Abstract
The study of migration generally refers to immigration. Emigration is usually neglected. This study aims at bringing the attention to one aspect of emigration, namely emigration and diaspora practices. These are developed for different purposes and consist of a heterogeneous assemblage of measures. In common with many other countries, India and Jamaica have both joined these efforts to tackle emigration in specific ways. Instead of looking at these practices through “external” factors, as emphasised by the literature, we use the governmentality approach to highlight how different actors have thought about emigrant and diaspora practices and according to which rationalities they have been enacted. We show that both India and Jamaica problematise emigration in economistic terms, i.e. to contribute to economic development. In this context, diasporas denote only high-qualified emigrants. The results also reveal a topological picture of governmentalities at work: we witness regulatory rationalities in the form of neo-liberalism and welfarism, but also pastoral, disciplinary and sovereign governmentalities operating in the [...]
TOPOLOGIES OF POWER: COMPARISON OF INDIAN AND JAMAICAN DIASPORA PRACTICES THROUGH AN ANALYTICS OF GOVERNMENT

THÈSE

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BJP</td>
<td>Bharatiya Janata Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community and Common Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSME</td>
<td>CARICOM Single Market and Economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>DKN</td>
<td>Diaspora Knowledge Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFBJ</td>
<td>Facilitators for a Better Jamaica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FICCI</td>
<td>Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry</td>
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<td>GLOBAL-INK</td>
<td>Global Indian Network of Knowledge</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOPIO</td>
<td>Global Organisation of People of Indian Origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLC</td>
<td>High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICM</td>
<td>India Centre for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDB</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDEA</td>
<td>International Diaspora Engagement Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>India Development Foundation of Indian Overseas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IJCHR</td>
<td>Independent Jamaican Council of Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INC</td>
<td>Indian National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation of Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAMPRO</td>
<td>Jamaica Promotions Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JLP</td>
<td>Jamaica Labour Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOD</td>
<td>Jamaica Overseas Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFAFT</td>
<td>[Jamaican] Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOIA</td>
<td>Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs</td>
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NAJASO  National Association of Jamaicans and Supportive Organisations
NRI    Non Resident Indian
OAS    Organisation of American States
OCI    Overseas Citizenship of India
OECD   Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
OIC    Overseas Indian Centre
OIFC   Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre
PBD    Pravasi Bharatiya Diwa (Day of Indians Abroad)
PIO    Person/People of Indian Origin
PIOJ   Planning Institute of Jamaica
RRFU   Returning Residents Facilitation Unit
TOKTEN Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals
UNDP   United Nations Development Program
UNO    United Nations Organisation
UWI    University of West Indies
WB     World Bank
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I wish to extend my thanks particularly to Prof. Marco Giugni, not just in his capacity as president of my doctoral jury and for the organisational tasks included therein. His exceptional intellectual competence coupled with his incredible personal modesty are truly inspirational for every doctoral student (and others) and it is mainly with regard to this "way of being" that moved, motivated, encouraged and stimulated me – not just with regard to academia. Although extremely busy in his own research, he always took the time to discuss problems related to this thesis. His thoughtful theoretical and methodological comments were always highly appreciated.

Academically speaking, Prof. Wendy Larner proffered the most valuable insights and contributions. She not only influenced me and this thesis through her numerous pieces of research relating to diaspora practices and neo-liberalism, but it was also during the colloquial discussions that she gave me incredibly useful input – not only limited to this doctoral thesis. By drawing my attention to the significance scholars should attribute to empiricism with a sound theoretical stance in the background and pointing towards the use of theory with a "small t", she was able to bring me "down to earth" and direct me to the minutiae of empirical reality. Although not facile (and still ongoing), this process has enabled me to begin appreciating anthropological, ethnological and historical research much more than previously and I cannot thank her enough for such a profound influence.

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Abstract

The study of migration generally refers to immigration. Emigration is usually neglected. This study aims at bringing the attention to one aspect of emigration, namely emigration and diaspora practices. These are developed for different purposes and consist of a heterogeneous assemblage of measures. In common with many other countries, India and Jamaica have both joined these efforts to tackle emigration in specific ways. Instead of looking at these practices through “external” factors, as emphasised by the literature, we use the governmentality approach to highlight how different actors have thought about emigrant and diaspora practices and according to which rationalities they have been enacted. We show that both India and Jamaica problematise emigration in economistic terms, i.e. to contribute to economic development. In this context, diasporas denote only high-qualified emigrants. The results also reveal a topological picture of governmentalities at work: we witness regulatory rationalities in the form of neo-liberalism and welfarism, but also pastoral, disciplinary and sovereign governmentalities operating in the respective Jamaican and Indian settings.

Résumé

“My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to hyper- and pessimistic activism” (Foucault 1997: 256).
Introduction

“My endeavour will be to further strengthen the strong bond between India and overseas Indians, address your concerns and problems and to create an enabling environment, whereby Overseas Indians engage with and benefit from the opportunities in a rapidly growing economy” (Ravi 2009).

This statement by the Indian Cabinet Minister of Overseas Affairs at first sight might not seem exceptional. It conforms to our expectations that representatives of national governments seek to highlight links between the state and what could be called “civil society”. However, at a second glance, it is noticeable for at least two different reasons: first of all to see that suddenly there is a new actor or subject within the Indian civil society being specified, i.e. Overseas Indians or the Indian diaspora, who has not been previously mentioned in the past or, if it had been previously mentioned, is now referred to in a new way, i.e. in a positive manner. Whereas the Indian state considered the figure of the Indian abroad, and especially its relationship to the Indian state, with some scepticism previously, a turnaround could be observed in this regard from the beginning of the 1980s. The creations of annual Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas, i.e. Day of Indians abroad, of a ministerial department dedicated to overseas Indian affairs, and of other institutions are indicative of this reversal. The subject of the Indian abroad, or more generally of the Indian diaspora, seems to have acquired a new meaning. Secondly, it is also striking to see that the state is suddenly reaching beyond its own borders to identify new segments of its populations residing elsewhere and subject them to some of its policies.

More generally speaking, this new (or renewed) interest in diasporas as actor or subject of governmental practices is not unique to the Indian state, but seems to have become a globalising phenomenon. Vicente Fox’ declaration of intention in July 2000 to govern on
behalf of 118 million Mexicans, i.e. including 18 million Mexicans living abroad, the creation of diaspora ministries in several states, such as Armenia, China, Colombia, Ireland, Italy, Morocco, the Philippines, Turkey (under different names respectively) and other states or the creation of new names, such as Magyarsag (Hungarianness) or Italianità (Italianness), are just some prominent examples of such an attitude towards expatriate people and all point towards the same direction, i.e. the attempt of states to engage their respective diasporas. This diaspora engagement, or more generally these *diaspora practices* have taken several forms, both in symbolic or cultural terms as well as institutionally.

It is with regard to a deeper understanding of such practices that the present study is committed, i.e. the governing of certain groups which increasingly are known as *diasporas*. The emergence and increase of such practices invite a closer scrutiny, not necessarily in terms of identifying causes or origins of such practices, but rather by examining how such practices have been *problematised* in terms of *government*. This present study aims more particularly to explore whether, and in which ways, diaspora strategies as a regime of practices extend and intensify a particular form of governing discussed extensively in the relevant literature, i.e. the *neoliberal governmentality*.

Emigration, diasporas and diaspora practices are obviously not new phenomena (Böhning 1978; Hatton and Williamson 1998; Hollifield 2012; Leimgruber 2013; Rystad 1992). They have all existed since the beginning of mankind – along with other social processes transcending national boundaries, such as numerous social movements, businesses, media or epistemic communities. Since the early 1990s however, a new trend has emerged within the international community, whereby government and international institutions, non-governmental organisations and private sector actors have all become interested in emigrants...
and their potential for a more effective way to govern. New institutions and policies have therefore been devised to harness their potential. What seems novel about this trend is how it has been problematised in terms of a more effective way to govern; how diasporas have been targeted as a new object of knowledge, been increasingly re-labelled as “diasporas” and been attributed new roles or identities; and how the number and variety of institutions have become involved in activities pertaining to diasporas (Brubaker 2005; Cohen 1996; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003; R. C. Smith 2003d; Tölölyan 1996).

Diaspora practices or strategies have emerged in a context of many ongoing global changes, such as the increase in international migration generally speaking as well as the recent spread of formal diaspora institutions. The United Nations Organisation (UNO) together with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimate that in 2013 approximately 230 million people lived outside their country of birth, whereas in 1960 the number was about 75 million and 154 million in 1990 (UNO and OECD 2013). This global increase in international migration has been accompanied by the growing awareness of the potential contributions emigrant populations could make. Most recognized among these are remittances, which are estimated to have reached 325 billion US dollars in 2010, in contrast to only 161 billion US dollars in 2004 (World Bank 2010). Their role in political lobbying or for regime change is equally highlighted.

It might also be because of such reasons that concepts such as brain gain, brain circulation, human capital, transnationalism, globalisation and others have entered the lexicon of economists and policy-makers, highlighting the value of the skills, knowledge and networks of the respective diaspora members. Hence, it was no coincidence to see a high number of participants at the world’s first “Diaspora Ministerial Conference” in Geneva in June 2013, convened by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), where the spread and nature of the diverse diaspora institutions were discussed among other issues. Nowadays, such
institutions are found in more than half the member states of the United Nations (Gamlen et al. 2013: 4).

This trend of an increased role for diasporas has proliferated both in the international realm as well as in national contexts. Among the countries that have received some attention, both in the academic and non-academic literature, is the case of India. It is thereby seen as one of the most influential cases in which the diversity and complexity of diaspora practices can be observed and analysed. The Jamaican case on the other hand, i.e. the second case under scrutiny in this present study, has been much less analysed so far – although some literature does exist here, too.

There is a burgeoning literature, both academic as well as non-academic, on explaining or understanding diaspora practices, both in general and regarding the Indian and Jamaican contexts. So far, the main focus in the existing literature has been on describing and explaining “objectively” which factors account for the increased prominence of such practices. Three different approaches are normally retained in this regard: approaches of (1) migration and development, (2) of transnationalism and the state, and (3) of extra-territorial citizenship (cf. Collyer 2013: 4). While the former two approaches tend to explain diaspora practices with regard to interests, since states would attempt to tap into the resources of their respective diaspora, the citizenship approach is more normative in nature, as it explains states’ diaspora policies with regard to citizenship norms in force, thereby embracing them as part of the respective nation-state (cf. Collyer 2013; Gamlen et al. 2013; Ragazzi 2009b).

Yet, all of these approaches tend to ignore both the background of the current interests or citizenship norms with regard to diasporas as well as the broader implications of the current diaspora regime of practices with regard to sovereignty in the international realm and conceptions of citizenship. They furthermore are attached to some essentialised
conceptualisation or image of the state, since many of these scholars link the “problem of power” with what might be called the “problem of the state” (Foucault 2000; Larner and Walters 2004a; Rose and Miller 1992). Several scholars of globalisation or international and transnational migration for instance focus their attention on the state in an “age of globalisation”, which would increasingly be losing control – especially in a context of the increasing mobility of goods, capital and people. The phenomenon of globalisation, including transnational mobility, is thus considered as the main factor of political power, imposing itself as an “external” process or as an “external” reality upon nation-states.

Such an analytical prioritisation of the state in accounts of power might be linked to how questions of government and [political] power have been and are problematised in the realm of International Relations or in the field of what is nowadays more modestly called international studies. One could affirm in fact that all the great debates in the relatively young discipline of International Relations (Lapid 1989; Waever 1996) have addressed this problem in different terms: while realists or neo-realists conceptualize power mostly in military terms, liberals and neo-liberals institutionally, Marxist and neo-Marxist scholars place the sources of power in the economic realm and constructivists in cultural sites. Power is thus situated in different loci according to the theoretical stance the scholars occupies. But the fact still remains that the state is considered to be central in most of these accounts and is therefore treated as the primary site of research. A logical consequence of such an analytical prioritisation of the state in theories of international relations is the neglect of investigations of power “beyond the political state”, i.e. sites of power, which on the one hand are apparently non-political and on the other hand situated “outside” nation-states, i.e. on the international, the global or the supra-national level.
Research questions

This study takes up the challenge of investigating governing or power mechanisms, including such beyond the state. It tries to understand the rise of diaspora practices in more detail. It is an examination of the ensemble of governmental discourses and techniques, i.e. the assemblages, through which the respective diasporas have been subjected to different state policies, how political power is woven into these practices and on what consequences these particular discourse, policies and practices have in constituting political subjects. The focus is on understanding the rise of diaspora strategies as a policy option, rather than analysing the diaspora per se (Larner 2007: 334) and is thus interested in both the material and ideational (or symbolic) conditions enabling the deployment of such diaspora strategies. Hence, the present study explores the following questions: How did diaspora strategies emerge in the Indian and Jamaican contexts? How are diasporas thereby historicized and politicized? What are the assumptions of diaspora strategies or practices made about the nature both of the practices and the types of emigrants or diasporas suited to such practices? What are the broader implications of such practices in terms of sovereignty and citizenship conceptualisations? In what ways, if at all, are diaspora strategies involved in the current spreading and deepening of neoliberalism? What do these practices tell us more generally about neoliberalism? This study attempts in other words to uncover diaspora policies on a descriptive level and understand on an analytical level both the production of an intersubjective historical rationality (or rationalities) guiding state practices in the domain of diaspora engagement as well as how these rationalities are materialized and assembled in so-called governmental technologies. The study is in short an attempt in understanding the adoption of the governmental policies, discourses and practices with regard to the respective diasporas on the one hand, about understanding the constitution of such diasporas as political
subjects on the other hand and on reflecting on implications of such governmentalities on conceptions of citizenship and sovereignty.

For clarity’s sake, it should be noted that this study is not about the production of diasporic culture(s) of actors and groups other than governmental ones (as understood throughout this study, i.e. actors contributing to the hegemonic diasporic governmentality). It obviously seems very rewarding to enter this field of study and analyse such productions of diasporic culture(s) differing or even going radically against the official and hegemonising production of the diaspora and the state. But the present study is limited to the endeavour of political strategies of the dominant discourse(s) or governmentalities making use of the respective diasporas as a policy option, but not to its radically resisting or subverting discourses. The focus of the present study on hegemonic diasporic governmentalities will thus amount to grant “the state” some prominence in the analysis and might seem contradictory to the aim of looking at power mechanisms beyond the state. Yet, it actually is coherent with the governmentality perspective adhered to throughout this study, in as far as it is interested in how far power has effects at local places, thus showing that power can also be generated and applied locally independent of “the state”.

To find answers to these questions, theoretical tools provided by Foucault and so-called neo-Foucauldian authors will be used throughout the present study, especially those that came to be known as emerging from the governmentality approach. Drawing on this framework, diaspora practices are conceptualized as a regime of practices defined as the ways to think about and to act upon a particular topic, at any given time and place (Dean 2010: 21). Analyzing diaspora practices as a regime of practices means tracing genealogically the emergence of such practices; exploring the forms of knowledge this regime gives rise to and depends upon; and examining the diverse power dimensions and implications. Thereby, the
focus is directed to the assemblage of discourses, governing mechanisms and power technologies involved in generating knowledge about, and acting upon diasporas. The added value of such an approach will be outlined in more detail in the third chapter of the present study, dedicated to the theoretical framework.

Main arguments

Put succinctly, the arguments of this study go as follows. The first and main argument is that we observe different governmentalities, i.e. technologies or rationalities of power at work in Indian and Jamaican diaspora practices. While the available literature tends to present diaspora practices only, or at least principally, as operating through neo-liberal rationalities of government, the present study reveals that the picture to be drawn about operating technologies is much more complex. Instead of adhering to a single logic, such as neo-liberalism, the present study presents a topological analysis by relying heavily on theoretical developments emphasised by Collier and Ong (S. J. Collier 2009; Ong 2000; Ong and Collier 2003; Ong and Collier 2005; Ong 2006) where heterogenous elements originating in different rationalities coexist. While the neo-liberal rationality dominates Jamaican diaspora practices with welfarist, disciplinary and sovereign technologies complementing the picture, Indian emigrant and diaspora practices are operating both through neo-liberal and welfarist or pastoral modalities of rule, while disciplinary and sovereign technologies are complementary. By also focusing on neo-liberal governmentalities, the study is furthermore able to expose to what extent states – as one of the contemporary central political institutions – are not simply retreating from the global scene, at least in the field of emigration. We are not witnessing the emergence of more important actors, as some scholars on globalisation and global governance think and want to make us believe. The “retreat of the state” should instead be
seen as an effect of such neo-liberal thinking on government where the state simply is seen as one instrument or tool among others. This does not imply that “the state” decreases in importance, but simply that we should not necessarily start our analyses with an essentialised image of the state as acting on the international scene. The present study thus points to an increased attention scholars should grant to the empirical, since it depends on the domain of study to determine the importance and the place of “the state” in governing. Regarding the domain of emigration or diaspora practices, nation-states seem to structure actively transnational mobility by “nationalising transnational mobility” (Biao 2003) and are not simply passive receptors or observers of such processes. As will be demonstrated throughout this study, processes of globalisation (including transnational mobility) are therefore not to be considered as “external” processes or as an external reality imposing itself upon nation-states, as implicit in several accounts of globalisation and other scholars. They belong more to the active shaping of particular representations by the state, effectuated among others by the nation-state (cf. also Amin 2004: 224). As we will see in the analytical part of this study, the respective Jamaican and Indian state agencies are leading the diaspora practices, but are thereby “assisted” by a multitude of other actors – independently of whether these other actors are “above” or “below” the state.

This neo-liberal governmentality is not homogeneous across states however, as the concept of the “decoupling” (J. W. Meyer and Rowan 1977) from the sociological version of the neo-institutional theory suggests. For this reason we are encouraged to take the idea of a sociology of translation seriously in our capacity as scholars. While the transborder practices of diaspora engagement might emerge on the global scene (among others), the formulation and the implementation of such practices, i.e. the translations of such practices, follow a different pattern on regional and national scales, i.e. they are decoupled. It even seems
possible to observe the emergence of a new field of emigration on the global scale – with the state still having an important say within this field.

Linked to this previous point is the third main argument of the present study pertaining to the extension of power mechanisms. A new modality of government will be suggested, i.e. a *transborder governmentality* (re)producing citizen-state relationships with expatriates. Contrary to many accounts of the literature treating relations between the state and its diaspora, the present study brings the state or political power back into the focus of analysis. It therefore is about political power mechanisms extending its scope across different (and sometimes unexpected) fields and sectors.

This new form of governmentality does not mean, however, that we are witnessing the development of a new “scale” of government (for instance global governance with the inclusion of international organisations or international non-governmental organisations, such as localised governance with “civil society”) with the gradual disappearance of states' sovereignty (Ferguson and Gupta 2002). It is rather that states' sovereignty is reproduced by new actors (among others). The main argument therefore extends to a *reconceptualisation of state sovereignty*: the state is said to govern no longer simply a territorially bounded nation, as implicit and assumed in the traditional container model of society (i.e. societies contained by national borders). It is instead asserted that “the state” extends its scope increasingly beyond the territorially bounded nation-state, thereby reconfiguring itself as a *transborder-state* (cf. Brubaker and Kim 2011: 22). The present study hints therefore also at the reconfiguration of the state – but not necessarily the nation, as other authors have attempted to show (Basch et al. 1994). The state is in other words “imagined” exactly as the nation seems to be (Anderson 1983) and can therefore be equally reconfigured: “[…] states are not simply functional bureaucratic apparatuses, but powerful sites of symbolic and cultural production that are themselves always culturally represented and understood in particular
ways. It is here that it becomes possible to speak of states, and not only of nations [...] as „imagined“ – that is, as constructed entities that are conceptualised and made socially effective through particular imaginative and symbolic devices that require study“ (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 981). State power, or political power more generally, is spatialised differently, i.e. no longer in Westphalian conceptions of the international (where the state is limited by its territory), but rather in transborder terms.¹ Following similar lines, diasporas – on the same level as states – are treated as effects (“dependent variables”) of political projects or political mobilisations rather than as agents or causes (“independent variables”) of conflict perpetuation or conflict resolution, of development or of democratisation, as typically found in the literature on diasporas. The present study assumes in fact that diaspora practices constitute just one particular form, type or dimension of “transborder (or transnational) imagined communities” (Adamson 2012; Anderson 1983). Diasporas are forms of strategic social identity constructions in which different so-called political entrepreneurs try to create a transborder “imagined community” based on a particular identity category. It is this actor which comes to constitute the centerpiece of the so-called diaspora option. As will be discussed in the empirical chapters of the study, some of the identity categories are very broad (“universalizing”) in appeal while others are much more restrictive and particularistic.

¹ This does not mean, however, that territorialisation does not play a role any longer – rather the contrary seems to hold: all deterritorialisations imply reterritorialisations, as already analysed by Deleuze and Guattari (1980).
Assumptions

Underlying such arguments are ontological and epistemological assumptions which need to be spelled out for the sake of transparency.

This project adheres to a relational ontology, which can best be exemplified by looking at how power, i.e. our central concept, is approached throughout the remainder of this study. Power is conceived here in terms of practices and effects rather than by looking at some institutional loci where power would sit. It is thus against the view which considers power as a possession by a sovereign, determinate, collective body, such as the crown, the people, the parliament, the party, the class or any other actor that the present study is to be situated – a view which looks at what power substantially is and where its sources are to be found.

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2 Ontology is in short the science of being and asks questions of how reality (i.e. certain objects or subjects) come to be, i.e. how they come into existence and what qualities or properties („nature“) these subjects or objects have. Without entering into the details of ontological discussions in the realm of philosophy, two basic ontological distinctions will suffice for the purposes of the present study: the first one is between realist (or materialist) and anti-realist (constructivist or ideationalist) ontologies, while the second one distinguishes between essentialist (or substantialist) and relational ontologies.

3 Epistemology deals, in a nutshell, with issues of knowledge and cognition and belongs to the realm of philosophy. It asks questions about the nature and scope of knowledge as well as how it can be acquired – if such a move is considered possible in the first instance. It thereby also looks at the relationship between researchers and her or his objects of study. Regarding the nature and scope of knowledge, the literature suggests a distinction between epistemological positions emphasising the possibility of an “objective” and “real” knowledge while opposing epistemological positions foreground an impossibility – or at least some scepticism – to reach such knowledge (cf. Della Porta and Keating 2008; Furlong and Marsh 2010). The former positions have come to be known as foundationalist positions, with other names being objectivism or philosophical realism. The latter positions simply take the opposite name, i.e. anti-foundationalism. Critical Realism (with other names being neo-positivism, respectively post-positivism) and constructionism, interpretivism or humanism belong to the latter category (Della Porta and Keating 2008: 23).

4 It thus adheres to what Ball and Clegg (Ball 1975; Clegg 1997, 2001; Clegg et al. 2006) have identified as Machiavellian approach to power as opposed to the Hobbesian tradition: “Where Hobbes and his successors may be said to have endlessly legislated on what power is, Machiavelli and his successors may be said to have interpreted what power does” (Clegg et al. 2006). The tradition and influence of the seventeenth-century English political theorist Hobbes on the writings of power have clearly been dominant in the intellectual history of the concept of power.

5 The “modernist” and central tradition of equating power with its possession at some locus is visible in most of the classical accounts of power and extend well into the twentieth century in order to be able to construct a reasonably coherent narrative from classical authors, such as Hobbes and Locke until to one of the best known conceptualisations of power effectuated for instance by Lukes in the 1970s (Lukes 1974), including famous
Instead of considering power as a possession, it focuses on the strategic, instrumental or organisational elements of power.\textsuperscript{6} We thus need to investigate the effects of power; its practices, its strategies and technologies at the micro-level.\textsuperscript{7} When analysing how diasporas as subjects are constituted, we adopt the view that the definition of their identity (or identities) is dependent on their relation to those who govern them (as well as their relation with themselves). Their identity is in other words not given \textit{a priori}, as in the case of essentialist and substantialist ontologies; it is instead determined \textit{a posteriori} by analysing first the relation or the process of the constitution of the relation in being. In other words, it is a \textit{processual} approach, since it does not start by analysing some pre-constituted structure or some pre-constituted agents in order to define the relevant actors. It rather starts with the process itself, i.e. how the relation between governmental instances (as understood

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item It is a direct attack on the Hobbesian notion of a sovereign power, especially the belief that power would be possessed by some specific “body politic”: “\textit{Power must be analysed as something which circulates [...]}. \textit{It is never localised here or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth}” (Foucault 1980). Power is not to be analysed by looking at the origins or the “locus” of power, such as the sovereign state or some economic classes, as in neo-Gramscian accounts.
\item The origins of this Foucauldian view can be found in the figure of Machiavelli. This is not to say that Foucault could be considered an intellectual disciple of Machiavelli, but rather that both scholars were confronted with a similar problematic, i.e. how power is exercised to secure an “\textit{ordered totality of power}” (Clegg et al. 2006). The Florentine political thinker of the sixteenth century was as a matter of fact most concerned with contingent strategy and organisation (Clegg et al. 2006) in Florence and investigated unstable and heterogeneous alliances with a disbelief in any single, decisive centre of power. Machiavelli might in this sense be considered as one of the first post-modern thinkers before modernity even begun (Clegg et al. 2006), since he considered politics as a game composed of an endless series of contingencies with little place left for rational action – exactly as other post-structuralists (Laclau and Mouffe 2004).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
throughout the governmentality framework) and claimed diaspora members is affecting the very being of diasporas.\(^8\) It is in this context that we focus on the practices of constituting and using the diaspora for certain purposes – what we call henceforth diaspora practices.

Epistemologically speaking, we assume an interpretivist and reflexive position throughout the remainder of the present study.\(^9\) We are in fact interested in investigating the interpretations that relevant actors of the diasporic governmentality give to diasporic practices – including which subjectivity positions are attached to claimed members of the Jamaican and Indian diasporas respectively (cf. also Caterino and Scharam 2006: 5; Yanow et al. 2009: 461). It should therefore be clear that the knowledge produced and aimed at by the present study is just an interpretation of a governmental assemblage in the realm of diasporic practices.

**Contributions**

Having seen the main arguments and some of the underlying assumptions, which contributions does the present study provide, both in scientific and political termes?

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\(^8\) This same ontological stance has been appropriately applied in the realm of International Relations by Wendt: “I argue that self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, not structure. There is no ‘logic’ of anarchy apart from the practices that create and instantiate one structure of identities and interests rather than another; structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process. Self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential features, of anarchy. Anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt 1992: 394-5). Even though some Bourdieusian scholars consider constructivism as not adhering to a relational ontology – since one of its main concepts, i.e. intersubjectivity, would not truly be relational –, and use instead the vocabulary of “fields” and “habitus” in order to be truly relational, constructivism can still be seen as adhering to a relational ontology, as the Wendtian quote proves. Important for our purposes, however, is simply to note that we adhere to such a processual or relational ontology turning around social practices.

\(^9\) Interpretivism considers subjective meaning being central to knowing a world, which is populated by meaningful actors – thus pushing researchers to aim at discovering meanings that motivate the actions of such meaningful actors. Such interpretivism is linked to what is sometimes called the double hermeneutic following Giddens (1976), i.e. that „the world is interpreted by the actors (one hermeneutic level) and their interpretation is interpreted by the observer (a second hermeneutic level)“ (Furlong and Marsh 2010: 185) or to put it in a more complex way: „Interpretation works at two levels. The world can be understood not as an objective reality, but as a series of interpretations that people within society give of their position; the social scientist, in turn, interprets these interpretations. In a further reflexive turn, social scientists’ interpretations feed back to the people through literature and media [...]“ . (Della Porta and Keating 2008: 25). Interpretivism believes thus in the impossibility of having “objective” and value-free research, since every observer is already part of social world(s). S/he would therefore be affected by the social constructions of reality (cf. Berger and Luckmann 1967).
The first one is of empirical nature. The study aims at contributing to the literature on diaspora practices by providing a detailed comparative analysis of such practices in the contexts of India and Jamaica respectively.

The contribution is also of a theoretical nature, since the present study aims at providing new insights on how power is exercised by hinting at topological rationalities at work rather than simply highlighting a single mentality of rule at the exclusion of all the others. By analysing diasporic governmentalities in post-colonial contexts, the question of the actual exercise of political power is central and constitutes the main focus of this study: What mechanisms of power are at work and inhere the diasporic regime of practice? What are the implications of such practices in terms of power on the international scene, i.e. which subsequent power modalities are thereby enacted? Does the power still lie in the state, as postulated by [neo-]realist accounts of international relations? Has it been transferred to other actors, as globalisation theorists would like us to believe? Or should power be conceptualised and understood differently, as suggested by the present study?

The study contributes more generally to a “historiography of the present”, as it intends to examine contemporary power or governing mechanisms. Instead of subsuming them under some tempting singularity, such as “late capitalism”, “postmodernity”, “the risk society” or the “Empire”, it attempts to gain a better understanding of these mechanisms by scrutinising underlying mentalities, strategies and techniques by which we are governed and through which we govern ourselves (cf. Barry et al. 1993, p.265).

The study is furthermore also interested in looking at power mechanisms in a “globalising world” where the concept of globalisation is both discursively and materially contested. It attempts also to analyse the implications of such conceptualisations or discourses of globalisation with regard to relations between the state and civil society or public and private actors. Are these relations altered whereby a new form of government emerges, such as
postulated by authors of a neo-liberal governmentality for whom [diasporic] affairs are increasingly governed by what might be termed “government through communities” (Rose 1996) or “public private partnership” (Andonova 2010)?

Integral to the analysis of the power mechanisms is a further aspect treated in this study. By attempting to understand the finalised effects of governmentalities, i.e. the consequences or effects of Indian and Jamaican diaspora practices respectively, we also consider issues of subjects: “What happens [...] to [...] notions of territorialised identities, borders, and orders when these become spatialised (or despatialised) in some radically new ways?” (Albert et al. 2001). It thus looks in more detail at how such governmental practices geared towards diasporas constitute and attribute a certain identity (or identities) both to members of the diaspora, such as the “global subject” in the Indian context, by producing a particular “truth” about the diasporic entity to be governed as well as to the state (or rather the respective statecraft) itself. In other words it is also about the identification, subjectivation or subjectification of these diaspora practices.

To be concise, the study is to address the analytical triad of “identities, borders and orders” (Albert et al. 2001). It will demonstrate how each of these categories, fundamental for the realm of International Relations (but also other disciplines in the social sciences), are being reconfigured by diaspora practices.

Before outlining the plan of the present study and how we intend to proceed concretely, it is necessary to spell out why a study in political science, or more precisely in International Relations as sub-discipline of political science, should be concerned with these kinds of politics.

Firstly, it seems necessary to justify the focus on the field of migration in general before turning to the justification of diaspora practices, issues of power, knowledge and identities in
this same field in more detail. In other words, the question is about the legitimacy of venturing onto issues of migration within the discipline of International Relations: What is the value of studying the politics of migration in International Relations? Should students of international relations not focus their attention on issues of war, peace or security rather than global migration, as implicit for instance in some studies on the politics of peacekeeping and -building? What are the relations between the study of migration and the study of international relations?

It is certainly not revolutionary to affirm that the phenomenon of migration is not new, but has existed throughout the entire history of mankind (cf. for instance Böhning 1978; Hatton and Williamson 1998; Hollifield 2012; Leimgruber 2013; Rystad 1992). Migration is just one of the social processes that transcends national boundaries. Numerous social movements, businesses, media, epistemic communities, and various forms of governance are also organised across boundaries (Levitt 2004: 33).

But it is not the understanding of migration per se which is relevant for the purposes of this introduction nor the explanation of the causes of migration in general, but rather the relationship migration has had and has with [international] politics and the modern international system of nation-states which is of interest here. It is therefore necessary to go back to the origins of this system in order to be able to grasp the meaning of this relation – origins to be found in the early sixteenth century and the treaties of Westphalia in 1648, according to an orthodox historiography of international relations.

It is at that time that we observe the advent of the state in Europe and the so-called Westphalian states’ system with the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity at its core – although it is contested whether this system truly existed or has only been created for heuristic reasons (cf. for instance Osiander 2001). These principles, nowadays still visible for instance in the Charter of the United Nations and more generally in international law, granted
a central place to the sovereign state as independent, institutional agents in which national identities are bounded by territory – giving birth to methodological nationalism or the so-called “container model of society” (Giddens 1995; Taylor 1996; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002) where all social life is [analytically] seen as being contained within national societies. Closely linked to this system is a special ideology with roots in political economy, but with tremendous impacts on the political relations among states, i.e. mercantilism with the principle of territoriality at its core (Foucault 2004). It is this principle which renders the phenomenon of migration suspect, to say the least, according to this Westphalian-mercantilist logic. Migration began in fact to play a major role, as it became central to controlling in- and outflows to the territory of the nation-state (Ragazzi 2009). Migration represented a challenge to states' sovereignty in the sense that the movement of individuals across national boundaries violated the principle of sovereignty with its requirement of some degree of territorial closure (Joppke 1998; Rystad 1992; Sassen 2013). Borders were considered as unchangeable with migration potentially endangering this.

With the expansion of the European state system to other parts of the world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Bull and Watson 1984; Morse 1976) as well as the increasing role of nationalism following the French Revolution on the one hand and economic liberalism on the other hand (Rystad 1992), the state institutions of citizenship and nationality became increasingly important (Koslowski 2000). The role of migration slightly changed thereby, as the economic interdependence changed the role of migrants. The aim became to match the number of the population to the resources of the territory with the elimination of superfluous labour forces becoming necessary (Ragazzi 2009). But the territorial logic is still dominant in this logic, although slightly softened with regard to the classic Westphalian logic.

Even though there still does not exist any global regime in the realm of international migration nowadays, migration continues to play a certain role in international politics. To
understand this better, the discipline of International Relations seems most useful, as it is this
discipline which problematised international politics as its study object since the end of the
First World War (Hollis and Smith 1992; Waever 1996) through the means of the so-called
“great debates” (Lapid 1989).

From the standpoint of most scholarship in International Relations, migration seems to be
having impacts mostly on domestic politics, with only marginal effects for international
politics in general (Hollifield 2012; Weiner 1985). This might be a reason why migration
scholars concentrate mostly on domestic cases rather than on global politics of migration.
Other scholars emphasise that international migrants only constitute around three per cent of
the world's population (UNO 2013), thus having a relatively small impact on international
relations. From a more theoretical point of view, however, migration is treated differently
depending on which paradigm is adopted – although it should be mentioned from the outset
that the mainstream theories of international relations have neglected the study of migration
by downplaying, at its worst, the consequences the phenomenon can have on security and
international economics, or, at its best, by concentrating mainly on the politics of
immigration in receiving countries (Koslowski 2006). One becomes quickly aware for
instance of the [neo-] realist concentration on the “high politics” with its focus on security-
related issues (i.e. national security, foreign policy, issues of war and peace, etc.), which
might explain to some degree the neglect of migration as a legitimate field of study, since it
would belong the realm of “low politics” (i.e. social and economic issues) considering its
putative socio-economic nature. The international system defined in material terms should be
the only legitimate object of study according to this realist paradigm (Waltz 1979). Migration
could have constituted a legitimate field of study only if it could be demonstrated that
migration affects power relations between states, thereby upsetting the balance of power. The
emergence of liberal and world-system theories in the 1970s with their focus on other than
security-related issues could have triggered an increased attention to this phenomenon (Hollifield 2012). Yet, it is only recently, i.e. since the beginning of this new millennium with the constructivist turn in International Relations, that the field of migration began to receive attention. International Relations Scholarship began realising that migration can have important effects on the states' system, including their security and sovereignty (Weiner and Russell 2001; Weiner and Teitelbaum 2001). Migration has thus become a legitimate object of study in the discipline of International Relations nowadays.

Consequently, this study intends not just to elucidate in more detail issues of migration, but contributes more importantly to much larger debates, such as the ones relating to central questions within the discipline of International Relations. These relate for instance to the definition of the boundaries of nation-states, i.e. the basic units of the international system: do diaspora policies redefine the territorial boundaries of nation-states? Are migration states, or at least emigration states, becoming deterritorialised? The study contributes also to advancing debates on globalisation where the theme of “deterritorialisation” seems becoming to be shared among a large number of scholars (Larner and Walters 2004b, 2004a). It does so by questioning this equation of globalisation and deterritorialisation as a universally valid conceptualisation of globalisation by showing that it actually reflects a very particular, i.e. state-centric, definition of territory where it is assumed that geographical units somehow pre-exist ways of thinking about them (Agnew 1994).

Having clarified the legitimacy of the politics of migration in a study of International Relations, why focus on emigration and diaspora politics and practices more precisely? One other important contribution of this study deals with the debate about the “emerging migration state” (Hollifield 2004) looking not only at the much debated immigration, but mostly at emigration. In accordance with transnational literature, it is postulated that the
phenomenon of migration can only be understood by considering migrants not just in their capacity as immigrants, but also and foremost as emigrants and potential members of a diaspora. As already stated by Sayad some decades ago, i.e. before the emergence of transnational theory, every immigrant is always initially an emigrant (Sayad 1977). In spite of this, literature on migration is still almost always discussed with regard to immigration while neglecting many issues concerning perceptions and policies of so-called “sending” (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Xiang 2003, 2004) or, to be more precise, origin states. It is in this context that the present study intends to look at how different state governments perceive, identify and treat “their” emigrants and transform them into members of a relevant diaspora – i.e. what is commonly referred to as “diaspora policies” or “diaspora engagement practices”: “While diasporas emerge out of dispersals, not all dispersals lead to diasporas. For example the violent dispersals that took place in Libya and the Ivory Coast in 2011 as a consequence of the political turmoil in these two countries may not necessarily lead to the formation of diasporas, whereas the Russian invasion and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989, which led to massive dispersals of Pashtuns and other Afghani tribes into Pakistan and surrounding areas, did coalesce into a diaspora“ (Quayson and Daswani 2013). This focus on states’ practices with regard to their emigrants, and even more with regard to their constitution into a diaspora, is relatively recent. Most literature on this topic emerged only around the beginning of this new millennium (Basch et al. 1994; Bhagwati 2003; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003; Levitt and Schiller 2004; Levitt 2004; Levitt and Jaworsky 2011; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; T. Smith 1993; Willis and Yeoh 2004).

Why focus finally on issues of identification? What are the rationales for studying identity politics? Especially in a context of economic crisis at the time of writing where [material and economic] questions of “haves” seem to be of much more concern than [cultural or
ideational] questions of “being”, such demands for justifying the choice of a cultural topic seem more than simply legitimate. They become essential and inescapable.

One of the basic ontological assumptions behind the writing of this thesis is that cultural aspects of life, such as those related to identity, play an important role in today's political life which is not simply to be defined in materialistic (or economic) terms. Questions of “being” are not simply considered as relevant for personal and subjective reasons, but are in fact considered as essential in intersubjective and, thus, collective terms. As will be seen below, [political] power is to be conceptualised in cultural terms, and not in material (military or economic) terms – in accordance with the theoretical framework adhered to in this study. Issues of identification, i.e. the definition of political subjects fitting the current political rationality in use, are inherent in the exercise of political power and cannot be dismissed from a discussion of its mechanisms.

The rationale behind such a philosophical choice stems first of all, and most importantly, from the ontological belief in the importance of identities in international relations, such as endorsed by constructivist or post-structuralist scholars in International Relations (Ashley 1998; Guzzini 2000; Katzenstein 1996; Onuf 1989; Wendt 1992). This school of thought attributes causal (both regulative and constitutive) power to ideational factors, to which identities clearly and obviously belong.10 However, the problem with most of these accounts is that identity is treated as an exogenous (given) variable, whereas the process of identity

10 Identity, identities, or what other scholars call the “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 2004), would explain for instance the constitution of the relevant actor's interests. Other theoretical arguments in the International Relations literature can easily be inserted in this regard. Hopf argues for instance that a collective identity may reduce the security dilemma (Hopf 1998). Kahl suggests that identity may be a third causal mechanism (in addition to norms and structures) behind the democratic peace (Kahl 1998). Wendt claims that anarchy does not condemn states to a Hobbesian world of fear and conflict because some shared identities can decrease the expectation of violent conflict (Wendt 1999). Empirically, Rousseau has shown that a shared identity is associated with a reduction in both threat perception and the salience of relative gains (Rousseau and Van der Veen 2005).
formation and constitution, the object of this project, is seldom addressed within this literature. It is only by turning to the literature of comparative politics that the constructivist conception of identity is found and accounted for (Lustick and Miodownik 2002). Examples of this literature include the fields of ethnic conflict and nationalism (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Laitin 1998; Posner 2003) where the famous distinction between the essentialist and the constructivist account of identity is found. The former refers thereby to the primordialist view claiming that identity becomes fixed once it is acquired (either socially or biologically) (Cerulo 1997) whereas the latter constructivist view contends that individuals have multiple identities and that causal factors can trigger a shift from one identity to another. In the constructivist account, the only point of disagreement concerns the determination of the relative importance of the causal factors, such as industrialisation, colonialism, economic opportunism, entrepreneurship or other factors (cf. Chandra 2001). Poststructuralists even go a step further and criticise constructivists on the grounds that they simply would catalogue the identity construction process, thereby underemphasising the role of power in the classification process (Connell 1987) and mistakenly suggesting a multidirectional flow of structure and agency (Calhoun 1995). Poststructuralists therefore fear that social constructivist accounts ultimately approximate the very essentialism these fight against.

By looking at the constitution of diasporas' identities in a critical way, i.e. by including accounts of political power, this project takes the task of empirically defining their interest(s) seriously (Risse 1996).

It finally needs to be added that this project is deliberately and consciously aimed at studying the processes of the constitution of the diasporic identities or subjectivities, i.e. subjectivation or identification, and not simply the end results, i.e. the identities themselves. The main reason, as implicitly stated above, lies in the belief that processes of subjectivation or identification are ontologically prior to the subject per se (Deleuze and Guattari 1980). As
will be further discussed in greater detail in the literature review, most accounts of state
practices with regard to emigrants are done by taking the existence of such populations for
granted, i.e. where the identification of such emigrants are seen as relatively unproblematic.
Most studies discuss in other words rights, privileges, but also obligations of such nationals
living abroad, without looking at how such populations have been constituted in the
beginning. They have not addressed how different states have identified and constituted some
populations as their populations (Brubaker and Kim 2011). It is in this regard that the present
study endeavours foremost on the aspect of diaspora practices with regard to their emigrants,
i.e. on the identity politics of such practices – or, more precisely, on the identification politics
of such practices.

**Plan of study**

Having outlined the main arguments, the underlying onto-epistemological assumptions
underlying these arguments as well as the contributions these arguments intend to provide,
how is this study proceeding concretely? What is its plan? The study is structured as follows.
Since the aim of the study is to trace how diaspora practices were problematised and
operationalised in the Indian and Jamaican contexts respectively, i.e. to map the key elements
constituting them as a regime of practices, we will begin by presenting and discussing a
detailed review of the existing literature on diaspora practices. This starts with a discussion
on the relevance of diaspora practices on the international realm. The problem is to be
understood both in quantitative terms, inasmuch as one observes an increase in the number of
emigration state practices, as well as in qualitative terms, insofar as the nature of emigration
practices are in need of explanation. Especially worth mentioning is the the puzzling question
of how it is possible to understand the growth of emigration and diaspora practices with
regard to the governing of “domestic” populations abroad, whereas the classical
“Westphalian” order of the international holds as one of its most important principles the territorial limits of states entitling them to act only within these limits, but not outside of them. This first part will therefore expose in how far the analytical “inside – outside” distinction, so central for the discipline of International Relations, is problematic for the understanding of such practices. Three different approaches tackling the question of diaspora practices are thereby outlined, i.e. (1) a policy-oriented approach concerned with the migration-development nexus, (2) an analytical approach turning around transnationalism and (3) a normative approach turning around debates on citizenship. Yet, despite many merits of these approaches on which we will partially rely, they are not able to spell out to what extent diaspora practices emerge in a specific international context characterised, inter alia, by the problematisation of globalisation and global governance.

In order to include such contextual factors considered crucial, we will adopt a theoretical approach originating principally in the Foucauldian governmentality approach. This approach – at least when understood in its more historically specific sense – is able to hint at underlying political rationalities or mentalities of rule and power which are constitutive of diaspora practices. By availing ourselves of such a theoretical framework, we are thereby also capable of overcoming some of the shortcomings of an alternative approach we could have used, since it also addresses questions of how rule is exercised, i.e. the approach which came to be known as [global] governance approach.\textsuperscript{11} This latter approach “[…] assumes that the

\textsuperscript{11} Governance as a concept was introduced in academic debates in the 1980s when it developed onto a “catch-all term sometimes associated with the concept of “regime”, sometimes with the concept of “global order”, while it continues to be used by international financial institutions to justify the political conditions that they impose on countries which they consider poorly equipped for the proper management of the loans they received” (Smouts 1998). The concept came to refer to some kind of strategy, process or program for managing problems on a global, national or local level (Lemke 2007). This approach would seem well suited for the purposes of this study, since it involves effectuating a shift in the analytical focus from institutions – as in the modernist tradition of power outlined above – to processes of rule, thereby apparently enabling analyses of
objects of governance pre-exist their coordination in and through specific governance mechanisms” (B. Jessop 2003) and thus adheres to a realist or materialist ontology, since the objects exist independently and prior of human minds and thinking. The role of politics is furthermore conceived as involving no deep conflicts, thereby eliminating power from such accounts. It fails “[…] to take note of important aspects in the analysis of political processes that pertain to a sociology of domination” (Mayntz 2004; Smouts 1998). This is why some authors consider this approach to politics as “antipolitical” (Hirst et al. 2009; Larner and Walters 2004b, 2004a; Mouffe 2005) and technocratic. It is therefore not surprising to see the talk of the “end of politics” or “post-ideological” world linked to this theoretical approach.

The governmentality approach on the other hand is able to problematise the end of politics itself as a result of underlying political rationalities. It asks different questions about how the activity of governing is exercised, especially by looking at how the objects of government are rendered knowable and discursively constructed as a governable entity, and in a second step, which political technologies are used to govern such an entity. It thus draws the attention to the nexus between the production of “truths” or knowledge with regard to the objects to be governed and the actual exercise of power with a heterogeneous set of political technologies. Government is therefore conceptualised in much wider terms than traditionally assumed by state theories, since the actual activity of government and power is decoupled from the state. This does not mean, however, that the institution which came to be known as the state from the sixteenth century onwards has no role in these accounts – rather the contrary is true! The state is in fact considered as the most important institution where the exercise of power came changes from hierarchical and sovereignty-based modes of government to more horizontal, network-based modes of governing (cf. Czempiel and Rosenau 1989; Held and McGrew 2000; Held and McGrew 2007; McGrew and Held 2007). With regard to the concept of global governance, it hypothesises furthermore the end, or at least the erosion of state sovereignty at the profit of various transnational policy-networks (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Rosenau 2006) and other nonstate actors (Keck and Sikkink 2014).
to be centralised increasingly since the sixteenth century – a process known as the “governmentalisation of the state”.

