has preceded it. Indeed, although there are certainly several novelties, most issues already existed earlier. North-South solidarity, for example, is a typical NSM issue. Similarly, the struggle against economic liberalism is a long-standing claim of Marxist-oriented groups.

Thus, strands of the Old Left and the New Left – traditionally divided in their actions between a revolutionary and a reformist left – find a common ground within the GJM movement. We think that this common ground is found through the activation of ‘selective frames’ that are resonant with the master frame represented by the struggle against neoliberalism and that allow for the gathering of many different networks for a common cause (Passy and Bandler 2003).

To examine this argument, we can use a third dataset built in a fashion similar to the two mentioned earlier. The data come from research conducted during two protest events against the World Economic Forum (WEF) meeting in Davos, Switzerland, in January 2004. They show the different values of activists according to the network to which they belong. As can be seen in Table 8.3, which shows the issues addressed by participants in these protest events by type of network, the two principal issues are core issues of the GJM: to establish democratic forms alternative to the state, and to abolish capitalism (with the last column taking into account all types of networks). Also belonging to these priorities of the GJM are the issues of strengthening international law and breaking radically with current models of economic development. Most of these issues were already addressed by the NSMs. Most importantly, when the distributions across types of networks are compared, we see that, whatever the type of network to which they belong, participants privilege certain issues rather than others. This means that these issues resonate with the master frame. In addition, the more the issues are vague and abstract, the more they meet the preference of participants.

The fact that the ranking of issues is the same for every kind of network suggests that networks do not mobilise on specific frames, but on selective ones that are linked to the master frame. In other words, networks mobilise above all on thematically close issues or issues directly derived from the master frame.

This brief analysis of collective action frames in the GJM shows that, in spite of the national constraints and the traditions of contention, no matter where they come from, participants in this movement are able to put aside their specific identities in order to join the movement, displaying a similar priority order of issues on the level of the master frame. Indeed, in the specific case of the mobili-
Table 8.3. Issues Addressed by Participants in the Protests Against the WEF Meeting in Davos in 2004 by Type of Network (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>NSMs</th>
<th>Traditional organisations</th>
<th>Political parties</th>
<th>Unions and unemployed workers</th>
<th>No organizational affiliation</th>
<th>All networks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To strengthen international law</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To reform financial and economic international institutions</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To abolish financial and economic international institutions</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To involve more the NGOs in international decisions</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To reform capitalism</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To abolish capitalism</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To strengthen a larger state intervention in economic and social fields</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To develop participative democracy</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To establish a world parliament</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To establish democratic forms alternative to the state</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To break radically with current models of economic development</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
sation in Davos, sectoral issues such as homosexuals’ rights, mine clearance and education were not considered as priorities because they were too specific. In contrast, general issues were much more emphasised in the mobilisation.

Conclusion

We have tried to apply to the analysis of the GJM the classic social movement agenda for explaining contentious politics. Thus, we examined the role of political opportunities, mobilising structures and framing processes for this movement in an attempt to show that the national context remains crucial even for transnational forms of contention, such as those staged by the GJM. In a nutshell, we have argued that the GJM acts within a multi-level political opportunity structure in which national contexts still impinge in important ways on its mobilisation. Country-specific contextual aspects, above all the cleavage structure, from which stem pre-existing social networks in which movement participants are embedded, allow us to explain why the characteristics of the mobilisation of the GJM vary from one country to another. At the same time, the creation of common ways of framing political, social and economic issues makes the gathering of a variety of different organisations, groups and networks possible.

In the light of our discussion, it thus looks like the scale shift of the GJM depends upon the angle from which one looks at it. Indeed, national political opportunity structures still play a relevant role in explaining the structure of the movement, and national mobilising structures are still relevant as well. The scale shift is to be found in the collective action frames elaborated by the GJM. However, the classic social movement agenda goes still quite far in explaining transnational contention. Of course, it must be adapted to some extent, for example, by taking into account supra-national political opportunities in addition to national ones. As of today, however, the imprint of the national context and characteristics seems so strong, after centuries of state formation, that even a genuinely transnational movement such as the GJM remains partly imprisoned in the cage built by the nation state.

Notes

This chapter is an adapted translation of an article previously published in French as M. Giugni, M. Bandler and N. Eggert, ‘Contraintes nationales et changement d’échelle dans l’activisme transnational’, Lien Social et Politiqes 58 (2007): 41–57.

1. It should be noted that this actor is obviously not the only one to be engaged for another globalisation. NGOs also are part of the contention, but on a different ground, that of lobbying, which should not be confounded with mass protest (Siméant 2005).
2. Helpful reviews of these three aspects of the classic social movement agenda can be found in the *Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (Snow et al. 2004). See, in particular, the chapters by Hanspeter Kriesi on political context and opportunities, the chapter by Bob Edwards and John McCarthy on resources and social movement mobilisation, the chapter by Mario Diani on networks and participation and the chapter by David Snow on framing processes, ideology and discursive fields. See also Benford and Snow (2000) on framing processes.

3. This is also the case for the demonstrations against the World Economic Forum (WEF), which are very conflictual and attract a number of particularly radical participants, precisely due to the risks involved and the transaction costs of participation.

4. The data were obtained by handing out individual questionnaires to participants in the two events. See Andretta et al. (2002), della Porta (2003a, 2003b and 2005a), and della Porta and Mosca (2003).

5. This survey, based on the same approach as the ones mentioned earlier, was conducted on both sides of the French-Swiss border near Geneva, where the protest events took place over approximately one week. This explains why the sample includes the same amount of French and Swiss participants (about 40 per cent each) and allows for a direct comparison of the two groups.

6. Jubilee 2000 was created for the G8 protest in Birmingham in 1998. Set up by Christian associations and various NGOs, the aim of this campaign was to put pressure on Northern countries to obtain the cancellation of the debt of Southern countries by the year 2000.

7. The study by Fillieule et al. (2004) shows that French and Swiss participants were embedded in different organisational networks. Specifically, GJM organisations were more present on the French side. This can be explained by the fact that France is one of the birthplaces of the GJM in Europe, as attested by the founding of the strong development of Attac there. No equivalent SMO exists in Switzerland in terms of size.

8. Identity and substantive frames are only two among a wider variety of collective action frames one can find in the literature. For example, Snow and Benford (1988) distinguish between diagnostic (problem identification and attribution of blame), prognostic (problem resolution) and motivational (recruitment and mobilisation) frames. In a similar fashion, della Porta (1999) distinguishes between four types of frames according to their function: a) protagonist field definition, b) antagonist field definition, c) diagnosis, and d) prognosis. Focusing more on what movement participants feel than on the strategic efforts by movement leaders aimed at consensus formation (Klandermans 1988), Gamson (1995) speaks of identity, injustice and agency frames. Finally, in a more dynamic and strategic perspective, Snow et al. (1986) identify four main ‘frame alignment’ processes, that is, four basic ways in which social movement activists and organisations present their messages congruent with prevailing views of certain social problems: a) bridging, b) amplification, c) extension, and d) transformation.

9. One of the two protest events took place in Zurich on 17 January and the other in Chur on 24 January 2004, for a total of 411 respondents.

10. The selective frames identified by Passy and Bandler (2003) in the protest against the G8 Summit in Evian were very similar to these ones.
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