EU democracy promotion in the neighbourhood: from leverage to governance?

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Abstract

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Democracy Promotion in the EU's Neighborhood: From Leverage to Governance?

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PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
EU democracy promotion in the neighbourhood: from leverage to governance?

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EU external democracy promotion has traditionally been based on ‘linkage’, i.e. bottom-up support for democratic forces in third countries, and ‘leverage’, i.e. the top-down inducement of political elites towards democratic reforms through political conditionality. The advent of the European Neighbourhood Policy and new forms of association have introduced a new, third model of democracy promotion which rests in functional cooperation between administrations. This article comparatively defines and explicates these three models of external democracy promotion. It argues that while ‘linkage’ has hitherto failed to produce tangible outcomes, and the success of ‘leverage’ has basically been tied to an EU membership perspective, the ‘governance’ model of democracy promotion bears greater potential beyond the circle of candidate countries. In contrast to the two traditional models, however, the governance approach does not tackle the core institutions of the political system as such, but promotes transparency, accountability, and participation at the level of state administration.

Introduction

During the past two decades, the European Union (EU) has developed into an agent of international democracy promotion in its neighbourhood. The EU had long conceived of itself as a community of democracies and recognized the need to strengthen its own democratic credentials. Some of its external policies – most prominently, its Southern enlargement to Greece, Portugal, and Spain – had also been regarded implicitly and informally as a contribution to democratization. However, most of its external relations – above all trade agreements and development cooperation – had been notable for their apolitical content and the principle...
of not interfering with the domestic systems of third countries. It was only in the early 1990s that external democracy promotion became an explicit, formal, and general aim of the EU. In the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), the EU declared the development and consolidation of democracy as a goal of development cooperation (Art. 130u) and its Common Foreign and Security Policy (Art. J.1), and the principle of democracy was introduced in all its external trade and aid agreements.

From its beginnings, EU democracy promotion has been a multifaceted policy. We distinguish three models, two that reflect main approaches to external democracy promotion and a third model that is more germane to the EU as a framework for regional integration. The first model is linkage. It consists of activities that tackle the societal preconditions for democracy and give support to the democratic opposition and other civil society actors in the target countries. The second model of democracy promotion is leverage. This approach induces democratic reforms via political conditionality. Finally, the EU also promotes democratic principles through policy-specific, functional cooperation with third countries. We refer to this third approach as the governance model of democracy promotion. Whereas the linkage approach has been a constant in EU external policies since the early support to democratic transitions in Latin America in the 1980s, the leverage model then became dominant in the 1990s after the end of the Cold War. The governance model started becoming more prominent in the early 2000s in the context of the European neighbourhood policy (ENP) which seeks to promote neighbouring countries’ approximation to the EU’s system of rules below the threshold of membership.

In the early 1990s, the political integration symbolized in the creation of the EU coincided with the transformation of many Eastern European countries and these countries’ gradual rapprochement with the EU. While the EU continued to give support to democratic transition in Central and Eastern European countries through economic aid and targeted action towards civil society, it also embraced a more explicit and direct approach to democracy promotion by making aid, market access, and deepened institutional relations from association to membership conditional on a third state’s progress in institutional democracy. In the relations with candidate countries, political conditionality or leverage came to epitomize the EU’s democracy promotion efforts. Most notably, the Copenhagen Criteria agreed by the European Council in 1993 made the consolidation of liberal democracy the principal condition for starting accession negotiations. From the first round of Eastern enlargement negotiations, opening in 1998 and excluding Slovakia because of its democracy deficits, to the discussions about the membership prospects of Turkey and the Western Balkans, political conditions related to the state of democracy have been of central relevance. Whereas linkage continued to be the preferred approach to democracy promotion in Africa, Asia and Latin America, democracy, human rights and the rule of law became ‘essential elements’ in almost all EU agreements with third countries as both an objective and a condition of the institutionalized relationship. In the case
of violation, the EU introduced the (theoretical) possibility to suspend or terminate the agreement.  

The relative success of EU leverage in Central and Eastern European countries through political conditionality in triggering democratic change was mainly attributed to the attractiveness of membership. Although political conditionality remains an important declaratory policy in the EU’s external relations, its practical relevance has always been limited outside the enlargement context. Inconsistency and ineffectiveness is the general picture. The marked slowdown of EU enlargement and the failure to implement conditionality consistently beyond the circle of candidate countries have therefore partly shifted the attention of academics and practitioners away from leverage as a model for EU democracy promotion.

In recent years, the implementation of new association policies below the threshold of membership has yielded attention to a third approach to democracy promotion that has come to complement the two traditional channels and strategies of external democratization. This third approach consists in the promotion of democratic governance norms through third countries’ approximation to EU sectoral policies, i.e. functional cooperation. Less top-down than leverage and less bottom-up than linkage, this functional approach operates at the level of democratic principles embedded in the governance of individual policy fields and unfolds through the deepening of transgovernmental, horizontal ties between the EU and third countries’ public administrations. The ENP, which the EU designed as an institutional framework for managing relations and developing cooperation with the non-candidate countries of Eastern Europe, Northern Africa, and the Middle East, is a case in point. It proclaims shared values (including democracy, human rights, and the rule of law) to be the basis of neighbourhood cooperation and links the intensity of cooperation to the adoption of shared values by the neighbourhood countries. In practice, however, it is up to the neighbouring countries to decide to what extent they would like to cooperate with the EU on democracy, human rights, or the rule of law, and non-cooperation does not prevent intense cooperation in other sectoral policies, such as the environment, trade, or migration. Considering the constraints on democracy promotion outside an enlargement framework, the European Commission suggested refocusing the EU’s efforts from the promotion of democratic regimes to the promotion of democratic governance, that is more transparent, accountable, and participatory administrative practice within the limits of autocratic regimes. It outlined that “[d]emocratic governance is to be approached holistically, taking account of all its dimensions (political, economic, social, cultural, environmental, etc.). […] Accordingly, the concept of democratic governance has to be integrated into each and every sectoral programme’ in the relations with third countries.