The third chapter follows up on the theoretical framework by substantiating it methodologically. The main instruments are the presentation and discussion of the data used for this study, i.e. the different governmental documents (including documents of international organisations), website articles and newspaper articles, as well as the specification and discussion of the appropriate methodology, i.e. how these data are to be analysed within a discourse analysis. In this chapter we will also justify why we believe that diaspora practices in the Jamaican and Indian cases are interesting cases. As presented in more detail in the third chapter, we believe that similar post-colonial settings influenced by the British colonial power as well as similar emigration patterns of these two states, such as states' economic situation or states' emigration rate, render a comparison of these two cases instructive for a richer understanding of present governmentalities.

The next chapter presents the results of the analysis in an organised manner by dedicating an entire chapter to each of the two respective cases, i.e. diaspora practices in the Jamaican setting followed by an analysis of the diaspora practices in the Indian setting. In order to be able to compare the two cases as optimally as possible, the analysis of the two cases follows thereby similar patterns by outlining first contextual elements of the Jamaican and Indian cases respectively. It is only in a second step that problematisation and the “operationalisation” of the respective problematisation is dealt with before ending the analyses with a discussion on which subjects are assumed throughout Jamaican and Indian diaspora practices respectively.
The concluding chapter finally summarises the different findings by emphasising the main aspects of the analysis. It also adds some critical comments about the conduct of this study itself by attempting to show to what extent other theories, such as institutional ones or neo-Gramscian accounts, have important similarities with the Foucauldian framework adopted throughout the present study, thereby downplaying some of the revolutionary and groundbreaking elements authors attach to the governmentality framework. The study finishes by highlighting some future research venues.
II. State of the Art

This chapter addresses multiple issues, but the main objective is to offer a survey on the relevant literature with regard to diasporas and more particularly diaspora practices. It will start by looking first at how diasporas have been approached in literature so far by considering the different conceptualisations of such actors with corresponding roles attributed to them. While the majority of the scholarship has considered diasporas as pre-constituted agents with certain roles attributed to them, the present study assumes that diasporas are not a pre-existing fact that simply needs to be discovered. They are instead considered as part of certain discourses termed diaspora practices. The practices are in other words constitutive of diasporas.

It is with regard to such practices that the next section is dedicated. It explores how the literature explains or understands such practices and outlines three approaches, (1) the migration-development nexus approach, (2) the transnational approach as well as (3) the normative-based citizenship approach. All of these approaches tend to explain diaspora practices with regard to some “external” factors. They are therefore unable to account for the underpinning rationalities of such practices, which is the main reason why an alternative approach is retained, i.e. the approach which came to be known as the governmentality approach.

**Diaspora**

Apart from the fact that claimed emigrant populations are quite impressive in quantitative terms, as suggested below, there is an extremely impressive and rich vocabulary that has emerged in the scholarly and non-scholarly literature about them. They all are referring to the
same, or at least similar, phenomena. Most of them are historically heavily charged, such as nationalism, ethnicity, culture, space, place, homeland, alienation or nostalgia. According to Quayson and Daswani, this might be explained "[...] because the conditions they pertain to are so variegated that their understanding requires a multifocal, and indeed interdisciplinary, approach" (2013). Yet, the concept of diaspora itself presents at least as many difficulties as all of the above mentioned concepts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emigrant Country</th>
<th>Estimated emigrant population</th>
<th>As % of Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>46'364'000</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>30'400'000</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>27'000'000</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>25'000'000</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>14'000'000</td>
<td>341%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>12'000'000</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>10'000'000</td>
<td>212%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>8'650'000</td>
<td>282%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>8'000'000</td>
<td>103%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>7'000'000</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>6'067'000</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>5'800'000</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>5'400'000</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>3'765'000</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2'600'000</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>2'000'000</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>985'500</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>645'000</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National population censuses
Regarding first the non-scholarly sector, one should mention the [rather uncritical] use of the concept of diaspora in the policy-making realm. Not only do states increasingly refer to their diasporas, but international institutions do so, too (Agunias 2009; Agunias and Newland 2012; Fullilove 2008; IOM 2012; Kuznetsov 2006; OECD 2012a, 2012d; UNO and OECD 2013; World Bank 2010). Contrary to past characterisations of diasporas as traitors, they are increasingly considered in a positive light becoming new national heroes (Dufoix 2008, 2012; Green and Weil 2007).

Regarding the scholarly “community”, several theoretical approaches to diaspora practices exist, presented below in more detail. They are used to refer to the same, or at least similar, phenomenon by using a different language or vocabulary. Whereas transnationalism and citizenship studies often seem to use the more neutral term of “emigrants” when speaking about the group of migrants under scrutiny, authors of the development migration nexus or of political geography seem to prefer to speak of “diasporas” (cf. Ho 2011). It obviously is not exclusively reserved to the latter approach, as some authors of other approaches use the denomination of “diasporas”, too. But it is probably most commonly used only among the practice-oriented approach (Collyer and Vathi 2007).

But even among scholars using the concept of diasporas, its meaning is not always clear. Definitions of diasporas are in fact not highly coherent. In a review of the scholarly literature, Ragazzi discerns six different uses of the concept of diaspora: “[...] diaspora as a population (meaning 1), a social environment (meaning 2), [...] an actor of international politics (meaning 3), [...] a social movement (meaning 4), a signifier (meaning 5), or a political discourse (meaning 6)” (Ragazzi 2012 passim). The first three meanings can be subsumed as essentialist or naturalising conceptions of diaspora, i.e. diasporas as a “thing” or a social
group with specific characteristics existing “out there” (cf. for instance Cohen 2008; Safran 1991), while the latter three consider the term as a practice (Ragazzi 2012), i.e. diasporas not as an end result but as a process through which a particular social and political reality is produced or performed (cf. Adamson and Demetriou 2007; Carter 2005; Dickinson and Bailey 2007; Mavroudi 2008; Ní Laoire 2003; Samers 2003). This Ragazzian taxonomy fits well with a distinction established by Varadarajan between “[…] the more mainstream narratives that add diasporas to the burgeoning mix of nonstate/civil society actors challenging and pushing entrenched state actors in the direction of a more liberal global order […] (Darieva 2011; Shain and Barth 2003)” and the “[…] more self-consciously “critical” narratives that hail diasporas for exposing the limitations of the nation-state form, the inherent instability of the hyphen that connects the nation to the territorial state, thereby challenging us […] to rethink the realm of the international” (Varadarajan 2012).

Regarding the first three “essentialised” meanings where diasporas are conceived as pre-constituted agents, the literature is quite rich. Several authors can be read as adhering to such a conception: King and Melvin (1999) stand for instance for the first meaning, i.e. diasporas as a population, Shain and Barth (2003) for the third meaning, i.e. diasporas as actors in international politics. But it is also about the literature attaching several roles to these pre-constituted actors. Diasporas came to be seen as having both a passive (when they are interjected into international relations not by their own doing) and an active (influencing the foreign policies of their hostlands or of their homelands) role. Several scholars affirm that they play an increasingly important role in the realm of international relations, as they grow in size
and in political strength. But this should not lead to the conclusion that diasporas have not played an important role in the past or, even more radically, that they did not even exist in the past. Rather the contrary is true! As Cohen or Varadarajan have demonstrated, diasporas have existed in the past and even played critical roles in sustaining various political orders (Cohen 2008; Varadarajan 2008). But it certainly seems to be possible to affirm that certain aspects of the role of diasporas are novel.

Regarding the passive role, diasporas might serve as political conduits for conflict and intervention or they have been posited as challenging traditional state institutions of citizenship and loyalty (Østergaard-Nielsen 2000), thereby defying conventional meanings of the state (Appadurai 1996). They are therefore considered as a major force in identity politics and are defined as the “[...] paradigmatic Other of the nation-state” (Tölölyan 1996), as challengers of its traditional boundaries (Cohen 2008), as transnational transporters of cultures (Clifford 1992, 1994) or as manifestations of “[...] de-territorialised communities” (T. Smith 1993). These attributes might be exaggerated, or “over-hyping” (Varadarajan 2012), since they seem to leave aside the historical role of diasporas. But they do have the advantage of indicating that most classical theories of International Relations, including the realist (or the neo-realist version) as well as liberal (or its neo-liberal version) ones, might place an unjustifyingly important role on state actors.

On the active side, many [pre-constituted] diasporas are seen as having increasing influence on international behaviour, such as the Armenians, Chinese, Cubans, Indians, Iranians, Irish, 

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12 Fullilove (2008) suggests that this increased role of diasporas stems from five interconnected factors: the growth in international migration, the revolution in transport and communications technology, the reactions against global homogenised culture (leading people to rethink their own identities), the end of the Cold War (increasing the salience of ethnicity and nationalism) and policy changes by national governments on issues such as multiculturalism
Jews, Palestinians, Sikhs, Tamils and many other (Al-Ali et al. 2001; Basch et al. 1994; Beilin 2000; Biersteker and Weber 1996; K. D. Butler 2001; Cohen 2008; Connor 1986; DeSipio 2000; Fullilove 2008; C. King and Melvin 1999; Lapid 1996; Mandelbaum 2000; Ögelmann et al. 2002; Panossian 1998; Portes 1999; Safran 1991; Shain 2002; Shain and Barth 2003; Sheffer 1986; Tölölyan 1996; Weil 1974; Woodward 2000). They are seen as operating as ethnic lobbies in hostlands, when for instance advocating multicultural foreign policies (Saideman 2001; Shain 2002). They campaign to democratise authoritarian homeland regimes (Koinova 2007; Shain 1999) and are a force in the global economy assisting homelands' economic development (DeSipio 2000; Georges 1990; Mohan 2002; Muniandy and Bonatti 2014; Naim 2002; Shain and Sherman 2001; Van Hear 1998). More generally, they seem to be able to promote transnational ties, not only in a positive way. Several studies demonstrate in fact that diasporas have become a key factor in sustaining insurgencies and spoiling peace processes (Adamson 2004, 2005, 2006; Al-Ali et al. 2001; P. Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Connor 1986; Huntington 1993; Lyons 2006; Shain and Cofman 2000; Shain and Aryasinha 2006).

But contrary to the majority of the existing approaches in literature, the present study does not assume that there is a diasporic actor or agent with certain assigned roles the analyst needs to “discover out there”. It refuses therefore to naturalise or essentialise such actors. These agents are instead treated as part of, i.e. are constitutive of certain governmental discourses that the present study is interested in exploring in more detail. Therefore, this study does not start from an “essentialised fact” of preconstituted diasporas. It treats them as results of diaspora practices which “[...] do not mobilise self-evident groups of people who have already organised themselves according to their countries of origin” (Larner 2007: 334). As will be
seen in a moment, the notion of the “diaspora” has in fact been the centrepiece of the discourse of diaspora practices, where it no longer simply refers to transnational populations of emigrants, but to a specific part of them, i.e. principally to professional networks of highly-skilled emigrants only. In other words, we pursue with diasporas understood as signifier or as political discourse, i.e. what Ragazzi classifies as the latter meanings of the concept of diaspora. These conceptions are found with different authors in the literature: Adamson and Demetriou (2007) for instance use diasporas as social movements, Berns-McGown (2007/2008) refer to them as a signifier with writings of cosmopolitanism or post-national belongings also going in the same direction (Brah 2005; Clifford 1994; Cohen 1996; Gilroy 1994). It furthermore can be found in the literature on creole or hybrid actors (Boyle 2001: 429) or on social and political spaces – such as transnational communities (cf. Vertovec and Cohen 1999), transnational spaces (cf. Jackson et al. 2004), informal political spaces (cf. Mavroudi 2008), or public spheres (cf. Mohan 2008). Diasporas are also used as a progressive or emancipating actor prone to alter gender conceptions (Gray 1997, 2000; Preston et al. 2006) or citizenship conceptions (Dickinson and Bailey 2007; Leitner and Ehrkamp 2006; Mohan 2008; Nagel and Staeheli 2004).

Having seen the different conceptions of diasporas and the way the present study will conceive of them, i.e. as signifier or political discourse, how are diaspora practices approached in the literature? What do they refer to? Which factors are responsible for their emergence? And how do they operate or work? We need in fact to explore such practices in more detail in order to be able to uncover the wider political discourses or rationalities.
Diaspora Practices

Migration management normally refers to the management of immigration, while neglecting the complementary aspect of how emigration is managed. With this in mind, it is no major surprise to see that different concepts have been used to denote the management of the latter. This study will use the concept of diaspora practices for such policies – for reasons linked to the processual, strategic and instrumental ontology adhered to. Such diaspora practices simply refer to all those political instruments, which relate to the management of emigrants or diasporas. To be more precise, they refer to any formal or informal practice dedicated in some way or another to the management of diasporas, or to be succinct: “[…] policies […] aimed at identifying, gathering, organising and promoting […] “diasporas”” (Ragazzi 2009b).

Formal diaspora strategies emerge only in the immediate post-war period in third world countries (Larner 2007: 335) before spreading globally – although not to all parts of the world: „they are not particularly visible in the so-called ‘heartlands of neoliberalism’ – the United States and United Kingdom. Rather they are found in those countries that […] include not only the developing countries of the ‘South’ […], but also ‘middling’ developed countries of the ‘North’ such as New Zealand, Scotland, Canada Australia, Singapore and Ireland“ (Larner 2007: 334). Still, „[…] more than half [of] all United Nations member states now have some kind of formal diaspora institution, and […] diaspora initiatives are widely recommended by experts in migration policy as an approach to multilateral migration management in lieu of centralised global migration governance“ (Gamlen et al. 2013: 25).
Although such practices are not new in political history, the recent spread globally of such practices and the increasing importance attached to them is new. As shown in the figure below, the simple quantitative increase in formal diaspora institutions is impressive. Several levels within the respective states are thereby considered. The inclusion of all these organisations is justified since many of the policies and practices developed and aimed at diasporas are situated on many different state levels.

**Figure 1: Diaspora Institutions Globally (1980-2012)**

13 Quango (Quasi NGO) refers to an origin state-sanctioned quasi-governmental national organisation; Legislative Body refers to an organisation located within the legislative branch of the origin-state government; Sub-Ministry refers to an organisation under the purview of an origin-state ministry; Executive Body refers to an organisation with an official reporting directly to the origin-state head of the executive branch of government; Hybrid Ministry refers to a government ministry-based organisation in the origin state with purview over diaspora management and other governmental issues; Full Ministry refers to an origin-state government ministry devoted exclusively to diaspora management issues.
Typologies

But what do such diaspora practices refer to? Empirically speaking, there is a vast range of practices that are categorised under this label. Some states seem to be trying actively to disburden their economies of unnecessary labour forces, such as observed during the beginning of the twentieth century (Green 2005; Reichert and Massey 1982). Other states seem to encourage the opposite, i.e. to reverse what came to be called the “brain drain” by adopting policies intended as incentives for emigrants to return, such as observed for instance with New Zealand (Larner 2007) or many Caribbean states. Politically speaking, one observes some states going as far as killing their expatriates abroad, like Turkmenistan, Libya or Russia, while others use them as instruments of foreign policy, i.e. as lobbies, such as observed in several states like Israel, Argentina, China or Mexico (Shain 1999; Shain and Barth 2003). Moreover, some expatriates are denied any political rights, such as the right to vote or even to be represented in parliament (Bauböck 2003d), although debates regarding citizenship rights are far from settled.

Typologies of diaspora practices offered by the literature are thus welcome to elucidate what these practices refer to.

Gamlen (2006) for instance suggests a useful typology by distinguishing between symbolic nation-building practices, institution-building practices as well as practices with regard to citizenship, i.e. extending rights and extracting obligations. While symbolic nation-building practices aim to produce a homogenous national diaspora, the institution-building practices would furnish the state with technologies, i.e. systems and institutions, to govern diasporas.

Symbolic practices refer to the organisation of conferences and conventions, the shaping of media, the promotion of national culture and an inclusive rhetoric. Institution-building
practices on the other hand stand for the establishment of consular and consultative bodies, the building of transnational networks (including scientific ones), monitoring efforts and the establishment of bureaucratic agencies or ministries to deal with diaspora affairs. The extension of rights is effectuated in two different sectors, i.e. in the political one and in the social or civil one. Regarding the political incorporation of the diaspora, it can refer to several political rights, such as the possibility to run for offices, the right to establish parliamentary representation of the diaspora, voting rights, special membership concessions or dual nationality (without necessarily having the right to vote). Regarding civil and social rights, they refer to welfare protection measures as well as tourism services. The extraction of obligations finally refers on the one hand to the promotion of so-called “expat lobbies” and on the other hand to investment policies, such as knowledge transfer programs, the establishment of special economic zones, or facilitations for diasporic remittances.

Agunias and Newland (2012) offer another typology of diaspora practices, which is most probably the richest empirical account to date. But it is not entirely clear whether these practices are developed as an empirical account or rather a prescriptive one to be followed upon. It encompasses four stages: (1) the identification of goals and capacities, (2) practices aimed at knowing one’s diaspora, (3) practices aimed at building trust and finally (4) practices turning around the mobilisation of different stakeholders. The first and second stages consist mainly of consultation and research activities, in order to identify the goals and capacities on the one hand and know one’s own diaspora on the other hand. The authors suggest to analyse mostly census data, but also to map existing diaspora organisations, to establish a skills inventory and to identify opinion interlocutors with the diaspora. The third stage aimed at building trust consists of practices termed “symbolic” or “institution-building” by Gamlen (2006). They refer to a whole range of practices, such as the establishment of social services to
the diaspora, activating consular networks, organising cultural events and promote national languages, interventions with host governments or giving privileges to non-resident expatriates and descendants. The mobilisation stage, i.e. the last one, consists finally of the nomination of diaspora spokespersons, the organisation of high-profile events, the sponsoring of travels for opinion leaders and youth, the creation (or adaptation) of government institutions, the establishment of volunteer corps or the facilitation of diaspora investments.

Ragazzi (2014) finally suggests a five-fold typology, consisting of practices in the following realms: in the symbolic one, in the religious and cultural ones, in the socio-economic one, regarding citizenship and regarding bureaucratic ones. Symbolic policies refer thereby to the inclusion of the diaspora in the national calendar of celebrations, the organisation of diaspora conferences or the establishment of a highest administrative unit charged with diaspora affairs. Religious and cultural practices stand for the establishment of religious institutions or personnel abroad, the establishment of cultural centres abroad or the establishment of schools abroad. Socio-economic practices have the establishment of scientific networks, of investment schemes for populations abroad in mind as well as welfare provisions for the diaspora or returnees. Citizenship practices are straightforward and refer to external votes or citizenship rights – both through residence abroad or if another citizenship is adopted (dual citizenship). The last category, i.e. state and bureaucratic controls, signify the issuing of origin identification documents for non-citizens, the encouragement of lobbying, the policing of populations abroad or the restriction of mobility for citizens willing to go abroad.
Table 2: Typologies of diaspora practices

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic Nation-Building</td>
<td>Identification of goals and capacities</td>
<td>Symbolic practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution-Building</td>
<td>Knowing one’s diaspora</td>
<td>Religious &amp; Cultural practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship (Rights &amp; Obligations)</td>
<td>Building trust</td>
<td>Socio-economic practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mobilisation of different stakeholders</td>
<td>Citizenship practices</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>Bureaucratic practices</td>
</tr>
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Based on and linked to such typologies is the question of which states – or rather types or kind of states – engage with their diasporas. The relevant literature offers here some preliminary taxonomies, too.

Levitt and Glick Schiller’s distinction of states according to their laws and extractive attitude needs to be mentioned in this regard, leading to three types of states: (1) transnational nation-states, (2) strategically selective states and (3) disinterested and denouncing states (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004: 1023-4). Transnational nation-states would treat their emigrants as long-term and long-distance members, with the granting of dual citizenship or nationality to them. States such as Brazil, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Mexico or Portugal would belong to this category. Strategically selective states on the other hand would also encourage some forms of long-distance economic and political nationalism, while retaining however the freedom to decide what they can or cannot do. Legal rights of citizenship or nationality are seldom granted, but some partial packages of tax privileges and services to emigrants are accorded. Empirical examples would include Barbados, Haiti, India, Ireland, the Philippines or Turkey. Disinterested or denouncing states finally would treat their emigrants as if they no longer belong to their homeland with Cuba or Slovakia as examples being mentioned.
Gamlen’s similar typology according to the provision of rights leads him equally to three types of states – while acknowledging first that states using diaspora engagement policies are found in all geo-political regions and geo-economic positions: (1) exploitative states, i.e. obligations without rights, (2) generous ones, i.e. rights without obligations, and (3) engaged ones, i.e. both rights and obligations (Gamlen 2006: 21).

Ragazzi finally offers the last typology known so far according to two criteria, i.e. the type of state sector “exported” to the population abroad on the one hand and the level of diaspora rights on the other hand (Ragazzi 2014: 78-81). His inductive analysis leads to the development of five types of states engaging in diaspora policies: (1) the expatriate state, (2) the indifferent state, (3) the closed state, (4) the managed labour state and finally (5) the global-nation state. The expatriate state would be foremost characterised by a focus on cultural and educational policies, with certain state services provided to a high-income category of “expats”. Voting rights might be provided, but not necessarily. Most of these states are found in the “West”, such as France, Germany, Italy, Spain or the United Kingdom. The indifferent state would simply show no real interest to its population abroad with diverse states such as Australia, Belgium, Lebanon, Nigeria or the United States of America illustrating this type. The closed state on the contrary is very much interested in its population abroad, but rather in a negative sense. It would try to regulate or restrict its mobility and police it abroad, with no allowance for external voting. States such as China, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cuba, Iran or North Korea are mentioned in this category. The managed labour state is one typically having a large population abroad without any real policies developed towards them - or at least only with policies regarding labour and circulation migration. These might include investment schemes for returnees or provision to welfare for populations abroad. Most of the studied states would be found in this category: Bangladesh,
Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, Jamaica, Jordan, Poland, the Philippines or the Ukraine. The final category, i.e. the global-nation state would regroup states representing the widest range of diaspora policies, with a broader number of rights being provided to populations abroad. It furthermore would organise language and cultural programs and look mainly for economic and political resources from the population abroad (with a range of civil, political and social rights in exchange). States such as Ethiopia, Greece, India, Ireland, Mexico, Morocco or Russia are mentioned in this regard.

Although Jamaica and India, the two cases treated in this study, are classed in different categories in Ragazzi’s typology, i.e. Jamaica in the managed labour state and India in the global-nation state, one can assert without too much risk that both pursue very similar policies with regard to their diasporas. Levitt and Glick Schiller consider both of them as strategically selective states, thereby confirming the similarity of both states in terms of the respective diaspora practices.

Table 3: Typologies of diaspora states

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transnational nation-states</td>
<td>Exploitative states</td>
<td>Expatriate state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategically selective states</td>
<td>Generous states</td>
<td>Indifferent state</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disinterested or Denouncing states</td>
<td>Engaged states</td>
<td>Closed state</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Managed labour state</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Global-nation state</td>
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All of these different taxonomies – both with regard to diasporas and diaspora practices – are relevant and useful for the purposes of this study, since they allow to grasp the phenomenon of interest, i.e. diaspora practices, more clearly. It is in fact upon such types of practices that the present research is based, while being attentive to acknowledge that some of these practices
are to be found only in certain types of diaspora states, while others are more frequently to be observed in other states.

But despite the unquestionable descriptive and analytical usefulness of all of these taxonomies, they are unable to spell out why diaspora practices have emerged in the first place. Regarding more particularly the theoretical framework we are adopting, they cannot show to what extent diaspora practices are the result of political imaginations and thoughts – or what we will call political rationalities. Several of them explore furthermore only state practices with regard to diasporas, leaving thereby aside the question of how other non-state actors are implicated in such practices. We are instead interested in investigating how non-state agents might be at least as important in the assemblage or regime of diaspora practices of India and Jamaica. In other words, it explores to what extent they actually are part of the government of diasporas thus rendering the distinction between the “public” and the “private” redundant.

**Causes and operating mechanisms**

Having seen what diaspora practices refer to, how is it possible to understand both the emergence of such diaspora practices as well as their operating mechanisms? We are thus looking both for* causal factors* accounting for the appearance of such practices as well as their* operating mechanisms*.

Only limited scholarship seemed to be available until recently to effectuate this task, especially with regard to the political role of the so-called origin or sending state in the process of rendering diasporas visible in politics (cf. Brand 2006; Ragazzi 2009b; M. P. Smith 2003a; Waterbury 2006a). Even though it has grown tremendously in recent years, it unfortunately
still remains little coherent. The section below attempts nevertheless to offer a coherent, structured and ordered way of classifying the different approaches, while keeping in mind that this obviously will be arbitrary and should therefore not be considered universally and objectively valid.

One possible way to classify the existing approaches is to suggest a threefold categorisation (Collyer 2013; Ragazzi 2009b; 2014: 82-7): (1) the migration and development approach, (2) the one of transnationalism and the state (sociologists and anthropologists questioning the traditional push-pull approach), and finally (3) one approach coming out mostly of citizenship studies. A further threefold classification effectuated by Gamlen, Cummings, Vaaler and Rossouw (2013) seems complementary in this regard, since two of the three approaches outlined, i.e. (1) the tapping perspective (interest-based or rationalist theories) and (2) the embracing perspective (constructivist, norm-based theories) can easily be inserted in the existing literatures identified for instance by Collyer (2013) or Ragazzi (2009b).

The main argument in short is that these approaches identify different reasons why diaspora practices emerge: both the migration development nexus as well as the transnational approach assert that [material state] interests are causing the adoption of diaspora practices, while citizenship studies tend to focus on different norms as explanatory factors. But none of them emphasise “internal” factors linked to how different actors implicated in diaspora practices think about them and develop tools operationalising such thoughts, imaginations or rationalities.

While both the interest-based (migration-development nexus, transnationalism) and normative-based approaches (citizenship studies) are presented below, the third approach that Gamlen et al. call the governing approach is specified only in the theoretical framework of
this study. It is in fact this latter perspective, more precisely the approach known as *governmentality*, which is going to be used throughout this study. It is the only approach able to consider diaspora practices not as an outcome of some “external” process or as an external reality imposing itself upon nation-states, but rather as being themselves constitutive of new realities by shaping them through particular representations.

**Transnationalism**

Although the transnational literature is, chronologically speaking, not the first one, it makes sense to begin with this corpus of literature. It constitutes in fact the most general approach for understanding both the adoption of diaspora practices as well as its operating mechanisms. The principal innovation of the transnational approach is of theoretical nature – and not of an “applied” one, as in the case of the migration development nexus, discussed below. It is less interested in developing “best practices” to be followed upon. It invites scholarship to explore how the state itself is redefined (cf. for instance Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003). It differs also with regard to the objectives and the questions that the scholars adhering to the respective approaches ask: whereas the migration development nexus emerged as an approach to economic development, transnationalism came out of concerns regarding classical approaches to [national] integration.\textsuperscript{14} It puts the figure of the migrant at the centre of its attention, especially in its role both as immigrant and emigrant,\textsuperscript{15} but the impact of the transnational activities on the state – theory known as *state transnationalism* – is part of this literature.

\textsuperscript{14} One should also mention that the theory that came to be known as migrant transnationalism has parallels in other fields of social sciences, such as International Relations where Keohane and Nye argued already in the beginning of the 1970s that it is necessary to rethink international relations from a transnational standpoint in order to include trans-border movements (cf. Keohane 1971; Nye and Keohane 1971).

\textsuperscript{15} This strand of the transnational theory is known as *migrant transnationalism*, but is less relevant for the purposes of this study. For an overview of this theory, please refer to the endnotes at the end of the chapter.
This approach affirms that the state develops transnational practices, such as diaspora practices, as an answer to the new migration and settlement patterns of migrants, but also as an answer to the societal requests of migrant groups upon national governments.

Transnationalism originated largely in the liberal constructivist paradigm and treats nation-states (and the accompanying territorial logic) as being increasingly eroded by several transnational actors, including transnationalised migrants or diasporas – the latter being able to influence the state system as actors outside of the system (Varadarajan 2010: 25). The state is therefore seen as becoming transnational itself because of external stimuli constituted both by new [transnational] migration patterns as well as the requests on behalf of their emigrants. It thereby is considered as having multiple ties with “civil society”, but not as disappearing in favour of other transnational actors (Goldring 2002; Koopmans and Statham 2001; M. P. Smith 2003a); the state is simply seen as taking up some new functions, such as those pertaining to diasporas, while losing some others. But the continuing importance of the state with regard to its citizens, for instance by influencing migrants' ability to make political claims (Cinalli and Giugni 2013; Koopmans and Statham 2001; Morales and Giugni 2013), is reaffirmed. Whether the state acts in this context as pursuing economic interests in order to improve their geo-economic position in the world-economy, as found with several neo-Marxist authors (cf. for instance Wallerstein 1979), is irrelevant. The main explanatory factors for diaspora policies by transnational states are thus “transnationalised” domestic politics, i.e. “[...] regime change and migrants semi-autonomous ability to make demands on their sending and receiving states” (M. P. Smith 2003a). Itzigsohn adds racial barriers encountered by migrants (José Itzigsohn 2000), while Levitt and De la Dehesa add divergent explanatory factors, such as political costs and size of constituency (Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003) to explain states’ diaspora policies.
But since the main factor of the transnational theory are domestic politics writ large, political processes within the state are almost absent – or at least largely neglected. The state figures in this account simply as receiver or “transmission belt” (Moravcsik 1997) of [transnational] societal demands, i.e. demands of the respective diaspora, but has no autonomy vis-à-vis such actors – as is the case more generally with liberal models of politics. This implies that the state would have no other role to play than simply translating such demands or adapting to new [transnational] migration patterns. It is barely possible to conceive of diaspora practices in terms of larger political rationalities, since the processes enabling the translations of societal demands or conceptions remain under-enlightened. It is therefore unable to include deeper lying thinking procedures as influencing the social demands.

But the transnational theory still seems to be useful for our purposes. By broadening the focus of analysis to include the social and political processes accompanying diaspora practices, it situates such practices in a larger [transnational] context. Seen in this light, such practices can be considered as being a specific form of transnationalism. This conception comes thereby close to how the present study considers such practices, i.e. as a form of transnational mobilisation by political entrepreneurs engaged in strategic social identity construction with the aim of constructing (and reifying) a transnational imagined community linked through different networks (cf. also Adamson 2012). The study’s objective is precisely to illuminate in more detail such transnational mobilisations by exploring how particular forms of knowledge enable diaspora practices (conceptualised as a regime of practices) and how this knowledge is materialised at different sites. Transnationalism is thus useful for the purposes of the present study, since it attracts the analytical attention foremost to the transnational discourse of diasporas, i.e. diasporas viewed as social and political constructions (instead of essentialised
diasporas). It is this transnational discourse both on diasporas and on migration patterns which is in need of further exploration, since the present study hypothesises that this discourse is itself indicative of wider political rationalities. This is not to say that new [transnational] migration patterns or new characterisations of diasporas as transnational are mistaken or not real; it is rather to direct the focus of the analysis to how such new realities have been acted upon and interpreted. The transnational theory serves in other words as starting and not end point, since the processes or problematisations enabling such migration patterns and emigrant populations to be seen through the transnational lenses are the focus of the present study.

Migration Development Nexus: From “Brain Drain” to “Brain Gain”

The literature on the nexus between migration and development has, chronologically speaking, been the first approach to study the phenomenon of emigration. It might be seen as the one concerned most with “practical” issues, since its aim is clearly to formulate “best practices” in the realm of diaspora engagement (Iskander 2010). It is thus clearly to be situated among the “problem-solving approaches” (cf. Cox 1981).

It emerged in the 1960s and 1970s and deals with the impact of emigration on sending countries in terms of economic development. Crucial to note in this literature is the assumption that emigration is referring here principally to economically highly-skilled or highly-qualified emigration, i.e. to workers having completed tertiary education (Lowell and Findlay 2002).

Two different approaches are outlined with regard to the highly-qualified emigrants (J.-B. Meyer et al. 1997; J.-B. Meyer and Brown 1999).

The first one is the so-called “brain drain” approach. It deals with the problem of economically skilled individuals leaving their country of origin. It is characterised by a negative view
regarding emigration, since such a process constitutes a *loss* of skills for the country of origin. Emigration is considered as unidirectional process, taking much needed skills away from the “home” country. In order to counter, or at least hamper the negative effects of the brain drain, different measures were taken (J.-B. Meyer et al. 1997: 2): imposing taxes upon emigrants (cf. for instance Bhagwati and Hamada 1973), regulating emigration through legal norms or restricting emigration in order to retain or recuperated highly-skilled emigrants. But since many of the brain drain strategies were incapable of addressing the numerous causes of emigration, it was argued that measures had failed.

While this negative view long dominated the field of migration, it was since the late 1980s that the impact of migration on economic development was seen in a much more positive light through the emergence of an alternative approach. It is an approach turning “brain drain” into “brain gain” by considering the departure of brains in a *circulatory* rather than a unidirectional logic. Emigrant groups are considered here as important actors in the alleviation of poverty or more generally for development projects both by state institutions, international organisations and non-governmental organisations alike. This resulted in several attempts to mobilise emigrants for such economic reasons (de Haas 2006; IOM 2012) – emigrants increasingly labelled *diasporas* without much conceptual rigour however (cf. Pellerin and Mullings 2012: 92).

It is in this second brain gain approach that two different options have emerged. The first one is the so-called “*return option*” which aims to “reverse the brain drain”. It is an option turning around the physical relocation of emigrants, but is still different from the restricting measures of the brain drain approach. While the latter aims at stopping or reversing the outflows, the return option accepts emigration as “natural” phenomenon, but attempts to
deal with its effects. It draws thereby heavily on the human capital approach to the extent that emigrants are increasingly considered in economic and individualistic terms (Larner 2007: 336; J.-B. Meyer and Wattiaux 2006: 3). Emerging at the beginning of the 1970s, it truly developed only in the 1980s and 1990s (Glaser 1978; Kao 1971; Swinbanks and Tacey 1996). Prominent examples are provided by various newly industrialised countries, such as Singapore or the Republic of Korea (Charum and Meyer 1999).

The second option is much for relevant for our purposes. It is the so-called “diaspora option” (or diaspora practices). Used first in 1997 by Jean-Baptiste Meyer and colleagues (cf. J.-B. Meyer et al. 1997) and subsequently adopted by several international institutions such as the World Bank (2007) or the Global Forum of Migration and Development which took place in 2007 for the first time, its aims depart radically from the “return option”, since the physical relocation of emigrants is no longer required. It rather aims at using emigrants “at a distance” by associating them to the programs of the country of origin: “Scientists and engineers may stay wherever they are; what matters is that they work for their mother nation in some way” (J.-B. Meyer et al. 1997: 3).

Praised for the cost-effective advantages, “[...] as it consists in capitalising on already existing resources” (J.-B. Meyer and Brown 1999), the diaspora option promises not only access to the knowledge and skills of emigrants, but also to the socio-professional networks in which they are inserted in the immigrant country. The main operating mechanism in the diaspora option is thus connectivity and networking, most visible in the establishment of so-
called diaspora knowledge networks (DKN)\textsuperscript{16} and emphasises social capital instead of human capital, as in the brain drain approach. Such networks carry out a range of different practices (J.-B. Meyer and Wattiaux 2006: 7-8): exchanging information (scientific, technical, administrative or political), transferring specialist knowledge, carrying out scientific or technological “diplomacy” (promoting the home country in the research, development and business community of the host country), organising trainings, creating enterprises and consulting on an \textit{ad hoc} basis. Most prominent examples in the literature are the Colombian network known as the Red Caldas (Red Colombiana de Científicos e Ingenieros en el Exterior), the South African one known as SANSA (South African Network of Skills Abroad) or the Chinese CHISA (Chinese Association of Scholars Abroad), but it is expected that there are over 300 networks existing throughout the world, with 155 already identified in 2006 (J.-B. Meyer and Wattiaux 2006: 14).

The difference to the transnational approach is to be emphasised in this context. While [transnational] emigrants were considered as backward-looking in the sense of remembering their memories of the ancestral origins they have in the “home” state, diasporas were described as forward-looking, since they would identify with development projects “at home”:

\textsuperscript{16} Other labels for such networks are \textit{“intellectual diaspora networks”} (Brown 2002), \textit{“scientific diasporas”} (Barré et al. 2003), \textit{“technological and scientific diasporas”} (Turner et al. 2003), \textit{“scientific, technological and economic diasporas”} (Connan 2004) or \textit{“knowledge networks”} (Kuznetsov 2005).
“The networks’ knowledge and development projects brought them back into the national sphere. Their identification is therefore more proactive, turned to the future, than retrospective and based on memory. They may move equally in two universes, like amphibians, but they respect this double allegiance and do not erase borders, at equidistance between communautarism (maintenance of separate communities) and cultural alienation. Across frontiers, they weave professional and associative ties but they keep the reference to the common origin as pivotal centre. [...] These features distinguish the DKN [Diaspora Knowledge Networks] from purely transnational communities [...] and bring them closer to the diaspora criterion” (J.-B. Meyer and Wattiaux 2006: 9).

To be concise, the migration development nexus understands the emergence of diaspora practices as linked to the so-called diaspora option: they are a “[...] policy orientation aimed at utilizing the human, economic and social capital of migrant populations in order to revitalize levels of investment, skill and development in the places with which they maintain ancestral ties” (Pellerin and Mullings 2012: 89). They are linked to the brain gain approach and attempt to devise models of including the highly-qualified emigrants into the national development agendas without forcing them to return to the countries of origin.

It obviously has to be added that economic factors are not the only ones being put forward in this literature on the migration development nexus, since cultural factors seem having a comeback in the literature (Boccagni and Decimo 2013; Dannecker 2009; Levitt 2012; Piper 2009; Rahman 2009). But the focus still is clearly on the economic dimension of development (de Haas 2008; Glick Schiller and Faist 2010; Goldring 2004; Levitt and Rajaram 2013; Mazzucato 2011), with the main debate turning around the question whether emigration can or cannot contribute to economic development. It therefore is possible to put this approach in perspective with the approach called “tapping perspective” by Gamlen et al. (2013).
viewpoint highlights different state interests in “[...] tapping the resources of emigrants and their descendants” (Gamlen et al. 2013) as main explanatory factor of diaspora policies of states. Different rationalist theories of the discipline of International Relations may be cited in this regard as informing this perspective.ii

This literature clearly informs our study, since many of its insights are highly useful: not only brings it our attention to the neglected domain of emigration, but it also highlights the constitution of diasporas as the centrepiece of both the return and the diaspora option. It also is highly useful for endeavours on practices where the objectives are economic ones linked to national development agendas – as we will witness in the cases of Jamaica and India. However, this corpus of literature is unable to consider or understand such policies as part of wider political rationalities, since its focus is mainly on aspects of economic development, but not on understanding either the background of the current interest in the “diaspora option” or the broader implications the adoption of such an option has. It barely addresses questions regarding intellectual assumptions of the brain gain strategies nor how particular representations of such strategies impact the operational implementation.

It is in this context that we turn to citizenship studies, since they draw our attention to a different kind of reasoning which is held accountable for the emergence of diaspora practices, i.e. normative reasoning.

**Citizenship Studies**

A third possible approach to explain or understand diaspora practices are citizenship studies (Gamlen et al. 2013) – besides the tapping perspective of the migration and development nexus on the one hand and the liberal-inspired transnational theory on the other hand. This
body of literature follows a different path than the two previous approaches. Whereas the other approaches are mainly empirical, and to some sense practice-oriented, citizenship studies follow a normative approach.

It therefore is no surprise to see that many theorists of this approach are political philosophers or political theorists (cf. Bauböck 2003a; Bauböck 2003d; Benhabib 2002, 2005). Bauböck is probably one of the most prominent scholars among these having addressed the issue of emigration policies. He has the merit of having introduced the issue of emigration into political theory by linking the rights of non-resident citizens and the rights of non-citizen residents into a broadly inclusive view of citizenship, which he defines as expansive or stakeholder conception of citizenship (Bauböck 2003a). But he barely addresses the question of why and how emigration or diaspora practices at all emerge.

Other authors contribute to theoretical clarifications, too – although most of these authors normally work in the empirical tradition. All of them address in a way or another the question of how to define citizenship nowadays. Fox suggests for instance three forms of transnational citizenship, i.e. (1) parallel, (2) simultaneous and (3) integrated citizenship (Fox 2005). Glick Schiller and Fouron call citizens participating politically in more than one nation-state trans-border citizens (Fouron and Schiller 2001) and Sassen distinguishes migrants as Unauthorised yet Recognised citizens or Authorised yet Unrecognised citizens (Sassen 1999).

But the main merit of this approach lies elsewhere – without denying the theoretical contributions of the above mentioned authors. It attracts the attention not simply to instrumental reasoning, but to normative reasoning, i.e. to explain states' diaspora policies with regard to citizenship norms in force. Green for instance explains state responses to emigration during the nineteenth century as a reaction to the emerging liberal norm of having
the right to emigrate (Green 2005). Fitzgerald, Barry or Smith consider the [globalising] norm of emigration in the same vein as central in explaining the ongoing state engagement with diasporas (K. Barry 2006; Fitzgerald 2000; R. C. Smith 2003e).

It is in this normative regard that Gamlen et al. refer to this approach as *embracing perspective* (2013), since the main explanatory factor of states' diaspora policies would not lie in simple state interests, but rather in underlying inter-subjective ideas and identities – as postulated by constructivist theories – about nation-states, including normative conceptions of such *great collectivities* (Hall 1993, 1996; Hall and Du Gay 1996; Hall 2007) as nationality, ethnicity, race, religion or even sexuality. States would therefore “embrace” lost compatriots by developing diaspora policies.17

It seems no coincidence to see some [constructivist] studies on diaspora policies where these latter are seen as resulting of certain *ideas* held about what a nation or a citizen is or represents. Especially ethnic models of citizenship are put forward in such accounts by emphasising how states include emigrants based on intersubjectively shared ideas or criteria of race, language, religion, history or culture (Basch et al. 1994). Such ethnic models are often associated with right-wing political regimes (cf. Brand 2006; Joppke 2005) – association which seems to constitute the main reason why some constructivist scholars expect to see diaspora policies to arise only with authoritarian or right-wing regimes. But it has to be

17 It obviously is not difficult to see the intellectual origins (and implications) of such an embracing approach in constructivism, since this latter perspective has contributed, especially in the beginning of the 1990s, to a better understanding of international relations through its focus on norms, ideas and social interactions. Constructivist scholars contend in fact that international relations are not simply to be explained by states' rational interests, as rationalists would believe, but think that these interests themselves are constituted by ideas and identities as a result of social interactions (Adler 1997; Epstein 2013; Guzzini 2000; Hopf 1998; Mahler 1998; Onuf 1989; Risse 2003; Wendt 1994, 1999). The main explanatory factor would therefore be social interactions giving meaning to certain ideas and norms.
mentioned that some studies highlight how certain states, such as Germany or Korea, which are classically considered as adhering to the ethnic model of citizenship or nationalism, practice diaspora policies where diasporas are defined in legal and political terms, i.e. what is referred to as civic model of nationalism (Brubaker and Kim 2011).

In short, the constructivist or embracing approach understands diaspora policies as a result of social interactions defining how certain ideas or identities with regard to citizens and nations are shared intersubjectively. It refuses the instrumental logic of rationalist approaches emphasising states' interests and adheres to a normative approach by highlighting how these interests themselves are constituted by certain interpretations of ideas, identities and norms. It thereby comes closest to the approach used throughout the present study, since it also looks at broader normative conditions and issues surrounding the adoption of diaspora practices. But the approach remains struck with explaining only states’ diaspora practices, thereby neglecting the role of other actors in the government of diasporas. It furthermore stresses mainly citizenship norms, while the present study intends to include broader social and political norms accompanying diaspora practices.

The three different approaches outlined are all useful for our purposes. The literature discussing the nexus between migration and development is relevant for attracting our attention to neglected processes of emigration which tend to figure in accounts on migration only as complementary to immigration problematics. But most important is their explanation of diaspora practices as part of the so-called diaspora option. Situated within the positive approach of the brain gain, it highlights the circulatory and networking logic of such an option and is thus of utmost importance for the Indian and Jamaican cases. The transnational theory is
at least as useful, since it invites us to consider diaspora practices as one particular form of the transnational discourse, i.e. as mobilisations of transnational actors. The normative citizenship approach finally comes closest to our understanding of diaspora practices, since it explains them with regard to intersubjectively shared norms or ideas.

But all of these approaches are unable to dig deeper, i.e. to understand diaspora practices as part of wider political rationalities or discourses where different thought processes come to define and render possible certain courses of action. The focus of the migration development nexus on economic aspects of emigration is rendering it impossible to consider the larger discursive picture of diaspora practices. The liberal assumptions of transnationalism are responsible for suggesting to explain diaspora practices as a result of domestic politics writ large without being able to to understand such domestic preferences as part of wider political rationalities. The exclusive interest of citizenship studies in states’ norms of citizenship hides that other actors might be playing an important role in the normative power mechanism of diaspora practices. It is out of these reasons that we pursue with an approach originating in Foucauldian thinking on government, i.e. governmentality. It understands diaspora practices as part of wider political rationalities and is thus able to reach deeper than the other approaches just outlined. Instead of holding “external” factors accountable for the emergence of diaspora practices, the governmentality approach emphasises instead “internal” factors linked to how thinking processes or governmental “mentalities” – also understood in the operational sense – impact diaspora practices.

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1 Migrant transnationalism developed as a reaction to liberal, assimilationist theories of multiculturalism which consider the figure of the migrant mainly in a one-way process of assimilation into a melting pot, i.e. as an immigrant, but not as an emigrant (Kymlicka 1995). Assimilationist theory asserts that immigrants can reach socio-economic equality with locally born population even though their origin might matter (Alba and Nee 2005; Jacoby 2004; Kivisto 2005), while the theory known as segmented
assimilationism suggests several possible ways for immigrants to integrate (Erdal and Oeppen 2013; Erdal 2013; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Guarnizo 2003; Ley 2013; Loch and Barou 2012; Lyons and Mandaville 2012; Park 2007; Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes 1997, 1999, 2001; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Migrant transnationalism innovates with regard to both of these theories by hypothesising that immigrants do not simply lose contact with their homeland and do not simply try to integrate in the host states' society. These immigrants would instead continue to remain active in their homelands while simultaneously attempting to incorporate in the new settings of the host state (Basch et al. 1994; Faist 2000a, 2000d; Fouron and Schiller 2001; Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999; Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; Guarnizo 1997; Jose Itzigsohn et al. 1999; José Itzigsohn 2000; Kyle 2000; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004; Levitt 2004; Levitt and Jaworsky 2011; Mahler 1998; Portes 1997; M. P. Smith and Guarnizo 1998): “A transnational lens [...] is both a perspective and a variable. It departs from a different set of assumptions about social organisation than those usually employed by social scientists and policymakers. It locates migrants within social fields that combine several national territories rather than expecting them to move back and forth between two impermeable nation-states, and exchange one national identity for another” (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004: 4).

Even though this theory exists, in slightly modified versions, under different names, such as translocalism (Barkan 2006), trans-state-activity (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004) or bi-localism, the main hypothesis remains the same, i.e. that migrants have to be considered both in their capacity as immigrants and emigrants. This hypothesis has been specified in further research by looking at different issue areas, for instance at the economic realm (with the issues of remittances, development, class differences, ethnic entrepreneurship), the political realm, the social one and the cultural domain. But it remains clear that the focus is most on the individual as unit of analysis, i.e. the individual seen both as immigrant and emigrant.

This strand of literature has produced many theoretical and empirical insights since then. Transnational migration is understood as taking place within social spaces not limited to the “container” of national societies, but transcending them, rendering these social spaces thereby fluid (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004; R. C. Smith 2005). This implies that the study of migrants is not limited to their relation either with regard to home states or with regard to their host states, but has rather to be complexified by including also other places where migrants connect to their nationals. Transnational literature is therefore not limited only to studying the lives of migrants, but also of nonmigrants occupying these sites, since the latter lives are also impacted (Levitt 2001; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004; Mahler and Pessar 2006; R. C. Smith 2005) – although some authors suggest limiting such studies only to certain migrants (Guarnizo 1997; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Guarnizo 2003; Jose Itzigsohn et al. 1999; Portes 2001; Portes and Rumbaut 2001) with their distinction between narrow and broad transnationalism or the concept of core transnationalism. These studies have thus, not surprisingly, resulted in different conceptualisations of such social spaces: Morawska suggests analysing migration as structuration (2003), thereby taking up the famous concept developed previously by Giddens (1984); Besserer (1999) and Kearney (1995) propose the concept of migration circuits; Guarnizo (1997) and Landolt (2001) the concept of transnational social formations; Levitt and Glick Schiller the one of social fields (2004); while Sorensen refers to transnational livelihoods (2002) or Smith to transnational life (2005). Faist suggests the concept of transnational topographies with different degrees of transnationalism: dispersion and assimilation as weakest possible form of transnationalism, transnational exchange and reciprocity a step further, transnational networks as an even stronger from and finally transnational communities, which are embedded enduringly in at least two states (Faist 2000a). The concept of transnational communities is present also with Portes, but not as a degree of transnationalism, but rather as an indicator of what he calls globalisation from below (Portes 1997). Levitt and Glick Schiller's tridimensional conceptualisation of social fields finally seems noteworthy, too, with a perceptual
dimension (in the socio-cultural domain), a conceptual level (affecting the “meaning of the analytical triad, 'identities-orders-borders' in the political domain”) and an institutional dimension “affecting forms of financial transfers, public-private relationships and development in the economic domain” (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004): “Using a transnational lens to understand migration requires letting go of methodological nationalism or the expectation that social life logically and automatically takes place within the nation-state framework. Instead, it means locating migrants within the transnational social fields in which they may or may not be embedded” (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). Sklair's understanding of the global systems' theory is very similar to this idea of a social field: „Global system theory is based on the concept of transnational practices, practices that cross state boundaries but do not necessarily originate with state agencies or actors. Analytically, transnational practices operate in three spheres, the economic, the political, and the cultural-ideological. The whole is what I meant by 'the global system’“ (Sklair 1998).

ii The realist perspective with its conception of international relations as an anarchic power struggle among rationally acting states would consider for instance that states engage their diasporas in order to assist them in their struggle against other states. Diasporas are considered as instruments in foreign policy – hence Shain's concept of multicultural foreign policy (2002). Studies on long-distance nationalism within armed conflicts might be read in this context (Anderson 1992; P. Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Demetriou 2003; Demmers 2007; Huntington 2004; Kosser 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen 2000) or empirical illustrations, such as the cases of Cyprus, Armenia or Eritrea come to mind.

Neo-liberalism is equally compatible with this tapping perspective, although it would not look at diasporas as simple auxiliaries, but rather as agents of [economic] cooperation and development. This theory has its merits mainly with the explanation of cooperation on the international level resulting from the creation and functioning of international regimes and institutions (cf. for instance Baldwin 1993; Powell 1994) – hence the concept of a win-win-situation. It is precisely with regard to the construction of such win-win outcomes that states might be seen for instance as encouraging emigrants to send remittances back home – remittances in the form of money, technology or newly acquired competences. Both the origin state and the emigrants would win from such an engagement: states would win by relieving home unemployment pressures and receiving remittances necessary for economic development (Appleyard 1989; K. Barry 2006; Basu 2005; Bauböck 2003a, 2003d; Bhagwati and Hamada 1973; Bhagwati 2003; Guarnizo 2003; Iskander 2010; José Itzigsohn 2000; Kuznetsov 2006; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003); emigrants on the other hand would win by attaining for instance better wages and living standards. It is within such a framework that the concept of “temporary labour export management” makes sense, such as those observed in several states like Bangladesh, Chile, New Zealand, the Philippines or South Africa (Solomon 2009).

Globalism or neo-Marxist accounts of international relations might also be added in this category, although for different reasons than for realist or neo-liberal theorists. Emigration policies are to be considered as an aspect of exploitative core-peripheries relationships (Wallerstein 1979) with poor origin states looking for their diasporas in order to overcome the structural asymmetries in the economic world-system (Basch et al. 1994). Such policies would therefore be simply a further indicator of origin states' dependence on remittances as a consequence of the economic “brain drain”. The program of the United Nations Development Program known as TOKTEN, i.e. Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals, could constitute an empirical illustration of such a theoretical account. The program's main objectives were and still are to mitigate “brain drain” by attracting professional emigrants back as short-term consultants on development issues in various states of Asia, the Caribbean or Southern Europe. Another prominent example is constituted by Mexico's famous initiative known as “Tres por Uno” where diaspora remittances are used mainly for public development projects (Kunz 2012).
III. Theoretical framework: Governmentality

The approach of this study geared towards understanding the practices and the processes whereby various state and non-state actors have become interested in diasporas (and their potential for economic development) is synthetic in the sense that it draws together different, but complementary theories from different bodies of literature. The main approach originates in an approach known as governmentality, but it draws somehow on approaches arising in other fields such as most prominently post-colonialism, but also [international] political sociology and globalisation. Such a framework is aimed at tracing how diaspora practices emerged in the Jamaican and the Indian contexts, mapping thereby the key elements that constitute them as a “regime of practices” and exploring its broader implications.

They all have in common that they tackle the groupist, essentialist or substantialist problem identified in the previous chapter by adhering to a strategic-relational ontology. They therefore can be situated, largely speaking, within the post-structuralist paradigm. They treat diasporas as manifestations of a new way of thinking about populations to be governed, but not as a group existing a priori. Diasporas come in other words to exist because of a certain discourse (or rather discourses) and of social practices, which are constitutive of them. These theories enable to understand how most political dynamics, including diaspora policies, come to rest on the fixation of meanings.
Approaches of governmentality and post-colonialism share a number of compatible epistemological and ontological foundations. For a central premise of both approaches is the analytical place accorded to language and discourses which are considered as constitutive of reality, and not simply reflecting a pre-existing reality (as in constructivist accounts).

This chapter begins by outlining first of all what is meant by the concept of governmentality before pursuing with a discussion of the more specific modalities of governmentality.

Initially coined by Barthes in the 1950s to refer to an ideological mechanism that presents the government as the origin of social relations (Lemke 2007: 2), the focus will be on the governmentality approach as developed by Foucault and the largely British school of governmentality studies (Burchell et al. 1991; Dean 1995, 2010; Foucault 2000; Hindess 1997; Rose and Miller 1992; Rose 1993a; Rose et al. 1996; Rose et al. 2006; Rose and Miller 2008). But it is difficult to determine exactly what this approach refers to in the literature, since there seem to exist at least two meanings to the approach (Dean and Hindess 1998; Dean 2010: 16): a first meaning is more general in scope, while the second meaning is more specific, but still taking up many elements of the first more general meaning. It is this latter meaning which will be used throughout this study. But a discussion on the more general sense is necessary, since the historical and more specific meaning attached to the concept is largely based on insights of the former meaning.
General sense of governmentality

While the concept of governing or government refers to the “conduct of conduct” (Foucault 1997: 203), i.e. a form of action on the actions of others or the will to structure the field of possible actions of others, the concept of governmentality (or analytics of government) in its general sense adds rationalities or mentalities to this special form of conduct. It thus considers that all governing is attached to particular representations, knowledges and expertise about the object to be governed. There is in other words a close link between the actual exercise of government and the conceptualisations of governing, hence the term governmentality composed of “government” on the one hand and “mentality” on the other hand (Lemke 2002, 2007): “The semantic linking of governing (“gouverner”) and modes of thought (“mentalité”) indicates that it is not possible to study the technologies of power without an analysis of the political rationality underpinning them” (Lemke 2001). Governing in this sense involves always a particular knowledge and a certain expertise with regard to the object to be governed. The manner of government is thus always linked to a special kind of rationality:

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18 This conception of government assumes that subjects are – to a certain degree – free to adopt a behaviour of their choice and is thus not be confused with other types of power relation which Foucault discusses. “Domination” (cf. Foucault 1988b: 19) for instance is characterised by its stability and hierarchy rendering it difficult to reverse and pointing to a limited margin of liberty for the dominated subject (Foucault 1975: 12). But government is also different from the other extreme of power relation where the margin of liberty is very high, i.e. the type of power relation Foucault calls “strategic games between liberties”. Government as special type of power relation is thus situated in-between the two other types, i.e. strategic games and domination: it is “the regulation of conduct by the more or less rational application of the appropriate technical means” (Hindess 1996: 106). Government goes beyond the spontaneous exercise of power over others and is characterised by a specific form of reasoning – called “rationality” – which defines both the objectives of government as well as the most appropriate means to achieve them. It is in this way that government can be seen as a useful tool to address relations between power and freedom (cf. Foucault 2000: xxviii).
“Government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through the desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs of various actors, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes” (Dean 2010: 18).

Governmentality in this more general sense is thus interested in how government is done within different regimes of practices and under which conditions such regimes emerge, continue to operate and are transformed.

Several elements of this conceptualisation of government should be outlined, since they form the basis of the second more specific sense of governmentality, as it will be used throughout the remainder of the present study.

Governmentality understood in this general sense highlights first the analytical nexus between power and knowledge and draws attention to the close links between thought and government. But thought is considered in a different way than understood for instance by historians of ideas or social and cultural historians: it is considered in its reception and operationalisation. In other words, it is about how thought operates or is practiced within the ways of doing of a certain society, but not about the theoretical and abstract dimensions of certain ideas, such as understood by historians of ideas, political philosophers or political theorists. This is what Foucault means when referring to regimes of practices or regimes of truth (Burchell et al. 1991). To analyse governmentalities is to analyse the relevant ideas, i.e. the relevant “truth”, in their
practical and technical dimensions. It is about how truth is produced under different political, social or cultural conditions.

It is here that the genealogical method expresses itself most clearly: this method aims to examine social practices and power relations by reconstructing the way in which certain things were *problematised* throughout time:

“When I say that I am studying the ‘problematization’ of madness, crime, or sexuality, it is not a way of denying the reality of such phenomena. On the contrary, I have tried to show that it was precisely some real existent in the world which was the target of social regulation at a given moment. The question I raise is this one: How and why were very different things in the world gathered together, characterized, analysed, and treated as, for example, ‘mental illness’? What are the elements which are relevant for a given ‘problematization’? And even if I won’t say that what is characterized as ‘schizophrenia’ corresponds to something real in the world, this has nothing to do with idealism. For I think there is a relation between the thing which is problematized and the process of problematization. The problematization is an ‘answer’ to a concrete situation which is real” (Foucault 1985: 115).

Problematising as a performative practice proceeds through the activity of situating practices in their discursive context, thus aiming at identifying tacit premises and

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19 Problematisation has a performative function (cf. J. Butler 2013), since the process of naming and rendering visible is not simply about mirroring pre-existing facts, such as typically conceived by conventional constructivist scholarship when examining language. It is only with this performative process that an object actually emerges as an object and acquires its positivity: “The name [...] individuates an assemblage that may have been in existence for a long time before it was named, and which may outlive its naming. But nonetheless, the naming is itself a creative act: it assembles a new individuation of concepts, symptoms, moralities, languages; it confers a kind of mobile and transferable character upon a multiplicity” (Rose 1999: 24). It is therefore not about objects or entities that have not existed previously or that constitute an illusion: “they are something that did not exist and that is part of reality, the effect of a regime of truth that separates truth from falsity” (Foucault 2010: 22). It is in this context that Foucault speaks of a “transactional reality” (Foucault 2010: 22) or that Rose uses the term of “irreal spaces” (Rose 1999), i.e. neither real nor imagined.
assumptions that made thinkable, sayable and doable certain regimes of practices (cf. Rose and Miller 2008). But regimes of practices are not simply about identifying problematisations, but explore also how the different elements constituting such problematisations are assembled into relatively stable institutional or organisation settings and are therefore not to be confused with particular institutions or systems. It is in this sense that the present study examines diaspora strategies as a regime of practices, defined as the more or less organised ways in which they have been turned into an object of knowledge, the various practices put in place to influence the activities of “diasporas”, and the various technologies involved in reaching the relevant aims of government.

A second element in need of further explanation is with regard to the concept of mentalities or rationalities, enclosed in the concept of governmentality. The concept of mentalities has been used analytically by classical sociologists, such as Mauss or Durkheim, who considered them as being implicit within a certain society and therefore as taken for granted, at least most of the time. As noted by Dean (2010: 24-5), they eschew thereby the “rationalist” weight in the sense that they do not entail

20 One can glimpse here some foundations of this approach in post-structuralist theories, which also focus on the constitution of certain knowledge. As will furthermore be seen below, the governmentality approach refuses the concept of subjects and replaces them with the concept of subjectifications. There are in fact no universal subjects of government according to this approach, but different subjects depending on the context.

21 Dean (2010: 31) gives an illustrative example of the difference between regimes and institutions: “[...] the regime of practices of punishing may find a central institutional support in the prison. However, how we punish also affects what happens in schools, families, barracks and so on. The existence of such regimes of practices makes possible borrowings across institutions and innovation within them.”
any normative or analytical privileging of a particular reason, such as logocentrism (cf. Said 1978). Mentalities or rationalities might in fact draw on “a-rational” elements, such as emotions, myths or symbolic language.

Mentalities or rationalities are furthermore by definition collective and not about individual representations. This is not to say that such mentalities inhabit only specific subgroups of a society or even social classes, as certain pluralist, Marxist or neo-Gramscian state scholars would affirm. It simply affirms that governing involves drawing on certain “instruments” available to the relevant governors – instruments (or technologies, to use a Foucauldian language), which might have originated within a certain subgroup. It obviously might be interesting to investigate in a further step the relationship between different mentalities of certain governors and a certain subgroup. But this will not be done within this study.

Closely linked to both comments above is a further, important element regarding the concept of the technologies of government. Other concepts, such as dispositif, apparatus, assemblage, techniques or instruments, have been created to refer to the same phenomenon (Li 2007: 264) and will be used interchangeably throughout this study. The governmentality approach is particularly interested in examining governmental technologies in order to understand diaspora practices. It does this by considering them as practices instead of institutions, such as done by classical theories of the state presented in the previous chapter: “Instead of taking institutions as the point of departure, it [the governmentality approach] focuses on technologies that are materialised and stabilised in institutional settings” (Lemke 2007: 9). The state – as one central institution – is thereby conceptualised as a practice of power that
operates in society rather than as a pre-existing institutional structure (Bigo 2008; Bonditti 2004; Foucault 2007: 282). It is this strategic or instrumental logic of the state on which both Foucault and Bourdieu agree that will be used throughout this study: considering the state as a strategy or an instrument rather than as a pre-given object. It is in this sense that one is able to “[...] cut off the king’s head yet” (Foucault 1978) in political theory. It is in other words through the development of the concept of political technologies that the “institutional centric” account (Foucault 2007) is overcome in as far as “the state [institutions]” are now considered as being the effect or result of political technologies. It is thus on these latter that an analytics of government (or governmentality) puts its main focus.

With regard to the conceptualisation of such technologies, one must insist that they are envisaged broadly, i.e. not simply being limited to social relations and material devices, but include also ideational, discursive or symbolic means. Such technologies would include

“[...] methods of examination and evaluation; techniques of notation, numeration, and calculation; accounting procedures; routines for the timing and spacing of activities in specific locations; presentation forms such as tables and graphs; formulas for the organisation of work; standardised tactics for the training and implantation of habits; pedagogic, therapeutic, and punitive techniques of reformulation and cure; architectural forms in which interventions take place (e.g. classrooms and prisons); and professional vocabularies” (Rose and Miller 1992: 183; Rose et al. 2006: 8).

Technologies are to be conceptualised in both their material and their discursive or ideational dimensions – which is not to say that the mixed ontology of certain scholars is taken for granted throughout this study. The priority is still given to the
ideational dimension of governmentality, but the political technologies operationalising such a dimension might be either ideational or material. It is in this regard the practical turn observed in some disciplines of the social sciences might prove very useful.22iii

The last element in need of explanation with regard to the general sense of the concept of governmentality is with regard to the apparently ideational dimension of such technologies and pertains to issues of identity (or rather identification) and of self.23vi One of the most interesting points with respect to this approach is in fact the way it provides a framework for thinking about the nexus between government or, more generally speaking, politics and questions of identity. This becomes clear when looking genealogically at the concept of government, as developed by Foucault in several of his writings. While it seems that the concept nowadays has almost exclusively a political connotation, Foucault demonstrates that the problem of government was conceived in more general terms well into the eighteenth century. Philosophy, religious studies, pedagogical or even medical studies used this concept in order to refer to problems of self-control, guidance for the family and children, directing the soul and other questions (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 989). This is the main reason why Foucault defines government as conduct, or rather as the conduct of conduct, referring thereby to government of others as well as government of the self (Foucault 1982: 340-2). Although this study will only be concerned with the

22 For an overview of the practical turn, please refer to the endnotes.

23 For an overview of the concepts of identity and identification in the literature, please refer to the endnotes.
government of others or what came to be called *political form of government* rather than what Foucault called the “*problematic of government in general*” (Foucault 2000: 88), it is useful to recall this distinction, since both government and identities are rarely addressed in the same token. Governmentality is thus also about constituting new subjects or identities, according to the underpinning rationality of the relevant government, thus defining political technologies of individuals as “[...] the way by which [...] we have been led to recognise ourselves as a society, as a part of a social entity, as a part of a nation or a state” (Foucault 2000: 404).

Overall speaking, governmentality enables to conceive of both practices of subjectivation (or individualisation) and practices of institutionalisation as two sides of the same coin, i.e. of the activity of governing: micro- and macro-practices belong to the same phenomenon (Lemke 2007). Questions of how populations are conceived of and identified, of which qualities and attributes should be part of them are hence part of any governing practice (cf. also Cruikshank 1999 for an account on “technologies of citizenship”). Practices of subjectivation (or of identification) are thus to be considered both in their material and their discursive or ideational dimensions (Acuff 2012), exactly as governmental technologies in more general.

24 The blurring of the traditional distinction between the public realm and the private one effectuated by feminist accounts and taken up by constructivist, respectively post-structuralist scholarship is a notable exception in this regard. Gibson-Graham for instance (2003) is interested in investigating how global subjectivities are constituted as a set of practices that connect them with particular version of globality, while Franklin, Lury and Stacey ask themselves how the “*global gets within [the body]*” (2000).

25 It mirrors in this sense the concept of *institutional logic*, present mostly in organisational and sociological theory to refer to how broader belief systems shape the cognition and behaviour of actors.
Specific sense of governmentality

Next to the more general meaning attached to the concept of governmentality focusing mainly on the nexus between knowledge and power, there is also a second, more specific meaning to the concept of governmentality which takes up many insights of the more general sense just outlined and which is used throughout the remainder of the present study. It is used as a “guideline” for what Foucault calls a “genealogy of the modern state” (Foucault 2007: 354) and is of historical nature to the extent that it analyses the evolution of how power has been exercised at specific times. The specific sense attached to the concept of governmentality refers in other words to a historically specific form of power which appeared at the end of the eighteenth century:

“The process or, rather, the result of the process through which the state of justice of the Middle Ages transformed into the administrative state during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and gradually becomes “governmentalized”” (Foucault 2000: 220).

This conceptualisation of governmentality is the result of Foucault’s attempts to investigate how the invention of government (in its more specific form) as early as the sixteenth century came to take the lead over other forms of power dominating in Europe at that time, especially sovereign power, pastoral power, reason of state, police, disciplinary power or biopower – while keeping in mind that these latter forms were not at all extinguishing:

“The tendency that, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led toward the preeminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, and so on) of this type of power – which may be termed “government” – resulting, on the one
hand, in the formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of knowledges [savoirs]” (Foucault 2000: 220).

Governmentality is considered in other words as a practice – or succession of practices – with specific rationalities inherent to it. The liberal and neo-liberal rationalities which were dominant at the time of Foucault’s writing took thereby a prominent place in his analyses:

“The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security” (Foucault 2000: 219-20).

In order to be able to grasp this [neo-]liberal modality of government with the three mutually constitutive elements of population, political economy and apparatuses of security, some preliminary remarks on the development of the theme of government as understood in its more specific sense by Foucault are necessary.

**Sovereignty & Nietzsche’s hypothesis**

It initially is against conceptions of power as conceived in juridico-political accounts, found in sovereign forms of power, that Foucault eventually develops what could be termed a “problematic of government”. Such a conception has its origins in feudal monarchies (cf. Foucault 2003: 34) and is characterised by a power over life and death, or – to use the famous formula of Foucault – by “[...] the right to take life and let live” (Foucault 1978: 136; 1991: 39), i.e. the “[...] the right to kill” (Tully 1988: 17). Although sovereignty has been reinterpreted in the sixteenth, seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries by authors as Bodin, Hobbes or von Pufendorf, where the right of the sovereign over death is limited, it remains “[...] a transcendent form of authority exercised over subjects within a definite territory” (Dean 2010: 124). It would manifest itself mainly through repressive mechanisms, visible for instance in the adoption of a language of law, regulation, sovereignty or consent – all of them “[...] backed up by coercive sanctions ultimately grounded in the right of death of the sovereign” (Dean 2010: 124). Power is thus seen as functioning according to a prohibitive, repressive, deductive or subtractive logic of power (Foucault 1978: 136): “It subtracts products, money, wealth, goods, services, labour and blood” (Dean 2010: 125). It is this juridico-political conception which seems to be at the base of both liberal theories of sovereignty as well as Marxist writings on class domination, assuming that power is something that can be acquired through law or legitimation by consensus and is thus considered to be something that one can possess – normally by some single, centralised source (called the “king’s head in political theory”) like “the state”, “the economy”, “the people” or others.

In response to this “juridico-political discourse” (Foucault 1978: 88), Foucault initially maintains this repressive mechanism of sovereignty, but this time by replacing consensus and law of the juridico-political discourse by war and struggle – a model of power he comes to call “Nietzsche’s hypothesis” (Foucault 1980: 91). It is this move which seemingly enabled him to “cut off the head of the king” (Foucault 1978: 89) in political analysis, to the extent that he prefers to focus his analytical attention on what he calls the “microphysics of power” (instead of the power holders). Yet, this analytical move does not truly cut off the king’s head, but just turns “[...]
the conception that he [Foucault] criticized [i.e. the juridico-political discourse] upside down by replacing law and contract by war and conquest” (Lemke 2002: 51).

**Governmentalisation of the state**

It only is by introducing the problematics of government or the so-called “governmentalisation of the state” (Foucault 2000: 221, 22; 2007: 109) taking place at the end of the eighteenth century that Foucault is able to truly cut off the king’s head. Power is now conceived of as *guidance*, i.e. structuring and shaping the field of possible actions of subjects by a multitude of agents and at different sites – rather than an entity that one can possess. It is at this point that it is possible to see how a “[...] headless body often behaves as if it indeed had a head” (Dean 1994). What Foucault is particularly “[...] interested in is the question how power relations historically could concentrate in the form of the state without ever being reducible to it” (Lemke 2002: 58) – a process that came to be known under this strange term of the “governmentalisation of the state”:

“The state can be seen as a specific way in which the problem of government is discursively codified, a way of dividing a ‘political sphere’, with its particular characteristics of rule, from other, non-political spheres’ to which it must be related, and a way in which certain technologies of government are given a temporary institutional durability and brought into particular kinds of relations with one another” (Rose and Miller 1992: 176-7).

Henceforth, Foucault sees the state as “nothing more than the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentality. [...] It is necessary to address from an exterior point of view the question of the state, it is necessary to analyse the problem of the state by referring to the practices of government” (Foucault 1984: 21). The state is
considered in other words as a historically particular and crystallised form of social power relations. The analyst wishing to understand power relations is thus obliged to analyse social relations and practices in all their chaotic and diffuse nature in order to be able to apprehend the phenomenon of “the state” – the latter seen as the effect or result of particular rationalities governing social relations and practices. “Power is everywhere, not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere” (Foucault 1978: 63) summarises well this headless body which would behave as if it had a head.

This new form of power, i.e. government, attached with particular rationalities known as governmentalities, takes the lead in the history of the West from the end of the eighteenth century onwards – without necessarily replacing previously developed forms of power. Liberal governmentality is thereby “discursively codified”, to use the expression used above by Rose and Miller, in the institutional form of the state. Yet, how is it possible to understand the emergence of this process called the “governmentalisation of the state”?

**Conditions of “governmentalisation of state”: Pastorship, reason of state and police – Disciplinary power**

Foucault provides us with an extensive analysis of historical rationalities having paved the way and eventually led to this “problem of the state”. To put it short, he highlights three political rationalities which all partake in the development of liberal and neo-liberal governmentalities, respectively:

“The pastoral, the new diplomatico-military technics, and finally the police, I believe, were the three elements from which the phenomenon of the governmentalization of the state, so fundamental in the history of the West, could be
produced” (Foucault 2000: 222).

It is the *pastorship*, the *reason of state* (linked to the diplomatico-military technics) and the *police* as governmental rationalities which he renders visible through his historical analyses and which he holds accountable for the emergence of government as new form of power.

The *pastoral* modality of power constitutes a prelude to the *disciplinary* dimension of liberal and neo-liberal governmentality, especially in the forms of the welfare state, contemporary ethics of care or philanthropic activities, to the extent that it develops the *individualising* technologies of the “*constitution of subjectivity*” first (Dean 2010: 92). Rooted in the ideas and practices of the Christian pastorate, it conceives of the relation between governors and governed as one characterised by a shepherd (as representative of God) being responsible for each and every member of her or his flock. The shepherd was thus considered to be educated to acquire a knowledge of the needs and the contents of the soul of each member of her or his community – leading to such practices as the examination and the guidance of conscience. It is placed within a “*theological-cosmological continuum in the name of which the sovereign is authorized to govern and which provides models in accordance with which he must govern*” (Foucault 2007: 234). It is thus a modality of power which aims at constituting subjects in line with divine law and is both individualising and totalising in as far as it consists of a concern for each and all of the flock.

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26 The aim of the pastoral modality of power is to ensure the needs and contents of the soul of each and everyone.
Reason of state takes up this latter concern by “secularising” pastorship. By linking reason of state to a neo-Stoic mentality of government (cf. Oestreich 1982) where the concept of civil prudence takes up a central place from the sixteenth century onwards, Christian interpretations of prudence and wise government are called into question, since virtue is no longer to be equated with the respect of divine purposes and ends. It is in this context that a plurality of practices and agents appear to regulate or to “govern” different “things” – corresponding each to different disciplines: “the art of self-government, connected with morality; the art of properly governing a family, which belongs to economy;27 and, finally, the science of ruling the state, which concerns politics” (Foucault 2000: 206). These “things” are considered to be no longer of transcendent nature, but are rather concerned with “earthly” concerns such as wealth, climate, customs, habits, accidents, misfortunes, famine, epidemics or others. Foucault discerns thereby a new education of rulers which parallels the neo-Stoic mentality put forward by Oestreich (1982) – education following an upward or downward continuity:

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27 Cf. The Greek origin of the term economy (οίκο-νομία) referring to the laws or the science of the household.
“Upward continuity means that a person who wishes to govern the state well must first learn how to govern himself, his goods, and his patrimony, after which he will be successful in governing the state. [...] On the other hand, we also have a downward continuity in the sense that, when a state is well run, the head of the family will know how to look after his family, his goods, and his patrimony, which means that individuals will, in turn, behave as they should. This downward line, which transmits to individual behaviour and the running of the family the same principles as the good government of the state, is just at this time beginning to be called “police”. [...] The central term of this continuity is the government of the family, termed “economy”” (Foucault 2000: 206-7).

Next to the emergence of an independent political rationality of government, the essential issue in the beginnings of an art of government is thus, according to Foucault, the introduction of oeconomy into political practice:

“To govern a state will mean, therefore, to apply economy, to set up an economy at the level of the entire state, which means exercising toward its inhabitants, and the wealth and behaviour of each and all, a form of surveillance and control as attentive as that of the head of a family over his household and his goods” (Foucault 2000: 207).

The [political] art of government is thus just the art of exercising power in the form, and according to the model, of the oeconomy – conceived of as an economy of a household or of the family. Yet, as specified in more detail in the section below, the concept of the “economy” was reinterpreted from the eighteenth century onwards: while it referred to a form of government based upon the model of the family and its household in much of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it “comes in the eighteenth century to designate a level or reality, a field of intervention [...]”
(Foucault 2000: 208) which is considered external to institutions of formal political authority (Dean 2010: 117).

But regarding the science of ruling a state, reason of state was clear that its aims are only with regard to reinforcing the state’s strength and well-being and is thus concerned as having its own rationality – independent of the wisdom of God or even the strategies of the sovereign prince (Foucault 1988a: 150). It is the emergence of a particular political rationality attached to the science of ruling a state, characterised by the introduction of economy into political practice, which renders reason of state so relevant for the emergence of government as new form of power: “Having the ability to retain one’s principality is not at all the same thing as possessing the art of governing” (Foucault 2000: 205).

Police and cameralism finally, as understood throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries serve as prelude to the biopolitical dimension of modern governmentalities in as far as they attempt to regulate all possible realms of human life.28 Acting as an instance of “general morality and respectability”, it extended its reach “[…] to manners morals and the minutiae of everyday life” (Dean 2010: 110). It sought to gain extended, exhaustive and detailed knowledge of a population of individual subjects in order to regulate it optimally – optimally being to the aims of

28 Biopolitics (as a form of biopower) is defined as “the attempt […] to rationalize problems posed to governmental practice by phenomena characteristic of a set of living beings forming a population: health, hygiene, birthrate, life expectancy, race” (Foucault 2010: 317), where population refers to “[…] a multiplicity of men, not to the extent that they are nothing more than individual bodies, but to the extent that they form, on the contrary, a global mass that is affected by overall processes of birth, death, production, illness, and so forth” (Foucault 2003: 242-3).
the health and the strength of the state. It is in other words with this rationality that the concept of *population* emerges as a distinct object of inquiry:

“The great eighteenth-century demographic upswing in Western Europe, the necessity for coordinating and integrating it into the apparatus of production and the urgency of controlling it with finer and more adequate power mechanisms caused ‘population’, with its numerical variables of spaces and chronology, longevity and health, to emerge not only as a problem but as an object of surveillance, analysis, intervention, modification, etc. The project of a technology begins to be sketched: demographic estimates, the calculation of the pyramid of ages, different life expectations and levels of mortality, studies of the reciprocal relations of growth of wealth and growth of population” (Foucault 1980: 81).

It announces the central concerns of what emerges from the beginning of the seventeenth century as *biopolitics* and following the motto of a government *omnes et singulatim*, i.e. of all and of each (cf. Foucault 2000: 298-325).

In short, it is through the governmental rationalities termed pastorship, reason of state and police that one can understand the emergence of the governmentisation of the state and, consequently, the frequent “overvaluing of the state” in political analyses. The emergence of an art of government, as governmentality or governmental rationality is sometimes called, seems thus to take place from the sixteenth century onwards in Western Europe (Foucault 2000: passim) – both in political theory and political reality.\(^{30}\)

\(^{29}\) An art is simply a “*technique conforming to certain rules*” (Foucault 2000: 314).

\(^{30}\) Illustrations of the empirical reality attesting to the emergence of an art of government are the development of the administrative apparatus of the territorial monarchies, connected to a set of
But it is important to recall that these three rationalities only serve as prelude to the emergence of modern governmentalities, i.e. to what has been called the “governmentalisation of the state”. They cannot yet be considered as integral parts of the new logic of the governmentality (in its specific sense). They still remain tied to a problem of sovereignty, visible also in the use of instruments often linked to those of sovereignty, i.e. laws or police regulations. They furthermore are attached to the “householding” conception of economy and the attempted derivation – or “upward continuity” – of the science of ruling the state from the art of governing a family. They are thus still different from the emerging new form of power, known as government.

It is only with the emergence of two poles of the “power over life” in the eighteenth century, i.e. biopolitics of the population and disciplinary power of the body, that a new form of power emerges at the end of the eighteenth century. It is this new form, which comes to be known as government, governmentality or liberalism (as political rationality) in the Foucauldian literature.

**Liberalism**

Foucault uses the concept of *governmentality* in its specific sense mostly to refer to *liberal* arts of government – which should not induce the reader to think that governmentality is attached exclusively to liberal principles (cf. Dean 2010: 155-74).

It is on liberalism understood here not as a philosophy or an ideology, but rather as a
rationality of government that the present section is dedicated to. It is more specifically concerned with the way that “[...] political and other authorities have posed themselves the questions of how to govern, what to govern and who should govern [...]” (Rose 1993a: 290), as already specified above under the rubric of the general sense attached to governmentality.

But before tackling the question of what is problematised as object of government and how such objects are to be governed, a preliminary remark on what or who actually constitutes political authority and where it comes from is needed, since it precisely is with regard to such authority that liberalism as a political rationality draws its objects, ethos and devices of rule. As will be seen below, it is one element which distinguishes liberal governmentality as conceived during much of the nineteenth century from [liberal] welfare governmentality at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century on the one hand and neo-liberal governmentality as emerging after the Second World War on the other hand.

Authority in liberal governmentality denotes a true, positivist, neutral and efficacious knowledge of humans giving rise to a very specific nature of “expertise” and authority (cf. Rose 1993a: 284). It comes from “expert authorities” upon whom formal political rulers are bound, leading to a form of government that Rose and Miller call “government at a distance” (cf. 1992), by taking Latour’s concept of an “action at distance” (cf. 1987) up. The central idea behind this is that the production of knowledge by a “centre” about places and events at some distance resulted in the centre’s ability to dominate that which was distant from it. Governmentality would work similarly through the establishment of loosely aligned networks:
“Language [...] plays a key role in establishing these loosely aligned networks and in enabling rule to be brought about in an indirect manner. It is, in part, through adopting shared vocabularies, theories and explanations, that loose and flexible associations may be established between agents across time and space [...] whilst each remains, to a greater or lesser extent, constitutionally distinct and formally independent” (Rose and Miller 1990: 10).

Historically speaking, liberal governmentality emerges in a context of “[...] the demographic expansion of the eighteenth century, connected with an increasing abundance of money, which in turn was linked to the expansion of agricultural production [...]” (Foucault 2000: 215). It is developed in opposition to reason of state or police with their “[...] megalomaniacal and obsessive fantasy of a totally administered society” (Rose 1993a: 289). It is critical – as visible for instance in the Anglo-Scottish school of early liberalism (Burchell 1996: 22) – towards the belief of these latter rationalities to be able to know perfectly, i.e. in all its details, the reality to be governed and to act upon it on the basis of such knowledge: “[...] the reality to be governed is constituted by several processes that are both necessary to the ends of good government and not directly visible to the agents of sovereignty” (Dean 2010: 63). This new form or modality of power recognises that it cannot govern as reason of state did, since the necessary knowledge and capacities concerning processes are lacking.

Liberalism refers to a form of government (or “conduct”) where the governed conduct themselves freely in a certain rational way – whether in the form of a “natural liberty”
of Adam Smith and the classical liberals or in the form of an “artefact”, as Hayek (and other neo-liberals) puts it (Burchell 1996: 24). It is in other words a “government through freedom” which is put forward in the Foucauldian literature, i.e. it governs “[…] as far as possible through the promotion of certain kinds of free activity and the cultivation among the governed of suitable habits of self-regulation” (Hindess 2004: 26). Liberal governmentality opens up for investigations the ways in which different practices inscribed within such a rationality have not suppressed freedom – as is the case for the type of power Foucault calls domination –, but, on the contrary, sought to “make up” subjects capable of exercising a regulated freedom and caring for themselves as free subjects (cf. Rose 1993a: 288). More substantially speaking, it takes as its object “the population” and is coincident with the emergence of political economy, i.e. the “[...] isolation of that area of reality we call economy” (Foucault 2000: 215).

There are therefore at least two realities that rulers are confronted to: population and economy. While both notions emerged already previously, i.e. in the political rationalities of police and reason of state, they are both reinterpreted within this new [liberal] governmentality. Population emerges thereby as the finality or objective of government, as opposed to other rationalities:
“In contrast to sovereignty, government has as its purpose not the act of government itself, but the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, and so on; [...] it is the population itself on which government will act either directly, through large-scale campaigns, or indirectly, through techniques that will make possible, without the full awareness of the people, the stimulation of birth rates, the directing of the flow of population into certain regions or activities, and so on” (Foucault 2000: 216-7).

While sovereignty was concerned to govern the territory and its inhabitants and while reason of state concentrated on governing (or “disposing” of) things, the new art of government seeks to govern populations, or more precisely, processes of populations; while the notion of the population was absent in sovereign forms of power, and while it was instrumental to the wealth and strength of the state in reason of state, [liberal] governmentality constructs the proper functioning of processes within the population as its objective. It attempts “[...] to increase the means of subsistence, to augment the wealth, strength and greatness of the state, to increase the happiness and prosperity of its inhabitants, and to multiply their numbers” (Dean 2010: 125). Government is henceforth considered to be a government omnes et singulatim, i.e. of each and all (cf. Foucault 2000: 298-325). It begins to broach concerns for fostering the life of the population (cf. Dean 2010: 107-15, 25), and not simply of “the state”.

But it is not only the concept of population which is reinterpreted within a different governing discourse; the notion of economy is reinscribed in this discourse in parallel. Population is considered decisive, since it is through the development of population as
a specific domain that rendered the reinterpretation of economy possible. Statistics plays thereby a central role:

“Statistics, by making it possible to quantify these specific phenomena of population, also shows that this specificity is irreducible to the dimension of the family. The latter now disappears as the model of government, except for a certain number of residual themes of a religious or moral nature. [...] What now emerges into prominence is the family considered as an element internal to the population” (Foucault 2000: 216).31

Since it is no longer the family which is considered central for good government – as visible in the notion of the oeconomic government of reason of state –, but rather the population, the theme of economy is now recentred on the level of the population as a whole. While oeconomy turned around the model of the family, economy turns around the model of the population, i.e. turning around the totality of exchanges between economic actors.32 It is this recentring of the theme of economy which gives rise to the new science called “political economy”.

Both processes within populations and within economies are assumed to be independent systems, which have their own internal logics and kinds of self-regulation. They are both purported to be “quasi-natural” entities, i.e. self-constituting

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31 One should mention at this point that liberal governmentality is not only tied to statistics, but more generally to “positivist” knowledge of human conduct as developed mainly in the social and human sciences (cf. Rose 1993a: 282,91).

32 Yet, one should mention – in accordance with Walter (2008) – that the governmentality literature rarely specifies what would constitute an economy and how this substance of economy came to be constituted. Economy is thus simply interpreted here as concerning the exchanges between economic actors.
and existing prior to any state of affairs established by government. This is already visible in writings of the Physiocrats, such as Quesnay, but even more so in the writings both of the “founding father” of political economy, i.e. Adam Smith, as well as David Ricardo. One actually even observes the notion of a *bio-economic* reality with the latter, characterised by a natural disequilibrium between subsistence and populations discovered by Malthus (Dean 2010: 134-7). This conception of the processes within the population and the economy as quasi-natural entities obviously has tremendous consequences for the new art of government: “Because systems [such populations and the economy] were envisioned as self-regulating, they could be left to work on their own [...]” (Hayles 1999: 86).

It is precisely in order to ensure the proper functioning of such processes that the liberal art of government develops so-called *apparatuses* or *mechanisms of security*. These refer to practices and institutions aimed at ensuring the proper exercise of liberty fundamental to the optimal and proper functioning of the economic and social processes that are found to exist within the population, including concerns such as health, welfare and education systems (cf. Dean 2010: 28-9). But it is not simply about security as condition for the proper functioning of these processes; it can also be put the other way around: “this responsible liberty is necessary to the security of those natural processes of economy and population which in turn will secure the well-being of the state” (Dean 2010: 139). There is thus a circular relationship between security and liberty.

It is with all these elements in mind, i.e. population and biopower, political economy and apparatuses of security, that the definition of governmentality in its specific sense, as given at the beginning of this section, is comprehensible:
“The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principle form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security” (Foucault 2000: 219-20).

To put it differently, liberalism as a rationality of government is both biopolitical and economic and can be characterised by an attempt to find a compromise between biopolitical concerns regarding processes within the population, and laws of economic government. It aims:

“[...] to balance the bio-political imperative of the optimization of the life of the population against the rights of the juridical-political subject and the norms of an economic government. [...] A knowledge of the processes that constitute the health, happiness and well-being of the population might lead to a coordinated and centralized apparatus for the administration of life. However, this ‘bio-political’ norm for liberalism needs to be set against norms of economic government. The latter are derived from a knowledge of economic processes, whereby excessive interference can endanger the security of the economic processes on which the material well-being of the population depends” (Dean 2010: 62,63).

But how exactly are processes of the population and the economy governed through apparatuses of security? Which modalities of power are at work here? Three groups of power modalities can be identified, with the first two belonging to the two “poles of power over life” or the two poles of biopower: biopolitics, i.e. the regulation of the population as a whole, anatomo-politics or disciplinary power, i.e. the logic which seeks to produce “appropriate” self-governing individuals, and finally security mechanisms which are similar, but not identical to disciplinary mechanisms.
Regulatory power: biopolitics

As just discussed, the object and end of government is population and economy with their independent processes that need to be governed. It is at the level of the population that bio-politics or the regulatory power operates. It

“focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary. Their supervision was effected through an entire series of interventions and regulatory controls: a bio-politics of the population” (Foucault 1978: 139).

The governmental interventions or regulations are aimed at gathering information about all aspects of populations. It operates through the definition and classification of populations into different groups, as well as gathering information about these groups – turning them into an object of knowledge and allowing control to be exerted over them. Such divisions of populations into sub-groups contributes or, on the contrary, hinders thereby the development of the welfare and life of the population.\(^{33}\) It suffices here to notice that biopolitical mechanisms produce certain population groups which are deemed “useful” and are thus the target of policies, while other population groups not fulfilling the criteria are excluded from the same policies.

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\(^{33}\) It is this mechanism of biopolitics which by the way is considered responsible for the potential development of racism (cf. Dean 2010: 163-5). Since biopower is exercised at the level of populations, wars will be waged at that level – on behalf of each and all: “If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill: it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population” (Foucault 1978: 137)
Disciplinary power

Regulatory power as visible in the emergence of biopolitics is only one side of the coin of liberal governmentality. There is in fact another “pole of power over life” that emerged already at the beginning of the seventeenth century, i.e. disciplinary power (Foucault 1975; 1978: 139). This power, which is sometimes referred to as the anatomo-politics of the human body, arises in the practical techniques of the training of the body and functions at the level of the body. It aims to increase the capacities of the body, to increase its usefulness and docility (Foucault 1978: 139):

“Discipline produces subjected and practiced bodies, ‘docile’ bodies. Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience). In short, it dissociates power from the body; on the one hand, it turns it into an ‘aptitude’, a ‘capacity’, which it seeks to increase; on the other hand, it reverses the course of the energy, the power that might result from it, and turns it into a relation of strict subjection” (Foucault 1975: 138).

Disciplinary power seeks thus to produce the subjective or individual conditions necessary to rule over a population made up of free citizens: liberalism “[...] becomes dependent upon devices (schooling, the domesticated family, the lunatic asylum, the reformatory prison) that promise to create individuals who do not need to be governed by others, but will govern themselves, master themselves, care for themselves” (Rose 1993a: 291). Three different mechanism are thereby at work.

The first is called normation – not to be confused with “normalisation” as a central mechanism of the security mechanism of the governmental form of power (cf. O'Grady 2014). It consists of prescribing (usually in law) what is normal, designating and possibly subjecting, i.e. disciplining, the abnormal to forms of regulation where
subjects come to comply with legally prescribed laws. Those who comply with the norms are rewarded, non-compliance on the other hand is punished and marginalised. Norms replace in this sense the laws, at least with regard to their functioning, since they operate no longer according to a negative, repressive or prohibitive logic, but go a step further: they prescribe what needs to be done. It is in other words a productive logic of power at work rather than the subtractive logic of sovereignty (cf. Foucault 1978: 136).

A second mechanism is observation, i.e. the hierarchical surveillance of people in order to render visible any incidence of non-compliance to certain norms (cf. Foucault 1978: 170-1). People are induced to think that they are permanently and constantly controlled leading individuals to interiorise the norms they are expected to conform to. It thus leads to a form of self-discipline. Typical sites of such observations are found in prisons, hospitals, the military or schools.

The third mechanism is examination which “[...] combines the techniques of an observing hierarchy and those of a normalising judgement” (Foucault 1978: 184). This mechanism – also found in the security mechanisms discussed below – operates through the documentation of individuals’ behaviour serving as a basis to measure it against the norm.

Important to notice both about biopolitics and disciplinary power is that they are considered as operating in interaction or intersection rather than as discrete power mechanisms:
“The society of normalisation is a society where the norm of discipline and the norm of regularisation intersect [...]. To say that power in the nineteenth century [...] has taken life in charge, is to say that it was able to cover the entire surface that stretched from the organic to the biological, from the body to the population, by a double play of technologies of discipline on the one hand, of technologies of regulation on the other” (Stoler 1995: 84).

**Security Mechanisms**

Next to the two poles of the power over life that are biopolitics and disciplinary power and that emerged earlier, security mechanisms emerge only with the new art of government. This mechanism strives to understand a particular social phenomenon of the population to be governed within systems of probability, cost calculation, and thresholds of acceptability (or security). Such probabilities are established with regard to the regularities of the governed population, i.e. with regard to the “norm”: by the means of statistics, the norm of the population is determined leading to the *normalising* mechanism. Contrary to the sovereign and disciplinary mechanisms which attempt to prevent some action on the behalf of the governed to occur – either through interdictions or through prescriptions –, the security mechanisms define a certain range of possible actions the governed are encouraged to pursue; whereas discipline works *upon* the people – attempting to regulate every aspect of their lives – security works *with* the population – allowing them to act “naturally”:

“Security is enacted not so much through establishing limits, of fixing locations, as above all and essentially, making possible, guaranteeing and ensuring circulations, the circulation of people, merchandise and air etcetera” (Foucault 2007: 29).
Security mechanisms are thus aimed at ensuring the processes of populations and economies to flow as naturally as possible. They no longer would work at the level of territories, but rather of the *milieu*, i.e. the space “with a set of natural givens – rivers, marshes, hills – and a set of artificial givens – an agglomeration of individuals, of houses, etcetera” in which a series of uncertain elements unfold (Foucault 2007: 21). The milieu can simply be understood as the material and cultural context affecting actions to be carried out.

But security mechanisms operate not exactly the same way as disciplinary power – although *norms* play the central role in both accounts. While the *normation* mechanism in the disciplinary regimes operates through the definition of the norm in law to be followed upon, the *normalisation* mechanism are enacted by elements of the population themselves (cf. O'Grady 2014: 515):

“The normal comes first and the norm is deduced from it, or the norm is fixed and it plays its operational role on the basis of the study of normalities. So, I would say that what is involved is no longer normation, but rather normalization in the strict sense” (Foucault 2007: 63).