This special issue seeks to reflect and assess EU democracy promotion in the regions covered by the ENP and Turkey at a critical juncture when the past successes of leverage in Central and Eastern Europe are unlikely to be repeated in the future and the conditions and impact of alternative models of democracy promotion are still insufficiently researched. Some of the contributions explore the
potential and limits of leverage in the European neighbourhood in such pivotal countries as Turkey and Ukraine. Others focus on the prospects of the governance model of promoting democratic rules and attitudes in Northern African and Eastern European countries through transgovernmental, sector-specific cooperation – a model that seems to be especially suited to the EU’s relations with neighbouring non-candidate countries. The special issue goes beyond the existing literature by broadening our understanding of EU democracy promotion conceptually and theoretically and by providing a comparative assessment of effects and effectiveness of different models of democracy promotion in the EU’s neighbourhood.

In this introductory contribution to the special issue, we comparatively define and explicate the different models of democracy promotion. We then move on to describe the current context of EU democracy promotion in the European neighbourhood, the decreasing relevance of leverage and the need to explore other models. In the two final sections, we give an overview of the contributions and draw general conclusions.

Models of EU democracy promotion

Democracy promotion comprises all direct, non-violent activities by a state or international organization that are intended to bring about, strengthen, and support democracy in a third country. This definition excludes the use of physical coercion as well as indirect and unintended effects such as the international demonstration effects of successful democratic transitions or the potentially positive effects of general international interconnections on democracy. ‘Democracy’ is understood in a very general and simple way as the accountability of public authorities to the people. Accountability mechanisms comprise, inter alia, the accountability of officials to the electorate through free and fair elections, the accountability of governments to parliaments, or the accountability of agencies to public scrutiny. Any activities designed to strengthen accountability, and hence also responsiveness to the citizens, qualify as democracy promotion. The concrete contents of democracy promotion activities vary across targets, envisaged outcomes, channels and instruments. For the purpose of this special issue, they are a matter of empirical analysis, not definition. We focus on democracy-promoting activities of the EU as an international organization rather than on the activities of its member states. Moreover, we further focus on strategies and behaviours rather than on the motivations of the EU. In other words, we are not interested in explaining why the EU promotes democracy and whether it is normatively desirable.

There is an extensive literature exploring the nature of the EU as an international actor but at a level that is too general and abstract for the purposes of this special issue. Whereas this literature discusses the ‘actorness’ of the EU, its peculiar organizational characteristics and capabilities as a non-state foreign policy actor in general,9 we prefer to describe the assumed organizational features and capabilities at the level of individual strategies. Another important strand of
the literature seeks to describe the EU as a distinctive kind of ‘power’ in the international system. ‘Civilian power’ \(^{10}\) and ‘normative power’ \(^{11}\) are the two best-known labels, though neither of them is sufficiently specific for the study of democracy promotion. For one, the promotion of democracy as defined above fits with both characterizations. Given the correlation of democracy with peace, international institutions, and trade, the promotion of democracy is a relevant activity for a civilian power engaged in civilizing an international system based on military self-help and the balance of power (see Note 10). Democracy promotion also matches well with the ‘normative power’ perspective according to which the EU projects its fundamental norms globally. In addition, both conceptions of EU power do not distinguish between different models of democracy promotion.

We propose three ideal-typical models of democracy promotion: linkage, leverage, and governance. These models can be distinguished on four main dimensions: the target system of democracy promotion, the envisaged outcome, the main channels, and the typical instruments.

- **Target systems of democracy promotion.** Democracy promotion can be targeted at the _polity_ as such, including the electoral regime, the division of powers between state organs, and respect for individual rights and civil liberties. On the other hand, it may operate at the level of _society_ and target the socio-economic preconditions for democratization, including economic growth, education, the spread of liberal values, and the organization of civil society and the public sphere. Finally, democracy promotion may also target _sectors_: the policy-specific governance regimes – such as environmental policy, market regulation, welfare regimes, or internal security.

- **Envisaged outcome of democracy promotion** Depending on the target, the outcome of successful democracy promotion differs. If it is targeted at the polity level, the typical outcome should be democratic institutions guaranteeing vertical (electoral) and horizontal accountability as well as the rule of law. When the target is society, the envisaged result is a democratic, ‘civic’ culture and meso-level institutions such as civic associations, parties, and a democratic public sphere. In the case of sectoral democracy promotion, the goal should be ‘democratic governance’, i.e. procedural principles of democratically legitimate political-administrative behaviour, including sectoral transparency, accountability, and societal participation.

- **Channels of democracy promotion.** The actors primarily addressed by international democracy promotion can be governments, societal actors, or administrations/agencies. Correspondingly, we speak of an intergovernmental, transnational, and transgovernamental channel of democracy promotion and of a top-down, a bottom-up, and a horizontal direction of external democracy promotion.

- **Instruments of democracy promotion** The most basic distinction regarding the instruments or mechanisms of international democracy promotion is
Conditionality implies a bargaining process in which an international actor uses selective incentives in order to change the behaviour of actors in the target country. These target actors are assumed to weigh the benefits they derive from democratic change against the costs and to comply with international conditions if the benefits exceed the costs. By contrast, socialization is a learning process in which an international actor teaches domestic actors democratic norms and practices in order to persuade them of their superiority. Democratic change then results from a change in normative and causal beliefs.

In principle, democracy promotion may be conceived to vary independently across these dimensions. Conditional incentives may be targeted at changing electoral regimes as well as improving civil society organizations and they may work top-down as well as bottom-up. The same is true of international socialization efforts, to take just a few of the possible combinations. However, both theory and practice have tended to concentrate on the three ideal-typical combinations summarized in Table 1.

Although this introduction presents all three models of democracy promotion, overall the contributions to this special issue focus especially on the leverage and governance approaches. While recognizing the enduring relevance of the linkage model of democracy promotion, our main interest is in the question to what extent there has been a shift from the leverage to the governance approach in EU external relations, and under which conditions each of these approaches is effective. This focus is corroborated by the fact that whereas new foreign policy initiatives reflect a move away from accession conditionality towards forms of association below the threshold of membership, levels of EU external aid and support for civil society have remained relatively constant over time.