In short, [liberal] governmentality operates principally through the two poles over the power of life, i.e. biopolitics and disciplinary power, and security mechanisms. This does not preclude the repressive mechanisms to cease to be operative: both law and consent on the one hand as well as coercion and violence still have their roles to play. But they cease to function now as foundations or sources of power and constitute rather instruments or effects of power (Foucault 1982: 219-22).
Liberalism as a rationality of government is considered fundamental in the development and evolution of government for the history of the West. Characterised by its formula to govern *through the freedom of the governed*, it aims at ensuring to the greatest extent possible the proper functioning of processes within the population and the economy by combining biopolitical, disciplinary and security mechanisms in the best possible way, i.e. by posing itself constantly the question whether it governs too much or too little. It is precisely with regard to this latter question that ensuing rationalities, such as welfare liberalism or neo-liberalism, differ with regard to classical “laisser-faire” liberalism, while still continuing to adhere to the main characteristics of liberal government.

**Welfare liberalism**

Liberalism as developing around the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century considers that classical liberalism was governing too little. Forms of social fragmentation and individualisation of “modern” society, as visible in higher suicide rates, crime, social disaffection (cf. Rose 1993a: 293) or the emergence of the “social” question (cf. Dean 2010: 146-54) all attest to such a perspective. It suggests to overcome these problems by governing “more”, i.e. by intervening increasingly in the natural spheres of the population and the economy. This “new” art of liberal government is what is called *welfare liberalism*.

Characterised by a greater role attached to the “social” – thus qualifying as a social form of government –, it confers a more important role to “the state” in ensuring both
the free exercise of individual citizenship and the free exercise of economic activities. The state is seen as an instrument to “re-invent [national] community”, as Rose puts it (1993a: 293). It would increasingly be linked to the authority of expertise: “Political rule would [thereby] not itself set out the norms of individual conduct, but would install and empower a variety of “professionals” who would, investing them with authority to act as experts in the devices of social rule” (Rose 1993a: 285).

Two seemingly opposing technologies are thereby used: social insurance and social work. They reflect the two opposing poles of the power over life, i.e. biopolitics and disciplinary power.

*Social insurance technologies* are clearly aimed at reinforcing the sense of community and constitute inclusive technologies in this sense (O'Malley 1992; Rose 1993w). Visible in devices as health and safety regulations, child care, or labour protection services, its logic is to *collectivise* the risks both the individuals and communities have to face with regard to the social aspects of the “capitalist” system. Sickness and injury are attenuated by social insurance technologies.

*Social work technologies* constitute the other side of the coin by focusing more on the individual – as for the disciplinary mechanism. By identifying particular “deviant” or “pathological” cases within the population – deviant or pathological with regard to social norms, as in the case for normalisation in security mechanisms –, these technologies seek to bring such cases “back” to “normality”. Typically seen in sites, such as “[…] the juvenile court, the school, [or] the child guidance clinic […]” (Rose 1993a: 293), social work technologies operate as a form of social machines, since they are constituted by “social” elements and are aimed at creating “sociality”.
Welfare liberalism is thus characterised by its attempt to govern “more” than classical “laisser-faire” liberalism in order to overcome problems of social fragmentation and individualisation. Two technologies are exemplary in this regard: social insurance technologies aiming at reinforcing the sense of national community on the one hand and social work technologies aiming at managing “deviant” or “pathological” cases of individuals on the other hand.

**Neo-Liberalism**

Neo-liberalism, or what is sometimes called “advanced liberalism” for want of a better term, can be seen as an attempt to govern “less” than welfare liberalism has done. It emphasises informal ways to govern. Constituting “[...] merely the most recent development of such techniques that govern human life” (Ong 2006: 13), it is difficult to treat “neo-liberalism” as a single political rationality, since many different neo-liberalisms seem to exist and to influence neoliberalism as a governmental rationality. Examples include the “governmental constructivism” of the German Ordo-liberals, the Austrian school around Mises and Hayek or the Chicago school around Friedman or Becker (Dean 2010: 187-92; Lemke 2001: 192-200). But they still seem to have
“[…] a common thread linking the many late twentieth century projects of neo-liberal reform, both within particular states and in the international arena, [i.e.] the attempt to introduce not only market and quasi-market arrangements but also empowerment, self-government and responsibility into areas of social life which had hitherto been organised in other ways – the corporatisation and privatisation of state agencies, the use of financial markets (and credit-rating agencies) to regulate the conduct of states, the promotion of competition and individual choice in health, education and other areas of what western states once regarded as the proper sphere of social policy, etc.” (Hindess 2004: 35).

In order to grasp these different elements better, it seems best to approach neoliberalism as a governmental rationality arguing mainly against the governing mechanisms present in the welfarist rationality. Several critiques of different nature and different origins are put forward in this regard (Dean 2010: 181), but what they all share is their valorisation of a free and self-realising subject – against the “overvaluing” of “society” in welfare state rationalities (cf. Dean 2010: 176). The neo-liberal critique in thereby particularly powerful, possibly because it is able to operationalise many of its ideas in a series of governmental technologies, i.e. “[...] monetarisation, marketization, enhancement of the powers of the consumer, financial accountability and audit” (Rose 1993a: 294-5).

The main critique of neo-liberalism towards welfare rationalities is with regard to how government is conceived:

34 For an overview of such critiques, please refer to the endnotes.
“Whilst welfare sought to govern through society, advanced liberalism asks whether it is possible to govern without governing society, that is to say, to govern through the regulated and accountable choices of autonomous agents – citizens, consumers, parents, employees, managers, investors” (Rose 1993a: 298).

Instead of governing “society” through social technologies, such as social insurance and social work, neo-liberalism starts with the premise that there is no such thing as “the social” or a “society” that could be governed. There only are individuals and communities, such as families, work teams, associations, consumer groups or emigrant communities which are not the same as members of a social and political community coincident with the national state:

“Now […], these groups no longer mediate between society and the individual but represent a plurality of agents that are put into play in diverse strategies of government. Government […] has become more multiple, diffuse, facilitative and empowering” (Dean 2010: 200).

The “social” government of the welfare rationality is therefore replaced – or rather supplemented – by an emphasis on atomised and individual agents. It is this element which is known as the “government through community” (Etzioni 1993; Grey 1996; Rose 1996). The language of community comes to take the lead over the welfare language of the social. The idea or concept of community is obviously not new, but what is new is how it is rendered technical, thus rendering it governmental. In this more governmental sense, the object of government is no longer a single social space coinciding with a nation – as for welfare rationalities –, but rather a multiplicity of heterogeneous, localised and overlapping spaces consisting of a diversity of communities, such as religious, ecological, feminist and other ones:
“Sometimes they are defined in terms of the geographical co-
ordinates of a micro-locale. Sometimes they are “virtual
communities” associated in neither “real” space nor “real”
time but through a network of relays of communication,
symbols, images, styles of dress and other devices of
identification [...]. Such virtual communities are “diasporic”: they exist only to the extent that their constituents are linked
together through identifications constructed in the non-
geographic spaces of activist discourses, cultural products and
media images” (Rose 1996: 333).

It still needs to be stressed that neoliberal rationalities aim at ensuring freedom of the
governed. But this freedom is reached in a “reflexive” form, i.e. by pushing neo-
liberal subjects to exercise freedom in the way that neoliberalism conceives of it in
order to gain the support and guidance that would allow them to exercise freedom. It
is in other words a circular or reflexive form of liberal government (Dean 2010: 188),
which could also be called tautological form of government, since the exercise of
freedom leads to exercise freedom.

Another related aspect of the “government through communities” concerns the role of
identification which differs welfare rationalities and neo-liberal rationalities: while the
“identification projects” of the social welfarist conceptions were aiming to construct
“[...] the socially identified citizen, the person who, above all, understood themselves
to be a member of a single integrated national society” (Rose 1996: 334), the same
identification projects of the community are not to occur “[...] in the “artificial”
political space of society, but in matrices of affinity that appear more natural. One’s
communities are nothing more – or less – than those networks of allegiance with
which one identifies existentially, traditionally, emotionally or spontaneously,
In short, neoliberalism attempts to govern through communities by assuming the existence of communities of different nature – even where the assumed allegiances do not immediately appear to exist. It thus evinces the “social” which was thought to be coincident with the national space of welfare rationalities.

This should not induce the reader, however, to conclude that such a new rationality would lead to the “death of the social” or the “end of the social”, as found in some cultural critiques (cf. Baudrillard 1983). The social continues to exist, as visible for instance in the emergence of the concept of “social capital” (Bourdieu 1980, 1986; Putnam 1993, 1995), but also as visible in the fact that “social policies” are increasingly carried out at the supra-national level through international institutions such as the OECD, the WHO, the ILO, the UN or the EU (cf. also Dean 2010: 186; Rose 1996). It therefore seems to be about a reconfiguration of the social, which does no longer coincide with national economies or national populations:

“Economic relations have come to be understood, not just as trans-national, not in terms of relations among discrete national economies, but as connecting up components of one national population [i.e. communities] with components of another – economic competition is between cities, between sectors, between specialised markets within economic relations that do not respect national political boundaries” (Rose 1996: 330).35

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35 It is thus no coincidence to see simultaneously the emergence of a language of network which links different nodes, i.e. communities, with other nodes, i.e. other communities – at the expense of scalar
Economic relations are in other words no longer considered to be confined to the “social” which is coincident with the nation – as for welfare rationalities –, but they are constructed as being increasingly “globalised” or “transnationalised” (Lash and Urry 1994; Zukin 1991) – thus exceeding the social or the national frame of reference. The economy as object of government is being reinterpreted, leading to a need to establish flexible economic relations in particular localities (cf. Hindess 1994). Such flexible techniques include for instance the compartimentalisation of space into particular economic zones in order to be able to govern the most efficient way, leading to an “uncoupling” of economic subjects or citizens within a national territory. It is this new conception of the economy which causes a split between “the social” and “the economic” – while both domains are considered identical in welfare rationalities. The latter use in fact the “Keynesian” technologies of social government, seeking to establish a form of security “[...] in which the health of society and the health of the economy became mutually reinforcing [...]” (Dean 2010: 176).

But it is not only with regard to the way government is conceived that neo-liberalism as political rationality differs from welfare rationalities. It is also with regard to the subjects of government. Characterised as “new prudentialism” (O'Malley 1992),

analyses (Amin 2002; Brenner 1999; Ho 2011). Neoliberal governmentality can thus be understood as a government of different networks consisting each of different communities.

36 New prudentialism is “new” in as far as it differs in some respects from prudentialism of the nineteenth century (Dean 2010: 194-5; Rose 1996: 342-3): The domains to be monitored and prudently managed are multiplied with neo-liberalism, since all possible areas of life (dependency, crime, retirement, education, diseases, dependency, etc.) are put under prudential management – while it was only procreative prudence, independence from poor relief and sobriety in the nineteenth century. Risk does furthermore never disappear completely, as assumed in nineteenth century prudentialism; it can only be minimised by identifying spaces, neighbourhoods, times of day and night, people which are of
these are conceived as active and responsible in their own government by following an economic-rational logic, i.e. following a logic that assesses the costs and benefits of a certain action (as opposed to other alternative actions). The subjects are situated within an “enterprise culture” (Heelas and Morris 1992) which aims at reviving and extending the norms and values associated with the market, i.e. “responsibility, initiative, competitiveness and risk-taking, and industrious effort” (Young of Graffam 1992: 33). The market is seen as the central device of neoliberalism, since it is this latter that allows the proper learning of “rules of conduct” (cf. Hayek 1979: 162). Their responsibility is no longer seen in the context of a society, i.e. a relation between citizens and society (regulated through the mediating state), but rather in the context of a community or communities; responsibility is now about taking care of those one is most concerned with (Dean 2010: 200; Rose 1996: 330).

37 The theory of human capital as developed by the Chicago school informs clearly this enterprise culture: „In this model, the wage labourers are no longer the employees dependent on a company, but are autonomous entrepreneurs with full responsibility for their own investment decisions and endeavouring to produce surplus value; they are the entrepreneurs of themselves“ (Gordon 1991: 44).

38 Hayek, as one of the main figures of neoliberalism, conceives nature, culture and rational design as three separate processes, each of which gives rise to „rules of conduct“. These rules are stratified: at base, the “instinctive” drives; above these, “traditions” restraining the first; and finally, the “thin layer of deliberately adopted or modified rules” (Hayek 1979: 159-60). So drives, traditions and consciously adopted rules operate within the respective spheres of nature, culture and reason. Reason (or appropriate “rules of conduct”) is thereby an effect of cultural evolution, i.e. of “spontaneous social orders”, such as markets, language, morals and law (Hayek 1979: 162-3).

It should be noted that this vision of freedom or appropriate rules of conduct is different both from “constructivist” German ordoliberals who conceived of freedom as resulting from a “vital policy” of the state (cf. Gordon 1991: 41), but also from classical liberals who conceive of freedom as one to be found in nature: “For Hayek, [...] the market is neither a natural sphere of the relations between exchanging individuals nor an artificial contrivance of appropriate policies but a spontaneous social order governed by customary rules selected by a complex cultural learning process” (Dean 2010: 184).
Those subjects (and spaces) on the other hand who are seen as not able or not willing to follow this model of the active and responsible subject within responsible communities are put under a different category, i.e. the targeted populations who will need intervention in the management of risks. These are often placed under well-known disciplinary mechanisms. But contrary to welfare rationalities, such groups and spaces are no longer to be governed by a unified “social service”, but by a variety of specialists each of whom is an expert in a particular problem in order to produce active and responsible citizens (cf. Rose 1996: 346-7). There is the emergence of a plethora of experts or authorities, which may be public, quasi-autonomous, for profit or from the voluntary sector. One seems to observe a kind of a “degovernmentalising the state”. While liberal governmentality was the result of a “governmentalisation of the state”, characterised by an attempt to bring various technologies under the umbrella of “the state”, neoliberalism seems to reverse this process by

“[...] detaching [...] the centre from the various regulatory technologies that it sought, over the twentieth century, to assemble into a single functioning network, and the adoption instead of a form of government through shaping the power and wills of autonomous entities” (Rose 1993a: 296).

The neo-liberal conception of government as operating through communities as well as its conception of the subjects as active and responsible gives rise to further political devices and technologies – next to the central device of the market. Other “welfare” devices are of interest here too, i.e. social insurance and social work. But they are reinterpreted for the purposes of neoliberalism:
“[...] social insurance, as a principle of solidarity, gives way to a kind of privatisation of risk management [...] And social work, as a means of civilisation under tutelage, gives way to the private counsellor, the self-help manual and the telephone help line, as practices whereby each individual binds themselves to expert advice as a matter of their own freedom” (Rose 1993a: 296).

Such devices can be put under more general technologies of neo-liberal rule, i.e. technologies of agency and technologies of performance (cf. Dean 2010: 196-8).

Technologies of agency on the one hand seek to enhance and improve the capacities of neo-liberal subjects for active and responsible action. Operating either as part of the “new contractualism” (cf. Yeatman 1998) or through “technologies of citizenship” (cf. Cruikshank 1994), they are principally used when confronted with subjects not capable or not willing to conform to the model of neo-liberal subjectivity. New contractualism refers to the proliferation of “outsourcing” of formerly public services to private and community agents, such as unemployment services, education services to schoolchildren, enterprise agreements and so on. Technologies of citizenship on the other hand refer to practices of self-esteem, empowerment or negotiation in order to produce active, responsible and eventually free citizens, which are capable of managing themselves and their communities, but also the diverse risks they are confronted to.

Technologies of performance operate more “from above”, i.e. as indirect means of regulating expertise and authorities. They aim at making the neo-liberal capacities of responsibility calculable, accountable and comparable in order to optimise them. They fall under what Rose and Miller call the “calculative regimes of accounting and
"financial management" (Rose and Miller 1992; Rose 1993a: 295). Working primarily through typical disciplinary mechanisms, several devices have been developed to assure that performance technologies are operative: budgetary disciplines, performance indicators, benchmarking, the establishment of “quasi-markets” and especially audit. They all seem having replaced trust as a mechanism and device of previous rationalities (cf. Power 1992). It is upon the citizens seen in their capacity as “consumers” to freely choose which expert is best for their conduct in a certain realm – phenomenon that Rose calls the “[...] apparent devolution of regulatory powers from “above” – planning and compulsion – to “below” – the decisions of consumers. [...] the relations between citizens and experts are not organised and regulated through compulsion but through acts of choice” (Rose 1993a: 295-6).

In short, neoliberalism as a governmental rationality attempts to govern through communities, instead of the society, by producing and relying on active, prudential and responsible subjects. This does not lead to an “end of society”, but rather to a reconfiguration of “the social” – coincident in welfare rationalities with the unifying “national space” – whereby it comes to be separated from “the economy” understood now as transnationalised and globalised. Neoliberal governing mechanisms need to expose a great flexibility to the extent that different communities are governed with different mechanisms and devices. The main device to produce neo-liberal subjects is the market which would educate subjects to conduct themselves in the appropriate manner. The market is complemented by a variety of experts – pointing to a “degovernmentalisation of the state” – who use technologies of agency seeking to
improve the capacities of neo-liberal subjects and technologies of performance seeking to render such capacities calculable and comparable.

**Synthesis**

It seems useful and helpful to synthetize briefly the different forms or types of governmentality as understood in the specific sense of the term, i.e. as a certain mentality of rule dominating at a specific historical time. It needs to be recalled that this study is interested in exploring and identifying the ways in which diaspora practices in the Indian and the Jamaican contexts are based upon some of the governmental rationalities highlighted in this chapter, i.e. governmentalities as understood in their specific sense of the term.

The discussion of such governmentalities started with the classic *sovereign* rationality adhering to a subtractive logic of power. It is concerned with forcing the will of the prince (or the “sovereign”) upon all the governed by according them no autonomy whatsoever to follow an alternative action than that imposed by the sovereign. The main instruments or devices of such rationalities are typically to be found in laws and regulations, which forbid certain actions – thus using the sword as its typical symbol.

The rationalities of the *pastorship*, the *reason of state* and the *police* are the first to point towards a new modality of power, although still using mainly sovereign instruments of laws and regulations. But they announce some of the elements that would come to have a lasting impact on “contemporary” rationalities, i.e. they act as the conditions of the ensuing “governmentalisation of the state”. Pastorship for
instance introduces the *individualising* and *disciplinary* dimensions to governmental rationalities by problematising government as the government *omnes et singulatim*, i.e. of each and all. Police as understood through much of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is relevant for its introduction of the *biopolitical* dimension to governmental rationalities by emphasising the role of an extended, exhaustive and detailed knowledge of the *population* for optimal ruling. Reason of state finally is notable for “secularising” pastorship, i.e. defining the attainment of “earthly” rather than transcendental virtues as objectives of rule. It is this rationality which leads to an autonomy of politics as a separate domain from other domains, such as morality which would be concerned with the government of oneself or economics (oeconomy) having the family or the household as its object. The oeconomy is thereby considered central, since it is according to this model, i.e. the model of the family or the household, that “good government” in the political realm depends.

It is this latter element, i.e. the economy within political practices, which is central for the emergence of the new form of power at the end of the eighteenth century, i.e. *government*. Thanks to specific historical conditions and the development of positivist human and social sciences, including statistics, government effectuates a reinterpretation of the oeconomy – based on the family model – leading to the emergence of *political economy* – based on the model of the *population*. It is henceforth concerned with assuring the proper functioning of processes within populations and economies, i.e. with social and economic processes, which are considered to function according to their own internal logics and capable of self-regulation, but which it cannot know in their entirety – as assumed in reason of state
and police rationalities. Government operates as a consequence and in its most dominant [liberal] form through the freedom of the governed. It is concerned with conducting the conduct of free subjects. Government comes therefore to be distinguished from mere domination which leaves no room to act freely, but also from strategic games which refer to ubiquitous interactions of human beings where power is not necessarily exercised against the interests of the other part of a power relationship.

Three interdependent mechanisms of power are at work here: regulatory mechanisms of biopolitics, concerned among others with defining and classifying populations in order to render them governable, disciplinary power mechanisms, seeking to produce the liberal subject capable of self-government through observation, normation and examination, and finally security mechanisms, which aim to govern the population within systems of probability, cost calculation, and thresholds of acceptability (or security).

But problems of social fragmentation and individualisation of modern society appearing at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century indicate that this classical liberal conception of government has failed by not governing “enough”. Welfare state rationalities thus institute a “government through society” where “the social” comes to be identified with “the national” territory and where “the state” comes to take up the most important role in governing the population – a phenomenon which Foucault called the “governmentalisation of the state”. The state confers the expertise necessary for any government thereby to “professionals” who employ both social insurance technologies as well as social work
technologies. The former are designed to collectivise the risks associated with modern life, thus intended to lead to an increased sense of national community. Social work technologies on the other hand are aimed at bringing “deviant” or “pathological” cases back to the “norm” of the population.

Welfare liberalism seems to constitute an extreme form of government by intervening “too much” in the social and economic processes. Neo-liberalism (as a mentality of governmental rule) develops therefore, from the end of the Second World War onwards, a new formula of rule, consisting of the attempt to rule without society. It suggests to “govern through communities”. Instead of governing through society, which does not exist in the first place according to neo-liberals, it seeks to produce active, prudential and responsible citizens capable of governing themselves.

The main device constitutes the market which would educate subjects to conduct themselves as neoliberalism hopes. It is complemented by a variety of experts – pointing to a “degovernmentalisation of the state” – who use technologies of agency seeking to improve the capacities of neo-liberal subjects and technologies of performance seeking to render such capacities calculable and comparable. The “social” comes thus to be reconfigured along economic lines understood now as globalising and transnationalising rather than as coinciding with the national territory.

Before pursuing with the specification of the Indian and Jamaican cases, as well as the question of the data and the analytical methods used, a final comment regarding all these rationalities is central. All of these rationalities with their objectives, experts, devices, technologies, and subjects, are not to be understood as referring to specific
historical periods. It is rather that there is a certain rationality which comes to take the lead or dominate other rationalities at specific moments and at specific places. The task of the analyst is therefore not to identify a single rationality of rule at a specific time and place, but rather to explore which rationalities are dominant, while being attentive to the fact that other rationalities are operative, too. It is in short not about the replacement of a rationality of rule by another, but rather about a “topology of power” (S. J. Collier 2009) where different rationalities coexist, thus pointing to a combinatory logic or logic of constellation.

The practical turn, often associated with elements of the theoretical approaches of constructivism, post-structuralism or [international] political sociology (especially the French figure of Bourdieu), asserts that the starting point of all analyses should be an investigation of practices rather than some structure or individual units. Practices would enable the researcher to look inductively at how each of the traditional levels and units of analysis might be present in social and political life (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 4), thereby rendering a true inter-paradigmatic debate possible (Lapid 1989; Waever 1996). Instead of claiming the causal primacy of structure (or agency), of ideas (or materiality) or of stability (or change), the focus on practices would not entail the emergence of a new “ism”. It would allow for a less substantialised account of social and political life without searching for hidden processes behind it. We follow in this respect Tully in the “[...] general reorientation in Western thinking in the twentieth century [...] a move away from the search for an essence hidden behind human activities to the surface aspects that give them meaning” (Tully 1999). This “empiricism of the surface” (Rose 1999: 57) breaks therefore with the search for the theory of social and political life and lets the empirical reality determine which factors are at work.

This orientation towards practices is not new. As noted by Adler and Pouliot among others (2011), poststructuralists – in a line with some writings of Foucault – were among the first to consider world politics as a set of textual or inter-textual practices (Der Derian et al. 1989). Coupled with the constructivist interests in ideas (Onuf 1989) and practical reasoning (Kratochwil 1991; Reus-Smit 1999), this focus on practices became to grow rapidly in the realm of International Relations (Adler 2004, 2008; Adler-Nissen 2008; Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009; Haas and Haas 2002; Katzenstein 2009; Koivisto and Dunne 2010; Kratochwil 2007; Krotz 2007; Mitzen 2006; Pouliot 2007; Pouliot and Mérand 2008; Pouliot 2008, 2010c, 2010b, 2010a; Seabrooke and Tsingou 2009; Wiener 2012; Williams 2007). Yet, most of these scholars conceptualised practices only in discursive (inter-textual) and ideational terms – leaving completely aside the material side, such as advocated by neo-realist or neo-liberal scholars in International Relations. One has to await further developments of constructivist and post-structuralist scholarship as well as insights coming out from [international] political sociology more recently to observe the conceptualisation of practices in both discursive and material terms (among others Adler and Pouliot 2011; Bigo 2011; Doty 1996). The observation of Doty, a leading post-structuralist scholar, might be representative in
this regard: “it is repetition and dissemination that give representations their power, not an inherent stability and closure” (Doty 1996: 72). It is with this understanding of governmental practices or governmental technologies in both their discursive and material dimensions, i.e. materialist constructivism or constructivist materialism, that the present study will pursue. It is interested in the fixation of meaning in matter – a hard work in which practices play a prominent role.

The concepts of identity or subjectivity seem having originated in the realm of philosophy already centuries ago. But it was only with the founder of modern philosophy, René Descartes, in the seventeenth century that the concept was introduced into philosophy and taken up prominently, among others, by Immanuel Kant in the late eighteenth century (Kelly 2013). Subjectivity was thereby conceptualised as referring to consciousness – with the famous Cartesian separation of the mind (qua consciousness) and the body as a consequence. This meaning of subjectivity which still can be found nowadays (Balibar 1994) was taken up, among others, very prominently by existentialist and phenomenologist thinkers in the mid-twentieth century, such as Sartre or Merleau-Ponty.

It was against this individualist conception of identity that structuralist thinkers from the 1960s or 1970s onwards reversed the logic by emphasising social structures constituting subjectivity.

But the politics of identity as a scientific area of study has only emerged recently, i.e. at the beginning of the 1980s. It can be defined as evoking the question of how difference is dealt with in a particular society (Bernstein 2005). Two approaches can be identified towards identity politics: An approach originating in the New Social Movements Theory and the emancipatory post-structuralist approach. The approach to identity politics depends foremost on the choice of the relevant theoretical conception of power. Whereas Marxists from the 1960s onwards tend to equate power with socio-economic factors, relying on the Althusserian or Poulantzian separation of “economic” from “political” and “ideological” spheres and thereby relegating identity politics to the epiphenomenal scene, post-structuralists define power in cultural terms and prefer therefore performative, deconstructive or queer politics over identity politics which is considered being essentialist and reifying. New Social Movements Theory is situated somewhere in between these two strands and considers identity politics as being one possible strategy of a movement among other nonidentity strategies or one type of politics in which movements engage (rather than an epiphenomenal practice, such as for Marxists, or rather than considering identity issues as the sole legitimate issues to be dealt with, as expressed by post-structuralists). Some authors (Armstrong 2002) even go as far as contrasting identity politics of social movements with interest politics of social movements where the latter simply attempt to transform society's economic and political structures, but not its cultural structures. But this latter theoretical strand does not answer key questions to identity politics, such as those regarding the relationship between identity, culture, and the political economy.

It also is interesting, if not primordial, to note how identity (or identities) of diasporas are treated in the literature: they in fact are treated as monolithic and essentialist entities in both narratives. Diasporas are mostly classified by the use of a national identifier, visible when talking for instance about the “Indian”, the “Armenian” or the “Mexican” diaspora. This kind of treatment of diasporic groups constrains the possibility, or worse, even prevents scholars to analyse conflicts within a diasporic group. This is not to say that nationalist discourses have ceased to be relevant in making sense of diaspora politics, but simply that the theoretical lenses should take into account that diasporic groups might not be homogenous and that other identifiers, such as gender or class might play a relatively more important role. This allows in other words the analytic possibility of the emergence of different
layers of diasporas, defined in function of the relative identifier. This theoretical stance owes much to
the constructivist turn in International Relations. When applying in fact some of the central hypotheses
of this approach to the definition of diasporas, it seems clear that it is not tenable to treat their identity
(or identities) as given and static – a problem that Brubaker calls “groupism”: “the tendency to treat
 [...] groups [...] as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed. I mean the
tendency to reify such groups, speaking of Serbs, Croats, Muslims and Albanians in the former
Yugoslavia, of Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, of Jews and Palestinians in Israel and
the occupied territories, of Turks and Kurds in Turkey, or of Blacks, Whites, Asians, Hispanics and
Native Americans in the U.S. as if they were internally homogeneous, externally bounded groups, even
unitary collective actors with common purposes. I mean the tendency to represent the social and
cultural world as a multichrome mosaic of monochrome [...] blocks” (Brubaker 2002).
A possible solution to this groupist problem is given by Varadarajan who suggests turning [back] to the
school of historical materialism: “For the diasporic condition in and of itself is an asocial and
politically empty abstraction. It is only by situating diasporas in their material, social relations, and
broader struggles that one can go beyond abstractions and flattening narratives to provide a nuanced
and politically responsible accounting of their current and potential roles” (Varadarajan 2012).

Another possible solution is given by post-structuralist and post-colonialist thinkers (Césaire
1972 [1955]; Damas 1943, 1956; Fanon 1965, 2002 [1961]; Sylvester 1999) who have
developed a rich vocabulary to describe and define diasporas: “roots/routes (P. Gilroy),
doubleness (W.E.B Dubois), hybridity (Bhabha), transculturation (Canclini),
belonging/unbelonging, uprooting/regrounding (S. Ahmed), syncretism, creolisation,
translation” (Venn 2009). All of these concepts have been forged in order to escape the
essentialist or primordialist conception of identity formation. It obviously is true that the
concept of subjectivity and of identity has been severely criticised since the emergence of
constructivist and post-structuralist approaches in the early 1980s. The main cause of these
criticisms lies precisely in the essentialist assumption of the presented conceptualisations,
which claims that there is a true “self” that can be attained. If there is no human essence from
which one can derive authenticity, as Foucault assumes to avoid essentialist understandings of
human nature and economic determinism, then how can one ever be hybrid (Knights and
Willmott 1989)? Althusser's anti-humanism and dismissal of orthodox economic determinism
seems having played an important role in reaching this anti-primordialist conception of human
nature (Agger 1991). The theories of Althusser and Foucault, for instance, search at decentring
the subject by conceiving it as a mere reflex of language, social discourse and power. Taking
the logic of decentring to an extreme, the notion of the 'death of the subject' has emerged,
notably in Baudrillard's theory. The concept of subjectivity altogether is considered a
redundant category in post-structuralist theory. Unlike modernism, with its characteristic
emphasis on selfhood, singularity, authenticity and agency, poststructuralist theory emphasises
the social construction and embeddedness of all personal identities, and the role of difference
and/or 'otherisation', which render the experience of the other(s) incomunicable to those who
do not share their (culturally constructed) perspective on reality. It nonetheless seems to be
possible to continue using the concept of identity and subjectivity without falling into the
groupist problem identified by Brubaker. Another prominent post-structuralist thinker, Derrida,
considers the subject in fact as absolutely indispensable for any analysis: “I don't destroy the
subject; I situate it” (Derrida 1966). It is in other words about identification or subjectivation
of diasporas that this study will pursue.

A number of critiques located on the political Left (and associated with movement of social
and cultural emancipation) criticised especially in the 1960s and 1970s the welfare state for its paternalistic stance, leading often to unresponsive attitudes toward the needs and differences both of individuals and communities (cf. Dean 2010: 180). This resulted in some initiatives and practices of “empowerment” and “participation” against the ills of such a “mass society” (Cruikshank 1994, 1999) as well as the development of “technologies of citizenship” in order to bring communities back in (cf. Cruikshank 1994; Kalm 2013; cf. Kymlicka 1995). One prominent example of such a critical stance towards the welfare state and its paternalistic attitude is provided by the formula followed during the Chinese Cultural Revolution “away with all experts / better red than expert” (Rose 1993a: 294).

A similar attitude could be observed with some feminist or Marxist accounts which stressed that the welfare state did not only reproduce capitalist social relations, but also that it objectified and disciplined women’s bodies in a patriarchal manner (Dean 2010: 180-1; Rose 1993a: 294). It is in this context that the calls for an “empowerment” of women or a reappropriation of control over one’s own body can be read.

One notices a second formula that was put forward against the welfare state, which did not consist in removing experts, but rather to extend expertise to each and everybody instead of having only a limited number of unaccountable experts. Certain movements for workers’ cooperatives to replace hierarchically owned and managed workplaces of the welfare state by the formula of “the generalisation of competencies” can be cited in this regard (Rose 1993a: 294).

One finally should mention “counter-cultural movements” as well as the “sexual revolutions” of the 1960s which start to rethink the ways in which it is possible to act as one part of a collective and on oneself – with corresponding techniques for self-actualisation (consciousness raising, empowerment, self-esteem, alternative pedagogy, politics of voice and representation) (cf. Cruikshank 1993; cf. Dean 2010: 181).

"Rose identifies two areas where the idea of community emerged: "By the 1960s, community was already being invoked by sociologists as a possible antidote to the loneliness and isolation of the individual generated by "mass society". This idea of community as lost authenticity and common belonging was initially deployed in the social field as part of the language of critique and opposition directed against remote bureaucracy. Community activists were to identify, not with a welfare system that they saw as degrading, policing and controlling, but with those who were the subjects of that system – the inhabitants of the housing estates, projects and ghettos. More or less simultaneously, the language of community was utilised by authorities such as police to comprehend the problems they encountered in dealing with difficult zones – “the West Indian community”, the criminal community. [...] what began as a language of resistance and critique was transformed [...] into an expert discourse and a professional vocation – community is now something to be programmed by Community Development Programmes, developed by Community Development Officers, policed by Community Police, guarded by Community Safety Programmes and rendered knowable by sociologists pursuing “community studies”. Communities became zones to be investigated, mapped, classified, documented, interpreted, their vectors explained to enlightened professionals-to-be [...]” (Rose 1996: 332).
IV. Methodology

Governmentality as understood in its more specific sense as a historical form of power has been applied to a myriad of different fields and different cases. This has taken place since the beginning of the 1990s when two widely cited collections on governmentality (cf. Burchell et al. 1991; Rose et al. 1996) as well as an influential article by Rose and Miller (1992) were published. But it is astonishing – at least in the beginnings of governmentality studies – to observe a tendency within this governmental corpus of literature to concentrate on “national” cases although an interest in “globalisation” has emerged more or less at the same time, i.e. at the beginning of the 1990s. This “schizophrenia” or “puzzle” seems having changed however, as some collections begun to explore “global governmentalities”, i.e. how “the global” has been imagined and been enacted (Larner and Walters 2004e, 2004a; Ong and Collier 2003; Ong and Collier 2005).

One form to imagine and enact such

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39 Without pretending to be exhaustive, there are several studies employing an analytics of government perspective that can be mentioned here. These range over several fields: accounting (Radcliffe 1999), political participation (Purvis and Hunt 1999; Tully 1999), labour movements (Manning 1999), education (Beck 1999), emotion and police studies (Watson 1999), empire (Akhil Gupta 1998; Malpas and Wickham 1997; D. Scott 1999), environment (Bennett 1999; Brosius 1999; Akhil Gupta 1998), globalisation (Dalby 1999; Larner and Walters 2004e, 2004a), health (Hughes and Griffiths 1999; Scambler and Higgs 1998; Stern 1999), journalism (Eide and Knight 1999), library studies (Joyce 1999), television (Ouellette 2008) or tourism (Hollinshead 1999). These studies furthermore concentrate on several cases, yet turn mainly around “domestic” ones: Canada (Blake 1999; Braun 2000), France (Donzelot 1991), the United States (Graham 1997), New Zealand (Larner 1997, 1998, 2007), but also “non-Western” cases such as China (Ng and Tang 1999; Ong 2000, 2006), India (Akhil Gupta 1998), Mexico (Kunz 2010, 2011; McDonald 1999; Stern 1999), South Africa (Durrheim and Foster 1999) or Sri Lanka (D. Scott 1999).

40 One could also mention other studies which are more specific in their endeavour of „global governmentalities“: Studies on colonial governmentality for instance are interested in the power mechanisms of “global” colonial empires (Kalpagam 2000; Mitchell 1988; Rabinow 1989; D. Scott 1995), studies on development governmentality at how “Western” norms came to dominate globally (Crush 1995; Escobar 1995), studies on economic governmentality at how discourses and practices imagine and enact a “global economy” (Hindess 1998; Thrift 2001) or studies on security in the context
“globalities” or “transnationalities” are diaspora practices, i.e. the object or unit of analysis of the present study. But such practices have rarely been addressed from an analytics of government perspective as employed throughout the present study. Rarely does not mean never, so that this study can fortunately build upon insights of previous studies of diaspora practices using the governmentality perspective: Thomas’ study on “African” diasporas could be mentioned for instance (2009) as well as Fikes’ essay on diasporic practices within the Black Atlantic context (2008), the collection edited by Heath and Mathur on the South Asian diaspora (2010), Ong’s studies on Chinese emigration practices (1999, 2000, 2006), Kunz’s study on Mexican diaspora practices (2010, 2011), Larner’s study on New Zealand diaspora strategies (2007), Ragazzi’s studies on Croatian emigration practices (2009a; 2009; 2010, 2013) or Mullings’ studies on Jamaican diaspora practices (2011a, 2012).

But what is strangely missing in most of these studies – with the possible exceptions of Ong’s and Mulling’s studies – is the aspect of post-colonial governmentality, i.e. the mentalities of rule that had and possibly still have to draw upon colonial mentalities – be it in continuity or discontinuity to these latter ones. It is even more astonishing, since diaspora practices have initially been approached in the literature with a focus on developing countries where colonial structures are still in place. One of the present study’s aim is to fill this gap by examining two cases of diaspora practices where the post-colonial context seems to be an important criterion for

of the European Union at how a transnational security field has emerged (Bigo 2008). One finally could mention the more theoretically-oriented studies of “international political theory” aiming at uncovering assumptions through which “world orders” came and come into being (Dillon 1995; Hindess 2000b, 2000a, 2002).
present governmentality, i.e. diaspora practices in the Indian and the Jamaican contexts respectively. The selection of these two cases is thereby motivated by a number of crucial analogies, while not losing out of sight their divergences.

First of all and most importantly is the fact that both the Indian and Jamaican states are situated in a context of post-colonialism, i.e. a context where a large part of the formal government was assumed by a colonial power, i.e. the colonial rule of the British empire. While India gained independence in 1947, Jamaica declared its moment of independence from the British crown in 1962. Both post-colonial states had therefore to deal with remnants of British rule, including the realm of emigration. It seems thus interesting to explore governmental rationalities, especially neo-liberal ones, in contexts outside North Atlantic situations, such as post-colonial contexts: “[...] there is a need to disaggregate and historicise how modern forms of governance have proliferated throughout the world. Too many analyses remain based on the assumption that neoliberal globalisation is an Anglo-American project, born in the Thatcherite-Reaganite years, then diffused into the remainder of the world via the activities of the international organisations, think tanks and the like [...] But the trajectories of particular neoliberal techniques should not be taken for granted” (Larner 2007: 343). The selection of two post-colonial cases is thus an attempt to analyse genealogically how governmental rationalities operate in such contexts, while keeping in mind that the seemingly most recent governmentality, neo-liberalism, has mainly been addressed as a rationality within the “heartlands” of neoliberalism, i.e. the United States or the United Kingdom.

But similarities between these two cases go further than just with regard to the colonial power. Both were confronted in fact with a similar type of emigrants –
although in different historical periods. Jamaican and Indian emigrants left their “home” country in their majority for economic reasons, more precisely to search for employment possibilities elsewhere than in Jamaica or India respectively. Whether this move was favoured or not by the colonial British empire or by the post-colonial Indian or Jamaican state respectively is not relevant for the purposes here. The fact that both had to deal with a similar type of emigration to engage with is central here. Linked to the similar type of emigrants is another striking parallel. It concerns the type of emigration policies of both states which is very similar once again. While Ragazzi classifies India under the category of a global nation-state and Jamaica as managed labour state, it still remains that both follow very similar diasporic practices (cf. Ragazzi 2014). Both states use diverse diaspora practices, such as symbolic, bureaucratic, socio-economic and citizenship practices while educational policies are reduced to language and cultural programs. They both have developed special ministries to deal with emigration issues. Gamlen notes similarities between both the Jamaican and Indian diaspora engagement policies, too – although India clearly exposes more developed policies (cf. Gamlen 2006). Both organise diaspora conferences, offer dual nationality and have developed specific knowledge transfer programs – as will be seen in more detail in the analytical chapters of the present study. Both states have thus developed similar diasporic practices, especially since the beginning of the 1980s.

One finally should mention the assumption of the present study that both cases can provide many insights in how transnational subjectivities, identities and hybrid subjects are treated and managed. Both diasporas seem having seen discourses of hybridity as central to the respective political cultures of the “homelands” (cf. for
instance Puri 2007: 4). Regarding for instance the Caribbean space more generally speaking, many of its emigrants have had to negotiate their identities in relation to several other actors, both in geographical and ideological terms (cf. also Hall 1996; Hall and Du Gay 1996): Geographically to actors such as Native America, Africa and Asia (from where most of its inhabitants came), Europe (from where the colonisers came) and the United States of America (the imperial neighbour); Ideologically to the New World, the Third World, the socialist bloc, and one another. On the other hand, the Caribbean diaspora might serve as a potential special case to other diasporic subjectivities, as suggested by discourses of mestizaje, creolisation, douglarisation, jiharismo, and the like. It might therefore suggest that one should be wary of any generalisation about diasporic subjectivity. But one obviously should be aware of some risks associated with the Caribbean diaspora. The Caribbean cannot simply be considered as a geographical region, “[...] but also a region of the imagination and lived cultural experiences: if its inner core sits within and surrounds the Caribbean Sea, its cultural contours spread outwards [...]” (Goulbourne and Solomos 2004).

Such similarities should, however, not hide the fact that differences – sometimes even important ones – exist between these two cases.

An important one is for instance the coming into being (or at least the rendering visible) of the Indian and Jamaican emigrants or “diasporas” respectively. Whereas the Indian diaspora is said to exist since a very long time, the Jamaican diaspora can be said to be of much more recent origin.

But it is not just with regard to the time periods that the respective diasporas have existed – or rather come into being –, which differs the two cases, but also with regard
to the *complexity* and the sheer *number* of the two respective diasporas. While the Indian diaspora is spread all over the world, Jamaican emigrants are largely found in North America (USA and Canada) and the United Kingdom. Numerically speaking, the Indian diaspora is believed to be around twenty-five millions spread all over the world (Chaturvedi 2005; Govinden 2011; Mishra 2005). Especially with regard to the USA, the Indian community is said to have earned impressive credentials (Chaturvedi 2005), such as nearly the double median income of American families, around sixty per cent having a higher education, making Indians the largest group of foreign students in the country (Amit Gupta 2004). The socio-economic aspect therefore certainly plays a role, which cannot be neglected when analysing their diasporic subjectivation. The Jamaican diaspora on the other hand is believed to count “just” about two millions spread mostly in the USA, the UK and Canada.-

Still on a quantitative level is the *emigration rate*, which is calculated in comparison to the total population. While India with its huge population of over one billion has only around one percentage of Indian emigrants, Jamaica with an already relatively small population of nearly three millions has more than one third of its population emigrating, i.e. around 36 per cent. Crucial is the emigration rate of the highly skilled parts of the respective populations, with only around four per cent in the Indian case, but impressive 85 per cent in the Jamaican case (World Bank 2010: 46,138). So, even if both states are confronted with the same economic type of emigration, the profile of the emigrating population differs in important ways. Indian emigrants are in their majority low-skilled (concentrated mainly in the Gulf states), while Jamaican emigrants are largely high-skilled.
In short, the Indian and Jamaican cases present many striking parallels, such as similar post-colonial settings with British rule, similar type of emigration, similar emigration policies or similar discourses of “hybrid” subjects. But these cannot hide that important differences exist between the two cases, such as the timing of the process of rendering the respective diasporas visible and the complexities as well as the emigration rates and emigration profiles of the respective emigrant populations. It is in part from this desire to study the immense diversity of existing diasporic practices that both the Indian and the Jamaican cases have been chosen to make them the sites of the present study’s case studies.

The **comparative research design**\(^{41}\) seems thereby perfectly suited to explore post-colonial governmentalities in more detail, as also implicit in the quotation from Rivett above. It thus will use the case studies to draw parallels or analogies as well as

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\(^{41}\) The research design „is a plan for collecting and analysing evidence that will make it possible for the investigator to answer whatever questions he or she has posed. The design of an investigation touches almost all aspects of the research, from the minute details of data collection to the selection of the techniques of data analysis“ (Ragin 2010: 191). The most classical difference in social research designs is generally effectuated when opposing quantitative (positivist) to qualitative (interpretivist) methodologies (cf. for instance Corbetta 2003; Creswell 1994), although such an opposition might seem misleading rather than productive. Manuals having gained the status of *classics*, such as the one produced by Brady and Collier (2010) or King, Keohane and Verba (G. King et al. 1994, 1995) attest to such a conclusion, too. Non-quantitative data and methods are seen as potentially supplementary to positivist research, while quantitative techniques with sophisticated computer software is nowadays used also by interpretivists. Mahoney and Goertz make another distinction between designs assessing *causes-of-effects*, i.e. estimating the average effect of one or more causes, and designs assessing *effects-of-causes*, i.e. explaining or understanding in depth how particular effects are produced (Mahoney and Goertz 2006: 230). Ferejohn uses the distinction between *externalist* and *internalist* designs to refer to a similar difference: „Externalists explain action by pointing to its causes; internalists explain action by showing it as justified or best from an agent’s perspective. Externalist explanations are positivist and predictive; internalist explanations are normative or hermeneutic. Externalists tend to call themselves political scientists; internalists, political theorists“ (Ferejohn 2004: 146). With an interpretivist epistemology, the present study is situated in research designs termed *qualitative, effects-of-causes or internalist* (cf. also Pizzorno 2008).
differences with regard to the way that different governmental rationalities are observed. It is more precisely with interpretive case studies (cf. Vennesson 2008) that we will proceed. Such studies use theoretical frameworks to provide an explanation of particular cases, i.e. the theoretical framework of governmentality to understand the constitution of diasporic practices:

“Case studies are accordingly chosen with an eye on potential analogies, parallels or points of equivalence that can be drawn, with the aim of illuminating similarities or differences, or raising new questions that do not offer themselves in isolated studies. Critically, identifying variables and criteria for comparison between cases drawn from preordained outcome can lead to entrenchment of teleological assumptions into the analysis, in spite of careful rationales and explanations for specific choices. It is in order to account for specific, historical experiences that case studies are chosen” (Rivett 2014: 6).

**Jamaican and Indian Diaspora Practices**

Having seen both the reasons of investigating Indian and Jamaican diaspora practices and the comparative research design to deal with them, what has the literature produced so far on these two cases?

The literature on these cases differs both in quantitative as well as qualitative terms.

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The study can therefore be said to be situated in the Weberian logic of social sciences – as opposed to the Durkheimian logic (cf. Ragin and Zaret 1983). While the Durkheimian logic would aim at generalising theory in order to single out “external” causes, the Weberian logic would rather aim at reaching concrete knowledge about historical divergence and specific processes by constructing so-called ideal-types as heuristic devices: “[An ideal-type] is no „hypothesis“ but it offers guidance to the construction of hypotheses. It is not a description of the reality but it aims to give unambiguous means of expression to such a description; [...] it is an idea, a unified ideal construct, abstracted out of certain features and keeping the essential features” (Weber 1949 [1904]: 90-2). It is precisely on such a basis of ideal-types of governmental rationalities – as presented in the theoretical chapter –, that this study is moving forward.
In the Jamaican context, only a very limited number of studies has analysed diaspora practices. Although some limited research has been conducted on the Jamaican diaspora, their history and their profile (Cooper 1985; Glennie and Chappell 2010; Insanally and Clifford 2011; Office for National Statistics 2011; Statistics Canada 2006; E. M. Thomas-Hope 1999; U.S. Census Bureau 2011; World Bank 2010), the governmental practices with regard to it has received even less attention. Most relevant seems research conducted by Thomas-Hope (1992, 1999; 2009; 2012), Sives (2012) and Mullings (2011a, 2012). Thomas-Hope for instance is most interested in the return migration of Jamaican emigrants and its impact on [economic] development in Jamaica. She thereby uses mainly an orthodox migration and development approach, as spelled out above, and has therefore little utility, as wider political rationalities or contexts play a secondary role in her accounts. Sives is more useful for the purposes of the present study, since she explores the institutionalisation of the relations between the Jamaican state and its diaspora through a focus on the first diaspora conference in 2004. But her approach – albeit intended to be critical – remains quite superficial, since she employs an institution-centred analysis around the structures set up by the Jamaican government. She is unable to spell out to what extent such structures are part of, or co-constitutive, of wider political rationalities. It is in this context that the studies effectuated by Mullings are most useful. She takes a more critical stance towards the recent Jamaican development strategy turning around diasporas. By using the a priori same theoretical lens as the present study, i.e. governmentality, she is able to highlight some implications of the current “diaspora option” for development purposes, especially to emphasise the elite nature of Jamaica’s diaspora strategy. She thereby comes close to the understanding of the
diaspora practices the present study uses by emphasising the “neoliberal regime of practices”. She focuses on some ways that the Jamaican case spreads and entrenches neoliberalism. But we intend to go a step further than she has done to the extent that we are not simply interested in neo-liberal rationalities, but also in other rationalities’ work within Jamaican diaspora practices. Her approach based exclusively on economic development seems furthermore to hamper a deeper analysis. It is also in these respects that the present study innovates.

Regarding the Indian context, the literature on diaspora practices is much broader than in the Jamaican context. But it rarely offers a critical inquiry into Indian diaspora practices as effectuated for instance by Mullings in the Jamaican context – with the notable exception of Varadarajan (cf. especially 2010) and, to a lesser degree, Dickinson and Bailey (2007).

Research on the Indian diaspora, its historical and geographical settlement patterns and its profile are quite well documented, with two waves of Indian emigration corresponding to the pre-independence and post-independence periods respectively (Chanda and Sreenivasan 2006; K. Davis 1951; M. A. Desai et al. 2009; Giri 2001; B. Khadria et al. 2008; Binod Khadria 2009; MOIA 2010; Singhvi et al. 2001; Vezzoli and Lacroix 2010). While the “old diaspora” of the pre-independence era emigrated mainly to other southern countries, the “new diaspora” after 1947 went – at least for the skilled members among the Indian emigrants – to North America, the United Kingdom and Australia. But the majority of Indian emigrants, i.e. around 80%, were still unskilled or low-skilled labourers going to the Gulf, West and Southeast Asia.
Regarding more specifically research on Indian diaspora practices, it is equally existent, although not as numerous as literature on the Indian diaspora. Studies by Castles (2008), Sinha-Kerkhoff and Bal (2003), Lall (2001, 2003), Hercog and Siegel (2010), Dickinson and Bailey (2007) and Varadarajan (2005; 2008, 2010) should be mentioned in this regard. But with the exceptions of Lall, Dickinson and Bailey and Varadarajan’s accounts, these investigations are either of descriptive or of prescriptive nature. They rarely question the practices themselves in a critical way. Hercog and Siegel for instance simply list the different state institutions involved in the management of the Indian diaspora (2010), while Sinha-Kerkhoff and Bal do the same, but applied to Indian emigrants in Suriname (2003). Castles and Wise’s account is prone to the same criticisms, although they describe emigration management in a comparative way (2008). More useful are Lall’s reviews of historical “eras” upon which the present study will rely (2001, 2003); she is able to contrast what she calls the “Gandhian doctrine”, the “Nehruvian doctrine” and the “Vajpayeean doctrine” with regard to the Indian emigration management. While the Indian diaspora was considered important for the imagination of the Indian nation under Gandhi, Lall is able to demonstrate that this conception changed dramatically as Nehru took the reigns of power. As we will see in a moment, Nehru accorded much less importance to the Indian diaspora. It was only under Vajpayee that the Indian state “rediscovered” its diaspora again. But Lall is not able to understand why these doctrines emerged and how they materialised. It is in this respect that Varadarajan’s accounts (2005; 2008, 2010, 2012) offer a possible answer. Relying on a historical materialist conceptualisation of politics, she considers the interests of the dominant economic classes in India as the main explanatory factor for Indian diaspora practices. Although
many of her empirical insights are used for the analytical part of the present study, it differs theoretically from her accounts. For the present study assumes that power is not situated in some specific place or actor, but that power is diffusely found at different sites. It is with regard to Dickinson and Bailey’s research on the cultural aspects of transnational governance (2007) that this study comes the closest. Their central argument is taken up, but differently and more largely applied. They assert that the tension between territorial nation-states and deterritorialised overseas populations is negotiated by dual citizenship and dual nationality provisions, but mediated by culturally embedded imaginations of transnational governance. But we are not simply interested in dual citizenship and dual nationality provisions, but wish to look beyond such provisions typically used by state actors.

In short, many of the above mentioned authors reveal the emergence of a new phenomenon of diaspora policies, strategies or practices. They also touch upon a crucial aspect the present study is keen in taking up, too, i.e. the unintended consequences of such a phenomenon – among which is the spreading and deepening of neoliberalism as a governing technology. The present study builds upon a large number of these analyses, seeking to explore whether, and in what ways, the Jamaican and Indian diaspora practices reproduce specific forms of neoliberalism and other rationalities. But it intends to move beyond existing research in at least three ways. First, the analysis seeks to move beyond the blindness with regard to post-colonial insights that characterise most existing literature. A lens of post-colonialism is capable of analysing the multiple ways in which sovereignty and citizenship are crucial to the functioning of the diaspora practices and to explore the implications of
such practices for post-colonial subjects. Second, the study adopts a relatively novel theoretical approach to study this phenomenon, i.e. governmentality. This approach allows to identify the specific sites where diaspora practices are (re)produced and the different institutions involved in such practices, as well as the relationship between these different sites, which enable a more holistic approach. More crucially, such an approach is capable of moving beyond the question of whether diaspora practices are successful in bringing about development, to shift the focus towards the broader unintended consequences of such practices and their performative power. The concern of the present study is not with what institutions within the framework of diaspora practices have promised and failed to do, but with what has actually been accomplished – intentionally or unintentionally – through the diaspora practices. It finally is through such an approach that the present study is able to explore whether, and in what ways, diaspora practices (re)produce neoliberal and other governmentalities. Third and finally, the study innovates empirically with new [and old] data regarding both the Jamaican and the Indian governmentalities of diaspora practices.

Data

Before engaging with the analysis of Jamaican and Indian diaspora practices, what are the sources we use to carry out our analysis? Data for the purposes of this study were collected from different sources and are therefore of mixed nature.

Generally speaking, data are mainly of qualitative nature and stem from governmental sources (such as official websites or governmental declarations), secondary literature,
newspaper articles, websites and audio-visual sources. Important to keep in mind with regard to the data collection process is the fact that „[…] governmentality research cannot be content with the nominal description of the „programmatic“ level of government that contains publicly accessible programs and agendas […]“. In contrast, „[…] the analyst has to „deconstruct“ the self-evidential character of such official rationalities by manifesting a system of contingent relations constituting a body of knowledge“ (Marttila 2013: 4-5). Data were therefore collected not only at the official levels, but aimed also at other ones.

Regarding more particularly the Jamaican case, data are of qualitative nature and originate more particularly in relevant secondary literature, newspaper articles of the two most printed daily newspapers Jamaica Gleaner and Jamaica Observer, websites of different Jamaican government agencies, but also of the respective diaspora conference websites.

The nature of the data for the Indian case are very similar to the ones of the Jamaican case. The data also consist of secondary literature, newspaper articles of the three most printed daily newspapers The Times of India, Hindustan Times, The Hindu and India Today. Websites of different Indian agencies are equally used, in particular the website of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA). Audio-visual material is finally to complement the sources in the Indian case.

**Analytical Method**

Once collected, the data are analysed and interpreted through a Foucauldian discourse analysis, more precisely through the *genealogical* method. It is such a method which
seems best suited to uncover the mechanisms and technologies by which power comes to be enforced in diaspora practices. Such a method starts from an analysis of the different ways in which the problems of respective emigration are constituted, the objects of emigration are categorised through specific modalities of knowledge production, and how each category is governed (cf. also Bigo 2002) – the latter corresponding to the different power modalities discussed in the previous chapter. Drawing upon and slightly adapting articles by Legg (2005: 148-9) and by Ragazzi (2009b: 384-5), it is thus through the following aspects that the present study proceeds:

**Problematisation, Episteme**

The first aspect of an analytics of government is foremost interested with how certain objects or phenomena, such as emigration, emigrants or diasporas, are problematised43 (Rose and Miller 1992: 181) – or with how the entity to be governed is attributed proper names (Larner and Walters 2004a: 498-500): “It is a bit as if I were to say to you: May aim has not been to give you the history of the planet Earth in terms of astrophysics, but to give you the history of the reflexive prism that, at a certain moment, allowed one to think that the Earth was a planet” (Foucault 2007: 276). It is to prepare the terrain for governmental action.44

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43 Dean (1995) calls this stage *episteme*, most probably to refer to the Greek word ἐπιστήμη meaning knowledge.

44 Problematisation can in this sense be considered as an essential dimension to *symbolic power* as understood by Bourdieu, i.e. the power to name, identify, define, demarcate, classify, categorise, specify authoritatively who is who and what is what, thereby helping to “making and unmaking groups” (Bourdieu 1991).
It is thus concerned with answering some of the following questions: Which distinctive ways of thinking and questioning are used with regard to diaspora practices? What are the broader material and ideational conditions in which a specific problem of emigration management emerges? Which specific problem(s) is or are thereby addressed (fear of depopulation, of overpopulation, of economic decline, etc.)? What are the taken-for-granted assumptions that underpin the problem (emigration practices are helpful, dangerous, etc.)? How does thought seek to transform practices?

**Techne & Governmentalities**

Having seen how emigration or emigrants are problematised, question arise as to how they actually are governed, more specifically how these ways thinking are rendered technical through different techniques, tools or governmental technologies.\(^{45}\) It is about the different arts, i.e. the different rules according to which these categories are made thinkable and practicable as knowable and administrable domains and according to which they are governed (Foucault 1975: 215). These rules are associated with “[…] a type of power, a modality for its exercise comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets” (Foucault 1975: 215). The following questions are thereby of particular interest: Which forms of thought, calculation or rationality are deployed? Which knowledge devices, tools or inscription devices (cf. Latour 1987) are used to render emigration populations visible

\(^{45}\) Dean (1995) prefers calling this stage techne, most probably to refer to the Greek word τέχνη meaning art.
and manageable (maps, census, statistics)? Which techniques and technologies are thereby used?

The underpinning rationalities attempt to govern each category of emigration in a specific way and correspond to the modalities of governmentality as specified in the previous chapter: *sovereignty* (or reason of state), *discipline* (or pastorship), and two different regulatory rationalities partaking in biopolitics, i.e., *welfarism* (or *welfare-liberalism*) and *neo-liberalism*. The following description of each modality is largely based upon the developments of these modalities in the theoretical framework. Before giving a brief description of each modality as used throughout the remainder of the present study – modalities serving as “codes” for the analysis –, two preliminary remarks seem useful.

It might first be useful to recall that these [historical] rationalities constitute *ideal-types* in the Weberian sense of the term. They might not manifest themselves as perfectly as their theoretical construction depicts. One secondly should add that these types do not correspond to a particular “epoch” or “age” of how diaspora practices have operated. It is not a series of successive elements, with the appearance of a new type or form causing the earlier one(s) to disappear (cf. Foucault 2007: 21-4). There is not a sovereign age, followed by a disciplinary age, and then by liberal and neo-liberal ones. It is rather about the dominant characteristic of diasporic practices or rather the system of correlation between disciplinary, liberal and neo-liberal practices which changes. It is in this sense that it seems to be more useful to talk about “topologies of

\[46\] Further rationalities might emerge out of the analysis.
power” (cf. S. J. Collier 2009; Ho et al. 2015), since many of the governmental rationalities are assumed to co-exist rather than to replace each other.

Sovereign Diaspora Practices

Sovereign diaspora practices, emerging in the medieval state, are concerned above all with control over clearly bounded land and wealth. Emigration in this context is seen as a threat and cause of concern.

Most relevant for the purposes of the present study are the power mechanisms through which sovereign diaspora practices operate. They use repressive, prohibitive, deductive or subtractive means, since they attempt at forbidding certain conducts considered dangerous or noxious and at subtracting products and money from the subjects of rule. They furthermore are “[...] backed up by coercive sanctions ultimately grounded in the right of death of the sovereign” (Dean 2010: 124). Typical instruments are thereby laws and regulations.

Disciplinary Diaspora Practices

Diaspora practices operating under the disciplinary logic, emerging in the administrative state of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, are foremost concerned with the individuals or subjects of rule, more precisely with creating individuals who “[...] do not need to be governed by others, but will govern themselves, master

47 Reason of state can be put in the same category as sovereignty, although originating historically much later and having „earthly“ rather than religious aims as well as governing (or disposing over) „things“ rather than territory and ist inhabitants. Yet, it uses a similar logic as sovereignty and can therefore be assimilated to sovereign diaspora practices.

48 A typical example of sovereign diaspora practices is the export of security apparatuses abroad in order to track emigrants for security reasons and possibly even execute them, if their conduct is considered “dangerous” to the interests of the territorially bounded state.
themselves, care for themselves” (Rose 1993a: 291).\footnote{The disciplinary logic can be put in a line with the \textit{pastoral} modality of power – although the latter develops in a religious context of Christianity. It is a modality of power which aims in fact at constituting subjects in line with divine law and is both individualising and totalising in as far as it consists of a concern for each and all of the flock (“\textit{omnes et singulatim}”). It is in this individualising aspect that it resembles the disciplinary logic.} Contrary to sovereign diaspora practices, which attempt to prohibit certain conducts, disciplinary practices can be seen as \textit{productive} power mechanisms, since they aim at creating emigrant conducts in line with a particular rationality.

Three different mechanisms are at work here, i.e. \textit{normation} where “disciplining” norms come to replace laws, \textit{observation} to induce people to interiorise the norms, and \textit{examination} aiming at documenting the emigrants’ behaviour in order to measure it against the norm. Some of the typical “disciplinary” institutions, such as schools or other educative institutions might serve as illustrations of this type of power practice.\footnote{Cultural centres and institutes for instance gather the “global nation” across borders and “[...] aim to prevent expatriate or same-language communities from being integrated either in relation to territorial claims or to the procurement of economic and political advantage” (Paschalidis 2009: 4). Examples include the Italian constitution of so-called \textit{Dante Alighieri Istituti} to spread “national culture” amongst the emigrant population from the 1920s onwards (cf. Totaro-Genevois 2005), the German establishment of the \textit{Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD)} in 1925 or the \textit{Goethe Institutes} from the 1950s onwards to promote the German nation across nations, but also British Councils, the French \textit{Alliances Françaises} or similar cultural centres of Turkey or Russia (cf. Laruelle 2006).}

But most disciplinary diaspora practices still refer to a closed national territory – and not to “the population” as in the following ideal-typical modalities of diaspora practices. Such practices are problematised mainly with regard to a fear of “depopulation” – in accordance with mercantilist or cameralist doctrines. Its main rationale is thus still to maintain a nation within clearly defined borders.
**Biopolitical or Regulatory Diaspora Practices**

Next to the diaspora practices aimed at the individuals or the subjects of rule are mechanisms of power operating at the level of “the population”, i.e. the population of respective emigrants – known as biopolitical or regulatory [diaspora] practices. Such practices aim at gathering information about aspects of the respective emigrants and operate therefore through the definition and classification of emigrants into different groups. It is this operation which enables to turn them into an object of knowledge and allowing control to be exerted over them. Two modalities of such practices can be built for analytical reasons: welfare-liberalism and neo-liberalism (or advanced liberalism, for want of a better term).

**Welfarist Diaspora Practices**

The problem for welfarist modalities of diaspora practices is not so much about depopulation, as for the disciplinary form, but rather with overpopulation, as the dominant intellectual and demographic environment changes. The aim of this type of diaspora practices is thus to match the numbers of the population to the resources of the territory, hence the elimination of excessive labour forces becomes necessary.\(^{51}\) The referent, however, is still territorial, i.e. the “national” population located within a territory, although the “territorial trap” (Agnew 1994) is weakened, with the condition that it be temporary. Should the migrants become “permanent”, suspicion is a consequence.

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\(^{51}\) Empirical examples include England’s policy toward Irish Catholics in the mid-nineteenth century (cf. Gray 2006), Italy’s policies towards Italians from the South in the 1910s (cf. R. C. Smith 2003e: 738), Japan’s policies in the first half of the twentieth century towards “dumping people” (cf. Endoh 2000) or Cuba’s policies in much of the second half of the twentieth century (cf. Colomer 2000).
But the territorial is also relevant in another sense, i.e. referring to how international relations are conceived. Each nation-state is still imagined as being territorially separated one from another (rather than constituting a “global” nation, as in the neo-liberal rationality). This implies that emigration still is seen or problematised within bilateral contexts between discrete and territorially separate nation-states where “[...] the recipient country compensates the donor country for the expertise they have taken away [through the efforts of the expatriate]” (Larner 2007: 335). Welfarist diaspora practices in this sense are aimed at supporting and enhancing the activities of ruling institutions in the recipient countries (Larner 2007: 335).

Practices within this type of diaspora practices govern foremost through “the social” – being coincident with “the national”. One encounters mainly social technologies, such as social welfare and social insurance schemes to govern emigrant populations. Typical governmental practices consequently include the creation of guest-worker programs, especially after the Second World War with the goal to alleviate unemployment and gain skills abroad, i.e. short-term interests of governments in harnessing economic gains through the circulation of sections of the population. The conclusion of bilateral agreements with regard to “temporary emigrant workers” as well as the provision of information about emigration prospects belong also to this liberal type of diaspora practices.

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52 Huge sections of national populations were concerned by such policies: the Mexican Bracero Program between 1942 and 1964 involved for instance almost four million Mexicans, almost thirty million workers from Algeria, Greece, Italy, Morocco, Spain, Portugal, Turkey and Yugoslavia were involved in European guest-worker programs between 1960 and 1975 (Reichert and Massey 1982: 3), the Philippines set up similar programs in the mid-1970s (Gonzalez 1998: 119) as well as China in the mid-1980s (Biao 2003: 32).
The approach towards emigration of these practices is not effectuated through typically “disciplinary” institutions, such as the police, the army or schools which aim at the individual body, but rather through social technologies aiming at the “social body”.

**Neo-Liberal Diaspora Practices**

The neo-liberal or advanced liberal – for want of a better term – modality of diaspora practices does not match the aim of alleviating the economy of excessive population. They are concerned instead with dispersion as a resource and a legitimate modality of political existence (cf. Ragazzi 2014: 389-91). The territorial referent is completely dismantled – in a context of economic competition increasingly considered as transbordered or *globalised* – to the profit of non-geographical criteria based on race, religion or ethnicity (cf. for instance Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999), i.e. the traditional ethnic nationalism is replaced by what Kastoryano calls *transnational nationalism* (2006). The referent is in other words no longer a bounded territory, as in the two previous types of diaspora practices, but a *collectivity* or *community*, i.e. the *community of emigrants* or of *diasporas*. This community no longer corresponds to the social collectivity identified with the national territory, as in other governmental rationalities. The collectivity is instead linked to *global networks* which increasingly come to replace bilateral relations between territorially bounded nation-states.\(^{53}\) It

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\(^{53}\) The territorial dismantling is described in the literature as having come about incrementally rather than in one sweep. The discursive change from “*brain drain*” or “*brain gain*” to “*brain circulation*” can be seen as illustrative of this – as well as of the economistic sense attached to emigrants, as expressed through the *theory of human capital*. The territorial referent where emigrants are expected to return home to contribute to the economic development of the “home country” is in fact implicit in the “*brain drain*” and “*brain gain*” discourses. The ensuing discourse of “*brain circulation*” which seems to replace the brain drain and brain gain discourses – due to claimed failures of these – dismantles the
therefore is not surprising to see the emergence of a “network language” in the
eoliberal modality of diaspora practices, also visible in the proliferation of scholarly
*network analyses* (Amin 2002; Brenner 1999, 2004; Bunnell and Coe 2001) – instead
of scalar analyses (cf. Appelbaum et al. 2001; Barney 2004; A. Barry 2001; Ho 2011:
The neo-liberal power mechanism governs emigrant populations *through communities*
and no longer through “the social”. What does this mean concretely? Since the social
no longer exists in the form known under welfarism, governmental practices falling
under the neoliberal modality aim to create individuals and communities capable of
governing themselves by becoming active and responsible citizens. It is in this context
that the semantic shifting from simple emigrants to members of a *diaspora* comes to
take place – diaspora being the new community to be governed and seen as a
community operating globally rather than locally and bound to [national] territories.
Neoliberal governmentality is often equated with the so-called “diaspora option” (cf.
Pellerin and Mullings 2012) which would replace the [territorial] “return option”.
The *market* is seen as the central device, since it would educate emigrants\(^{54}\) to become
active and responsible citizens capable of governing themselves (cf. Hayek 1979:
162). This tool aims at reviving and extending norms and values associated with the

\(^{54}\) It is in this context that one could place the market mechanism as a disciplinary tool, since it is also concerned with educating individuals. Yet, since it aims mainly at educating communities, comprising communities of individuals, this mechanism is placed under the biopolitical category and not the disciplinary one.
“enterprise culture” (Heelas and Morris 1992), i.e. “responsibility, initiative, competitiveness and risk-taking, and industrious effort” (Young of Graffam 1992: 33). Yet, their responsibility is no longer seen in the context of a society, i.e. a relation between citizens and society (regulated through the mediating state), but in the context of a community or communities; responsibility is now about taking care of those one is most concerned with (Dean 2010: 200; Rose 1996: 330).

A logical consequence of this “communitarian” logic is the emergence of a plethora of experts or “social actors”, each with specific competences for a domain of the community of emigrants (cf. also Ho et al. 2015: 155-6; Larner 2015; Leung 2015; Xiang 2011). The development of quasi-governmental institutions, such as emigrant foundations or advisory councils need to be seen in this context. It is their role to contribute to produce active and responsible emigrant citizens capable of governing themselves – both through technologies of agency and of performance. It is this phenomenon which was described as the “degovernmentalisation of the state” in the previous chapter.

Diasporas are conceived here differently, in the sense that populations in general, and diasporas in particular, are no longer to be considered as passive receptors of state policies, but should become active in their own government. It is in this context that one can observe the emergence of governmental practices oriented towards diasporas, or what is sometimes referred to as “global nation” policies. It is postulated that the

55 The theory of human capital as developed by the Chicago school clearly informs this enterprise culture: “In this model, the wage labourers are no longer the employees dependent on a company, but are autonomous entrepreneurs with full responsibility for their own investment decisions and endeavouring to produce surplus value; they are the entrepreneurs of themselves” (Gordon 1991: 44). The theory is thus relevant for diaspora practices, since it conceives them exclusively in economic-rational terms where everything becomes “economised”.

object of government is no longer over a population within a definite territory, but with regard to “global” communities, i.e. populations irrespective of their physical territorial location. This implies a focus on new criteria of belonging and identification – both based on inclusion and exclusion. Diaspora practices of this type include symbolic measures, such as the renaming of populations as “diasporas” – instead of immigrants, refugees, political exiles, guest-workers –, but also the renegotiation of the relevant national communities as including previously excluded populations.\(^5^6\) Other symbolic practices have been added more recently, such as the organisation of diaspora conferences, or the celebration of “national diaspora days”. But it is probable that the list will increase in upcoming years. Next to such symbolic practices, neo-liberal diaspora practices are also of institutional nature, with a tremendous increase of “diaspora” ministries and agencies in several states, both on state level, but also on local levels (cf. Agunias 2009).\(^5^7\) Specific legal status and identification documents given to expatriates are worth of mentioning in this regard. The neo-liberal type of diaspora practices sees finally the development of practices aimed at defining the roles or obligations of the diaspora. Such practices include investment policies where in order to capture increasing capital from the diaspora, but

\(^{56}\) It is in this context that the respective announcements by heads of states to govern on behalf of their respective nations can be read, including Ariel Sharon’s understanding of his government as including „Jews worldwide“ (cf. Shain and Bristman 2002: 77), Vicente Fox’s announcement to „govern on behalf of 118 million Mexicans“, i.e. including 18 million Mexicans living in the United States of America or Mary Robinson’s declaration to be the Irish Prime Minister of Irish everywhere in the world (cf. Gray 2006: 360-1).

\(^{57}\) Empirical examples are rich and include a Ministry of Diaspora in Armenia, a Ministry of Expatriates’ Welfare and Overseas Employment in Bangladesh, an Overseas Employment Office in China, an Irish Abroad Unit in Ireland, a Ministry of Haitians Living Abroad in Haiti, a Ministry of Italians Abroad in Italy, and much more institutions.
also the promotion of so-called “expat lobbies” (cf. Gamlen 2006) in order to extend the state’s foreign policy.\textsuperscript{58} Such practices are normally accompanied by the extension of rights within the framework of citizenship, including the introduction of dual citizenships, of voting rights for members of diasporas, or the right to hold public office (cf. Bauböck 2005; Faist 2000a).

Many other political “technologies” could be mentioned in this neo-liberal type of diaspora practices, such as political speeches, philanthropical initiatives, the creation of investment funds, but the enumeration is by far not exhaustive.

In sum, the neo-liberal type of diaspora practices decouples the territorial referent, dominant in the disciplinary and liberal forms, by the communitarian one as object of diaspora practices and attempts to govern through responsible and active emigrants.

**Synthesis of modalities of diaspora practices**

It is with sovereign, disciplinary and particular forms of biopolitical or regulatory modalities of diaspora practices that the present study is equipped to analyse such practices in both the Indian and the Jamaican contexts, respectively. They treat different problems with different aims, and correspond each to a different logic with differing practices. Ensuing is a differing conception of the diaspora according to each logic. The software program *MAXQDA 11* is used for purposes of coding the data.

\textsuperscript{58} Empirical examples include most famously Israel, but other states such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Eritrea, Greece, Macedonia, Mexico, Hungary, Romania or Russia belong to this non-exhaustive list, too (C. King and Melvin 1999; Laruelle 2006; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Shain and Bristman 2002; Skrbiš 1999; Waterbury 2006c, 2006a).
### Table 4: Modalities of diaspora practices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modality</th>
<th>Sub-Modality</th>
<th>Main technologies or power mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sovereign</td>
<td></td>
<td>Prohibitive and repressive laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disciplinary</td>
<td></td>
<td>Productive technologies (cf. normation, observation, examination) aimed at individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory</td>
<td>Welfarism</td>
<td>Government through the social: Social technologies (social insurance, social work)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Bio-political)</td>
<td>Neo-liberalism</td>
<td>Government through communities (diasporas): market, experts using agency and performance technologies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Identification

Having analysed both the material and ideational context in which diaspora practices emerge (*episteme*) as well as the power mechanisms at work (*techne*), a final and linked aspect that a governmentality analysis is concerned with are which categories of diaspora practices are created (guest-worker, political exile, emigrant, diaspora, etc.). Which statuses and capacities are attached to them? What forms of conduct are ideally expected from them (generate wealth, lobby governments, etc.)? What duties and rights do they have? Emigrants seem being attributed different *identities* according to each rationality. Sovereign rationalities identify emigrants for instance as “pathological form of existence for a nation, a pathology that can only be “cured” by the territorialisation of the dispersed populations” (Ragazzi 2009b: 385). Members of the emigrants are thus simply expected to turn home where they will have to contribute to the wealth and strength of the sovereign state – and thus subject

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59 Dean (1995) calls this stage *ethos*, most probably to refer to the Greek word ἔθος meaning character or disposition.
themselves simply to the will of the sovereign ruler. Welfarist conceptions on the other hand consider emigrants of being a temporary phenomenon, since the referent still is the national population located within a territory. Emigrants are thus seen to return sooner or later. Should the migrants become “permanent”, suspicion is a consequence. The neoliberal modality sees emigrants as a legitimate form of social life. Diasporas are conceived here differently, in the sense that populations in general, and diasporas in particular, are no longer to be considered as passive receptors of state policies, but should rather become active in their own government.

It is in short through three methodological steps that the present study will analyse the data in the Indian and Jamaican contexts: how diaspora practices are problematised, which power mechanisms are at work and how respective emigrants are identified.

60 Although not truly operating according to a repressive logic, the funding of return (through financial or tax initiatives for instance) can be seen as an instance of such a sovereign practice (cf. also Green 2005: 276).

61 An example of such a suspicion is the emergence within the Indian context of so-called ABCD emigrants, i.e. American Born Confused Indians.
V. Analysis

The analysis of diaspora practices within the Indian and Jamaican contexts is effectuated in two sub-chapters, matching the two cases of interest to the present study. Every sub-chapter is structured in a similar manner in order to facilitate comparison across the different case studies. It will begin by contextualising the case by presenting a short account of the history and the geographical patterns of emigration of the case under scrutiny, followed by the material and intellectual context surrounding them – thus corresponding to the first methodological step of the problematisation (*episteme*). It will then pursue with the actual power mechanisms at work as well as the identifications of the respective diasporas.

A. Jamaica

Diaspora practices within the Jamaican context belong undoubtedly to the more recent ones, globally speaking. The beginnings of this enterprise can be seen occurring only at the beginning of the 1980s, whereas other states had begun to identify, organise and subject their respective diasporas already much earlier. The context or problematisation within which these practices are to be situated is an economic or *economistic* one with its declared aim of achieving increased economic development by relying on this newly emerging “state category” of the Jamaican diaspora.

In order to analyse Jamaican diaspora practices, a historical sketch of the larger patterns of Caribbean emigration will be given before turning to the historical patterns of Jamaican emigration. It is argued that the nature and evolution of Jamaican
emigration have an important impact on how diasporic practices in Jamaica have developed. The chapter pursues thereafter how emigration practices, and more particularly diaspora practices, have been problematised within the Jamaican context before turning to the analysis of the governmental rationalities operative in the Jamaican context. The underlying assumptions regarding subjects of such diaspora practices are tackled in the last section of this chapter.

**Episteme: Problematisation**

As outlined both in the theoretical framework and, in more detail, in the methodological chapter, the context within which diaspora practices develop is of utmost importance to understand these better. The context refers both to the material conditions enabling the emergence of such practices as well as their intellectual or ideational context. It is only with this in mind that it is possible to uncover [tacit] assumptions of diaspora practices within the Jamaican context, such as, most importantly, which problem(s) are to be resolved through the adoption of such practices, which tools, techniques and technologies are used and how diaspora practices operate with certain imaginations of emigrant subjects.

The discussion of the wider regional context of the Caribbean constitutes in this sense the start. This seems indispensable, since much of the Jamaican problematisation with regard to emigration is closely intermingled and linked to developments in the larger Caribbean basin. It is only in a second step that the discussion turns to Jamaica more specifically. Both sections offer the necessary background knowledge about the
History and geography of respective emigration, before analysing how these have been problematised.

**Caribbean emigration**

**History and geography of Caribbean emigration**

Caribbean emigration consisted, historically speaking, predominantly of black Caribbeans emigrating. The first emigration period can be situated between 1835 and 1880 and had in its majority neighbouring Caribbean islands as destination that were culturally and linguistically similar (cf. Chaney 1985: 111; Proudfoot 1950: 2). Most of the emigration was from the smaller Eastern Caribbean islands to British Guiana (known today as Guyana) and Trinidad (Johnson 1973; Marshall 1983; Ramesar 1976; Richardson 1980). To replace workers who had left, large numbers of Indian, Chinese and Javanese contract labourers were recruited by the English-speaking colonies, especially Trinidad and British Guiana or European labourers to the Spanish Caribbean (Hope 1984; Mintz 1974).

The second wave of Caribbean emigration lasted until the 1920s and saw many Caribbean people move to Hispanic cultural areas, such as Cuba or Santo Domingo, to work in the banana and sugar plantations – or to Panama for the construction of the Panama Railway and Canal. This extended later on also to English-speaking islands, as the American Fruit Company expanded its operations. As a consequence, the population of many Caribbean islands was actually declining between 1890 and 1920 (cf. Marshall 1982: 464). As noted by Roberts, Jamaicans in particular began moving to the United States of America in this period, with net emigration reaching almost 8’000 migrants per year. It was only with the US enactment of quota laws in 1921 and
1924 respectively that halted migration from Jamaica and other Caribbean islands (1974: 3). This stop lasted for more or less twenty years, i.e. until the early 1940s, during which most Caribbean migration was destined for the oil fields of Venezuela and Curacao (cf. Marshall 1982: 8).

With the beginning of the Second World War, Caribbean migration toward the United States took off again and began also moving to the United Kingdom later on, i.e. mostly from the 1950s onwards. Both countries were in need of support for their war efforts, since their own citizens were actively serving the war industries. However, it was with the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 in the United States that severely restricted Caribbean migration to the USA, leading the Caribbean migration mostly to Great Britain (cf. Vertovec 1993: 263). The 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act and the 1965 Hart-Cellar Immigration Reform Act, however, facilitated Caribbean migration to the USA to a much greater extent than at any other time since 1924, leading to the reverse dynamic.

**Problematisation(s) of Caribbean emigration**

Notable in all these emigration processes are both how the Caribbean emigration was problematised by scholars and how Caribbean emigrants problematised “themselves” and their experiences.

In the scholarly literature, we observe that the Caribbean denotes a homogenising category of emigrants that is synonymous with people of African heritage. People of different origins, such as Indo-Caribbeans, are excluded (cf. Vertovec 1993: 239). Such a neglect is perceptible for instance when remembering that the region is sometimes known as the *West Indies* and can be “seen” in the faces of some
Caribbean people, as observed by Hall among others: „[…] when you visit Guyana or Trinidad, you see, symbolically inscribed in the faces of their peoples, the paradoxical “truth” of Christopher Columbus’s mistake: you can find “Asia” by sailing west, if you know where to look!“ (2007: 227). It therefore comes as no surprise to see that little sociological work has been carried out on Indo-Caribbeans up to now (cf. Vertovec 1993: 274). Caribbean migrants in general were thus regarded monolithically as Blacks – independent of the previous hierarchy of shades valid in the West Indies during the time of colonialism – with several sub-groups, such as the distinction between whites, coloureds and Negros (cf. Vertovec 1993: 239). This “racial” aspect is also present – though differently – when considering how surprised some Caribbean emigrants were when discovering a white working class in Britain whereas poverty was always associated with black people (cf. Vertovec 1993: 241): the first-generation Caribbean experiences in Britain generated a corresponding valorisation of blackness on the part of Caribbean people, leading among others to a kind of new identity within the new places. There therefore emerges a new experience of acknowledging the salience of race in the immigration context. The whole experience of living in a white racist society, as visible in the British concerted policy of black geographical dispersal (cf. Vertovec 1993: 262), seems to have contributed to forging a black identity where in many cases such an identity did not exist previously or was not consciously thought about.  

62 It is in this context that a statement of one of the most important theorist of the negritude movement, Frantz Fanon, can be read: „It is the white man who creates the Negro. But is is the negro who creates négritude“ (Fanon 1965: 47).
One should also point out the fact that the passage to Britain brought Jamaicans, Barbadians, Grenadians, St. Kittians, Guyanese, Trinidadians, etc. for the first time in close proximity to one another, undermining thereby the “island chauvinism” and antipathies which seemed to be extant within the Caribbean (cf. Vertovec 1993: 240) – leading eventually to the fact that island chauvinism no longer seems to be present nowadays with second- and third-generation Caribbeans (cf. Vertovec 1993: 251).

Emigration, finally, was rarely considered (or problematised) as a permanent escape. It was rather seen as a solution for extending opportunities beyond the resource limitations of small islands in general: “For Caribbean people of all social classes, international migration became the most effective strategy for dealing with the constraints of highly stratified societies and small, dependent economies” (E. M. Thomas-Hope 1999: 185). This also explains why the return option is still upheld by many Caribbean emigrants.

But what problem(s) were diaspora practices aimed at resolving? Were they meant to overcome racial problems within Caribbean societies? To include also non-Black emigrants in societies? Or rather to improve living conditions of Caribbean emigrants within immigration contexts perceived as racist? Although the racial aspect seems to be present in diaspora practices – a point we will come back to later –, it seems that they were rather seen as constituting an alternative path to [economic] development – alternative path to the one followed upon until the end of the 1980s based on foreign direct investments (FDI). This seems to become visible in the beginning of the 1990s, more particularly with a report of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in 1992, i.e. Time for Action, when diasporas are first mentioned officially in the Caribbean
context and truly enter the vocabulary of Caribbean and, more particularly, Jamaican politics (B. Mullings 2011a: 414; Sives 2012: 119). The authors of the report suggest in fact a new means of economic development by drawing on the “skills and [...] capital” in the diaspora (cf. also Moore 1994: 155):

„But there is one further source into which CARICOM countries can tap; this is the diaspora. The consultations which we have had with West Indians in the diaspora [...] have impressed upon us that there is potential capital for investment to be mobilised in these countries throughout the opening of branch banks and facilities for the retailing of commercial and Government securities in the principal concentrations of West Indians in the diaspora. [...] We are convinced that the adoption of specific steps to mobilise for the development of the Region, the creative skills and the financial capital which residents in the diaspora possess will materially enhance the investment and production effort which the countries of the Region, and the Region as a collective unit, can mount in the years ahead“(West Indian Commission 1992: 122-3, our emphasis).

Further on, the report states:

„And those who have migrated in their hundreds of thousands, whom we have tended to identify with loss, drain, problems, weakness? It is becoming apparent that they may increasingly become a source of strength if we are imaginative enough to respond to their strong, continuing attachment for home. Our visits to consult with the diaspora in Britain, Canada and the USA were not only a revelation of the strengths, skills, resources, experience and energy in the keeping of our fellow West Indians living abroad but also a revelation of their continuing and enthusiastic commitment to help if given half a welcoming opportunity to do so” (West Indian Commission 1992: 122-3, our emphasis).
International competitiveness, it is suggested, would thus increase by relying on overseas experts – instead of retaining the previously dominant model of economic development based on foreign direct investments (FDI) as main factors of growth, since

“[...] FDI has contributed little to dynamic specialisation in higher value-added production due to limited knowledge transfers and weak research and development spillovers” (World Bank 2005: 48).

The neo-liberal theory of human capital is central hereby, since it is precisely with regard to such thinking that economic growth is to be attained according to the report – even though not explicitly stated. As already briefly mentioned, this theory puts the “creative” individual at the fore for the production of wealth rather than any “external” actor, such as foreign investors or national welfare institutions. Instead of “public actors”, the burden or responsibility of attaining economic development is henceforth put on the shoulders of individual emigrants, which are to be found – we are told – in the emigrant community. It is in this place that one would find the “creative skills” necessary for such national aims of economic well-being. Although developed mainly to explain wages, this theory seems to inform the perspective of the West Indian Commission when problematising [national] wealths through the mobilisation of [national] diasporas.

It therefore seems of no major surprise to see several scholars beginning to work on this “new” emigrant community, relabelled diaspora. It is not relevant whether they deliberately or consciously worked on diasporas with a view to promote economic
development or not. What is relevant, however, is that they began working upon this group – thereby rendering it also interesting to Caribbean state officials keen of finding new ways of economic development. Studies documented in this line how emigrant remittances were important for economic growth and investment rates, with a further advantage of seeing improvements in education, health and poverty levels:

“[…] countries that, while experiencing a surge in remittances flows, also promote sound economic policies and human capital development – and make progress in strengthening the institutional framework – will likely benefit in a variety of ways (Fajnzylber and López 2007: 47, our emphasis).

This “fact” coupled with the increasing questioning of the “old” foreign investor-oriented development model and the increasing shift of foreign investors to Latin America and China led therefore to the rendering visible of a new category of a new political object (or subject), i.e. national diasporas: „It is in the context of the failure of FDI-driven strategies to stimulate and sustain economic growth, the declining levels of incoming investment and the growing recognition of the potential scale and intensity of diaspora contributions that the popularity of skilled diaspora strategies should be understood“ (B. Mullings 2011a: 30). It should be stressed, however, that this appearance does not mean that Caribbean emigrants have not existed previously. It simply means that these persons come to acquire the status of an agent or “actor” to be acted upon, i.e. that they become politically visible and enter the vocabulary of Caribbean state officials as a new political category – although having existed already previously.

It is in this wider regional context of the Caribbean that diaspora practices within the Jamaican setting should be viewed.
Jamaican emigration

History and geography of Jamaican emigration

As indicated by Insanally et al. (2011), Jamaicans have been emigrating for generations. This emigration has been the case both to other Caribbean islands and Central America as well as to other regions of the world, notably Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (Foner 2005).

Historically, the main reasons for Jamaican emigration seem to have been mostly for economic ones linked to the search for employment possibilities elsewhere than on the Jamaican island (Cooper 1985; Glennie and Chappell 2010: 7). This fact is important to understand the nature of the Jamaican political engagement of its diaspora. Contrary to other Caribbean cases, such as Haiti or the Dominican Republic for instance, the lack of major political turmoils in Jamaica has in fact shaped, and continues to shape, the form of the political engagement of Jamaican emigrants (cf. Howard 2003; Laguerre 1998; Levitt 2001) – insofar as the engagement is of a rather limited nature.

Looking in more detail at historical patterns of Jamaican emigration, the first major Jamaican labour migration occurred immediately after the abolition of restrictions to free movement in the mid–1830s when large numbers of workers went to Central America and Panama until the middle of the twentieth century. Major construction projects, such as the trans-Isthmian railway and the Panama Canal were promising migrants better economic earning possibilities (Glennie and Chappell 2010: 2).
Migration patterns changed however during the Second World War, when the United States of America and the United Kingdom were in need of workers from Jamaican (and other Carribbean) former colonies. It is estimated for instance that some 10’000 Jamaicans, both skilled and unskilled, were recruited for the British West Indies Regiment (Glennie and Chappell 2010: 2).

This trend of emigration towards the United Kingdom and the United States of America continued after the Second World War. Especially the United Kingdom saw the arrival of many Jamaican migrants during the 1950s and 1960s and, due to the restrictive nature of migration policies in the United Kingdom in the late 1950s, the two North American states of Canada and the United States of America experienced major Jamaican immigration after the 1960s – states where migration was by far not as restrictive as in the United Kingdom at the time (cf. E. M. Thomas-Hope 1999: 184). It was mostly in industry, transport or for hospital services that they were needed. To give a visual idea of Jamaican migration patterns after the Second World War, the figure maps them graphically:
The geographical pattern of Jamaican emigrants is still concentrated in these three states nowadays, i.e. the United States of America, Canada and the United Kingdom. The United States of America counted slightly more than a million of Jamaicans in 2011 (U.S. Census Bureau 2011) with around 500’000 to 600’000 emigrants alone in the Southeast according to the Jamaican Consular services in Miami, Canada reported 230’000 Jamaicans (Statistics Canada 2006), while there are purportedly 150’000 Jamaicans (or with Jamaican origins) living in the United Kingdom (Office for National Statistics 2011). Other destination countries of Jamaican emigration are the Cayman Islands, the Bahamas, Antigua and Barbuda, Germany, Netherlands Antilles, Australia and Barbados (World Bank 2010).

The recent profile of Jamaicans living outside the island is quite difficult to estimate, considering the lack of appropriate and reliable data. Kim nonetheless suggests that
“[…] at least 25% of Jamaican citizens live overseas […] and the rate of population growth of legal Jamaicans in the US is almost twice as high as the population growth in Jamaica” (Kim 2007: 7). The OECD estimates that the emigration rate is around 33% (OECD 2012a: 126), while the World Bank estimates that it even amounts to 36% of the Jamaican population living as emigrants (as of the year 2011), i.e. a total of 985’500 emigrants (World Bank 2010: 146).

Looking at the profile of the emigrants in more detail, it is striking first of all to observe that Jamaica has one of the highest rates of emigration of highly-educated people, i.e. tertiary-educated population: 85% of this category emigrated in 2000, ranking thereby on the third position worldwide (World Bank 2010: 146)! This might contribute in explaining why several Jamaican – and other Caribbean – emigrants have been particularly successful abroad, as exemplified by their recurrent denomination as Jewmaicans (Cohen 1998: 24). The gender profile of emigrants finally is more or less balanced, while the age of emigrants is clearly in the category of people between 25 and 64 years, as visible in the table below (OECD 2012a: 126).

Table 5: Profile of Jamaican Emigrants (2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 – 24 (%)</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-64 (%)</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>74.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+ (%)</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low-educated (%)</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly-educated (%)</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD 2012
A last contextual element needed to better apprehend how diaspora practices are problematised, concerns the organisation of emigrants abroad. Diaspora practices in the Jamaican setting emerge in fact in a setting where Jamaican emigrant networks abroad pre-exist the formal diaspora practices. The different authorities enacting the economistic problematisation of diaspora practices are therefore able to capitalise on such networks – although with some tensions, as will be seen below in more detail. Jamaican emigrants have, not surprisingly, established links to their relatives remaining in Jamaica, different communities, businesses or, more generally, the Jamaican nation prior to the early 1990s – although it is difficult to quantify them due to a lack of appropriate data. But most of these linkages have been created by Jamaican emigrants without any formal initiative taken by the Jamaican state at that time. One example might be the National Association of Jamaican and Supportive Organisations (NAJASO), which was already created in 1977 in the United States of America. This association has emerged in order to “[...] address immediate problems which primarily affected their communities [Jamaican groups from across the US] in the USA” (Muschette-Kirk 2014: introduction) – thus pointing as early as the late 1970s towards a neoliberal logic where emigrants (and their respective communities) would have to govern themselves instead of relying upon support from Jamaican national or social institutions. More specifically, “several projects were implemented, including: NAJASO’s financial contributions to the Jamaica Adult Literacy (JAMAL) program; The Adopt-A-School program with the Mountain View Basic School in Kingston, Jamaica being the first of many basic schools to be built by NAJASO; the 1978 Marcus Garvey Scholarship Fund, an annual scholarship for 3 Jamaican students attending the University of the West Indies (UWI); and the erection of a bust
of the Most Right Excellent Marcus Mosiah Garvey, Jamaica’s first National Hero located in the Hall of the Americas, Organisation of American States (OAS), Washington, DC in 1980 (Muschette-Kirk 2014). Sives (2012: 114) mentions further examples, such as the establishment of an organisation aiming at helping the Jones Town basic school, the establishment of the Mount Industry Civic Association (especially in the health sector), or the creation of the Friends of Trelawny Association in order to contribute building infrastructure – all initiatives taken by emigrants. Similar organisations have not emerged, however, in the other major places of Jamaican emigrants, i.e. in Canada or the United Kingdom.