**Linkage**

The transnational linkage model is based on two pillars: ‘direct’ democracy promotion through support for democratic civil society and political opposition groups, on the one hand, and ‘indirect’ democracy promotion through intensified transnational exchanges with democratic countries, on the other. In both cases, the role of the external actor (in this case the EU) consists in enabling and empowering
societal, non-governmental actors to work for the democratization of their home country from below.

Direct support can be material or educational. The EU may, for instance, give money to pro-democratic civil society organizations or parties or provide them with infrastructure such as computers, mobile phones, or photocopying machines. It may also organize meetings, seminars, and conferences that help these societal organizations to improve their political strategies and their cooperation. This leads us to the general expectation that the effectiveness of linkage increases with the intensity of direct EU support to pro-democratic societal organizations.

The indirect channel of linkage is broadly related to the modernization account of democratization. According to modernization theory, democracy is a function of the level of social and economic development of a country. In his pioneering work, Seymour Martin Lipset studied the social conditions or ‘requisites’ that support democracy and identified ‘economic development’ — broadly understood as a syndrome of wealth, industrialization, urbanization and education — as the most important one. Economic development goes together with better education, less poverty, the creation of a large middle class and a competent civil service. It thereby mitigates the class struggle and promotes cross-cutting cleavages. In addition, it nurtures a belief in tolerance and gradualism and reduces commitment to extremist ideologies. In sum: ‘The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy’. More recent contributions to the modernization theory of democracy complement Lipset’s socio-economic ‘requisites’ of democracy. While Boix and Acemoglu and Robinson emphasize income equality and the mobility of elite assets as democracy-promoting structural factors, Inglehart and Welzel highlight change towards emancipative and self-expression values in post-industrial societies as a source of demand for democracy.

How can the presence or specific activities of the EU contribute to such socio-economic development? First of all, any indirect linkage impact of the EU is necessarily of a longer-term nature. Rather than affecting the short-term calculations and power resources of governments and non-governmental organizations, it helps to transform the environment and socio-economic structures of third countries. Furthermore, some of these activities and impacts may be unintended side-effects of general EU–third country relations. We can further distinguish economic development, education, and contacts as indirect linkage mechanisms.

First, the EU may promote the economic development of target countries. By increasing trade relations, investment and development aid, it can contribute to democracy-conducive wealth in general.

The positive effects of trade, aid, and investment may increase with diversification in two respects. On the one hand, they are most helpful if they do not simply benefit small economic elites but if their benefits are spread out as broadly and evenly as possible across the population thus contributing to general wealth and higher income equality. On the other hand, they are most likely to promote democratization if they strengthen mobile against immobile assets. Rather than nurturing the agricultural or primary resources sectors, the EU would therefore have to focus
its trade and investment on the industrial and services sectors. We thus hypothesize that the effectiveness of EU linkages increases with EU trade, aid and investment, in particular if the benefits reach society at large and are concentrated in the secondary and tertiary sector of the economy.

Second, the effectiveness of linkage increases with EU support for education in the target societies. By helping to raise the levels of literacy and education in the target societies – i.e. through building schools and universities, funding educational programmes, further educating teachers, welcoming students – the EU can prepare the ground for successful democratization in the future.

Finally, the contact hypothesis predicts that the effectiveness of democracy promotion increases with the frequency and intensity of contacts between the EU and the target society. Through business contacts, work or study abroad, tourism, longer-term migration, and media exposure, target societies may come into contact with democratic ideas and practices. To the extent that these contacts convey an attractive social and political alternative, they may contribute to value change and inspire more demand for freedom and political rights in the target countries.

In sum, we hypothesize that the more the EU directly supports pro-democratic civil society organizations and indirectly supports the modernization of target societies through contacts, diversified trade, aid, and investment as well as educational programmes, the more the linkage model of democracy promotion will be effective. However, in order to be possible, and to produce demand for (more) democracy from below, these contact, exchange, and support activities require a modicum of transnational openness on the part of the target country and of autonomy for the civil society. Linkage efforts will not reach civil society if a country is isolated from the outside world and civil society has no freedom of manoeuvre. Thus, the effectiveness of linkage also increases with the external accessibility and domestic autonomy of civil society.

Leverage

According to the leverage model, the EU targets third-country governments with the aim of inducing them to introduce democratic change in state institutions and behaviour. It constitutes a top-down strategy of democracy promotion that does little to foster a civic culture or strengthen intermediary institutions such as civic associations or the public sphere. Even if it is successful, leverage might thus contribute to a formally functioning democracy that is, however, not necessarily underpinned by democratic culture and civil society.

In order to produce institutional reform through leverage, the EU uses political conditionality. Conditionality is best conceived as a bargaining process between the democracy promoting agency and a target state. In a bargaining process, actors exchange information, threats and promises in order to maximize their utility. The outcome of the bargaining process depends on the relative bargaining power of the actors. Informational asymmetries aside, bargaining power
is a result of the asymmetrical distribution of the benefits of a specific agreement (compared to those of alternative outcomes or ‘outside options’). Generally, those actors who are least in need of a specific agreement are best able to threaten the others with non-cooperation and thereby force them to make concessions.

In using conditionality, the EU sets the adoption of democratic institutions and practices as conditions that the target countries have to fulfil in order to receive rewards from the EU – such as financial aid, technical assistance, trade agreements, association treaties and, ultimately, membership. States that fail to meet the conditions are not coerced to introduce democratic reforms but simply left behind in the ‘regatta’ to assistance and membership. The analytical starting point of the bargaining process is the domestic status quo, which differs to some extent from the EU’s standards of democracy. The status quo is conceived as a ‘domestic equilibrium’ reflecting the current distribution of preferences and bargaining power in domestic society. EU leverage may upset this domestic equilibrium by introducing (additional) incentives for compliance with democratic rules into the game.18

The most general proposition for the effectiveness of EU leverage therefore is: A government introduces democratic changes in state institutions and behaviour according to EU conditions if the benefits of EU rewards exceed the domestic adoption costs. The more detailed conditions then specify the size of the benefits as well as the size of the costs. In addition, credibility is an intervening variable. With a given size of benefits and costs, the effectiveness of leverage increases with the credibility of conditionality.