Remittances, i.e. money sent back home by emigrants, are also to be mentioned when discussing the organisation of Jamaica emigrants. Kim for instance shows that twenty-four percent of Jamaican households received remittances between 1995 and 2002 (2007: 7), while the Inter-American Development Bank estimates that the total amount of remittances grew from 184 million US Dollars in 1990 to 1870 million US Dollars in 2005, equivalent to eighteen per cent of the Jamaican Gross Domestic Product (2006: 2).

Problematisation(s) of Jamaican emigration

But what were the problem(s) that emigration, or more particularly diaspora practices were envisioned to resolve? How are diaspora practices problematised? What is the specific context within which such problematisations occur? As implicitly mentioned above, Jamaican diaspora practices appear within the same problematisation of the wider Caribbean context, i.e. to reach economic development through an alternative
pathway than the model previously followed upon, which was based on foreign direct investments as its main source (cf. also Mangion 2011: 80; B. Mullings 2012: 408). Jamaican emigrants, as they were called in the beginning of the economistic problematisation of Jamaican emigration (instead of the later denominator of members of them as members of the Jamaican diaspora), were thus seen as an alternative means to attain [economic] wealth.

Historically (or rather genealogically) speaking, it seems that Jamaican emigrants – and more generally emigration – did not appear worth being problematised for a long time – at least not in terms of Jamaican agency. British colonialism obviously accounts for much of this lack, since the issue was mainly aimed at agents recruiting workers for economic purposes within the borders of the Jamaican state or prospective emigrants.63

It is only with its independence from the United Kingdom in 1962 that Jamaican emigration began to be framed differently and independently from the colonial power’s interests. It was henceforth considered „as a deeply institutionalised strategy for economic subsistence and betterment within the community“ (Basch 1982: 11) and

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63 One could mention in this regard different legislative acts prior to the 1990s, representing such a problematisation (cf. E. Thomas-Hope et al. 2012: 54-6): the Foreign Recruiting Act of 1875 which allows the responsible Minister to „prohibit or limit persons recruiting for any foreign state“ (Anonymous 1875: §3) – an act which has remained in force although replaced in practice by the Employment Agencies Regulation Act of 1957. Both of these acts deal, however, not with emigrants per se, but rather with the recruiting agents or employers wishing to hire Jamaicans abroad. Three other acts deal more specifically with [prospective] emigrants: The Emigrants Protection Act of 1925 (Anonymous 1925) specifies the rules regarding permits for persons going to specific countries, the Recruiting of Workers Act of 1940 (Anonymous 1940) does exactly the same, but with regard to countries not concerned under the Emigrants Protection Act, and finally the regulations of 1935 and 1965 with regard to the Passport Act (Anonymous 1935) define the conditions under which one may be granted a Jamaican passport for travel. But all of these legislative acts remain restricted to colonial rationalities and do not constitute a problematisation of the Jamaican diaspora.
“part of the natural development process from the developing country perspective” (Basch 1982: 134) – thus taking into account the [economic] well-being of Jamaicans themselves rather than that of the United Kingdom. It was thus from the outset that Jamaican emigration processes were framed in economistic terms. Central in the problematisation of Jamaican emigration for economic aims were mostly social scientists. Several statistical, demographic or economic studies could be cited in this regard (cf. Chaney 1985; Harewood 1972, 1975; Kritz 1981; Murray 1982; Palmer 1977, 1983, 1984; Proudfoot 1950; Roberts 1958, 1974; Segal 1975).

This should not preclude other issues from being invoked when referring to such processes. But it is to assert that the economic objectives are the dominant one in the Jamaican context, i.e. to assert that Jamaican emigrants were identified mainly as important and crucial sources of economic development.

In accordance with our ontological conception of power as being everywhere, since it comes from everywhere, it is necessary to consider different sites where Jamaican emigrants were problematised.

One site seems particularly important in this context, i.e. universities – more particularly scientific disciplines situated within human and social sciences. Social scientists were crucial to this economistic enterprise: Jamaica’s emigration was initially problematised as an [economic] “brain drain” which would be a major problem for development, perhaps more so than any other of migration's impacts:

“...In the past 30 years external migration, in the form of emigration, first to the United Kingdom, then to the United States and Canada, has served as a powerful curb on growth” (Roberts 1974: 174, our emphasis).
Emigration problematised in this negative sense – resonating the “brain drain” discourse – would effect the quality of the Jamaican educational and health systems, by “over-stretching” the personnel (cf. Mortley 2011; E. Thomas-Hope et al. 2009).

It is only from the 1980s onwards that scholars began to study the phenomenon of Jamaican migration and emigration in a different context, i.e. in the context of “brain gain”, and more particularly of diasporas. The signifier of the diaspora serves to denote a different way of how economic development was to be achieved. It was suggested to tap into their resources by using the “diaspora option” or the “virtual cluster approach” (Gamlen 2006: 16-7; Larner 2007; Pellerin and Mullings 2012):

„That is a whole West Indian nation over there strategically placed in new homes but willing to be involved in constructing the future of a land they have not forgotten. Not entirely a drain then – perhaps a remarkable source of influence and assistance” (West Indian Commission 1992: 82, our emphasis).

Such a discourse would achieve economic development by asking members of the Jamaican diaspora to provide “[…] advice, mentoring, business partners and offshore finance” (Larner 2007: 336). It is thus a globalising logic where highly-qualified emigrants constituting the Jamaican diaspora are no longer required to physically return home – globalising logic normally associated with the diaspora option of brain gain strategies.

But it is central to highlight that the other option of the brain gain discourse i.e. the “return option”, is also present in the Jamaican case, as will be seen in the “technical” part of this chapter. It is therefore not only the “deterritorialised” diaspora option which operates in Jamaica; the “territorial” [and mainly welfarist] logic of the return option is equally to be mentioned.
It is in this context of a brain gain discourse that the Jamaican *diaspora practices* came to be seen and problematised as the centrepiece in the “co-development process” (Agunias 2009; Connan 2004; de Haas 2006; Margheritis 2014b, 2014a). Jamaican state officials strive for economic wealth together with the emigrant community. It is in this sense that the Jamaican diaspora was *formally* rendered visible from the 1990s onwards – sense that has not changed up to today, as stated in the Jamaican national policy plan of action on international migration and development in 2013:

„The strengthening of relationships and partnerships with the Diaspora is seen as strategic step in advancing the national development agenda. The Diaspora contributes significantly to national development in critical sectors such as health and education. Cash and non-cash contributions from Jamaicans overseas have been important in improving household income and Jamaica’s foreign currency reserves. The size, constituent skills and location of the Diaspora offer development opportunities. Working with the Diaspora through local community development, outreach to second and third generation Jamaican migrants, and trade promotion are some of the common positions from which mutual benefits can be derived“ (Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) 2013: 38, our emphasis).

**Reification through diaspora conferences**

Although the establishment of *diaspora conferences* is analysed in the “technical” part of this chapter, it makes sense to highlight at this point already how these conferences build upon such economistic problematisations and pursue them – thereby contributing to reifying such problematisations and rendering them more
stable. This section is thus merely dedicated to highlight how these conferences enter into the economistic problematisations of diaspora practices.

An analysis of the different issues discussed during these conferences reveals such an emphasis on economistic thinking or economistic framing of diaspora practices.

Although the objectives of the first conference in 2004 were defined in a threefold manner as consisting of diverse issues – (1) to record the contribution of Jamaican emigrants to Jamaica’s national [economic] development, (2) to involve Jamaican emigrants in the economic, political, social and cultural life in Jamaica and finally (3) to develop the structures strengthening the state-diaspora relations (cf. Duncan 2004) –, the main ones were clearly aimed at ensuring Jamaica’s national [economic] development, promoting investments and discussing future financial and business models.

A look at both interventions during the conference as well as its official program point to such an interpretation (cf. B. Mullings 2011a: 417). Themes during the first diaspora conference of 2004 were: Going for Greater Efficiency - Public Service Delivery; Your Business is our Business; Foreign and Trade Policies & the Involvement of the Overseas Community; the Jamaican Economy and finally Development, Industry and Tourism (Diaspora Conference 2004). Similar themes were suggested at the second diaspora conference in 2006, at least when following the official agenda: Mobilisation of the Diasporic Community, Opportunities for Business Linkages and Investment, Globalisation and the Diaspora and Implications for the movement of people with focus on the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) (Jamaica Information Service 2006). The third conference in 2008 continued
this path by attempting to „convert support from the Diaspora into local economic development“ (Jamaica Observer 2008).

Notable were especially from 2008 onwards how both diaspora delegates, Jamaican state officials and private sector representatives began to see all possible issues in terms of their economistic lenses. More than three quarters of the fourth convention in 2011 followed up on the economistic lenses and how these could be operationalised in institutional terms by drawing on the Jamaican diasporic community, and more particularly on its youth in order to assure a sustainable development. The themes dealt especially with issues such as Jamaica’s Economic and Social Development, Opportunities for development partnerships and funding or Maximising Brand Jamaica. The latter theme included even the 2012 Olympic Games in London, which were considered as a unique opportunity to attract diaspora investments to Jamaica’s national economic development. The fifth convention of 2013, finally, did not change the economistic path: the main objective was still to initiate business, trade, investment and venture capital deals (Jamaican High Commission United Kingdom 2013; Vasciannie 2013), but to achieve these „in a sluggish, International Monetary Fund-dominated economy“ (Jamaica Gleaner 2013f). Methods and ideas for development „in a modern world“ (Les 2013) would need to adapt to the new context.

A special focus within this economistic logic was dedicated to the discussion of Jamaica’s long-term economic development, with a governmental report entitled Vision 2030 serving as the basis of discussions (Jamaica Gleaner 2013a). Particular investment sectors discussed during the conference were mostly tourism, health, education and the agricultural one. Many diaspora delegated complained in fact about a little conducive investment context upon which the government should act.
Discussions turned therefore around issues of how to create an economically better context or environment to attract investments (Silvera 2013b).

But we observe that the the economistic discourse of Jamaican diaspora practices did not proceed without oppositions. From the outset onwards, several complaints coming from different corners were discernible. Mostly emigrants from New York were at the front when complaining for instance about the issues discussed during the first diaspora conference in 2004:

„They got us wet, and just left us hanging. We want an action plan to address issues we face both in Jamaica and the U.S“ (Irwine Clare, Caribbean Immigrant Services New York, quoted in: Mesquita-Adams 2006f).

This opposition went as far as suggesting an alternative agenda for the second diaspora conference in 2006. Several Jamaican emigrants from New York had in fact been meeting since March 2006 to craft such an alternative agenda. The result was that conference delegates during the second conference were confronted with (at least) two agendas, i.e. one imposed by the main conductors of the diasporic governmentality and another one proposed by delegates from New York (cf. Mesquita-Adams 2006f; B. Mullings 2011a: 240). Despite such counter-conducts – to use the Foucauldian language – coming from some emigrants from New York, the official agenda was largely retained for this second diaspora meeting. This is what the New Yorker section opposed by insisting that

„[W]e don’t want to be lectured to by just private-sector people. We want to get grass-roots people in the mix“ (José Richardson, president of Sons and Daughters of New York, quoted in: Mesquita-Adams 2006f: our emphasis).
There only were a few suggestions incorporated in the agenda of this second conference. It therefore seems legitimate to have doubts about the statement of one of the organisers and main conductors of this second diaspora conference:

"We eagerly await the diaspora and what they have to say. We’re not just interested in the diaspora because of remittances“ (Rex Nettleford, President of Jamaican Diaspora Foundation, quoted in: Mesquita-Adams 2006f: our emphasis).

The chairman of the conference confirms such doubts:

„Their [emigrants] advance in professions worldwide and accumulation of personal wealth makes them increasingly important as potential and actual investors“ (Douglas Orane, Chairman of Second Diaspora Conference, quoted in: Jamaica Gleaner 2006h: our emphasis).

A final example includes possible human rights abuses: even though local non-governmental organisations, such as Jamaicans for Justice, the Independent Jamaican Council for Human Rights (IJCHR) or the National Action Coalition asked for putting these issues on the agenda in the context of the discussion on crime and justice (Jamaicans for Justice 2010; S.-A. Thompson 2007), such issues were silenced once again.

Despite all of the oppositions and counter-conducts during many of the diaspora conferences, the economistic discourse within which diaspora practices were placed remained dominant throughout the entire process of the problematisation of the diasporic governmentality. This even began to attract some sarcastic comments about the logic underpinning these conferences and conventions, as discernible in editorials or commentaries:
„[...] your safety is not a priority, just your money“
(Commentary to Editorial, quoted in: Jamaica Gleaner 2013f).

„All they whant is we MONEY YU MUSN’T ASK FOR UNACCOUNTABLY JUST LET OFF THEY MUST BE JOKING“
(Commentary to Editorial, quoted in: Duncan 2004).

The emphasis on economic issues does not preclude however that other issues were not discussed during diaspora conferences. Several other issues were discussed there, relating to crime, education, health, social reproduction, philanthropy, humanitarian assistance or cultural issues. But crucial to note is the attempt to place all of these issues within the wider discourse of the economistic discourse.

One could mention for instance social or political issues put forward by the opposition leader Seaga in 2004:

„But they [Jamaican emigrants] want and deserve much more. We must develop an appropriate institutional framework in which they can be integrally involved in the social and political life of our country. The experiences they have acquired can be of immense value in improving the quality of governance and the relationships between the people and their government and among the people themselves“ (Seaga 2004: our emphasis).

Some participants moreover seemed to be interested in issues of humanitarian assistance, philanthropy, cultural practices, modes of social reproduction (B. Mullings 2012: 418) or tourism (Jamaica Information Service 2006). Concrete examples include the suggestion by Jamaican emigrants from Canada during the second conference to establish a Jamaica Fund to help finance several projects on the island, including education, health and policing activities (Jamaica Gleaner 2006g). It was planned to base the fund on the Israeli model where Jamaicans could contribute
on a monthly basis (cf. Sheil 2006). At the same conference, it was also suggested to establish Disaster Preparedness Committees in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom (cf. Sterling 2006), thereby adding the humanitarian sector to the agenda. But, as previously noted, these issues were clearly secondary in the problematisation of diaspora practices within the economistic discourse.

To be concise, all diaspora conferences pursue and reify the economistic discourse as set out already at the beginning of the 1980s. The slogan of the *Mapping Jamaica Diaspora Project* summarises this spirit best:

“I am here. You are there. We are Jamaica – A borderless society. Together we work towards growth and prosperity”
(Manderson 2014: our emphasis).

In short, it was at *different sites* that the Jamaican diaspora was named and constituted as the principal actor to bring *economic development* to Jamaica. Jamaican nationals living abroad were not the ones who took the initiative to render themselves more visible in politics, as was the case in other Caribbean states for instance. The “discovery” of the Jamaican diaspora, and its strategic importance for economic wealth, has in general been the result of scientifico-political projects since the early 1990s rather than of groups of the Jamaican civil society or the different Jamaican emigrants abroad (Sives 2012: 114) – contrary to many other Caribbean states. This does not mean, however, that it is through a so-called *top-down* approach that the Jamaican diaspora was problematised and made visible. The Jamaican state
adopted the ideas from other different actors, thereby constituting them as a new political category to be acted upon.

Substantially speaking, Jamaican emigration was barely problematised as a “Jamaican” issue under British colonial rule. But from the moment of independence in 1962, it was framed within economistic terms. Although initially placed in a “brain drain” discourse where emigration was considered as harmful for economic development, we witness a change to the “brain gain” discourse beginning in the 1980s.

It is with this in mind that the Jamaican government began thinking about and establishing different tools, i.e. political technologies, to render the Jamaican diaspora visible, manageable and thus governable. Such tools include knowledge or inscription devices – to use the vocabulary of the sociologist Latour (cf. 1987) – and symbolic instruments in order to subject Jamaican emigrants to appropriate technologies of power. It is with equipped with such tools that we will then be able to analyse the different rationalities at work within Jamaican diaspora practices. These range from sovereign modalities of power to disciplinary ones aimed at individual members of the Jamaican diaspora, but also welfarist and neo-liberal modalities of power aimed at the population of the Jamaican diaspora.

**Techne & Governmentalities**

The “technical” aspect of analysis is mainly concerned with looking at how diaspora practices translated the economistic problematisation concretely, i.e. which type of knowledge and which political technologies were used, but also according to which
logic they operated. To this end, we first need to analyse which knowledge was used and which instruments and tools were used to render the *economistic* problematisations of diaspora practices operative as knowable, manageable and ultimately governable domains. The instruments and tools which are used – one should recall – are conceptualised both in material and symbolic terms; they refer to performative practices denoting “[…] a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets” (Foucault 1975: 215). Different institutions and actors, such as state institutions, are thereby seen as effects of political technologies rather than as starting points; they constitute the “crystallisation” of technologies, i.e. technologies that are materialised and stabilised in institutional settings (cf. Lemke 2007: 49-50). It is thus argued that these political technologies also include the constitution of specific *identifications* of actors enacting these diaspora practices, including Jamaican state actors.

The analysis of the techniques, tools and instruments to render diaspora practices visible, manageable and thus governable serve as the basis for the ensuing analysis of mentalities of rule or governmentalities. The second section is about specifying which governmental technologies are at work.

**Knowledge devices, techniques and tools**

Several instruments have been created and used in the Jamaican context to “operationalise” the economistic problematisation of diaspora practices. Knowledge and inscription devices rendering the diasporas visible are thereby primordial. But it is not only through a specific type of knowledge used to render them visible, but also through symbolic practices that aim at producing a communication relationship with a
shared mentality among emigrants – at least those emigrants mainly targeted. The targeted emigrants constitute only a special section, i.e. the creole professionally successful emigrants – thus responding to a typical biopolitical mechanism of classifying the emigrant population in order to govern the classified sections according to certain logics or rationalities. As will be seen, the most important symbolic practice in this context is the organisation of biennial diaspora conferences.

**Knowledge and inscription devices**

Regarding first the type of knowledge, it comes as no major surprise – when recalling the relevant governmentality literature – to observe that mostly *human* and *social sciences* were used to produce diaspora practices, as mentioned briefly in the last section. Central were mostly *social scientists*, such as statistics, political economy, political geographers, political demographers, anthropologists or economists. This seems logical when recalling the origins of the scientific discipline known today as statistics. In its beginnings, it was considered as an enterprise at the service of the state, still visible in the name *stat*-istics, by collecting data about national populations and their attributes. They have been most prominent in problematising emigrants qua members of a diaspora as a real *political* problem to be dealt with. It is (also) on such a *scientific* basis that the Jamaican state is able to render emigrants “knowable”, visible – and thereby governable.

All of these scientific disciplines began to bring to the fore the concept of *Jamaican diaspora* by identifying it with a certain segment of Jamaican emigrants, i.e. the highly-qualified ones, and by characterising some of its dominant traits and by collecting data on issues such as mortality, fertility, labour force or growth prospects.
– thus clearly pointing to the salience of biopolitical rationalities. Such emigrants were thereby mainly identified by their desire to return home, as developed in more detail in the section on the subjects of diaspora practices. The desire to return home would however only be possible once the economic gains have been made abroad (due to profit-seeking natures of members of the Jamaican diaspora):

„Caribbean migrants [...] are unlike European immigrants [...] more like the inhabitants of a European colony, trying to reap as much benefit as possible by residing in the colonial power“ (Dominguez 1975: 59).

„The Caribbean exodus is distinctive because its migrants have [...] resisted assimilation and sought to retain homeland ties and cultural identities“ (Segal 1987).

A further instrument of such biopolitical instruments was the classification of the emigrant population in different cohorts in order to identify them better according to several criteria, including their age structure, their sex composition, their educational attainments, and others. Interesting to note is that such cohorts were almost never constructed with regard to the then dominating social structure classifications in the West Indies, i.e. with regard to racialised classes. It is as if that criterion were simply invisible or ostracised from such accounts – although the racial criterion is of utmost importance in the Jamaican context. But it is an assumed criterion rather than explicitly stated. We will see in a moment that economic development in the Jamaican setting has been mainly problematised as following a model of a “racialised capitalism”.

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But studies are not only limited to statistical, demographic or economic disciplines. Political geography (Boswell 1981) enters the field as much as sociology (Bovenkerk 1974), anthropology and ethnology (Du Toit and Safa 1975; Rhoades 1979; Safa and Du Toit 1975) or history (Ramesar 1979; Silvestrini and Thomson 1985) by highlighting different aspects of diasporas. If it is true that sociological or anthropological accounts look mainly at the effects of returning emigrants on domestic societies, they still contribute to bringing a new group to light by highlighting different aspects of Jamaican nationals living abroad.

What these studies all have in common is the attempt to map out patterns of migration and emigration from Jamaica – a tool that has not been previously used in the context of Jamaican emigration. While it began by an interest of population demographers, statisticians and economists who were mainly concerned about the consequences of emigration for population growth and distribution, development economists entered the stage to hint at the problems such emigration was causing to the Jamaican economy. Historical or geographical knowledge was thereby used instrumentally to demonstrate to what extent emigration was dealt in different time periods and in different places.

It is with this in mind that the Jamaican government “picks up” this “new reality” in the early 1990s – after a report of the CARICOM. With the issue and “problem” of emigration already mapped out by social scientists, it contributes to creating a new thinking tool or political category – known as the diaspora. Illustrative is a comprehensive study produced by the Jamaican Diaspora Institute (Ying et al. 2010) which identified close to two hundred diaspora associations in the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada, which were involved in four main areas of economic
assistance, i.e. education, social services, health foundations and business, investment and trade. But it is only with a recent *Mapping the Jamaican Diaspora Project* that the visibilisation of the Jamaican diaspora is intended to be complete – by June 2015 (Jamaican High Commission United Kingdom 2014; Manderson 2014).

The last type of knowledge which is used in the Jamaican context is the *learning* or *emulation* of diaspora practices *by visits* of diaspora conferences of other countries and of the analysis of other homeland diaspora partnerships (cf. Jamaica Gleaner 2006b). A Jamaican Prime Minister used for instance the success stories of Israel, India, Ireland, China and Mauritius as examples to be followed upon (Silvera 2013d).

Before proceeding with the question of which other [symbolic and material] devices are used to render diaspora practices governable, two last important notes have to be mentioned regarding the knowledge produced mainly by the human and social sciences. When referring to the “picking-up” of the socio-scientific knowledge by Jamaican state agencies, one has to keep in mind that this practice does not imply that the latter simply are passive receptors of such a knowledge. By picking it up, they rather participate in reproducing and thereby *reifying* the newly identified objects of knowledge, which came to be known under the label of “diaspora”. State agencies are thus to be seen as active knowledge-producers as were the social scientists in the beginning.

Knowledge is in other words not to be equated simply with the traditional scientific locations, such as universities or policy think tanks where social scientists are situated in their majority, but is *produced at multiple sites*. If the social scientists contributed
in bringing the idea of diaspora into being, Jamaican state agencies reproduce and reify such an idea constantly by tying it to its national imaginary and nationalist ambitions (cf. also Werbner 2002).

Secondly, the production, reproduction and reification of knowledge is not limited to these sites of [social] sciences and the state, but are also found in places, which may seem surprising prima facie. Cultural sites (understood largely) should primarily be mentioned in this regard. It obviously would be beyond the scope of the present study to look at the impressive diversity of manifestations where the Jamaican diaspora is treated in the culture, but some subjectively selected examples will hopefully suffice the argument that knowledge on the Jamaican diaspora in its economistic sense is also to be found in the cultural field.

One could mention for instance the numerous culinary dishes that are identified not just generally speaking with Jamaican cuisine, but more particularly with the Jamaican diaspora – thereby materialising the idea of the [economically successful] diaspora through food products or companies: „Jamaican diasporic food stories can be followed through the big brand names like Pickapeppa, Dunns River, Jamaica Sunpride, Walkerswood, Grace and Goya that find prominent shelf space in many supermarkets. [...] Food like this can easily turn eating into a joyful cult activity bonding any dispersed diaspora“ (F. W. Knight 2011). Many other products are regularly mentioned as materialising the Jamaican diaspora: Blue Mountain Coffee, Jamaican Jerk, Red Stripe or Ginger Beer.

One could mention press products, such as the magazine Jamaican Diaspora which looks at the [economic] achievements of the Jamaican diaspora in several fields.
One could mention films, which are re-interpreted as part the Jamaican diaspora: *Cool Runnings* is just one example.

One could mention the development of songs, styles or even entire genres in the music industry produced under the rubric of the Jamaican diaspora: the appropriation by the diaspora movement in the USA for instance of some music pieces issued by the Jamaican reggae/dancehall musician Orville Burrell, better known as *Shaggy* is indicative in this regard. Tessanne Chin’s success in the USA is equally attributed to the demographic and economic weight of the Jamaican diaspora.

Finally, one could mention the organisation of different festivals, such as the annual *Long Island Caribbean American Heritage Festival*, dedicated to the Jamaican diaspora combining several cultural elements of the “Jamaican diaspora” at one single place and placing such elements within the economistic discourse of Jamaican diaspora practices by including a “[...] Caribbean Business Connection” therein (Jamaica Diaspora Connect 2014).

All of these cultural sites are just as important – if not even more important – as the Jamaican state agencies in reproducing (and thereby reifying) the idea of a Jamaican diaspora by “branding” what it means to be Jamaican. To be concise, if the knowledge on the Jamaican diaspora has mainly been produced by social scientists – for economistic purposes above all –, the (re-)production and (re-)negotiation of such a knowledge is effected in a dispersed way throughout many different sites.

It is thus a sort of a *symbiotic* relationship between formal political authorities of Jamaican and human and social sciences that characterises the type of knowledge used in diaspora practices as developing mainly from the 1980s and 1990s onwards,
i.e. where the idea develops to use the diaspora as crucial source of economic development.

**Symbolic devices**

Having seen which type of knowledge was mainly used in diaspora practices within the Jamaican context, which symbolic tools were used?

Symbolic practices aimed at enacting and performing the “new” economistic problematisation of Jamaican emigration and emigrants through the relabelling of them as members of the Jamaican “diaspora”. It is, in the Jamaican context, about integrating Jamaican [highly-qualified and creole] emigrants into the Jamaican nation, as visible also in the CARICOM report of 1992. It considers explicitly that they are part of the respective West Indian nations, contributing decisively to the task of the symbolic nation-building necessary for the governability of diasporas:

„Lest it be thought that our interest in the Diaspora is purely mercenary, we must also find better organised, more systematic, ways of involving ourselves in the problems they face in their new homes. [...] We must represent our interest in the well-being of our people at the highest levels and whenever required. We must treat these men and women and children of the Diaspora as West Indians all, far from home but close at heart“ (West Indian Commission 1992: 26-7, our emphasis).

But central in this symbolic construction of the Jamaican diaspora is who was considered to be part of it. The call of the Jamaican Senator Munroe for a conference to be convened regarding diaspora engagement is highly instructive in this regard: although it called for the inclusion of *all Jamaican emigrants* to the definition of the
 Jamaican diaspora – since this motion called for the recognition of the positive role of Jamaican emigrants in general in Jamaica’s economic development – the motive for the initiative of the Jamaican senator highlighted from the outset that only a certain fraction of Jamaican emigrants were targeted, i.e. only those that would prove *economically useful* and thus useful for the achievement of Jamaican development objectives. It is in other words only with the *economically successful emigrants*, targeted by this initiative, that a communication channel was sought. The motion was, unsurprisingly, unanimously adopted by the Jamaican Senate.

Other symbolic “nation branding” practices include the numerous travels undertaken by former Prime Minister Patterson to meet “Jamaican overseas representatives”, but also in order to present *Medals of Appreciation* to several Jamaican emigrants living in London. Though the institution of such medals already developed in the beginning of the 1980s, they were rarely discerned to overseas Jamaicans up to the beginning of the 2000s and constitute thus an additional and welcome occasion for Jamaican state officials to tie Jamaican emigrants to an “enlarged” Jamaican nation.

But by far the most important nation branding technology were the establishment of *biennial diaspora conferences*. Their main objective was to provide a forum where diaspora members – or so-called “delegates” – meet with representatives from Jamaican state agencies and private companies. The provision of such a forum was thought to “embrace” the Jamaican diaspora and tying it to the Jamaican nation. As will be seen below, it is also during many of these meetings that new practices and institutions are developed aimed at improving incrementally the government of the diaspora.
Such convenings were established after a first series of dialogue was held throughout the United States, Canada and the UK, i.e. the major settlement places of Jamaican emigrants, between January to June 1999 – convenings sponsored both by the pre-existing emigrant organisation NAJASO (National Association of Jamaicans and Supportive Organisations) and the Jamaica National Guild. But no tangible results arose from these series of dialogue. It was only with the creation and appointment by former Prime Minister Patterson of a Minister for Diaspora Affairs, based in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade (Franklyn 2004; Sives 2012: 119) that concrete results were being produced. The first real result was the organisation of a symposium at the MONA Business School of Business in 2003, to which a number of “key individuals” from the diaspora were invited to participate. Not surprisingly, these individuals were considered fundamental mostly with regard to their economic contributions to the Jamaican economy. The main objective of this symposium was, according to former Foreign Minister Franklyn, to listen to

„some of the issues they [representatives from the overseas community] would like to address“ with the result that „they underscored and underlined that we needed to increase the dialogue with the overseas community“ (2004).

The result of the symposium was the creation of diaspora conferences. These would take place in a biennial rhythm – always around June 16, which was defined to be the Jamaica Diaspora day (B. Mullings 2012: 414-5). Several Jamaican emigrant communities would furthermore organise on that day different activities, such as seminars, health fairs, cultural and sporting events in celebration of the Jamaican diaspora. In order to prepare the first biennial conference, a planning committee consisting of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, private sector
entities, other public sector agencies, the University of the West Indies, the University of Technology and the returned residents associations was established. It was also suggested – during the first diaspora conference – to hold biennial meetings to review achievements and goals of the diaspora meetings.

Before analysing in more detail governing rationalities operative at these diaspora conferences, some general remarks with regard to them are provided by way of introduction. The table below lists the themes of the respective diaspora conferences.

Table 6: Jamaican Diaspora Conferences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Theme</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Unleashing the Potential</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Unleashing the Potential</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Building a Borderless Partnership for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>One Nation: Jamaica and Its Diaspora in Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>A Nation on a Mission: Jamaica Partnership for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Jamaica and the Diaspora: Linking for Growth and Prosperity</td>
</tr>
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</table>

As can be seen, the first biennial diaspora conference was held in June 2004 and marked the formal beginning of diaspora practices in the Jamaican context. It took place in Kingston, i.e. the capital of Jamaica, as alsooo the second and third conferences. But the location of the fourth and fifth conferences changed. The fourth conference moved to Ocho Rios in St. Ann. This might seem negligible, but it nevertheless is notable for at least two different reasons: first is the fact that the costs of such a move imposed additional expenses upon participants, since they could no longer find accommodation in Kingston. The attendance costs were thus becoming even more expensive with this conference – thus highlighting that mainly wealthy
diaspora members are targeted. The second reason is of symbolic nature, since it seems no coincidence that this location has been chosen for this fourth diaspora conference. Ocho Rios is known for its “Mystic Mountain”, an adventure site, which was cofounded in 2008 by a Jamaican emigrant living in the United States who had returned to Jamaica and invested in his homeland (Diversity Plus Magazine 2011). The fifth, and hitherto last, biennial diaspora conference took place in 2013 in Montego Bay, the second-largest Jamaican city – with the sixth one scheduled in the same city.

Just as worth mentioning is the time leap between the third and the fourth biennial conferences. The fourth diaspora conference, relabelled convention (B. Mullings 2011a), took place only in June 2011 instead of 2010, as initially staged. The official reason given was unrest in Kingston in 2010 which hindered the holding of a peaceful conference (Morrison 2011), but others believe that „the real reason for the cancellation was the extremely low registration by delegates because of the lack of involvement of the members of the Diaspora in the planning of that conference, including the determination of its agenda“ (Franklyn quoted in: Jamaica Observer 2011).

One also needs to outline that the two initial two conferences took place under the governmental reigns of the People’s National Party (PNP), while the following conferences were organised under the governmental auspices of the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP). With the electoral victory of the JLP in the national elections of 2007, some expected to see a change of emphasis with regard to the main rationality underpinning the Jamaican diasporic governmentality. But they would be proven
wrong, since the new JLP government pursued the same rationality as the previous PNP government.

A final remark by way of introducing these diaspora conferences regard the number of participants. They were – with one exception – steadily increasing since the beginning of the formal diaspora strategy. While the first biennial conference in 2004 numbered around 250 participants, the second had already 500 participants, the third 700 while inviting a record total of 1512 participants at the fifth conference in 2013 (Balford 2013; Jamaica Gleaner 2006b; Jamaica Information Service 2010; Jamaica Observer 2008; Spaulding 2013; Walker-Huntington 2006). Only the fourth conference (or convention, as it was officially called) stands out in this regard, since it numbered only around 500 participants (cf. Gilchrist 2011). The reason of this exception seems obvious, for this is linked to the attempts by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade (MFAFT) to change the manner of how members of the diaspora choose their representatives.

To be brief, the different diaspora conferences and conventions are central insofar as they constitute a privileged channel for rulers to communicate with the Jamaican diaspora – thereby also contributing to continuously visibilise this new political actor. This can be seen as early as the first diasporic conference taking place in 2004 (cf. for instance Diaspora Conference 2004). Symbolic nation-building practices, which continue up to today can be found for instance in statements and declarations by several Jamaican state officials outlining how far the Jamaican nation would also include its diaspora. Most notable is the statement of the former Prime Minister Patterson who always spoke about a Jamaica without borders. Wherever Jamaicans
reside and work, he used to say, Jamaica is present (Jamaica Observer 2004a; Mesquita-Adams 2006a).

The statement of the leader of the opposition follows the same direction:

„It is said that no man is an island. In our case it can also be said that our island is not a nation because the Jamaican community stretches across oceans and continents and can be found in virtually every corner of the world. [...] despite the geographical and generational differences the vast majority remains committed to their homeland, its people and its culture. [...] Let it [the conference] be the start of something new and a positive step in the recognition that ours is a nation that exceeds our island shores“ (Seaga 2004: our emphasis).

The chairman of the diaspora conference makes a similar statement:

„As a nation, it is important that we redefine our scope of activity not only within the 4,400 square miles which is Jamaica but look to the 4½ million persons who live both inside and outside of our borders. I am suggesting that we need a national strategy to deal with this reality of the Jamaican nation being 4½ million people globally rather than just 2½ million located physically “on the rock”“ (Orane 2004: our emphasis).

Such symbolic nation-building practices were almost always accompanied by continued “visibilising” efforts and practices – thus pointing to a concerted and symbiotic relation between symbolic and visibilising practices. It is therefore possible to deduce that both practices go hand in hand, i.e. the discursive visibilisation of the diaspora coupled with the symbolic nation-building.

One could also mention the Washington-based National Coalition on Caribbean Affairs which had been advocating for Caribbean governments to become more
involved in helping to organise the Caribbean Diaspora as early as the first diaspora conference in 2004. This is why Senator Trevor Monroe introduced a resolution in the Jamaican Parliament to do just that and to recognise the value of the Diaspora – a resolution, which was subsequently adopted. Senator Delano Franklyn was appointed to lead the charge in this on-going process (Mesquita-Adams 2006a).

A declaration by the Prime Minister during the second conference points to a similar direction in this regard:

„These persons [Jamaican emigrants] may be willing to offer their expertise. But we are unaware of them. We need therefore to establish networks or search mechanisms that will identify and locate these Jamaicans and match them with our needs in disciplines that are key for development“ (Simpson Miller, Jamaican Prime Minister, quoted in: V. Davis 2006).

Finally, one could mention the numerous statistics and reports produced for the fifth diaspora conference in 2013 regarding Jamaican emigrants (cf. Jamaica Gleaner 2013k).

But the fact that the Jamaican government still continues up to today to pursue mapping projects of the Jamaican diaspora shows that the efforts to render the Jamaican diaspora visible are far from completed.

**Governmentalities**

Having seen that the establishment and organisation of diaspora conferences constitute one of the most important tools of diaspora practices in the Jamaican context, what logic underpin these conferences? Which rationalities of government are operative within them? Which mentalities of rule are discernible? How do they
render diaspora practices governable according to the economistic problematisation? It seems that several logics or technologies are operative herewith.

**Neo-liberal (normalisation) technologies**

The most important and most widely discussed modality of power is undoubtedly what the literature calls the *neo-liberal* technology. Several elements within diaspora practices can be elucidated to assess this claim.

The logic of the *market* that is so fundamental for the neo-liberal modality is to be mentioned foremost in this context. It is this logic which enables to *commodify* many aspects of diaspora practices – including nation-branding strategies, a plurality of enacting actors, linguistic aspects materialising the market logic as well as spatial arrangements enabling such a logic to perform.

**Nation-Branding strategies**

The *framing* of different issues in economistic terms through *strategic branding* or, applied to the political realm, *nation branding* (cf. Browning 2015) is one such aspect, as already sporadically hinted at above. It was considered possible to „*[d]evelop [a] framework for strategic branding of Jamaica and quantify Jamaica’s cultural industry*“ or to see „*[c]hurch and business communities coming together to facilitate growth [...]“ (Jamaica Gleaner 2008a). This seems reminiscent of the discourse of *nation branding* which is seen as one of the main mechanisms enabling different actors, such as state actors, to cope with geopolitical frames problematised and imagined as being premised on markets and globalisation processes, i.e. premised on neoliberal rationalities. States are thus themselves becoming neoliberalised in this
account. It is therefore based on problematisations of world politics as a *global marketplace* within which states are increasingly seen as resembling large corporate enterprises: “Such “state as firm” metaphors encourage an ethos within which states are no longer competing over territory and power, but over investment and market share and where success is viewed as conditional on a state’s entrepreneurial capacities” (Browning 2015: 200; cf. also Fougner 2006; Weidner 2011). It is imagined as a globalised world where “competition states” (Fougner 2006) come to replace political enmies, i.e. where economic rivalries about market domination are taking the lead (cf. also Moisio 2008). Nation-branding seems in this neoliberal problematised context to be one of the ideal strategies available to actors in order to cope with such a problematised environment. It seems particularly attractive, since it is considered as a strategic action aimed at eliciting emotional ties to a particular nation (and what that nation might stand for) in order to garner economic “dividends”.

Some of the consequences of such strategies are remarkable: one first observes a *commodification* of different domains, such as subjectivities, culture, history and others – visible for instance in the increasing “outsourcing” of different nation-branding processes to private sector representatives and marketing consultants (cf. Browning 2015).

Such a commodification is particularly visible in the Jamaican context during the fourth diaspora convention which took place in 2011 – with similar patterns holding for the other diaspora converences. More than three quarters of the fourth convention in 2011 followed up on the economistic lenses and how these could be operationalised in institutional terms by drawing on the Jamaican diasporic community, and more particularly on its youth in order to assure a sustainable development. The themes
dealt especially with issues such as *Jamaica’s Economic and Social Development, Opportunities for development partnerships and funding* or *Maximising Brand Jamaica* (!!!). The latter theme even included the 2012 Olympic Games in London, which were considered as a unique opportunity to attract diaspora investments to Jamaica’s national economic development. The fifth convention of 2013 did not change the economistic path: the main objective still was to initiate business, trade, investment and venture capital deals (Jamaican High Commission United Kingdom 2013; Vasciannie 2013), but to achieve these „*in a sluggish, International Monetary Fund-dominated economy*“ (Jamaica Gleaner 2013f). Methods and ideas for development „*in a modern world*“ (cf. Les 2013) would need to adapt to the new context. A special focus within this economistic logic was dedicated to the discussion of Jamaica’s long-term economic development, with a governmental report entitled *Vision 2030* serving as the basis of discussions (Jamaica Gleaner 2013a). Particular investment sectors discussed during the conference were mostly about tourism, health, education and agriculture. Many diaspora delegates in fact complained about a little conducive investment context upon which the government should act. Hence, discussions dealt with issues of how to create an economically better context or environment to attract investments (cf. Silvera 2013b).

But it is not just about commodifying domains, but also actors, including state actors: “*[…] as the international economy has steadily globalized, and firms have themselves slipped their national bonds, the “competition state” has transformed from a narrow focus on assisting national firms to an emphasis on making the state itself an increasingly attractive destination for global investment capital. Thus it is no longer*"
firms, but countries themselves which need to be made more competitive and attractive for investment” (Browning 2015: 202). It is in this sense that Fougner observes a transition from “statesmanship” to “salesmanship” where the aim would be to sell “[…] the state as a location to globally footloose capital and firms” (Fougner 2006: 180) – applying perfectly to the Jamaican context.

Plurality of enacting actors

It is in this context that a discussion on the plurality of actors enacting the economistic discourse of Jamaican diaspora practices is to be placed. In accordance with the neoliberal modality of power exposed in the theoretical framework, one observes that it is not only incumbent upon state actors to enact a certain rationality; other actors emerge, thus leading to a privatisation of different authorities (cf. also Ho et al. 2015; Larner 2015; Leung 2015; Mohammad 2007; Xiang 2011). Even artistic and cultural actors are integrated into the economistic discourse as visible for instance with Shaggy’s appeal to the broader Jamaican nation to invest in Jamaica.

Since diaspora practices in the Jamaican context are led by Jamaican state agencies, it is obvious that they need to be mentioned in the first instance. They are predominantly present during the diverse biennial diaspora conferences and seem to define their agendas. There are mainly two units representing most prominently the Jamaican state, i.e. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade (MFAFT) as well as the Jamaican Promotions Corporation (JAMPRO) – the latter being an agency of the Ministry of Industry, Investment and Commerce. The fact that exactly these two state units are present is not surprising at this point of time, since it is indicative of the economistic problematisation of diaspora practices.
However, this rather unsurprising state presence is not alone; several *private sector representatives* are at least as important in the conduct of the diaspora conferences (B. Mullings 2012: 420). Most discernible were, especially during the second conference in 2006, major Jamaican firms from the sectors of food distribution and financial services, including investment promotion officers. These firms were not only important sponsors of the second conference, but held a majority of the presentations during the event (cf. Jamaica Gleaner 2006h). These private actors were warmly welcomed by Jamaican state officials, as noted in different statements of government officials. The declarations of the Jamaican Prime Minister Patterson or the Foreign Minister Knight are indicative in this regard:

„I wish to congratulate the private sector sponsors whose farsightedness and commitment have made this Conference possible and, indeed, all those who have played a role in making the event a reality“ (Patterson 2004).

„Throughout the two-day conference, our nationals will be provided with the wonderful opportunity to articulate their views, share ideas on a range of issues which affect their welfare and interests central to which is the critical question of national development. [...] I would like to thank also Corporate sponsors for their invaluable support in making this conference a reality“ (K. D. Knight 2004).

Both of these actors, i.e. Jamaican state officials as well as representatives of the private sector, were dominating all of the conferences. This can be legitimately deduced from the analysis showing that they were by far granted the most time for their presentations, which is also mirrored in the fact that they counted – quantitatively speaking – the highest number of interventions, at least during the first three conferences. The fourth and fifth diaspora conferences (respectively
conventions) on the other hand were much more balanced. A quick glance at the number and the weight given to interventions during these conferences reveals that Jamaican emigrants, especially from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, were at least as present as government officials and private sector representatives. It furthermore should be noted that the youth was accorded particular importance during this conference, since they were not mere observers, as at the previous conference in 2008, but were actively engaged in the discussions.

It still prevails however that the agenda and the issues of the diverse diaspora conferences were dominated and dictated largely by the main conductors of the Jamaican diasporic governmentality, i.e. Jamaican state officials as well as private sector representatives – thus indicating how far not only subjects of diaspora practices are imagined and problematised in economistic terms, but actors enacting such practices, too.

Finally, one should also mention the setting-up of some institutions which sustains this neo-liberal logic where communities and individuals increasingly govern themselves – according to the economistic discourse. One can mention the establishment of overseas trade councils from 2004 onwards to promote investment. Examples of such councils are found especially in major towns of the USA, such as New Jersey, Los Angeles, Minnesota or Philadelphia (B. Mullings 2012: 415). The formation of regional diaspora groups, established in the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Canada, follows exactly the same logic as does the diaspora advisory board consisting of twelve persons, including seven persons from the diaspora in Canada, the UK and the USA. The latter was meant to meet every six months and to consult with Jamaican state representatives. A new diaspora foundation
was thereby charged to coordinate – through its secretariat – the efforts of regional diaspora groups, local civil society organisations as well as Jamaican state agencies. It would furthermore be charged to make recommendations to the Jamaican government on behalf of the diaspora (cf. V. Davis 2006). By the start of the third diaspora conference taking place in 2008, both this *Jamaica Diaspora Foundation* and the *Jamaica Diaspora Institute* were established and incorporated in the MONA business school of the University of the West Indies – thus attempting to include universities as actors enacting the neo-liberal market rationality. Their task was defined as administering projects and programs, raising external funds and conducting research on behalf of the diaspora. The institute was also given the task of developing the database of Jamaicans abroad, including their central skills, because earlier efforts had come to no fruition.

**Linguistic aspects: Pragmatism & Ownership**

Next to nation-branding strategies and authorities acting as technologies of the neo-liberal rationality, linguistic aspects should equally be mentioned when discussing the commodification of diaspora practices. It seems to be no coincidence to notice that the language revolved entirely around terms of trade, investment and competition. The accent put for instance on *pragmatism* for advancing in the conference is striking. Both conference participants, at least a fraction, and state officials stressed the importance of focusing on pragmatic solutions to Jamaica’s problems rather than engaging in “wasteful talk” about the causal factors underlying these problems (Vasciannie 2013): „Less talk, more action“, as expressed by an editorial of the Jamaica Gleaner (2013a). The conference was considered as an ideal opportunity for
diaspora members to get network opportunities for investment (cf. C. Thomas 2013) with some 240 business meetings facilitated by the conference and leading to fourteen investors looking for investment opportunities in thirty local business projects (Jamaica Gleaner 2013n; Jamaica Observer 2013a, 2013c). The statement of a participant to the second conference in 2004 as well as the one of another participant to the fourth conference in 2011 seem representative in this regard:

„The Diaspora Conference is not a convention or a rally where you sit and listen to speeches for two days. It is an interactive Conference where the delegates dialogue with a view to solutions. It is not a talk shop“ (quoted in: Walker-Huntington 2006: our emphasis).

„Having a conference in Jamaica is a waste of time, space and money. These people only want to sit around a big table dipping biscuits in their tea and coffee and talking pure poppycock which so many are tired of hearing“ (H. Scott 2011: our emphasis).

Furthermore, it does not seem to be a coincidence to observe the frequent use of terms, such as ownership, stake-holdership or psycho-economic connections in several statements of the third conference. Illustrative might be the declaration by the former President of Jamaica Trade and Invest, when he was speaking to diaspora members:

„It’s about a sense of „ownership“ or „stake-holdership“ that only you have in this country because you’re JAMAICAN! No foreign investor can or will ever be able to make this claim. No matter the size of the investment. No foreign investor will ever be able to have the „psychic-economic connections to the Rock that you intrinsically have!“ (Gregory 2008: our emphasis).
The statement of the university lecturer Dr. K’adamawe K’nlf’e that Jamaican universities should stop researching on problems and rather begin to research solutions is to be seen (cf. Jamaica Gleaner 2013k) in this same vein.

**Spatial arrangements**

A final aspect contributing to commodifications and thus to the neo-liberal market logic of diaspora conferences are the *spatial arrangements* materialising such a problematisation. This was notable especially at the fifth biennial diaspora conference in 2013 where a set-up of a diaspora marketplace aimed at creating a „*practical space where there can be active business interactions, thus eliminating the notion that the conference is a talkshop*“ (Jamaica Observer 2013a, 2013c). More than fifty companies and organisations participated there. This marketplace was considered as a *business-to-business zone* through which JAMPRO, a government agency of the Ministry of Industry, Investment and Commerce, was facilitating connections between local suppliers with investors.

In sum, diaspora conferences in the Jamaican context operate largely through neo-liberal modalities or technologies of power. While the subjects of such practices are defined on racial and economic criteria, the different actors enacting such a rationality are in the most part adhering to such economistic practices. The commodification of such practices finally through nation-branding strategies, the pragmatic language used throughout the conferences, but also spatial arrangements point in the same direction.
Diaspora conferences interestingly do not operate only through neo-liberal market rationalities. Other rationalities are at work, too – although not to the same extant as the neo-liberal ones.

**Disciplinary technologies**

One of these other technologies, which barely seem to be addressed in existing literature on diaspora practices in general, and more particularly with regard to the Jamaican case (cf. B. Mullings 2011a, 2012; Sives 2012), are disciplinary technologies aimed at producing “appropriate” individuals in their conduct as members of the Jamaican diaspora. Such neglect is surprising in some regards, since the disciplinary modality of power is often portrayed in the literature as the “other side of the coin” of biopower next to the “security mechanisms” of the governmental or biopolitical regime. But, as pointed out among others by Collier (cf. 2009), the automatic and almost mechanical coupling of the biopolitical rationality to the disciplinary one is mistaken; instead, they should be seen as independent rationalities: “If previously Foucault saw regulatory power and discipline as complementary parts of a coherent logic of power that operated on different registers, then in the later work he posts no necessary link between them. [...] when Foucault returns to a discussion of ‘normalization’ it is no longer to indicate how regulatory power and disciplinary power together form a normalizing society, but to simply indicate how ‘each deals differently with what we call normalization’ (Foucault, 2007: 56)” (S. J. Collier 2009: 87). The disciplinary logic should therefore be seen as an independent modality of power rather than a simple complement of the biopolitical component of the governmental rationality.
Turning to the disciplinary rationality in the Jamaican context, some of them have already been hinted at in the discussion on the neo-liberal modality above. However, they have not really been developed. When recalling that disciplinary technologies operate mainly through the three mechanisms of normation, observation and examination, one realises that they are well and truly present in the Jamaican context. A prominent illustration of such a disciplinary stance is discernible in how a [mental] sense or identity of ownership or “stake-holdership” is encouraged. By pinpointing to the “wasteful” manner of conducting discussions at diaspora conferences, as expressed by the slogan “less talk, more action” (cf. Jamaica Gleaner 2013a), a pragmatic norm is developed thus normating individual emigrants to adapt to and adopt such an approach. Another mechanism for pointing towards the prominence of “newly valorised subjects” where only those with a sound economic background are assigned significant market value is the pricing of attendance of diaspora conferences. It seems to be no coincidence that prices had been set at a certain level in order to both include the “flexible citizens” (cf. Ong 1999, 2006) and to exclude “unflexible citizens”. If one is keen on achieving the “reward” in the form of the status of a conference delegate – and thus being considered as member of the Jamaican diaspora –, one “simply” needs to adapt to the new norm of becoming economically successful. The awarding (Governor-General Diaspora Award of Excellence) of three Jamaican emigrants, i.e. Misters Vin Martin, Howard Francis and Dudley Morgan (cf. Vasciannie 2013), to enter the “Jamaican hall of fame” for their “outstanding contribution to Jamaica” (Jamaica Gleaner 2013k) follows this logic precisely – as well as the “talk with friends” to increase the sense of confidence Jamaican emigrants.
might develop towards the Jamaican nation in general, or the Jamaican government more particularly or the urging of Jamaican government officials directed at Jamaican emigrants to be less cynical in their stance towards Jamaica (cf. Hines 2013). The other side of such “rewarding” mechanisms – thus taking up a special form of the examination mechanism, since the rewarding can simply be considered as the “medal” for passing successfully the “exam” of emigrant or diaspora citizenship – can be seen when observing how emigrant organisations, having pre-existed the formal beginning of diaspora practices in the Jamaican context, are excluded from conferences – precisely because they do not adapt to the new norm. It is thus the other side of rewarding, i.e. punishing which is operative in this context. Important for theoretical purposes is to note that such punishing is effected not for the sake of punishing, as is the case in the sovereign modality of power; but is seen as instrumental to influence the behavior of actors towards the desired norm – a norm which corresponds in this Jamaican setting to the active and responsible emigrant qua member of the Jamaican diaspora.

But it is not just about individual emigrants who are disciplined to become economically sucessful through the development of a sense of ownerhsip. It is also, as shown above, about political statesmen being pushed to conduct themselves as “salesmen” (cf. Fougner 2006). By problematising world politics increasingly through economistic and market lenses, political actors are presented as having no true alternative to acting as salesman if they want to be successful and “fulfil their political mandate”. A special modality of such disciplining is the practice of congratulating which can be considered as a simple modality of the examination mechanism. When
congratulating for instance businessmen for their successful appearance at diaspora conferences, this assumes that such acting is considered desirable and thus imitable. Patterson’s statement, in his capacity as Jamaican Prime Minister, or Knight’s assertion, in his capacity as Jamaican Foreign Minister, are indicative in this regard:

„I wish to congratulate the private sector sponsors whose farsightedness and commitment have made this Conference possible and, indeed, all those who have played a role in making the event a reality“ (Patterson 2004).

„Throughout the two-day conference, our nationals will be provided with the wonderful opportunity to articulate their views, share ideas on a range of issues which affect their welfare and interests central to which is the critical question of national development. [...] I would like to thank also Corporate sponsors for their invaluable support in making this conference a reality“ (K. D. Knight 2004).

Disciplinary technologies are thus well and truly operative in diaspora practices within the Jamaican context – both with regard to “educating” emigrant individuals to conduct themselves as “true” or “normal” members of the Jamaican diaspora and with regard to the “conductors” or actors enacting such diaspora practices who are encouraged to conduct themselves as salesmen.

What about other rationalities or modalities of power? Are sovereign rationalities discernible for instance? Or what about welfare rationalities? As shown below, it is suggested that such rationalities are operative, too – although not as much as the dominant neo-liberal governmentality.
Welfare technologies

Welfare rationalities are concerned, it should be recalled, with governing populations according to a “social” logic where the social is identified with the “national” – thus still pointing to the salience of the territorially delimited nation-state model. It is in other words not through communities, i.e. the Jamaican diaspora seen as active and responsible, and individuals that welfare technologies operate; there are instead national institutions that are seen as main instruments of such welfare technologies. Several can be mentioned within this regard, all still aimed at materialising the economistic discourse and problematisation of diaspora practices and thus constituting an effect of such problematisations rather than their origin.

Most important in this context is the establishment of the Jamaica Overseas Department in 1998, i.e. before the start of the diaspora conferences. The department followed up on the Returning Residents Facilitation Unit (RRFU) already set up in 1993 within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade (MFAFT). It sticks thereby to the welfarist and territorial mentality of rule, as implicit in the “return option”. This should not come as a surprise, however, since many of the emigrants of the 1960s began to retire in the late 1980s and early 1990s. When the unit was transformed in 1998 to the Jamaica Overseas Department (JOD), the focus was extended in principle to include all emigrants. But the practices of the JOD were still targeted mainly at returning emigrants.

It was within the activities of this new ministerial department that the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) entered the stage with its programme of the Return and Reintegration of Qualified Jamaican Nationals (RRQJN) – programme seeking to recruit members of the diaspora residing in industrialised countries to contribute their
experience and skills to national development efforts (IOM 2000). The IOM created also an internet website providing information to potential returning residents regarding resettlement, but also serving as a sort of professional intermediary between interested members of the diaspora and potential employers in Jamaica (B. Mullings 2011a: 30; Sives 2012: 119).

Their mandate was to look after the interests of Jamaicans in the diaspora, especially returning migrants, and to ensure that their skills and resources from them would benefit development in Jamaica (Franklyn 2010: 7). The department was in other words institutionalising and materialising governing mechanisms through social or national institutions in order to “look after the interests of Jamaicans in the diaspora”.

The Return and Reintegration of Qualified Jamaican Nationals of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) can be seen in the same logic, although it is not a national institution this time, but an international institution seen as governing mechanism for diasporas. The latter program sought to recruit members of the diaspora residing in industrialised countries in order to encourage them to put their experience and skills to the service of national development efforts – with a total of fifty-eight Jamaican emigrants recruited for professional positions in Jamaica’s public sector (IOM 2000). All of these practices are thus clearly adhering to the territorial and welfarist logic of the return option.

With the start of the diaspora conferences, a whole set of further national institutions were established in order to govern diasporas through such tools. Action plans – both with regard to migration and development policies as well as to diaspora policies – can be mentioned in this regard. Presented during and after the fifth and hitherto last diaspora conference in 2013, the migration and development policies action plan is
developed more particularly to minimise the culture shock and prepare returning Jamaican emigrants for assimilation (Jamaica Gleaner 2013a) – thus still pointing clearly to the territorial return option where emigrants were seen as being able to contribute to economic development only by returning “home” in line with the “brain drain” discourse. The *diaspora policy action plan* on the other hand, presented also in 2013 (cf. Silvera 2013a), was aimed at optimising coordination among the different national institutions and delve into “best practices” developed internationally, while adhering to the more recent discourse of “brain circulation”.

Next to such action plans, the Jamaican government decided to set up a *diaspora bond* which would finance projects like small business development in rural areas (B. Mullings 2012: 212). It was eventually decided to designate a significant portion of the bond issue to fund an *education trust* (Jamaica Gleaner 2008d) – a trust to fund only tertiary education, thus obviously privileging only the qualified segments of the Jamaican population. Both institutions were thus set up in order to govern the Jamaican diaspora through national institutions.

In sum, welfare rationalities are also at work in the Jamaican setting of diaspora practices. Visible through the development of the JOD, action plans or institutions, such as the diaspora bond and the education trust, these institutions aim at governing the Jamaican diaspora typically through Jamaican national institutions. Although the territorial criterion, characteristic of welfare rationalities, is not necessarily present in all these tools, it still can be considered as essential to most of these. But this territorial criterion is even more important for the last rationality at work in the Jamaican setting: the sovereign governmentality.
**Sovereign technologies**

Although hardly mentioned in the existing literature on the Jamaican case so far, the governmental rationality identified with the sovereign regime is in point of fact at work in the Jamaican settings. When recalling that the main instruments of this regime are laws and police-like regulations which operate through repressive and extractive logics, one becomes aware that such a logic is clearly present here. Not only is such a rationality visible in the prominence of the “law and order” discourse underpinning many discussions at the diaspora conferences; the legal framework for governing diasporas is to be mentioned in this regard, too.

Regarding first the “law and order” discourse, it can be observed at how discussions disputed about the issue of *criminality*. Crime was in fact considered as one of the most urgent problems Jamaica had to deal with, as noted by several participating emigrants during the second diaspora conference in 2006:

„People are very, very afraid of the crime situation in Jamaica. I know many people who want to come back home, but because of what they hear of the country, they stay abroad in the cold. This is a great loss to the country“ (Clive Banton, quoted in: Jamaica Gleaner 2006b).

The insistence around this *law and order discourse* impacted also other issues, since other potential issues were thereby simply silenced. Many insisted for instance on emphasising increasingly *social and education programs* to tackle criminality:

„It [education] is indeed most important. You cannot fix the country problem until you reach the youth. If the Government does this, the country will be better off“ (Daniel Gough, quoted in: Jamaica Gleaner 2006f).
It is nevertheless important to be specific on this point: criminality was treated only insofar as it could further the national development agenda. The law and order discourse is thus seen as an *instrument* or *technology* to materialise the economistic problematisation of diaspora practices.

The juridico-legal component is another instrument of materialising this logic. Although barely dominant in the Jamaican setting, they still deserve analytical attention. One can mention the establishment of a bi-partisan *parliamentary board committee* in order to translate proposals from the diaspora into national policies (V. Davis 2006; Sheil 2006). Proposed at the second diaspora conference in 2006 by the Jamaican Prime Minister Simpson Miller, it was envisioned to

> „[...] consider recommendations and suggestions of a policy nature from the Diaspora in conferences and other initiatives through the Diaspora Advisory Board“ (Prime Minister Simpson Miller, quoted in: V. Davis 2006).

The committee would furthermore aim

> „[...] to hear and debate changes to existing laws that might have an impact on Jamaicans in the diaspora; to hear and debate potential constitutional and/or policy considerations for allowing an electoral voice and representation of diaspora constituencies in Parliament; and to recommend foreign policy that could be undertaken to support the interests of the diaspora communities and to encourage investments in Jamaica“ (Franklyn 2010: 13).

The measures taken with regard to the parliament went even further than the proposal for a parliamentary board committee. It was announced that emigrants were entitled to *take a seat within the Jamaican senate*, thereby expanding and signalling the
acknowledgement by Jamaican politicians of the increased importance they accorded to Jamaican emigrants (V. Davis 2006; Leigh Campbell 2006). However, the ruling by the Jamaican Supreme Court, known as the case opposing Dabdoub to Vaz and others, put a halt to such intentions – clearly pointing to the negative conception of power associated with the sovereign rationality. The issue before the court was to decide whether an American citizen of Jamaican origin, i.e. Daryl Vaz, was eligible for the Jamaican House of Representatives (Anonymous 2008: 4). But the court concluded that Mr. Vaz

"[...] was not qualified to be elected to the House of Representatives for the constituency of West Portland“ (Anonymous 2008: 52).

Sovereign rationalities are thus well and truly operative in diaspora practices within the Jamaican context. Visible through the law and order discourse aimed at enabling the “free” operating of the economistic problematisation of diaspora practices, but also visible through legal measures, such as the ruling by the Jamaican Supreme Court, the attempted setting up of seats for members of the Jamaican diaspora in the Senate or the parliamentary board committee, this rationality is, however, much less important than other rationalities.

**Identification**

To conclude this chapter, questions of subjectivity as assumed throughout diaspora practices are addressed: What subjects are assumed throughout these diaspora practices? Which kind of citizens are imagined as a result of these practices? It should
be recalled that it is not about “real” subjects of diaspora practices that this discussion is dedicated to; it rather is about identification or subjectivation, i.e. the process to “[…] elicit, promote, facilitate, foster and attribute various capacities, qualities and statuses to particular agents” (Dean 2010: 43-4). It is thus about attempting to confer a certain subject upon imagined members of the Jamaican diaspora.

Subjects of diaspora practices

The imagination of the subjects of diaspora practices is a central aspect to be discussed (cf. Ho 2011: 764). It concerns more specifically the members of the Jamaican diaspora. Such members are first of all assumed to be motivated by their affective ties and their desire to “give back” to the Jamaican island (B. Mullings 2011a: 30). Generally speaking, Jamaican emigrants are believed (and expected) to be willing to return home, since they would continue to strongly identify with their Jamaican nation and homeland (Gmelch 1992; E. M. Thomas-Hope 1999). The desire to return to their homeland has even been identified as one of the defining characteristics of the Jamaican diaspora64 – thus clearly pointing to the continuing salience of the national and territorial criterion in the Jamaican context. The statement of a Jamaican journalist, when commenting on the Jamaican diaspora conferences, might be representative in this regard:

64 It might be because of this point that Cohen (1998) defines Jamaican emigrants as constituting a „cultural diaspora“.
“Peel away the layers of discontent and you'll find people with nationalistic zeal – and discretionary income – nostalgic about a country they left behind. Their hearts are still in Jamaica. Some are coming because they have skills they sincerely want to use for the common good. Others are coming because they seek entrée into a class-conscious society they never knew. Still others want to witness just how the Government will do its one-upmanship on what they say they're already doing” (quoted in: Mesquita-Adams 2006a our emphasis).

Jamaican emigrants willing to belong to the Jamaican diaspora are imagined as being professionally qualified with regard to the economic criterion. Only the skilled and qualified members of the Jamaican emigrant group are included in other words in diaspora strategies, since diaspora members are understood as agents of economic development. These are thus selected and chosen with regard to the criterion of attributing a certain market value to subjects who are seen as capable of contributing to the national development agenda. It is precisely within this context that one can take up Ong’s idea of flexible citizenship where the “newly valorised subjects”, such as those with a sound economic background, are assigned significant market value, while all other emigrants not fitting this scheme are denied citizenship (cf. Ong 1999, 2006).

A statement by a Jamaican commentator is instructive in this regard, perfectly summarising the profile and subject underlying the Jamaican diaspora problematisation:

“Although it is hard to define simply who these individuals [relevant Jamaican emigrants] are, they are the men and women of a third generation who are citizens of the country in which they live, have gone through higher education, have significant academic qualification, are working in highly paid jobs in the mainstream of society, are often close to the
highest levels of government or the private sector, and have a very different relationship and attitude to the Caribbean to those who came before.

They are individuals who are international in outlook, understand how politics and business works, are well connected in mainstream society, and have influence. [...] To put it bluntly: [...] It is an elite that the region ought to be more proud of, which provides not only role models in the nations in which they now live, but have much to offer the countries from which their grandparents came” (D. Jessop 2011: our emphasis).

The relevant criteria for subjecting the Jamaican diaspora originate in the realm of economics with the imagination of the Jamaican diaspora as a

“repository of capital, skills and contacts which can be leveraged for investment in, and the development of, Jamaica” (Jamaica Gleaner 2011: our emphasis).

It can even be seen in the official governmental action plan entitled Vision 2030 Jamaica that the Jamaican diaspora is seen as ideal partner for the economic development of Jamaica with multiple roles:

“as a source of investment and entrepreneurship for business ventures; by providing lobbying support for Jamaica in international fora; as a source of academic and technical expertise; as a market for tourism and our exports of goods and services; and as a network for advancement of Jamaicans in international businesses and other endeavours” (Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) 2009: our emphasis).

Conference organisers thus clearly favoured individuals considered to be “experts in the community” given their history of engagement in philanthropy, economic empowerment and political galvanisation (cf. Walker-Huntington 2006). The economic costs that diaspora conference members had to pay linked with the fact that
the engagement as diaspora conference member is done only as volunteering – both point towards the interpretation that only emigrants with a certain income are encouraged to participate – thus leading to an unequal mobilisation distribution among the population of Jamaican emigrants. An interviewed Jamaican emigrant in London purported for instance that

„I do know of people who would love doing something, but they simply cannot afford it. Volunteerism has its costs“ (Interview Michelle 2013)

Though there is a broadening of conference delegates as early as the third conference in 2008 where new segments of Jamaican emigrants were invited, i.e. youth representatives and journalists (cf. Jamaica Observer 2008), these were still clearly chosen with regard to the potential market value they could have.

It therefore comes as no surprise to see that most of the conference participants were a group of largely middle-class, professional emigrants whose experiences were different from that of the working-class Jamaican emigrants (B. Mullings 2012: 421).

Moreover, the emphasis put on pragmatism and result-oriented thinking during several conferences (Mesquita-Adams 2006a; B. Mullings 2012), as exposed below in more detail is indicative of how deep such an economistic discourse is digging into the personal conducts and identities of members of the Jamaican diaspora. Not just the appeal of some academic circles to stop to research problems and begin researching solutions (Jamaica Gleaner 2013o, 2013f, 2013p), but especially the insistence of having to come out “of our mental enslavement” (Bedford, quoted in: Jamaica Gleaner 2013f and being “more mechanical-minded” {Ledgister, diaspora conference delegated, quoted in: } point to this deep impact.
And still, some rare calls for an enlargement of the imagination of Jamaican diaspora members beyond the mere economistic realm can be noticed (cf. Abbott 2014; Jamaica Observer 2008; T. Reid 2008):

“Jamaicans are tired of being seen as just a big wallet with a wad of cash. They want to be afforded the opportunity to contribute more than just remittances to the country’s development” (T. Reid 2008).

But apart from the third diaspora conference in 2008 when some similar statements were made, almost no other instances of challenging such an economistic problematisation of subjects of the Jamaican diaspora have been observed.

But it is not only with regard to the economic criterion that subjects are chosen or favored within Jamaican diaspora practices. The analysis of the participants (or “conference delegates”) reveals that mostly creole and middle-class Jamaican emigrants were chosen, while excluding others. It is therefore with regard to a racial criterion that subjects of diaspora practices are defined – thus pointing to what certain authors have called “racial capitalism” (Hintzen 2002) in the Jamaican context. Racial capitalism is thereby to be situated within the wider discourse of how economic development has been problematised right after the achievement of Jamaican independence in 1962 – thereby turning first to the racial criterion. Economic development was in fact constructed as being linked to a small group of creole Jamaican elites, mostly with white, brown, Jewish, Chinese and Syrian origins (Beckford 1972; Philipps 1977; S. Reid 1977; Stone 1991). This development has reproduced, rather than unmade, the racial hierarchies of the colonial plantation system. Even though the presidency of Manley attempted at redistributing resources
to Jamaica’s primarily black working classes in the 1970s, his policies were eventually eroded. The subsequent return of the “creole” vision of economic development placed the mainly creole middle classes at the centre of this project, while associating “black” strategies as inefficient and backward. It is therefore easy to see that the emerging diaspora engagement practices in the Jamaican context are closely linked to this vision of economic development having its origins with the creole elites of Jamaica. Rather than constituting power relations “external” to the Jamaican society, diaspora practices simply “mirror” and “transnationalise” domestic power hierarchies (B. Mullings 2011a). The colonial legacy is of utmost importance in this context.

**Tensions of identification processes**

However, the selection of the subjects of diaspora practices in the Jamaican context according to economic and racial criteria did not proceed without tensions. These are discernible on several levels.

Pre-existing emigrant organisations, such as NAJASO, were in fact bypassed by state-led diaspora practices. As already mentioned above, many emigrant organisations have existed prior to the diaspora engagement process by the Jamaican state in the early 1990s, but they were not always included. Though it is true that many of the 250 participants at the first diasporic conference were representatives of pre-existing, organised community groups within the Jamaican emigrant population, the conference organisers clearly favoured economically valuable emigrants. Although no one in 2004 publicly affirmed wanting to “replace” the existing organisations with new ones, it was not clear how the new structures put in place at that moment in time...
would connect with those established independent of government. A former minister would have commented that

„there were fears [...] that their [pre-existing diaspora organisations] own autonomy and independence were being threatened by this big, overarching movement [...] they are fiercely tied to their independence and their organisation as they have known it over the years“ (quoted in: Sives 2012: 121).

Casual observers and a few NAJASO members, citing lack of transparency and accountability, viewed the government's push to engage the diaspora with scepticism, especially after news that remittances had surpassed tourism as the number one foreign exchange earner. A few NAJASO members saw the government-led diasporic movement as encroaching on their territory:

[…] It’s unclear whether the NAJASO and the government will kiss and make up. One thing is clear though: many individuals and organisations are already contributing to Jamaica in their own way to help sustain alma-maters, families and friends (Mesquita-Adams 2006a).

This issue was increasingly and successfully becoming a non-issue. Although it was occasionally regretted that organisations, such as most prominently NAJASO, were still not part of the diasporic movement, comments did not go beyond that point. Other relationships, such as those between participants and non-participants and even more those among the participants themselves, were “overlaying” this issue by their granted relevance.

One therefore sees this concern or fear of pre-existing diaspora organisations losing their independence and effectively become co-opted by the Jamaican government, although the stated intention of the Jamaican government was to work in partnership
with them. But, up to this day, these organisations were successfully invisibilised – exactly as many others.\(^{65}\)

Another level of tension concerns the challenge of mobilising a wider constituency of the diaspora than already mobilised. As visible as early as in the preparation phase of the second conference in 2006, the question of who is included and who is excluded, neglected or invisibilised was deeply controversial:

„The diaspora movement has become an ugly mess. All the regions are dealing with strife as there are people who believe they ought to be invited. They refuse to understand that it is a delegate conference not a mass meeting or rally“ (Dahlia Walker, diaspora advisory board member, quoted in: Mesquita-Adams 2006a).

One of the results of the first biennial diaspora conference had in fact been the institution of a *Diaspora Advisory Board*, consisting of twelve persons (of which seven persons were Jamaican emigrants from Canada, the USA and the UK). One of its functions was precisely to *choose* the conference delegates, i.e. assumed

\(^{65}\) On a normative level, this does not necessarily imply that such pre-existing emigrant organisations should be included. An inclusion could also cause many additional problems, when considering the heterogeneity and the differing experiences that Jamaican emigrants have effectuated (cf. Bauer and Thompson 2006; Foner 2005). Vertovec furthermore shows that Jamaican emigrants in Britain have a lower income in comparison to their counterparts in the USA and that the absence of a flow from the Caribbean diminishes the cultural enrichment that the closer links with the Caribbean afford for instance Jamaican New Yorkers. There obviously are the electronic media facilitating an interpenetration of popular cultural forms. „*But this does not turn London into New York or Brixton into Brooklyn: there are limits to the capability of modern technology*“ (Vertovec 1993: 264). He finally points out that the political influence of Caribbeans in general, and more particularly Jamaicans, in the United Kingdom is considerably less than that enjoyed by Afro-Americans in the US (Vertovec 1993: 260). This diversity of different members could potentially and theoretically have positive impacts in bringing a variety of ideas and experiences to the discussion (Sives 2012: 121), but the differences have rarely been addressed during this (and subsequent) diaspora conference(s). Rather the opposite is true, as just shown above. The differences have in fact been overlooked, since a stricter definition of the Jamaican diaspora would have implied less potential financial resources flowing into the country.
representatives of the Jamaican emigrant community. But, there was a purported lack of transparency about how these delegates were selected. The culmination of this conflict was reached prior to the fourth conference in 2011, when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade (MFAFT) attempted to change the method by which members of the diaspora chose their representatives to serve on the Diaspora Advisory Board – consisting in the selection by the MFAFT rather than in the election of the new members of the diaspora advisory board. The reason behind such a stance was clear, as stated among others by the Jamaican state minister Robinson (belonging to the JLP):

„Some wrong people are on the board [, i.e.] some PNP [People’s National Party] people“ (Robinson, quoted in: D. Mullings 2011).

A final level of tension is to be mentioned among different members of the diaspora participating at the conferences. Different profiles with regard to age, gender or class give them different connections to Jamaica – thereby also shaping the nature of the working relationships that eventually develop. And yet, such tensions did not translate in real differences at the outset. A statement by a Jamaican emigrant of the United Kingdom is indicative in this regard:

„But what was clear from the conference is that the major issues of concern for us in the UK were the same for others in the United States and Canada“ (Paulette Simpson, UK representative to Diaspora Advisory Board, quoted in: Jamaica Observer 2004b).

In order to facilitate the organisation of delegates, it was decided to broaden their number „in order to organise the Jamaican community overseas [...] in a very
systematic and incremental fashion“, as stated by Senator Franklyn (cf. Jamaica Gleaner 2006a). Youth representatives and journalists were subsequently encouraged to attend the conferences. Future leadership – as the youth came to be called – was thereby considered central for the „survival of the relationship between Jamaica and its diaspora“ (Jamaica Gleaner 2008b):

„We want to open the space for dialogue and engage with the youth of Jamaica who can play an active role in the community and society“ (Campbell, director of Jamaican Diaspora Foundation, quoted in: Jamaica Gleaner 2008b).

Interestingly, there were even local Jamaicans invited to participate at the diaspora conference in 2013, including local moderators and panellists as well as local manufacturers. The conference in 2013 for instance included a record total of 1512 participants out of which 424 were overseas Jamaican emigrants, 214 local Jamaicans, 61 local moderators and panellists and 45 local manufacturers (Balford 2013; Spaulding 2013).

The inclusion of the local Jamaican population is also notable because the relationship between the state-led diaspora and Jamaican locals had been previously described as problematic. As early as 2006, when the second conference was organised, tensions between Jamaican locals and delegates were in fact increasingly discernible. The latter were increasingly considered as potential returnees taking away “their” jobs, thereby tightening the already difficult economic situation – and thus pointing to the prominence of the market rationality attached to conference delegates or subjects of the diaspora practices:

"Some Jamaicans see us as a threat. They're saying: 'Here you come with your big expertise to take away our little jobs.'"
This „awkward“ relationship, as qualified by David Mullings, a future leader of the Jamaican diaspora (2011l), continued throughout the following conferences where Jamaican locals were reported to receive many participants with resentment (cf. T. Reid 2008).

The inclusion of Jamaican locals in the diasporic governmentality can thus be seen as an attempt to “tame” those sectors of the population, which went against these economistic state-led diaspora practices.

What is most important to note about all these “counter-conducts” – to adopt the Foucauldian vocabulary – is the fact that they do not serve to question the governmentality of Jamaican emigrants per se, but rather to question how this governmentality is effectuated. Visible mostly during the fourth biennial conference in 2011, these counter-conducts are thus to be situated within the very governmentality process rather than treated as exogenous or objective variable impacting the process. These point in fact to „the will not to be governed thusly, like that, by these people, at this price“ (Foucault 2004: 75) and apply ideally to these governmentality processes.

**Synthesis of Jamaican governmentalities**

Contrary to many accounts in the literature portraying diaspora practices as operating only through neo-liberal governmentalities, the analysis above suggests a more complex picture or topology. Although the neo-liberal governmentality is clearly the most important and dominant one, other rationalities, such as the disciplinary, the
welfarist or the sovereign ones are not to be neglected in an analysis of diaspora practices within the Jamaican setting.

Already at the stage of the problematisation of diaspora practices, we could observe that welfarist problematisations are present: the territorial logic of return attached to how diaspora practices could enhance economic development of Jamaica is a case in point. But it is true that the globalising logic associated with the neo-liberal rationality is the dominant one during the problematisation stage.

Regarding the more technical aspect of the tools, techniques, instruments and rationalities, the analysis has shown first that specific knowledge techniques are used to render the economistic problematisation of diaspora practices visible: typical biopolitical tools (such as identification and classification of Jamaican emigrants into different cohorts), mapping techniques of socio-scientific disciplines, but also emulating techniques by visiting other diaspora conferences. Regarding the governmentalities, we witness that there are at least four different rationalities operative in the Jamaican setting – or at least elements of these four rationalities: (1) the neo-liberal modality of power operating through the market where different and dispersed authorities, “experts” or what the theoretical literature has called “communities” emerge to govern the Jamaican diaspora through nation-branding strategies, linguistic mechanisms, but also spatial arrangements; (2) the liberal rationality associated with the social qua national technologies is also present, principally through the manifold use of the [territorial] return option, but also insofar as several Jamaican [national] institutions enter the stage to govern the Jamaican diaspora; (3) the disciplinary mechanism operating through normating technologies, such as the emphasis put on “ownership”, “pragmatism” or the different awards
setting individual examples to be followed upon; but also disciplinary mechanisms with regard to the enacting actors who are disciplined to adopt characteristics of a “salesman” rather than a “statesman”; and finally (4) even sovereign mechanisms are at work with juridico-legal mechanisms visible in the ruling of the Jamaican Supreme Court, but also the accent put on [legislative] parliamentary bodies to govern affairs relating to the Jamaican diaspora. We thus observe a topological picture of different rationalities at work within the diaspora practices of Jamaica.
B. India

Contrary to the Jamaican diasporic governmentality, which began to render its diaspora only from the 1980s onwards visible and developed accordingly its political technologies from the 1990s onwards, the beginnings of the Indian case are founded much earlier. In fact, it was already at the beginning of the twentieth century with the anti-colonial movement including Gandhi – the purportedly proto-typical figure of the Indian diaspora, as will be seen below –, that this group enters the political stage in India and became visible. After a period of indifference of the post-colonial, Nehruvian Indian state towards its diaspora, political technologies materialise and crystallise only in the context of an economic crisis touching India severely at the beginning of the 1990s. Similar to the Jamaican case, India uses the medium of conferences to gather its diaspora and establish symbolic and institutional capacities for its government. These conferences are called Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas (Days of Indians abroad), with the first one taking place in January 2003.

In order to understand the (trans-)formation of this Indian diaspora governmentality, the chapter is organised in the same way as the previous Jamaican chapter. The first section below provides the reader with the necessary background and contextual information about Indian emigration, i.e. its history and the geography of settlement in order to analyse how such emigration has been problematised at different periods during the twentieth century as well as the beginning of this twenty-first century. It then continues with the Indian diaspora governmentality per se, i.e. addressing subsequently the issues of the different knowledge tools, instruments and techniques for subjecting the Indian diaspora as well as the use of particular governmental
rationalities inherent to them. The chapter concludes with a discussion on subjects of Indian diaspora practices as assumed by them.

Episteme: Problematisation

History and Geography of Indian Emigration

It comes as no surprise that the history of Indian emigration is complex. But Indian emigrants are often divided into just two categories or types of emigrants, corresponding to different waves of emigration (cf. Clarke et al. 1990; Anirudha Gupta 1974; Mesthrie 2000; Rajagopal 2000; Twaddle 1975): (1) pre-independence Indian emigrants consisting mainly of indentured labourers going mostly to British colonies in Africa, Malaya, Burma, Fiji and the Caribbean on the one hand and (2) post-independence Indian emigrants going mainly to the Gulf states (for the economically low-skilled migrants) or to North America and Europe (for the economically mid- or high-skilled migrants) on the other hand. Generally speaking, and common to both waves, most Indian emigration has taken place because of economic reasons (Hercog and Siegel 2010: 76; Mani and Varadarajan 2005; Varadarajan 2010).

Regarding the first wave of Indian emigration, i.e. taking place before Indian independence in 1947 and constituting the old Indian diaspora, one first observes that the Indian labourers were sent to British plantations all over the British empire between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, i.e. to the Caribbean, Africa, South and Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific (cf. Binod Khadria 2009). Even after the abolishment of slavery in 1833 by the British Parliament, banning slavery –
at least legally – across the British Empire, the need for large numbers of labour was still needed and was also to be found in the Indian subcontinent. They were mainly hired as indentured workers to destinations in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans and to destinations in Southeast Asia. An estimated 30 million Indians emigrated in the period from 1834 to 1947 (cf. K. Davis 1951), with 4 million Indians living abroad in 1947 (Gilroy 1993). The table below gives a glimpse at the geography and numbers of persons of Indian origin (PIO) in 1948:

Table 7: Settlement of old Indian diaspora

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Persons of Indian Origin (PIO)</th>
<th>As % of Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ceylon (Sri Lanka)</td>
<td>750’000</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>750’000</td>
<td>4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaya</td>
<td>520’000</td>
<td>11 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>285’260</td>
<td>3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>265’000</td>
<td>65 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>195’747</td>
<td>35 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Guiana</td>
<td>163’434</td>
<td>42 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>125’000</td>
<td>47 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tinker 1976

Indian emigration continued after gaining independence in 1947 and is purported to constitute the new Indian diaspora (cf. Dickinson and Bailey 2007; Hercog and Siegel 2010). This new diaspora is usually divided into two different socio-economic groups: high-skilled Indian emigrants are mainly found in North America, the United Kingdom and Australia, while mid- and low-skilled Indian migrants turned mainly to

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66 The kangani system is to be mentioned in this regard, i.e. a method of recruitment, where one of the workers was sent back to India to recruit new labourers, usually from his own region and caste (cf. Rangaswamy 2000).
the Gulf states as well as West and Southeast Asia (cf. Vezzoli and Lacroix 2010). Furthermore it should be noted that most Indian emigration is conceived and problematised by most emigrants as a temporary stay, whereas the emigration towards North America, the United Kingdom and Australia is considered more as a permanent option (Lall 2003: 127). Thus, the old diaspora reveals a “South-South” pattern of emigration, whereas a part of the new diaspora begins turning to the “North”.

But as will be seen below, it is mainly from the experiences of the so-called Non-Resident Indians (NRIs), i.e. Indian citizens not residing in India who comprise the new Indian diaspora, that the Indian diaspora is constituted and rendered visible today – thereby consciously and deliberately blurring the distinction between old and new Indian diasporas.

Looking first at the semi- or low-skilled Indian emigration after Indian independence in 1947, one notices a high concentration in the Gulf states – with almost ninety percent of unskilled migrants going to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia (Singhvi et al. 2001; Vezzoli and Lacroix 2010). This emigration began in the mid-1970s and was due mainly to the oil boom in these Gulf states (Binod Khadria 2009). It is estimated that seventy percent of Indian emigrants to the Gulf states are semi-skilled or unskilled (Singhvi et al. 2001). The table below gives an indication of the stock of Indian emigrants in some of the Gulf states.
Table 8: Stock of Indian Emigrants in Gulf States (in 2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>No. of all migrants</th>
<th>No. of Indian migrants</th>
<th>Indian migrants as % of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>27'448'000</td>
<td>7'288'900</td>
<td>1'417'371</td>
<td>5.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>7'512'000</td>
<td>3'293'264</td>
<td>1'200'089</td>
<td>16.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>2'782'000</td>
<td>826'074</td>
<td>434'512</td>
<td>15.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>2'737'000</td>
<td>2'097'527</td>
<td>755'584</td>
<td>27.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katar</td>
<td>1'759'000</td>
<td>1'305'428</td>
<td>470'307</td>
<td>26.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>1'262'000</td>
<td>315'403</td>
<td>113'669</td>
<td>9.0 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNO 2011, 2010

It is important to emphasise that most of current Indian emigration is low-skilled or mid-skilled, while there is only twenty per cent of the total Indian emigration that is skilled (Chanda and Sreenivasan 2006). The low- or mid-skilled Indian emigrants going to these states are typically young men (Singhvi et al. 2001) and come mainly from Southern India (especially Kerala), but also from Andhra Pradesh, Goa, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu.

Turning to the skilled (or at least semi-skilled) Indian emigration which took off in different waves in the 1960s and 1970s to the United Kingdom and North America, Giri (2001) identifies four different waves of Indian migrants to Europe. The first wave would have begun in the early 1960s with indentured labourers from former European colonies coming to Europe. The second wave took place in the late 1960s during the European reconstruction boom with most Indian migrants going to the United Kingdom, and smaller sections to Germany, the Netherlands, France and Belgium. The 1980s saw the third Indian migration wave, but restricted mostly to
high-skilled professionals – considering the restriction of European immigration regulations. The fourth wave finally, which began in the 1990s and continues up to the present, saw the arrival of many Indian IT (information technology) specialists to Europe. Indian migrants constitute the fourth largest group of non-European Union immigrants in the European Union in 2006 – after Turkish, Moroccan and Chinese migrants (cf. Eurostat 2014). Most of these Indian migrants reside in the United Kingdom with an estimated 1.2 million persons, with the Netherlands as the second largest place of Indian emigrants in the European Union (cf. Singhvi et al. 2001).

But it is predominantly to the United States of America that most high-skilled Indian emigrants turned – with almost seventy percent of Indian emigrants having completed tertiary education in 2010 (OECD 2010). Indian emigration to the USA started only from the 1970s onwards, with only 12'296 Indian-born individuals residing there in 1960, but growing to 1.5 million in 2005 (M. A. Desai et al. 2009). In sum, 92.3 percent of all Indian emigrants with tertiary education reside in three countries: the USA, the UK and Canada (OECD 2010).

Generally speaking, the population of Indian emigrants – of all low-, mid- and highly-skilled emigrants – represents nowadays one of the largest and most established ones. The estimates of the High-Level Committee of Indian Diaspora (HLCID) in 2001 show that the major receiving countries are the United States of America with almost 1.7 million Indian emigrants living there, followed by Malaysia with just a few thousand Indian emigrants less and Saudi Arabia with almost 1.5 million. But as shown in the figure below, the largest stock of Indian emigrants is by far to be found on the Asian continent.
Figure 3: Stock of Indian Emigrants (by continent)

Source: Migration Development Research Centre 2007 (aggregated figures)

Problematisations of Indian emigration

Making sense of the Indian diasporic governmentality requires (at least) a threefold analysis corresponding to different historical narratives or problematisations about the Indian diaspora (Dickinson and Bailey 2007; Hercog and Siegel 2010: 92; Mani and Varadarajan 2005; Sinha-Kerkhoff and Bal 2003; Varadarajan 2010). These three periods or historical rationalities are constituted, in chronological order, by (1) the colonial period where India stood under the reign of the British Raj – a period including the nationalist movement leading to Indian independence in 1947 –, by (2) the immediate post-independence period under Nehru from 1947 onwards and finally by (3) the period starting with the economic reforms in the beginning of the 1990s by Manmohan Singh, then Indian Finance Minister under the government of Rao. Sinha-
Kerkhoff and Bal even went as far as naming the three respective phases according to the statesman they consider the most influential during each period, leading to three different problematisations of the Indian state towards its diaspora: the *Gandhian* approach (for the colonial period), the *Nehruvian* approach (for the immediate post-independence period) and the *Vajpayeean* approach (cf. Sinha-Kerkhoff and Bal 2003). It is this latter classification corresponding to some of the most prominent Indian statesmen, which is used for the present study. Although we will predominantly concentrate on the most recent [Vajpayeean] problematisation throughout the remainder of this chapter, an overview of the two preceding historical problematisations is necessary by way of contextualising the contemporary governmentality of Indian diaspora practices – and also by way of demonstrating that the Indian diaspora has been made visible very early in the context of a certain conception of the Indian nation, thus laying the basis for the visibilisation of the Indian diaspora for the Vajpayeean problematisation and governmentality.

**Colonial & Gandhian problematisations**

As noticed by several scholars, the Indian state – or rather the colonial Indian state – as well as the emerging Indian nationalist movement were very concerned about the fate of Indians abroad before independence in 1947 (Dickinson and Bailey 2007; Hercog and Siegel 2010; Lall 2003: 123; Mani and Varadarajan 2005; Varadarajan 2010). But what exactly characterises the role of the Indian colonial state on the one hand and the positive relationship between the Indian nationalist movement and the Indian expatriates on the other hand? How is this to be explained? To be blunt, the argument is double: first, regarding the colonial Indian state, the management of
emigration was problematised as being central to satisfy the demands of British capital; secondly, regarding the Indian nationalist movement, i.e. the Indian National Congress (INC), the existence and the participation of the Indians abroad was problematised as being necessary in the processes of imagining the Indian nation, particularly in the form that challenged the legitimacy of the British colonial state (Varadarajan 2010: 53). The Indian nation was from the outset imagined as a *transnational* nation, including Indian emigrants.

The colonial state of India has already entered the political stage regarding emigration at the beginning of the nineteenth century (cf. Varadarajan 2010: 51-5). A series of different tools (or political technologies) attest to such an involvement: *sovereign* tools such emigration acts beginning in 1842 as well as conventions with France in 1861, with Denmark in 1863 and with Holland in 1870; the appointment of *persons of approved character* to conduct the oversight of Indian emigration; the institutionalisation of the Government Protector of Emigrants; but also *neo-liberal* tools, such as the selection of emigrant recruiters with the task to “persuade” people to emigrate need to be mentioned. They all indicate the active involvement of the Indian colonial state in affairs of emigration (Kondapi 1951; Sundaram 1933: 14). This state involvement seems to be problematised in [welfarist] *economic terms*, i.e. to assist British manufacturers by providing them with cheap labour. It should be noted that the colonial state actively targeted migrants from the South Indian caste of the untouchables to emigrate – almost sixty-five percent of the total Indian migration was from this caste –, since it believed that members of this lowest caste were the easiest to convince to move away from places where they were exposed to caste
oppression. The system of indenture gradually came to an end only at the beginning of the twentieth century. It was also banned in Mauritius in 1915, on the Caribbean islands in 1917 and in Fiji in 1920. It seems that this was due to pressures from political activists, such as Mohandas Gandhi or Krishna Gokhale who took up the cause of emigrants to ban recruitment and investigate charges against plantation owners (Varadarajan 2010: 55-62).

It is also with this in mind that the Indian nationalist movement emerges. Several of the political activists who initiated and maintained the pressure on the colonial Indian state – on behalf of or even as Indian expatriates – were in fact members of the emerging Indian nationalist movement. The Indian nationalist movement with the Indian National Congress (INC) as its institutional embodiment favoured the solution to remain part of the British empire in the early decades of the twentieth century. The colonial Indian state was thereby still seen as the legitimate source of authority that could and would ensure the protection of expatriate Indians (Varadarajan 2010: 57). This stance seemed to be justified also by the protective attitudes and practices of the colonial government, for instance after the end of the First World War, when some of its prominent leaders argued that the Indian nation’s contribution to the war, and the British empire more generally speaking, had to be recognised and rewarded. Otherwise a revolutionary movement could turn the momentum on its side otherwise. The Bolshevik revolution served hereby as the scenario to be avoided by all means. It

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67 The practice used for such recruitment was known as following the kangani system, at least with regard for emigration to Southeast Asia. Other destinations used a practice known as maistry, which basically refer to the same phenomenon (Mearns 1995; Sandhu 1969; Stenson 1980; Varadarajan 2010: 184).
is with these thoughts in mind that the British raj defended the cause of Indian emigrants at the imperial conferences from 1921 onwards, i.e. to grant equal rights to Indian subjects as to other British subjects (Varadarajan 2010: 58-9).

A further element which hampered the “moderate” position of the Indian nationalist movement was the fraction of the movement calling for greater equality, but still remaining in the British empire. The British Foreign Office published in fact in 1923 the so-called Devonshire Declaration which held that “the interests of the African natives must be paramount. [...] if and when those interests of the immigrant races should conflict, the former should prevail” (Lall 2001: 81). This declaration is to be seen in the context of growing opposition from the local population in settlement countries (especially East African countries) of Indian emigrants.

The connections which were being increasingly established between Indian emigrants and the INC on the Indian mainland need finally to be addressed in order to understand the weakening of the moderate fraction of the Indian nationalist movement. The origins of these connections are established inter alia by a young Indian lawyer in South Africa who initially supported the British rule, for instance in the Anglo-Boer wars (Apparsamy 1943), i.e. Mohandas Gandhi – who serves today as the proto-typical figure of the ideal member of the Indian diaspora. He developed connections with the INC during the period of his leadership of the South African Indian struggle as early as 1913. Several ties were subsequently established between Indian emigrants and the INC, thereby also underlining the INC’s conviction that the problems faced by the Indian nation were not restricted to the territory of mainland India (Hercog and Siegel 2010; Sinha-Kerkhoff and Bal 2003; Varadarajan 2010: 61);
Indian emigrants belonged to the Indian nation, or as expressed by an INC member at
the time:

“Wherever they [Indian emigrants] may be and howsoever
difficult their existence, they constitute little bits of India and
take to the lands where they live the culture and the religion,
the traditions and the ways of their great motherland. Neither
the passage of centuries nor in some cases, the complete
break with the past has made them forget the glory that was
India” (Rajkumar 1951: 11, our emphasis).