In a first step, we can differentiate between tangible (material and political) and intangible (social or symbolic) rewards.19 The former include financial assistance, market access, and voting rights in the EU, the latter international recognition and praise. In general, democracy means a loss of autonomy and power for the target governments. These governments have to respect, inter alia, the outcome of free and fair elections, the competences of courts and parliaments, the rights of the opposition and national minorities, and the freedom of the media. Lest a target government blocks democratic change, these political disincentives need to be balanced in kind by political incentives such as military protection or economic assistance to improve the security and the welfare of the state – and the reelection prospects of the government. We therefore hypothesize, first, that tangible rewards are a necessary condition of effective leverage. This hypothesis is corroborated by Kelley who shows that socialization efforts by international organizations have not been sufficient for the reform of ethnic politics in Central and Eastern Europe and by Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel who find that international organizations unable to provide material incentives have generally been unable to produce democratic change in the region.20

Second, the effectiveness of tangible rewards increases with their size. Accordingly, the promise of enlargement should be more powerful than the promise of association or assistance, and the impact of the EU on candidates for membership
should be stronger than on outside states not considered potential EU members. Only the highest international rewards – those associated with EU membership – can be expected to balance substantial domestic power costs. Comparative empirical studies concur on the finding that the conditional promise of membership in the EU has been a requirement for effective EU democracy promotion or has produced the strongest effect on democratization in Europe’s neighbourhood.

Third, the effectiveness of sizable material and political rewards increases with their credibility. In a conditionality setting, credibility refers to the EU’s threat to withhold rewards in case of non-compliance with EU conditions and the EU’s promise to deliver the reward in case of compliance. On the one hand, the EU must be able to withhold the rewards at no or low costs to itself, and it has to be less interested in giving the reward than the target government is in getting it. If a target government knows that the EU prefers unconditional assistance to no assistance or unconditional enlargement to no enlargement, then conditionality will not work. Therefore, the effectiveness of leverage increases with the asymmetry of international interdependence in favour of the EU. On the other hand, the EU must be capable and willing to pay the rewards. Promises lose credibility if they go beyond the EU’s capabilities, strain its resources, or produce internal divisions among the member states. The credibility of the promise is also weakened when the payment of the reward is distant: target governments tend to fulfil costly conditions when are rewarded instantly. Hence, the effectiveness of leverage decreases as the EU’s costs of rewarding, internal disagreements, and the time until the payment of the reward increase. On the basis of this reasoning, assistance and association have been more credible rewards than accession, which is not only costly and divisive but also requires several years of negotiation – the more so, the poorer, the bigger, and the more culturally distant the target states of democracy promotion are. The strongly contested candidacy of Turkey corroborates this correlation.

Fourth, the effectiveness of EU leverage increases with the strength and determinacy of its conditions. Most fundamentally, given the domestic equilibrium in the target state, rules are unlikely to be adopted if they are not set up as conditions for rewards. In addition, we can distinguish between strong and weak conditionality depending on how consistently and explicitly the organization links rewards to the fulfillment of conditions. The stronger the conditionality, the more likely it will be effective. In addition, the determinacy of the conditions, and the determinacy of the rules from which they are derived, enhances the likelihood of adoption. Determinacy refers both to the clarity and formality of a rule. The clearer the behavioral implications of a rule are, and the more ‘legalized’ and binding its status, the higher is its determinacy. Determinacy matters in two respects. First, it has an informational value. It helps the target governments to know exactly what they have to do to get the rewards. Second, determinacy enhances the credibility of conditionality. It is a signal to the target countries that they cannot manipulate the rule to their advantage or avoid adopting it at all. At the same time, however, it binds the EU. If a condition is determinate, it becomes more difficult for the EU to claim unjustly that it has not been fulfilled and to withhold the reward. Empirical research on EU
conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe shows that the strength of conditionality has had an impact on how quickly candidate countries adopted EU rules, whereas formality did not matter as long as the conditions were clear and clearly communicated. However, a lack of determinacy, e.g. in the area of minority rights, may well lead to inconsistent conditions and outcomes across the target countries.

Last but not least, the effectiveness of EU leverage depends on the political costs of democratic reform for the target governments. Domestic costs are low if meeting the EU’s political conditions engenders no or low power costs for the target government. This is the case if compliance is not perceived to endanger the dominance of the ethnic core group, threaten the integrity of the state, or to undermine the target government’s practices of power preservation and its institutional power in the state apparatus. By contrast, domestic political costs are prohibitively high if the EU’s demands are seen as threats to the security and integrity of the state or as tantamount to regime change. Research shows that EU conditionality is generally ineffective vis-à-vis autocratic regimes but also if meeting EU conditions risks the survival of a democratic governing coalition – unless the reward of membership or accession negotiations is very close.

In sum, on the basis of theoretical and empirical research, we hypothesize for the leverage model of EU democracy promotion that it is likely to be most effective if the EU sets strong and determinate conditions for quick and credible accession to full membership, if interdependence between the EU and the target state is asymmetrically favouring the EU, and if the domestic power costs of fulfilling these conditions are low for the target state government. This means that with increasing ‘enlargement fatigue’ and the diminution of countries subject to membership conditionality, the leverage model of EU democracy promotion becomes less relevant. Against this backdrop, alternative, less ‘direct’ forms of democracy promotion through linkage and governance may gain in prominence.

**Governance**

Like the linkage model, the governance model postulates mainly an indirect way of democratic governance promotion. We call it the ‘governance model’ for two reasons. First, rather than focusing on electoral democracy, it embeds elements of democratic governance in sectoral cooperation arrangements between the EU and public administrations in target countries. ‘Democratic governance’ locates the notion of democracy at the level of the principles that guide administrative rules and practices in the conduct of public policy. The focus is thus less on specific democratic institutions such as elections or parliaments but rather on the principles underlying democracy which are applicable to all situations in which collectively binding decisions are taken. These principles include transparency, accountability, and participation. Transparency refers both to access to issue-specific data and to governmental provision of information about decision making. Accountability is about public officials’ obligation to justify their decisions and actions, the
possibility of appeal and sanctioning over misconduct. This can include both horizontal accountability between independent state agencies (such as investigating committees, or ombudsmen) and vertical accountability that emphasizes the obligation for public officials to justify their decisions. Finally, participation denotes non-electoral forms of participation such as involvement of non-state actors in administrative decision- and policy-making.\textsuperscript{28}

Second, democracy promotion according to this model is embedded in the EU’s ‘external governance’.\textsuperscript{29} External governance refers to institutionalized relationships with non-member (and non-candidate) countries such as the ENP countries, in which the partner countries commit themselves to approximate their domestic policies and legislation to the EU \emph{acquis}.\textsuperscript{30} These institutionalized relationships establish horizontal transgovernmental networks between public administrations in the EU and third countries in a specific field of public policy.\textsuperscript{31} Democratic governance is promoted indirectly as part of the third countries’ approximation to EU sectoral legislation such as environment, competition, immigration or any other policy field. Given that these EU policies were designed for liberal democracies, they often contain democratic governance principles related to transparency, participation or accountability. These could be, for example, rights of stakeholders in environmental policies to be consulted, to have free access to information, and take legal recourse against administrative measures.\textsuperscript{32} This model of transgovernmental democratic governance promotion does not necessarily address civil society actors, nor does it directly affect the overarching institutional arrangements of the polity. Therefore, even if it is successful, democratic governance promotion may still occur within a generally semi-autocratic political system – although, as we shall argue, a certain level of political liberalization and of civil society empowerment is a necessary condition for its success.

In conceptualizing the conditions for effective democratic governance promotion, the model follows an institutionalist approach\textsuperscript{33} that focuses on properties of the EU \emph{acquis} and on the institutionalization of cooperation in explaining EU influence. In addition to these institutional variables, the approach needs, however, to pay attention to sector-specific factors as well as conditions of the third country. As illustrated in Table 1, the governance model is mainly based on socialization as a trigger of change, although it can also be linked to the use of conditionality. Accordingly, it stipulates that the transfer of democratic governance norms and rules is a function of institutionalized exposure of target countries to the EU. The conditions for socialization are the more favourable the more that these norms and rules are codified in EU institutions and the more intensely third country officials are in contact with EU institutions. At the same time, the governance model also assumes that sector-specific interdependence and costs can either promote or impede this socialization process.

Given the focus on EU \emph{acquis}-transfer as an instrument of democracy promotion, the first hypothesis is that \textit{the more that democratic governance elements are legally specified in the EU \emph{acquis}, the more likely it is that these norms will be effectively transferred to the third country}. This effect should be even stronger
when the respective principles are also included in sectorally relevant international treaties to which the third country abides.

The vehicle through which the EU acquis and hence democratic governance principles are transported are transgovernmental interactions between EU actors and their sectoral counterparts in a third country’s administration. It is our second hypothesis, therefore, that the more these interactions are institutionalized in transgovernmental networks, the more likely it is that the democratic governance norms will be effectively transferred to the third country. The reason is that transgovernmental networks between EU and Member State administrative officials and experts, on the one hand, and administrative officials of the partner countries, on the other, are expected to facilitate communication and, by engaging third countries in joint problem solving, facilitate rule transfer. In so far as these networks are also concerned with the implementation of the respective policies, they can act as laboratories for the realization or relevant democratic governance norms.

The additional involvement of other international actors — mainly other international organizations — in the promotion of the same democratic governance norms should enhance the effectiveness of EU norm transfer. Hence our third hypothesis: The more EU activities are supported by other international actors, the more likely it is that these norms will be effectively transferred to the third country. As in the case of international treaties, the support for EU norms by international actors strengthens the legitimacy of the EU acquis.

The positive impact of cooperation in transgovernmental networks facilitating communication and engaging ENP states in joint problem solving with the EU, however, may be offset by some sector-specific factors, such as the costs of adaptation that a third country faces in the particular sector and the degree of interdependence with the EU in the respective policy. The fourth hypothesis is therefore that the higher the expected adoption costs of the third country are and the less sectoral interdependence favours the EU, the less likely successful rule transfer is.

As with linkage, external influence finally depends on the openness and autonomy of domestic administrations in the target countries. The horizontal transgovernmental ties that are at the heart of the governance model presuppose a certain degree of decentralization of administrative structures, empowerment of administrative officials, and openness towards contacts and cooperation with the administrations of international organizations and other countries. In other words, the effectiveness of democratic governance promotion increases with the accessibility and autonomy of the administration of the target country (fifth hypothesis). The autonomy of civil society also plays a (secondary) role in the governance model, in particular for the application or implementation of democratic governance norms: the functioning of transparency, accountability and in particular participation necessitates the existence of active civil society which demands access to the decision-making process. Table 2 summarizes the main conditions of effective democracy promotion stipulated by the three models.

On the part of the EU, the effectiveness of the linkage model depends on transnational support fostering civil society, pro-democratic parties, and modernization.
As for leverage, effectiveness depends on the kind, size, and credibility of EU incentives: the credible prospect of membership holds the highest promise. The governance model of democracy promotion stipulates a high degree of EU and international institutionalization of democratic governance norms and of transgovernmental relations – as well as sectoral interdependence that is high and favours the EU. Domestic conditions relate to adoption costs and the structure of state and society. In the leverage model, the general political adoption costs of governments potentially stand in the way of effective democracy promotion, whereas the governance model focuses on sectoral, policy-specific adoption costs. The success of linkage crucially depends on the accessibility and autonomy of civil society, whereas democratic governance promotion primarily requires the accessibility and autonomy of the administration.

Democracy Promotion in the EU Neighbourhood

In the past decade, research on democracy promotion in the accession countries has focused on leverage, i.e. the EU’s political accession conditionality. Several comparative studies have concurred on two main findings. First, only the credible conditional promise of membership has proven a powerful tool in helping Central and Eastern European countries to consolidate democracy. Socialization strategies or the use of weaker incentives have generally not been sufficient to bring about democratic change. Second, even a highly credible membership perspective has not been effective if meeting the EU’s conditions implied regime change or threatened the political survival of the third state government as it has been the case in Slovakia in the mid-1990s and in Yugoslavia under Milosevic until 2000.

Both conditions for successful EU leverage arguably are on the wane, however. First, the EU is currently unwilling to extend the perspective of membership to countries beyond the current candidates in the Western Balkans and Turkey. While membership is excluded for the Northern African and Middle Eastern neighbours, the EU has not been willing to commit itself to a conditional accession promise for the European transition countries of Moldova and Ukraine either.

Table 2. Conditions of effective democracy promotion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU conditions</th>
<th>Leverage</th>
<th>Governance</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for civil society and socio-economic development</td>
<td>Kind, size, and credibility of EU incentives</td>
<td>Institutionalization of democratic governance and transgovernmental relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity of transnational contact</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sectoral interdependence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accessibility and autonomy of civil society</td>
<td>Political adoption costs</td>
<td>Sectoral adoption costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accessibility and autonomy of administration</td>
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For all these neighbouring countries, the EU has designed the ENP as an alternative to rather than a preparatory stage for membership. Even in the candidate countries, political accession conditionality has lost credibility (cf. Kubicek, 2011). At any rate, the potential accession date of most candidate countries will likely be so far in the future that the incentives of membership lack power in the present.

Second, the EU’s political conditionality has proven highly inconsistent below the threshold of accession conditionality. On the one hand, political conditionality is strong at a declaratory and programmatic level. The ENP is based on the EU’s commitment to promote core liberal values and norms beyond its borders and claims to use political conditionality as the main instrument of norm promotion. ENP strategy documents tie both participation in the ENP as such and the intensity and level of cooperation to the ENP partners’ adherence to liberal values and norms. In addition, the ‘essential elements’ clause features in almost all legal agreements between the EU and partner countries in the region.

Implementation is patchy, however. Comparisons of ENP Action Plans reveal an incoherent democracy promotion policy and the overriding importance of the EU’s geostrategic and partner countries’ political interests. In a comparative analysis of EU responses to violations of democratic norms in the post-Soviet area, Alexander Warkotsch shows that, while the existence of a democracy clause in EU–third country agreements significantly increases the likelihood of an EU response to anti-democratic policies, it is not significantly correlated with responses that go beyond verbal denunciation. Strong sanctions are more likely to be used against geographically proximate states and less likely against resource-rich countries. Studies of EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean confirm this picture. The EU’s application of political conditionality in this region is undermined by its efforts to build a multilateral partnership in the Southern Mediterranean and to promote peace in the Middle East – otherwise it would risk losing essential partners for these efforts. At the end of the day, the EU, and particularly its southern member states, appears to prefer stable, authoritarian and Western-oriented regimes to the potential instability and Islamist electoral victories that genuine democratization processes in this region are likely, in some cases, to produce.

Finally, domestic conditions in most neighbouring countries stand in the way of effective political conditionality. Most of the ‘European neighbourhood’ from Belarus via the Caucasus to Northern Africa is governed by autocratic states for which complying with the EU’s political conditions would be tantamount to regime change. Even in the democratizing countries of the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, and Turkey, legacies of ethnic conflict, extreme political polarization, and severe weaknesses in governance capacity block the road to further EU integration. In sum, this special issue starts from the assumption that the EU’s most studied and, arguably, most successful strategy of democracy promotion is losing its prominence and effectiveness, and that alternative models are potentially becoming more relevant. These other models have been less well theorized and less systematically researched than EU political conditionality.
As for linkage, there is statistical evidence that geographic proximity to the EU is systematically correlated with democracy. This, however, is only a proxy for a mixed bag of transnational exchanges, contacts, and similarities (and probably other unspecified influences related to distance). We do not yet know which kinds of linkages are relevant for democracy promotion and what the specific EU contribution is. In addition, the literature is generally sceptical as far as EU democracy support from below is concerned. Studies on EU support in the southern neighbourhood point out, for instance, that EU assistance has remained extremely modest, focused on a narrow sector of civil society (such as secular organizations that are approved by, and often connected to, Middle Eastern and Northern African partner governments) and privileged non-political community services. An important reason for the modest and timid support is the fact that the most governments of the neighbourhood region regard direct linkage as illegitimate interference in their internal affairs and that the EU has an overriding strategic or economic interest in securing intergovernmental cooperation. Finally, the domestic conditions for bottom-up support appear unfavourable in most neighbourhood countries because democratic civil society is weak and lacks autonomy.

Since linkage is thus unlikely to be an effective alternative to leverage, we turn to the governance model in this special issue. This model has been much less explored in the literature than linkage. At the same time, it appears to suit the conditions for democracy promotion in the EU’s neighbourhood better than either leverage or linkage. First, it is in line with the main thrust of the EU’s external action and the ENP: the creation of policy networks and the transfer of EU policy rules (see Note 31). Second, it is less overtly political. Because democratic governance rules come as an attachment to material policies, do not target change in basic structures of political authority, and focus on the administration rather than societal actors, they are less likely to arouse suspicion and opposition by third country governments.

Contributions

The contributions to this special issue deal with the problems and limits of the leverage model as well as the potential of the governance model of democracy promotion in the EU neighbourhood. Some contributions analyse the problems of leverage, whereas others explore the potential of democratic governance promotion. For the reasons mentioned above, the linkage model is not the main focus of the issue.

Paul Kubicek analyses the effects of EU leverage (conditionality) in Turkey between 2000 and 2009 and draws comparisons to the effects of linkage (cultivation of civil society). Whereas the first half of the decade was characterized by significant democratic reforms, they stalled in the second half. In Kubicek’s analysis, the change in democratization had mainly do with a variation in the conditions of conditionality. Reforms between 2000 and 2005 were triggered by the EU’s recent
commitment to Turkish membership and received further momentum in 2002 when the reform-oriented Justice and Development Party AKP removed the Kemalist parties from power. A large and credible incentive was thus matched by lower political costs of reform. The credibility of the EU’s commitment appeared high and was confirmed by the EU’s decision, in 2005, to open accession negotiations. These conditions worsened after 2005. Popular disapproval across the EU and the principled opposition of major EU member state governments cast doubt on the EU’s commitment; further reforms and the implementation of promises made became more costly for the government; and the envisaged duration of accession negotiations moved any reward for these reforms far into the future. By contrast, the cultivation of civil society was less relevant in the first phase, and could not compensate for the worsened conditions of leverage in the second. As Kubicek points out, Turkey is a hard case of democracy promotion compared to the Central European countries. In comparison to the other target countries studied in this special issue, however, it is the one with the most favourable conditions of leverage.

Raffaella Del Sarto and Tobias Schumacher start from the observation that the EU has moved from negative to positive conditionality in its relations with the Mediterranean countries. Whereas the association agreements threatened the partner countries with the termination or suspension of cooperation when basic standards were violated, the ENP envisaged rewarding democratic progress with intensified cooperation. In either case, however, the effective use of leverage requires clear conceptual underpinnings; its credibility hinges on well-defined democratic conditions. In a comparison of the EU’s ENP Action Plans with Jordan and Tunisia, however, Del Sarto and Schumacher show that the benchmarks are vague, arbitrary, inconsistent, incomplete, and thus useless for credible conditionality. Whereas the inconsistency is partly due to the principle of ‘co-ownership’, which allows partner countries to co-define the Action Plans according to their own priorities, it also shows a lack of determination on the part of the EU. At a conceptual level, Del Sarto and Schumacher thus confirm the widespread assessment that the EU’s democracy promotion is inconsistent. This finding applies to the ENP in general – and is not invalidated by the fact that in countries with a relatively strong domestic democratization and EU integration agenda such as Ukraine we may observe clear and determinate benchmarks in the Action Plan.44

Tom Casier analyses EU democracy promotion in Ukraine, arguably the Eastern ENP country that has made most progress in democratization. Casier distinguishes two tracks of intergovernmental cooperation on democracy outlined in the ENP Action Plan: one focusing on formal democracy, i.e. the constitutional and institutional framework of democracy, the other on substantive democracy, i.e. the governmental practices within these institutions. He observes an asymmetric outcome for both tracks. Whereas Ukraine has made significant progress with regard to formal democracy, substantive democracy clearly lags behind. To a large extent, the discrepancy can be explained by the fact that formal institutional change can be achieved faster than the change of practices. The continuation of old
practices also allows vested interests to reduce the costs of democratic institutional change. According to Casier’s study, however, the discrepancy is reinforced by the EU’s focus on formal institutions and the weaker visibility of substantive practices. On the one hand, the case of Ukraine thus shows that, in the absence of a credible membership incentive, EU democracy promotion can work via ‘self-imposed conditionality’: if the elites of the target state are strongly committed to European integration and regard democratic reforms as a way to demonstrate their commitment and induce the EU to perceive their country as a viable candidate. On the other hand, however, self-imposed conditionality is likely to remain at the level of formal institutional reform and does not appear to improve substantive democracy.

Democratic governance and the governance model of democracy promotion are the focus of the three remaining contributions. Anne Wetzel asks whether the transgovernmental promotion of democratic governance might be less affected by inconsistency than intergovernmental leverage. In a comparison of three policies – the regulation of genetically modified organisms (GMO), water governance and fisheries – she shows that this is not the case. When economic interests are threatened by stakeholder participation, as they were in the GMO and fisheries cases, democratic governance promotion is likely to be downgraded. Regarding the ‘input’ side of democracy promotion, that is, the EU’s consistency and determination, ‘governance’ therefore does not seem to have an advantage over leverage.

By contrast, the joint contribution by Tina Freyburg, Sandra Lavenex, Frank Schimmelfennig, Tatiana Skripka, and Anne Wetzel analyses the ‘output’ side of the governance model and the conditions of effective democratic governance promotion. In a comparison of three policies (competition, environment, and migration policy) and four countries, two from the Eastern neighbourhood (Moldova and Ukraine) and two from the Southern neighbourhood (Jordan and Morocco), the study shows that country-level political variables (membership aspirations and the degree of political liberalization) do not explain the variation in outcomes. This finding demonstrates that the governance model is indeed an independent model and that the promotion of democratic governance operates differently from leverage. The authors argue that the transfer of democratic governance norms follows a sectoral dynamic and match the conditions stipulated by the governance model. Accordingly, the adoption of democratic governance provisions by the target states is the more successful, the more strongly these provisions are codified in the sectoral acquis, the more institutionalized the cooperation between the EU and ENP states is, the more interdependent the parties are, and, finally, the lower adoption costs are for national governments and sectoral authorities. However, the analysis also reveals that legislative adoption is generally not followed by rule application. As in the two-track case presented by Tom Casier, changes mainly remain formal. Because the contribution by Freyburg et al. is based on the most-likely ENP countries for effective democratic governance promotion, the lack of application can be generalized to the entire neighbourhood.

In the final contribution, Tina Freyburg shifts the focus from macro-level of domestic legislation to the micro-level. She asks whether participation in
transgovernmental policy networks influences the attitudes of state officials regarding democratic governance. In a comparative analysis of two EU twinning projects in Morocco, she finds conditional support for the effectiveness of democratic governance promotion. Whereas in the issue area of environmental policy, the participants in the twinning project exhibited a significantly higher support for democratic governance than the non-participants, this was not the case for the twinning project on competition policy. The difference cannot be accounted for by properties of the state officials such as their linkage experiences but is best explained by the difference in politicization (the intensity of the political actors’ interests at stake) between the two sectors. The finding that non-politicized sectors are more conducive to democratic governance promotion matches the results of the previous contribution.45

Conclusions
Studies on EU democracy promotion largely concur that EU leverage has been an effective model of democracy promotion in the (potential) candidate countries for membership. But what happens if the EU does not offer membership in return for democratic consolidation, or if its membership promise lacks credibility? Does leverage still work, or are alternative strategies more promising? The contributions to this special issue study different models of EU democracy promotion in the European neighbourhood, which does not have a membership perspective, and in Turkey whose accession process appears to have slowed down or even stalled. What can we learn from these cases?

Leverage is reaching its limits. The ineffectiveness of leverage even appears over-determined in the neighbourhood countries. The EU’s lack of consistency, determinacy, and credibility combines with high political costs on the part of the partner governments. This is not the end of democratic reforms as recent developments in Turkey show.46 Self-imposed, anticipatory conditionality in Ukraine is another partial substitute for strong external incentives, and partner governments may use the EU as an external anchor for reforms in the face of domestic resistance (see Note 44). But both examples also show the limits of ‘conditionality-lite’.47 Reforms often remain constrained by domestic constellations of power and interests or remain superficial, and self-imposed conditionality is unlikely to go far in the absence of EU responsiveness.

Linkage however is not an alternative. The contributions to this special issue have not systematically assessed the linkage model but the patchy evidence assembled here confirms the expectation of low impact. In the case of Turkey, the cultivation of civil society could not compensate for lack of credibility and external incentives (see Note 46), and in the case of Moroccan state officials, the variation in transnational experiences and exchanges did not account for the variation in socialization effects.48

What about the governance model of democracy promotion then? Sector-specific cooperation in transgovernmental networks seems capable, indeed, of influencing the legislation as well as the attitudes of state officials in favour of
Democratic governance. Democratic governance promotion, however, proves to be as vulnerable to contrary economic and strategic interests and costs, and as susceptible to superficial implementation (see Note 45), as leverage. In addition, it needs to be emphasized again that sector-specific participation, transparency, and accountability cannot compensate for the absence of democratic elections, representation, and the rule of law at the highest political level, nor does it replace an active civil society and socio-economic preconditions at the most basic level of democratization. Clearly, the governance model is no panacea and no substitute for EU leverage. But it provides a track of democracy promotion that is worth exploring further. At any rate, while the contributions to this special issue differentiate analytically between the three models of external democracy promotion, their empirical results document very much the interplay and mutual interdependence between external incentives for political institutions, the development of civil society, and democratization at the level of sectoral governance.

Postscript

When this special issue was finalized and ready to go to press, the successful revolts in Tunisia and Egypt, the popular unrest spreading across Northern Africa and the Middle East, and the uncertain prospects of democratization in the region demonstrated once again the need and timeliness to reflect on the EU’s democracy promotion agenda in its neighbourhood countries. While the EU’s long-standing focus on stabilizing the southern Mediterranean region with the help of autocratic regimes is discredited, the EU is struggling with defining its strategy to assist democratization processes under the new circumstances. As the transition countries will not be considered for membership even in the longer term, leverage is unlikely to be viable. In this respect there is nothing to be added to the conclusions of this special issue. By contrast, the anti-regime movements have in some countries opened up new opportunities for the impact of linkage that we considered highly unlikely when we planned this issue. Yet, given the weakness of civil society in the region and of the EU’s ties to the anti-regime movements, direct linkage will be difficult to implement; and indirect linkage is by definition a long-term project.

For these reasons, the promotion of democratic governance may yet turn out to be the EU’s best chance in the short term. Many regimes in the region are likely to survive the wave of unrest; in these cases, there is hardly an alternative to the governance model. Those countries that experience regime change will continue to cooperate with the EU across a wide range of policy issues and to seek its assistance. The established transgovernmental policy networks with the EU are likely to persist. In addition, however, these countries will be more open towards transparent, accountable, and participatory policy-making and policy implementation than their predecessors.

Acknowledgements

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Notes

1. For the juxtaposition of ‘leverage’ and ‘linkage’ as main models of external democracy promotion, see Levitsky and Way, ‘International Linkage’.
3. The ENP applies to Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, and Ukraine. Belarus, Libya, and Syria qualify for participation but have hitherto not concluded the corresponding agreements.
6. Schimmelfennig, ‘Europeanization beyond Europe’.
11. Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe’.
16. Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization.
17. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, 12–16.
18. Ibid.
19. For the following, see Schimmelfennig, ‘The EU: Promoting Liberal Norms’.
22. Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, ‘EU Democracy Promotion’.
23. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe.
25. Schimmelfennig, ‘Strategic Calculation’; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, ‘EU Democracy Promotion’.
27. Beetham, ‘Democracy and Human Rights’, 4–5; see also Freyburg et al., ‘Democracy between the Lines?’.
28. Cf. the concept of ‘stakeholder democracy’, Matten and Crane, ‘What Is Stakeholder Democracy’. In this sense, democratic governance is similar to, but goes beyond, good governance (see, e.g. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, ‘Governance Matters’). Good governance refers mainly to the effectiveness of governance and need not be democratic.
29. Lavenex, ‘EU External Governance’.
30. The EU acquis mainly comprises the entire body of EU primary (treaty) and secondary law in force. In addition, it includes politically binding declarations (as in the EU’s foreign and security policy).
32. For concrete examples, see Freyburg et al., ‘Democracy Promotion’.
33. Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, ‘EU Rules’.
34. Slaughter, A New World Order; Lavenex, ‘A Governance Perspective’.
35. See, e.g. Kelley, Ethnic Politics; Pridham, Designing Democracy; Vachudova, Europe Undivided; Schimmelfennig, Engert, Knobel, International Socialization.
38. Warkotsch, ‘The European Union and Democracy Promotion’.
40. On Croatia, see Freyburg and Richter, ‘National Identity Matters’.
43. We thank one of the reviewers for alerting us to this point.
44. Casier, ‘The EU’s Two-Track Approach’.
45. Freyburg et al., ‘Democracy Promotion through Functional Cooperation?’.
46. Kubicek, ‘Political Conditionality’.
47. Sasse, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy’.
49. Freyburg, ‘Transgovernmental Networks’; Freyburg et al., ‘Democracy Promotion through Functional Cooperation?’.
50. Wetzel, ‘The Promotion of Participatory Governance’.

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