It is in this context that the INC issued for the first time a resolution advocating
separation from the British empire in 1923 (Varadarajan 2010: 59). The rationale
behind this resolution materialising the anti-colonial problematisation of Indian
emigration is straightforward with regard to the issue of Indian emigration: since the
Indian colonial state, i.e. the British raj, was unable – or unwilling, depending on the
perspective (cf. Lall 2001) – to protect Indian emigrants and since India was not (yet)
a national government, the nationalist movement would be limited to lobbying with
the Imperial powers for better, i.e. equal, treatment of Indian emigrants. The
nationalist movement could therefore do nothing to support the cause of the Indian
expatriates – unless becoming independent. The case of China was hereby often
presented as proving their cause, since they believed that the Chinese state was able to
protect its own expatriates because of being independent (Varadarajan 2010: 61-2). In
other words, it is by making a direct connection between problems faced by the Indian
emigrant populations and British rule that enabled the Indian National Congress to
call for independence from the British Empire: “since the British Government [was]
unwilling to concede Indians absolute freedom [...] in their own country, they can
hardly be expected to prove themselves vigorous champions of Indian rights in other countries” (On Looker 1944: 4). The establishment in 1936 of a separate department of overseas Indians, headed by Dr. N.B. Khare, by the colonial government of India could do little to change this perception.

In sum, the colonial British raj was considered responsible for the Indian inability to protect the Indian emigrants abroad – the latter being constructed and problematised as an integral part of the Indian nation. As long as India were to remain a colony, nothing would change this situation.

**Nehruvian problematisations**

With the Indian independence in August 1947, we would expect that India’s official policy towards its diaspora would finally be free of the previous obstacles linked to the colonial Indian state. The new Indian state was expected to take its responsibility towards its transnational members of the Indian nation, as reasserted also by the new president of the INC, Pattabhi Sitaramayya:

“Indians abroad, it may look like a paradox to say so, paved the way really for Indian emancipation within the frontiers of India. It was the gospel of passive resistance that was conceived, developed and implemented in Transvall in 1908 that paved the way for the development of non-cooperation, passive resistance, civil disobedience and satyagraha in the years 1920 to 1945, and it was really the implementation of the teachings of Mahatma Gandhi, subject to the principles of truth and non-violence over a quarter of a century that made Indian freedom possible. We therefore owe all that we are to the initiative, the originality, the daring and the sacrifice of Indians abroad” (Sitaramayya, president of INC, quoted in: Varadarajan 2010).
But contrary to all [legitimate] expectations, a complete reversal of the Gandhian approach was observed with the first Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru – approach lasting up to the neo-liberal reforms in 1991. To put it bluntly, the Nehruvian period could be categorised as a period of *studied indifference* (cf. Parekh 1993) with the Indian diaspora no longer being problematised and considered as part of the Indian nation.

It begins in December 1947 when the new Indian Prime Minister Nehru met with the Ceylonese government to discuss the issue of the Indian population living there. It has to be recalled that most of the Indian emigrants at the time were to be found in Ceylon and Burma, as indicated in *table 7* above. Even then, the questions of political rights for the Indians there were not discussed at that meeting and the Ceylonese decided to act unilaterally on the fate of Indian emigrants through a series of legislative measures (Varadarajan 2010: 67). Although these measures were met with protests from the Indian government, it still refused to discuss Ceylonese proposals to repatriate these Indians. A similar situation could be observed in Burma, the other place of settlement with major numbers of Indian emigrants at the time of Indian independence. This led in a first step to the creation of a new category of *stateless persons* with no civic or political rights (cf. India 1958).

The rationale of the Indian government, and its Prime Minister Nehru in particular, with regard to its problematisation of Indian emigration was that it believed that since most of the Indian emigrants in Ceylon or Burma were born there and had decided to establish a new life there, they should integrate themselves as far as possible into the country of residence instead of continuing to see themselves as Indians. Nehru’s
statement in a Lok Sabha (Indian House of Commons) is indicative in this regard and worth being quoted:

“Now these Indians abroad, what are they? Indian citizens? Are thy going to be citizens of India or not? If they are not, then our interest in them become cultural and humanitarian, not political. That interest of course remains. For instance, take the Indians of Fiji or Mauritius: are they going to retain their nationality or will they become Fiji nationals or Mauritian? The same question arises in regard to Burma and Ceylon. It is a difficult question. This house gets mixed up. It wants to treat them as Indians, and with the same breath it wants a complete franchise for them in the countries where they are living. Of course the two things do not go together. Either they get the franchise as nationals of the other country, or treat them as Indians minus the franchise and ask for the most favourable treatment given to an alien” (Nehru 1948: our emphasis).

But the rationale behind India’s position can be stated in more general terms, since Nehru and the INC sought to construct a truly new identity for the Indian state after independence in 1947. They saw in India a new model to be followed upon by all decolonising nations in favour of anti-colonial struggles and in favour of territorial notions of sovereignty (Heimsath and Mansingh 1971; Lall 2001, 2003), or as stated by a declaration of the INC in 1948:

“The National Congress has, even while it was struggling for the freedom of India, associated itself with the progressive movements and the struggles for freedom in other countries. India’s liberation was viewed as a part of the larger freedom of all the countries and the peoples of the world. In particular, the Congress has stood in the past for the ending of all imperialist domination and colonial exploitation of any country or people” (Indian National Congress (INC) 1948: our emphasis).
“As far as imperialism was concerned, India’s new government was committed to the permanent withdrawal of colonial rule from Africa and all other colonised nations. Nehru believed that the people in Asia who had experienced decolonisation had a special responsibility towards the people in Africa and their struggle for freedom. India was especially concerned about British Africa, hoping to exert some influence in London. It also decided to actively support the struggle against the British in East Africa despite the interests of some Indian entrepreneurs in the region” (Lall 2003: 125). In Nehru’s eyes, it therefore would have been counterproductive to support Indian emigrants in different countries. This would have violated the newly acquired sovereignty of the decolonised states by intervening in “internal” affairs of these states. Nehru sought to build an alliance among the newly independent, decolonised states of Asia and Africa. The conference of Bandung in Indonesia in 1955 is exemplary in this regard, since it led the basis of the so-called non-aligned movement during the Cold War.

The Gandhian transnational Indian nation was thus reversed to a classic, territorial and national Indian nation under Nehru. His insistence on India’s role as fighting against colonial exploitation and for anti-colonial struggles is evident in another of Nehru’s statements at the Lok Sabha a decade later:

“We have left it to the Indians abroad whether they continue to remain Indian nationals or to adopt the nationality of whichever country they live in. It is entirely for them to decide. If they remain Indian nationals, then all they can claim abroad is favourable alien treatment. If they adopt the nationality of the country they live in, they should associate themselves as closely as possible with the interest of the people of the country they have adopted and never make it appear to function in any way that they become an exploiting
agency there” (Nehru 1957).

It is thus this policy of *indifference* (Parekh 1993) which characterises India’s “formal” problematisation of their Indian expatriates almost for half of a century, i.e. until a major economic crisis hits India at the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s.

However, this does not mean that such a diasporic problematisation characterised by its indifference towards Indian emigrants did not meet any resistance. Especially noteworthy are debates taking place from the beginning of the 1960s onwards – debates emerging in response to different events affecting India. The first of such an event was the Indian defeat in the war against China in 1962 and subsequent discriminatory treatments of persons of Indian origin in several parts of Asia, especially where Indian emigrants were present. But it was also with regard to events unfolding on the African continent that debates on the role of the Indian state towards its diaspora were raised. One can mention the racially discriminative policies of the South African government against Indian emigrants, but also the anti-Indian protests that broke out in Kenya, Tanzania or Uganda forcing many Indian emigrants to leave these countries. Opposition members were outraged by such events, or rather by the inaction of the Indian state towards its Indian expatriates:

“What [has the government] been doing here? India is being kicked by Ceylon; India is being kicked by Burma; India is being kicked by Pakistan; India is being kicked by China. What are they doing there – sitting and moping? (Member of opposition in Lok Sabha debate in 1964, quoted in: Varadarajan 2010)

They believed that the distancing of the Indian state from persons of Indian origin (on the basis of different citizenship, as indicated above) was a big mistake, since it
constituted a problem in terms of “Indian nationhood”. They consequently asked for the protection of all Indians by the Indian state, regardless of their citizenship – thereby acknowledging the responsibility of the Indian nation-state toward the Indians abroad. But Nehru and the subsequent INC governments refused such demands on ideological and socio-economic reasons. Indian emigrants in Burma or East Africa were in fact not considered as Indians on whose behalf “free India” would be obliged to act; these people

“spent their lives in the pursuit of wealth, were not progressive and were completely devoid of the kind of feelings that free India stood for” (Lakshmi Menon, Minister of State for External Affairs, quoted in: Varadarajan 2010: our emphasis).

Even worse was that these emigrants had, in Nehru’s opinion and the different INC governments, aligned themselves with the British colonisers prior to national independences of African and Asian states. Supporting the emigrants would thus undermine all that “free India” stood for; the identity of the new Indian nation-state required a policy based on these ideological principles rather than on the “origin of people” (cf. D. Singh 1965).

In sum, India’s role under Nehru was problematised and constructed as cultural or humanitarian with regard to its diaspora, since Indians abroad “still have a bit of India with [them]” (Sinha-Kerkhoff and Bal 2003) and were expected to act as non-exploiting agents. But India could not be expected to play a political role in this regard, since it went against India’s search for a new and independent identity based on ideological principles of anti-imperialism and non-dependency. The Indian state
under Nehru emphasised citizenship as the marker of national belonging – while keeping in mind that Indians abroad were refused dual nationality –, the nationalisation of key sectors in industry and banking, and the strict regulation and limited inflow of foreign capital (Varadarajan 2010: 116). Even though there were some changes in the Nehruvian problematisation in 1977 with the Janata government, it was only at the beginning of the 1980s, and more clearly at the beginning of the 1990s, that this Nehruvian policy was questioned, thus turning the focus to the contemporary Indian governmentality towards its Indian expatriates or towards its Indian diaspora, as it is most often called.

**Vajpayeean problematisations**

In order to better apprehend the emergence of the most recent and contemporary problematisation of diaspora practices within the Indian setting, two contextual facts should be stressed: the Indian state faced an economic crisis from the beginning of the 1980s, meanwhile several Indian emigrants (belonging to the so-called “new Indian diaspora”) were beginning to fill up their fortunes more or less at the same time.

Looking first at the new Indian diaspora, its constitution emerging from the 1970s onwards needs to be recalled. It consists of Indian citizens emigrating both to North America and the United Kingdom on the one side, i.e. skilled Indian emigrants in its majority amassing increasingly their fortunes; and the Gulf states on the other side, i.e. with un- or semi-skilled Indian emigrants in its majority. The Indian state was thus confronted with a different profile of the diaspora from the 1970s onwards and especially at the beginning of the 1990s than in 1947 when it gained its independence.
But more importantly was the fact how these two groups of Indian emigration were perceived: “While the migration of professionals to the West was seen as a cause of concern for the Indian state, the movement of unskilled labourers to the Gulf states provided a study in contrast. Using the argument that the temporary migration of a group that was largely unemployed in India would be beneficial to Indian society at large, various Indian governments worked to facilitate this process” (Varadarajan 2010). It is thus in a context of overpopulation that emerging emigration or diaspora practices within the Indian setting need to be situated – at least concerning to the low- or mid-skilled Indian emigrants of the Gulf states.

Regarding the economic crisis India faced from the 1980s onwards, it began with a low agricultural output (due to a severe drought) and a foreign exchange crisis in the early 1980s. These crises brought the Indian state close to bankruptcy and asked thus needed an exit strategy. The “easiest” way out would have been negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to receive a loan. But this option was seen by many as the second-best solution, also because of negative experiences the Indian government had had with the IMF in the 1960s where it was accused of having ceded its sovereign right to stand against imperialist policies in exchange for food aid (Varadarajan 2010: 94). It was precisely because of these negative experiences that the Indian government adopted a slightly different approach consisting of two complementary elements: on the one hand, it still requested a loan from the IMF – which was accorded to them amounting to five billion US dollars, i.e. the largest loan given by the IMF at that time to any developing country –, but given under the condition that they unilaterally adopt a substantial macroeconomic, structural
adjustment plan. This allowed the Indian government to maintain its claim of being sovereign and not bowing to any external pressure, as was criticised in the 1960s. However, this strategy can still be seen as bowing to external pressure in the form of IMF conditionalities, only in a different form, known as “homegrown conditionalities” (Chaudhry et al. 2004).

The second element of the Indian strategy is far more important for the purposes of this chapter. In order to get foreign currency flowing into the country again, the relationship of the Indian state with Indian emigrants was rebroached and reproblematised – thereby questioning the prevailing Nehruvian definition of the Indian nation as consisting only of Indians within the territorial boundaries of India. Non-resident Indians (NRI), as Indian emigrants had increasingly come to be called – contrary to the Nehruvian period where they were simply referred to as Indians abroad, Overseas Indians or Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) –, were suddenly presented as being once again part of the Indian nation by reemphasising their “Indianness” – thus going back to the Gandhian conception of the Indian nation as a transnational nation. Even though this initially was clearly done in an instrumental way, as visible in the statement of the Indian finance minister at the time (P. Mukherjee 1983), it still marks a clear break with the Nehruvian tradition. The questioning of this tradition was effectuated by introducing, or at least announcing the idea of so-called NRI investments or, more precisely, the NRI Portfolio Investment Scheme (as political technology) in 1982 by the government of Indira Gandhi. Instead of recurring to IMF loans, NRIs were suddenly seen as the best solution to India’s balance-of-payment problems:
“There is possibly a feeling that instead of going to the IMF and succumb to their conditionalities it would be more prudent to go to the NRIs. All that we need is a mere $5 billion or so and the NRIs, it has been estimated, have more than $20 billion stacked up in banks abroad. A fourth of that should be no problem” (Panandiker 1991).

Recalling that NRIs were beginning to increasingly amass their fortunes abroad – at least with regard to the skilled Indian emigrants in North America and the United Kingdom –, why not appeal to their (NRIs) sense of patriotism? It was with this initially instrumental move that the Nehruvian Indian post-colonial nation was beginning to be transformed (and reversed) to an Indian transnational nation (again), i.e. including NRIs and PIOs. But it took more or less a decade to truly materialise the new relationship between the Indian state and its diaspora, since Rajiv Gandhi’s period as Indian Prime Minister from 1984 to 1989 (after Indira Gandhi’s assassination in October 1984) was marked with the deliberate “non-problematisation” of this relationship due to the conscious inaction of the Indian government to put in place any new measure that might lead to a greater institutionalisation of it (cf. Varadarajan 2010: 111, 201). The Indian Finance Minister of the time, Yashwant Sinha, made it clear that NRI investments were not large enough to have any impact on the Indian economy (cf. Sinha 1991).

But the military coup in Fiji by General Sitiveni Rabuka in 1987 and especially the signs of a huge economic crisis at the beginning of the 1990s brought the figure of the NRI to the forefront of Indian politics again – and this figure would not disappear any more up to today. The new government of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and especially his Finance Minister Manmohan Singh – the latter becoming Indian Prime Minister in 2004 and staying there until 2014 – in fact faced a severe economic crisis
in 1991 “[...] due to the combined impact of the political instability [of the end of the Cold War in 1989] [and] the accentuation of fiscal imbalances and the Gulf crisis” (M. Singh 1991). The withdrawal of much capital held by NRIs in the early part of 1991 further exacerbated the crisis, leading India to the “edge of a precipice” (M. Singh 1991), as reiterated again and again by Singh:

“The room for manoeuvre, to live on borrowed money or time does not exist any more. Any further postponement of macro-economic adjustment, long-overdue, would mean that the balance of payments situation, now exceedingly difficult, would become unmanageable and inflation, already high would exceed the limits of tolerance [...]” (M. Singh 1991).

The Indian government thus sought to restore as quickly as possible India’s credibility in order to avoid default in international payments. This was done by adopting a threefold strategy: (1) withdrawing the [Nehruvian] state from the “nonproductive” public sector, (2) opening up the Indian economy for foreign capital – at least with regard to 34 major areas (Lall 2003: 129-30) – coupled with the conversion of the rupee on the trade account (Tharoor 1997: 171-2), and (3) finally, and most importantly for the purposes of this chapter, the ensuring of a greater involvement of NRIs in the Indian economy by offering them greater incentives and opening up new sectors for their investment (Varadarajan 2010: 108). The reforms went thereby in radical opposition to the socialist Indian state as envisaged and practiced by Nehru (and his followers) insofar as the planning process was abandoned, nationalised enterprises were opened up for privatisation and the liberalisation of the foreign investment regime. They indicate therefore an overt rejection of the socio-economic visions and practices of the Nehruvian, post-colonial, Indian state. It is this movement which has been characterised as the “neo-liberal movement” by several scholars.
But it has to be noted that these neo-liberal reforms were not effectuated without protests and opposition. The political left on the one hand and the Hindu nationalists (represented by the Bharatiya Janata Party, i.e. BJP) on the other hand strongly opposed such reforms on the grounds that these plans only favoured a tiny fraction of the Indian population, while the masses had nothing to gain. In addition, Indian industrialists also strongly opposed these reforms, since they endangered the economic protectionism they were used to under the Nehruvian swadeshi (self-reliance) state (Lall 2003: 130; Varadarajan 2010, 2012). It might be for these reasons, but also for reasons linked to the policy process itself before these reforms were truly implemented. It was only when the Indian diaspora, particularly the NRIs, insisted on realising the reforms that things began to change from 1997 or 1998 onwards, i.e. at the time when the BJP came to power.

But what role does the Indian diaspora, i.e. the NRIs, play in this crisis or rather in the management of this crisis? Why and how was it problematised and rendered visible? The main argument – along the lines of Varadarajan (2010) or Ong (1999) with her concept of flexible citizenship or the newly valorised subject – is that the figure of the NRIs, and thus of the Indian diaspora more generally speaking, is essential for understanding this new governmentality, since NRIs were not just sought for instrumental, economic reasons – as argued for instance by Lall (2001, 2003) –, but were considered as “subject who could plausibly embody national aspirations [and] the potential for India to succeed in the global economy” (Varadarajan 2010: 110). In other words, NRIs came to be seen as a synonym for the neo-liberal reforms initiated
in 1991 and were discursively constructed accordingly. To be clear, the Indian diaspora was an ideal figure for the Indian state insofar as it proved that Indians in general were capable of succeeding in the global economy – thereby providing a reason to overcome the “inferiority complex” that apparently prevented India from taking its place on the global stage (cf. also Varadarajan 2010: 129).

**Contextual conditions**

In order to understand this particular discursive construction (or visualisation) of the Indian diaspora, we have to take a closer look at the socio-economic conditions underlying this move. This construction contributes to better apprehend the power relations underlying the Indian diasporic governmentality by emphasising how the relationship of the Indian diaspora to the Indian nation-state evolved to reach the point of reimagining the Indian nation as a *diasporic nation*.

It is imperative to re-examine the structure of the post-colonial Indian economy being almost entirely dominated by a small faction of Indian industrialists until the early 1990s. As already partially mentioned in the section on the Nehruvian rationality above, the Indian post-colonial state taking shape from 1947 onwards was a result of different factors, such as the partition of the Indian subcontinent into two separate states, i.e. India and Pakistan, Nehru’s socialist leaning socio-economically speaking and most importantly his internationalism. However, two important factors of crucial importance are commonly overlooked or neglected, i.e. who exactly among the general Indian population was standing behind, or rather leading these new post-colonial policies on the one hand and the general economic order or context of the period on the other hand. It was in short in a Keynesian context where state
intervention was considered as a best practice that a small section of Indian industrialists – represented by associations, such as the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) took over the reigns of the Indian state from 1947 onwards by convincing the INC by different means to adopt its agenda, i.e. to protect the domestic economy from outsider interference or to sponsor institutionally industrialisation (Chatterjee 1993; A. Mukherjee 2002; Muppidi 2004; Varadarajan 2008, 2010, 2012). Therefore, it is not difficult to interpret Nehruvian socialism as just one manifestation of Keynesian capitalism.

With the advent of the different oil shocks in the 1970s and the end of the Bretton Woods institutions more or less at the same time, a new economic context called neo-liberalism was taking shape by numerous scholars and policy-makers. It comes as no surprise therefore to observe the negative reactions and opposition from major parts of Indian industrialists at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s when the figure of the NRI, and the Indian diaspora more generally, came to the forefront of the political stage of India. It manifested itself in the numerous fears of the “old” Indian hegemons, i.e. the Indian industrialists protected by Nehruvian socialism, towards the Indian diaspora. Most disturbing for these hegemonic circles was the fact that several of the NRIs were identified with economic empires that could easily take over the Indian economy, thereby ousting the established Indian industrialists out of the market, and endangering their privileges as well as their social position. The Indians abroad were the most feared, “such as the Hindujas from Europe and the Chhabrias from Dubai, because they could challenge the Birlas, Goenkas and Modis from the Marwari caste of traders and industrialists” (Elliot 1987). But the fears were
not simply limited to traders and industrialists, but also to politicians. Birla’s statement in the Rajya Sabha (Indian Upper House) is indicative in this regard:

“The recent happenings in the industrial and other fields in the country which seek to oust the existing management through sheer money power are disturbing. To corner the shares of a company and to dislodge its management or to grab the property of others may be an acceptable mode of business for an entrepreneur in western countries, but it is contrary to our philosophy and culture” (Birla 1989: our emphasis).

But how did the group of the Indian diaspora, and especially the figure of the NRI, come to the forefront of Indian politics? It was more or less from the mid-1970s and especially the 1980s onwards that they were increasingly problematised as [potential] saviours of India and accordingly made visible. It is not surprising to observe that this process occurs just about the same time as the new Indian diaspora emerged with many skilled professionals leaving India for the “West” and even more unskilled and semiskilled workers emigrating towards the Gulf states. Interestingly and centrally, the perception of these two different groups of Indian emigrants by Indian society was very different: while the skilled emigration to the “West” was considered as a brain drain and therefore a serious problem to be dealt with, the unskilled and semiskilled emigration to the Gulf states was considered as beneficial to India, since it consisted mainly of emigrants being unemployed in India. But much more important for the purposes of this chapter is to observe both the discursive blurring of categories of emigrants in this period, simultaneously making their visibility possible and the constitution of the Indian diaspora as a homogeneous social group, as well as the re-
inclusion of these emigrants (as a homogeneous social group) in the Indian nation. An increasing interchangeability of categories, such as the Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) or the Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs), is increasingly observable in official documents as well as the general Indian public from the mid-1970s and especially the introduction of the first NRI Portfolio Investment Scheme by the government of Indira Gandhi in 1983 onwards (cf. also Lessinger 1992, 2003; Varadarajan 2010: 104-5). This interchangeability or blurring implies that the criterion of Indian citizenship, so central for the Nehruvian rationality, is abandoned. It therefore enabled the discursive constitution of the Indian diaspora as a homogeneous social group, consisting both of emigrants from the “old Indian diaspora” and the “new” one.

It is this homogeneous group which, in a second step, was constructed discursively as belonging to the Indian nation (again). This was done by extrapolating the experiences of just one particular group of Indian emigrants, i.e. the NRIs in the “West”, to the Indian diaspora at large. Once again, this contradicted radically what Nehru envisaged as the Indian nation – thereby reversing the existing power relations. As shown in the previous section, the immediate post-colonial construction of the Indian nation excluded the Indian diaspora from the Indian nation, thus referring to them as foreign Indians. The Indian nation under Nehru was limited to Indian citizens living in India, while the construction of the Indian nation from the mid-1970s onwards was to include many more people, such as PIOs without necessarily having the Indian passport. The Indian diaspora was suddenly becoming a part of the Indian nation and was no longer constituted as foreign Indians. It is the discursive passage from the foreign Indian to the global Indian, which represents this problematised
change best. To be concise, it was both the constitution of the Indian diaspora as a homogeneous social group and the re-inclusion of the Indian diaspora in the Indian nation that characterises the period from the mid-1970s onwards. It is this diasporic re-imagining of the Indian nation which enables the Indian government to pursue its [economically] neo-liberal agenda. The legal case opposing Swraj Paul, a London-based businessman of Indian origin, to several Indian industrialists in the early 1980s contributed greatly in increasing the visibility of the Indian diaspora in Indian politics (Varadarajan 2010: 79-80, 110-1, 17). This case was in fact a very important contextual element when trying to understand the introduction of the NRI Portfolio Investment Scheme in 1983. But it was mostly in the 1990s that narratives purporting the Indian diaspora as heroes upon which the Indian government relied on in order to make its diaspora visible – narratives which are discussed in more detail in the next section.

In sum, the Indian diaspora was extant and thus been visible from the outset of the Indian nation-building process. While the diaspora was an integral and crucial part of the Indian transnational nation, as imagined under the nationalist movement of Gandhi and his followers, this role was radically transformed in the immediate post-colonial period under the leadership of Nehru. In fact, the latter restricted the Indian nation as consisting only of Indian citizens living within India and considered India’s role with regard to its diaspora only in humanitarian and cultural terms. Just the same, it was with the progressive introduction of the neo-liberal reforms, beginning with the NRI Portfolio Investment Scheme of the government of Indira Gandhi in 1983 and pursued with the political package of the government of Rao and Singh in 1991, that
the figure of the NRI – and thereby the Indian diaspora more generally – was brought back into Indian politics, considering the Indian nation as transnational once again. Although it might seem that the Indian diaspora was re-introduced for instrumental economic reasons, it was shown that the reason for such a move seems to lie much deeper in so far as the Indian diaspora served the purpose of giving back India its confidence, assuring its major place on the world stage. Therefore, it is also within a “geopolitical” discourse that diaspora practices in the Indian context have been problematised. The NRI was considered essential to prove that Indians could succeed in a global economy, enabling thereby the liberalisation of its markets in order to compete globally. It is thus both for economic as well as “geopolitical” reasons that diaspora practices in the Indian setting have been problematised, thus pointing to “geo-economic” problematisation of such practices.

Through the establishment of several “visibilising” technologies – especially within the framework of the newly created Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, including both educational programs as well as a genealogical tool –, the renewed interest in the Indian diaspora was thereby affirmed.

**Techne & Governmentalities**

Before delving into the “technical” aspect of governmental rationalities of diaspora practices within the Indian context, it should be recalled once again what this techne is about. It is mainly concerned with looking at how diaspora practices translated the geo-economistic problematisations concretely, i.e. which knowledge techniques, and
which political technologies were used as well as according to which logic they operate. It is thus more specifically about what knowledge was used, which instruments and tools were used to render such problematisations of diaspora practices practicable and operative as knowable, manageable and ultimately governable domains. The instruments and tools which are used – one should recall – are conceptualised both in material and symbolic terms; they refer to performative practices denoting “[...] a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets” (Foucault 1975: 215). Different institutions and actors, such as Indian state institutions, are thereby seen as effects of political technologies rather than as starting points; they constitute the “crystallisation” of technologies, i.e. technologies that are materialised and stabilised in institutional settings (cf. Lemke 2007: 49-50). It is thus argued that these political technologies also include the constitution of specific identifications of actors enacting these diaspora practices, including the Indian state actors.

The presentation of the knowledge tools, devices and techniques to render diaspora practices visible, manageable and thus governable serve as the basis for the ensuing analysis of mentalities of rule or governmentalities. The second section is therefore about specifying which governmental technologies are at work, thereby underpinning these different tools.

**Knowledge devices, techniques and tools**

In order to “operationalise” and render the geo-economistic problematisations of diaspora practices governable, it is first necessary to establish what types of knowledge render the actors and domains visible in order to be governed. It is only
once that these latter have been rendered knowable through such [knowledge] devices that they become manageable, visible and thus governable. It is thus only in a second step that we can tackle the question of the different mentalities or rationalities of government informing and constituting the diaspora practices in the Indian setting.

So, what types of knowledge devices or tools are used to render the Indian diaspora visible? It is argued that the principal techniques to produce “appropriate” knowledge on the Indian diaspora – as understood by the geo-economistic problematisation – are found at different sites and are literary, cinematographic and journalistic *narration*, *mapping* of the profile of the Indian diaspora by specially appointed actors, and different *symbolic practices*, such as most prominently the organisation of diaspora conferences, known in the Indian context as *Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas*, i.e. days of Indians abroad.

**Narrating techniques**

One can mention in the first instance several practices or techniques related to *narration*, i.e. the act of producing *narratives* which purport the India diaspora as heroes. This happens as early as the 1970s and 1980s and it is upon such narrations that Indian formal authorities will eventually rely upon.

An example of such narrating practices is provided by the retelling of the success of the so-called “Indian Silicon Gurus” by Rajghatta for instance (2001). It is about several Indian emigrants succeeding in science and technology in the United States of America:
“Farouk Arjani, a young Parsi entrepreneur from Bombay [who, in 1973] founded Artec International, a pioneer in word processing [...]. Thampy Thomas, a Keralite who had studied in BITS, Pilani, left National Semiconductor to found Elxsi, among the earliest Silicon Valley ventures to make mainframe computers [...]. In 1978, Sirjan Lal Tandon founded Tandon Computers, one of the earliest suppliers of disc drives to the personal computer industry. Early in the 1980s, Suhas Patil and Umang Gupta, both IIT alumni, respectively founded Patil Systems (which would later become Cirrus Logic) and Gupta Technologies (which would later become Centura Software Corporation). Kanwal Rekhi, another IITian [...] cofounded (with Inder Mohan Singh and Naveev Jain), the networking company Excelan in 1984” (Rajghatta 2001: 31-2).

Similar narratives were also produced at other sites, most prominently probably in the Indian film industry, known as the Bollywood film industry, which seems indicative, since several Bollywood movies attempted to define the Indian nation at several different periods according to different problematisations (Chakravarty 1993; J. Desai 2003; Mehta 2001; Prasad 1998; Virdi 2003). It is highly instructive in this regard to see that the figure of the NRI is problematised as the central figure in Indian films from the early 1990s onwards. The story is mainly about some NRI who revealed her or his “Indianness” through her or his commitment to a certain set of [Indian] values despite being raised in a foreign country (typically the United Kingdom or the United States of America). Several films can be cited in this regard, such as Lamhe (1991), Dilwale Dulhania Le Jayenge (1995), i.e. one of the most successful Bollywood movies of all times, Virasat (1997), Kuch Kuch Hota Hai (1998), Kabhi Alvida Naa Kehna (2006), Devdas (2002), Kal Ho Naa Ho (2003) or Taal (1999).
But it is not only through literary and cinematic narratives that the issue of the Indian nation and of its content is present. In fact, several popular Indian newspapers published articles, special issues or editorials with regard to what came to be called from thereon the *global Indian* – discussed in further detail in the section on the subjects of Indian diaspora practices. An editorial in the weekly *India Today* is representative of such a stance:

“If you can take an Indian out of India, but you cannot take India out of an Indian” (Purie 2003).

**Mapping techniques**

It is upon such narratives and media articles – not truly “backed up” by reports of the human and social sciences as in the Jamaican case – that new visualising or knowledge devices enter the stage, i.e. *mapping technologies*. It was with the accession to power of the nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) with a new government headed by Atal Bihari Vajpayee68 in 1998 that made the Indian diaspora also on the Indian political stage salient where it would no longer disappear up to today. The creation of the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora (HLCID) in August 2000 and its report issued in December 2001 (Singhvi et al. 2001) is central in this respect. This group was charged to map out, i.e. to make the Indian diaspora visible by engaging with all sections of the Indian diaspora, and to recommend to the government a „*broad but flexible policy framework*“ to Indian formal authorities in

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68 Vajpayee was already known on the Indian political stage before he took over the position of Indian Prime Minister, also with regards to the issue and the rendering visible of the Indian diaspora. It was already in 1977 at a seminar for instance that he was quoted saying the following: “The subject of overseas Indians is one which is very dear to our hearts […] everyone of Indian origin overseas is a representative of India and retains many aspects of our cultural traditions and civilisation. Though our sons and daughters have gone abroad to work or to reside there, India will never disown them or fail to appreciate and respect their essential loyalty to the culture and heritage of the mother country” (Vajpayee, quoted in: Singhvi et al. 2001: our emphasis).
order to facilitate the involvement of the Indian diaspora in India’s development. This task was effected by consulting representatives from various diaspora groups, such as most prominently the umbrella organisation *Global Organisation of People of Indian Origin (GOPIO)*, but also by analysing diaspora policies of other states towards their diasporas (cf. Singhvi et al. 2001: chapter 23). As already seen in the previous section, the report makes the Indian diaspora visible as consisting of two hitherto independent categories of Indian emigrants, i.e. NRIs and PIOs (cf. Singhvi et al. 2001: xi).\(^{69}\) The report then pursues with one of its main goals, i.e. to *map out* the Indian diaspora. It does so by presenting the results of an immense amount of data gathering in order to produce numbers of the Indian diaspora by country or region. But it is also about defining the *profile* of the ideal member of the Indian diaspora, which is outlined – at least when carefully analysing the content. Although this aspect is presented and discussed in more detail in the section on the Indian Diaspora Ethos below, it suffices for now to indicate that the Indian diaspora is presented as having *professional success*, being *multicultural*, but still attached to some form of *Hinduism* (Chaturvedi 2005; Dickinson and Bailey 2007).

**Symbolic techniques**

The *mapping technologies* constitute not the only tools in order to render the Indian diaspora knowable, visible, manageable and thus governable. *Symbolic techniques* aiming at (re-)including members of the Indian diaspora within the Indian nation are

\(^{69}\) This is the first time that the term of the NRI receives an official definition, since it was only with the Foreign Exchange Management Act in 1999 that this category was officially introduced (MOIA 2009l).
equally to be mentioned in this context, since they also contribute to making the Indian diaspora visible and thereby knowable. Several tools are developed with this purpose – while also keeping in mind that many of these tools do not simply serve purposes of rendering the Indian diaspora knowable, but also have other purposes, as discussed in the section below on governmentalities.

**Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas**

The most important tool or device is the establishment of diaspora conferences, known as *Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas (PBD)*. Aimed at celebrating Pravasi Bharatiyas, i.e. Indians abroad, it was held once a year around the ninth of January – since this date constitutes the day on which the most famous Non-Resident Indian Mahatma Gandhi returned to India from South Africa. It marked the “[…] *definitive moment in the production of the Indian domestic abroad [...]*” (Varadarajan 2010: 135) and thus the beginning of the formal engagement process of the Indian diaspora. The first PBD was organised in 2003 in New Delhi jointly by the *Indian government* and the *Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI)* at a cost of 49 million US dollars (Mani and Varadarajan 2005; Varadarajan 2010: 135). The costs included the organisation of lectures, seminars, trade exhibitions, food and drinks, but also stage shows featuring Bollywood actors.

The rationale of its establishment, as stated in the report of the HLC, was clearly for *symbolic* reasons, i.e. as a recognition by the Indian state of the [geo-economic] value of its emigrants, neglected almost for half of a century during the Nehruvian problematisation. It was thus to emphasise
“[...] that the constructive role played by the Diaspora, its achievements and goodwill towards India should be celebrated and recognised in an appropriate manner” (Singhvi et al. 2001: 555).

PBDs aimed in other words at signalling the definitive reversal of the Nehruvian conception of the Indian nation as limited only to Indian citizens. Several statements by Indian public officials, but also by conference participants highlight the renewed Gandhian conception of the Indian nation as being a transnational one, i.e. including the Indian diaspora:

“Every one of you here is an achiever in your own right and as you succeed, India succeeds with you. [...] The Indian diaspora has today come into its own. [...] To conclude, the colours of our passports are different; the religions we profess are not the same; our mother tongues vary; and the regions from which our ancestors came are far apart, but “Phir bhi dil hai Hindustani” (Sinha 2003: our emphasis).

Some of the comments of the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s serve to underscore the same:

“Vishwa Bharati Parivar ke Vishisht Pratinidhigan [...] - Over 20 million of you have set up home in scores of countries near and far, but each one of you shares a common identity – your Indianness – and a common origin, this motherland of your forefathers. Therefore, this great gathering [...] is truly a homecoming. It is also a grand occasion of the country to pay a tribute to its sons and daughters who have succeeded in reaching the pinnacle in so many diverse fields of human endeavour all over the world. [...] Friends, Pandit Nehru once remarked that wherever there is an Indian, a bit of India goes with him. [...] The Pravasi Bharatiya family today also includes

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70 This can be translated as „Yet the hear is still Indian”
Indian writers in English with an international readership; entrepreneurs and industrialists with a global reach-up of operations; management and all lifestyle gurus with a huge following; and film-makers, sportspersons, artists, and performers of great popularity” (Vajpayee 2003: our emphasis).

This symbolic nation-building focus was obviously not only present during the first gathering of the PBD, but continued to be raised at subsequent conferences. It thereby confirms Renan’s dictum of the nation as a daily plebiscite (cf. Renan 1996 [1882]). It would be excessive to list all instances of subsequent conferences where, how and by whom this central issue was raised. But some statements of subsequent PBDs with regard to outlining the renewed transnational conception of the Indian nation might prove useful. They all indicate the confirmation of the initial neo-liberal reforms begun in the early 1980s and 1990s by definitively recognising the growing importance of a new actor for the Indian state, i.e. the Indian diaspora.

“Indians abroad are bound to India by the magical umbilical cord of history, culture, tradition, social and historical ties” (Sinha 2004: our emphasis).

“We are one family. The whole world is our home. That is why I have often said that while the sun has set on many great empires of the world in the past, the sun will never set on the world of the Indian diaspora! From Fiji in the East, to Los Angeles in the West, from Cape Town in the South to Toronto in the North, the people of Indian origin are the world’s most globalised community” (M. Singh 2007: our emphasis).
“In this increasingly inter-dependent and inter-connected world, overseas Indians are becoming ‘Global Citizens’. The overarching idea of a shared culture and shared values bonds all of us together. The Indian Diaspora is a pluralistic community just as India is. It holds within its fold people of different languages, faiths and regions. I call this multi-cultural identity, Indian-ness. The idea of India transcends the narrow barriers of religion, language, caste or class, both within and outside the Indian nation” (M. Singh 2008: our emphasis).

In sum, the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas essentially serve(d) to confirm the redefinition and reproblematisation of the Indian nation according to the geo-economic discourse prevailing in the Vajpayeean problematisation of diaspora practices. Whereas the Nehruvian problematisation favoured and implemented a limited Indian nation due to ideological and economic reasons, the Vajpayeean problematisation with its beginnings as early as the 1980s reverses this logic in favour of the Gandhian problematisation. It therefore comes as no surprise to see the “great soul” Mahatma Gandhi being continuously mentioned at the PBDs, since it is with his transnational conception of the Indian nation that the PBDs strive to construct a historical continuity.

In addition to the Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas, other symbolic techniques and practices are to be mentioned with having the same purpose in mind, i.e. to render the Indian diaspora knowable, visible, manageable and thus governable according to the Vajpayeean geo-economic problematisation.
**Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Awards (PBSA)**

One could mention for instance the *awarding technique* in order to make the Indian diaspora visible according to geo-economistic criteria. It is in this context that we can analyse the so-called *Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Awards*, the third recommendation emerging from the HLCID report. These awards are the highest honour that overseas Indians can obtain and are conferred upon NRIs, PIOs or any of their organisations *having enhanced India’s prestige* in their country of residence – thus clearly pointing once towards the geo-economistic problematisation of diaspora practices. Many other criteria that may justify the presentation of such an award are listed and they all point to the same conclusion, eg. The “[…] significant contribution for the welfare of the diaspora” or the “[…] significant contribution towards better understanding abroad of India and supported India’s causes and concerns in a tangible way” (MOIA 2013: 16). These awards obviously have a direct impact on the ideally imagined subject of the Indian diaspora practices. But most important for the purposes of this section is to highlight their symbolic function, which is to assure an “appropriate” translation of the geo-economistic problematisations of diaspora practices – also by (re-)including the Indian diaspora within the Indian nation.

**Tracing the Roots**

Another symbolic practice worth mentioning is a program of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) developed from October 2008 onwards, entitled *Tracing the Roots*. This program, jointly conducted by the MOIA and the private company *Indiroots*, would enable interested PIOs to find the roots of their ancestors in India by asking them to apply through the Indian Mission in the country of their residence
This practice contributes thereby to signal, once again, the reversal of the Nehruvian problematisation of Indian emigrants towards their re-inclusion into the Indian nation as problematised by Vajpayee onwards.

**Pravasi Bharatiya Kendra**

The creation of a centre for the Indian diaspora known as *Pravasi Bharatiya Kendra* (MOIA 2007: 30-1) pursues similar objectives. As already suggested by the report of the HLC, it would provide a suitable place to commemorate the trials and tribulations of the Indian diaspora. Being constructed as a building in New Delhi – which should have been ready since the end of 2014 –, it would serve mainly for “visibilising” and symbolic purposes. Its aims were to maintain the cultural identity and “civilisational ethos” of all members of the Indian diaspora, to serve as a permanent exhibition illustrating the history of the Indian diaspora and to run short-term courses and orientation programs for the youth of the Indian diaspora. In order to fulfil these services, the Kendra would be expected to facilitate a library, a cultural centre, a 500-seater auditorium, a permanent exhibition space, guest rooms, business centres and meeting rooms (MOIA 2013: 42).

Other symbolic practices pointing towards the “appropriate” translation of the geo-economic problematisation are worth mentioning, too. Although these practices do not primarily serve symbolic aims, they still contribute to the attainment of some of them. These include the *Global Indian Network of Knowledge (Global-INK)*, the *Prime Minister’s Global Advisory Council*, the *Gender Advisory Group*, the *Overseas Indian Centres (OIC)* or the publication of *memoranda of understanding* with certain
institutions. Only the publication of MoUs is discussed here, since it seems to be more coherent to discuss the other tools in the section on the different governmentalities of Indian diaspora practices.

Publication of Memoranda of Understanding (MOU)

The publication of the conclusion of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs of several memoranda of understanding (MOU) with other institutions is aimed to further the aims with regard to the government of the Indian diaspora. One of these MOU was concluded in 2006 with the national TV station Doordarshan in order to mandate the latter to disseminate and publicise appropriately and as largely as possible the policies and activities of the MOIA (MOIA 2007: 14). Other media were also included in later MOU, such as AIR, Lok Sabha TV and several private national or regional channels and daily newspapers (MOIA 2013: 38). Another MOU was concluded more or less at the same time with the so-called Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) to support Indian culture, i.e. performing arts or languages, in the diaspora and to promote interactions between India and its diaspora in the cultural space (MOIA 2007: 14).

In short, it was a mix of different types of knowledge techniques produced at different sites that rendered diasporas knowable, visible, manageable and thus governable. Different narratives which were produced in literary, journalistic and cinematic sites play a major role in this enterprise. It is on such accounts that the mapping exercise of the HLCID is effected. Several symbolic techniques complement the narrative and mapping techniques by signalling the definitive reversal of the Nehruvian
problematisation of diaspora practices as indifferent towards their Vajpayeean problematisation where the Indian diaspora finds itself re-included in the Indian nation. Exemplary in this regard are the establishment and organisation of the Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas, but also other symbolic practices, such as the awarding technique or the different dissemination and publication techniques. It is with these types of knowledge that we are henceforth able to analyse the governmental rationalities or mentalities underpinning diaspora practices in the Indian setting.

**Governmentalities**

Having seen the different tools for making the Indian diaspora visible, manageable and thus governable, what logic or rather logics underpin and substantiate the diaspora practices in the Indian context? Which rationalities of government are operative within them? Which mentalities of rule are discernible? How do they render diaspora practices governable according to the geo-economistic problematisation? It seems that several logics or technologies are operative hereby – exactly as in the Jamaican case. In order to analyse these, the different technologies are presented together with the corresponding tools that are used within the respective rationality.

**Neo-liberal technologies**

As we would expect when recalling the dominance of the neo-liberal trope in the literature on diaspora practices in general, one of the dominant rationalities operative within the Indian case are *neo-liberal* technologies. Operating through the logic of the *market* and governing through *communities*, several elements within diaspora practices can be elucidated to assess this claim.
Regarding first of all the logic of the market, this would penetrate almost all domains of human activity according to the neo-liberal rationality. It thereby is not pivotal to know whether the market is understood through the prism of the human capital theory of the Chicago school, the socio-constructivist theory of German ordo-liberalism with minimal governmental intervention to assure the proper functioning of the market or the emphasis on the market as an ideal educative tool for citizens willing to govern themselves, as emphasised by the Austrian school around Mises or Hayek. Most relevant is rather to see whether and how the market penetrates Indian diaspora practices and commodifies them. Several aspects seem to contribute to such commodifications, such as commodification of issues and themes discussed, conceptions of governing relations based on networks, a plurality of enacting actors and linguistic aspects materialising the market logic enabling such a logic to perform.

**Commodification of issues**

The themes and issues discussed for instance at the Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas clearly reveal that typical “geo-economistic” issues such as trade and investment are at the forefront. However, it is not simply about identifying such typical issues associated with the geo-economistic problematisation; it is also about how other issues have been approached and it is here we see that they are most often tackled from the perspective of the market with its emphasis on cost-benefit calculations. We notice for instance that issues such as tourism, media and entertainment, health, youth, philanthropy or even issues linked to gender and culture are discussed through “marketised” lenses (FICCI 2013; MOIA 2009a, 2010, 2011, 2012b, 2013; MOIA and Ministry of Youth Affairs & Sports 2014).
Plurality of enacting actors

But neo-liberalism understood as a rationality of government is not simply about spelling out the marketisation of diaspora practices. It is also about the different authorities or experts enacting the geo-economistic problematisation. Contrary to sovereign or welfarist approaches, neo-liberalism emphasises the multiplication and diffusion of such authorities and experts, since communities would govern themselves increasingly independently from state institutions. It is precisely this phenomenon that can be observed when analysing Indian diaspora practices. Different Indian state institutions are obviously to be mentioned in this context, but they are by far not alone in this task; universities (or academic actors), industrial representatives, chambers of commerce, cultural actors (such as the Bollywood film industry) or even individual Indian emigrants themselves should be mentioned in this context – without coming close to exhausting the list. They all assert certain “claims” over Indian emigrants, or more specifically, over subjects of the Indian diaspora.

Different Indian state agencies seem to be leading the government of Indian emigrants and the diaspora. Operating mainly through the Ministry for Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA),71 formal Indian authorities have established a multitude of regulatory bodies

71 The Ministry for Overseas India Affairs (MOIA) has been established in a context where many observers were skeptical about how serious Indian formal authorities were about engaging its overseas population. The reason for such skepticism lies in the fact that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) with Vajpayee as its leading figure suffered a surprising defeat at the polls in 2004 – although being enthusiastic about its chances of getting re-elected, as visible during the second Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas in 2004 which stood under the BJP election slogan Shining India. However, it was the INC led by Sonia Gandhi, i.e. the widow of Rajiv Gandhi, who emerged as winner. An alliance known as the United Progressive Alliance with the INC as its strongest party took over the reigns of executive power, with Manmohan Singh taking office as the new Indian Prime Minister. It therefore was not entirely clear whether the geo-economistic problematisation of diaspora practices (as initiated by the BJP and Vajpayee in particular) would be pursued. Yet, in one of its first announcements (in May 2004), the new government made it clear that it would continue on the path set out by the previous government, thus holding on to the [symbolic] celebrations of the Indian diaspora through the Pravasi
who are charged to handle specific issues of the government of overseas Indians. One finds first of all four different units within the MOIA, each responsible for a special domain: Diaspora Services Division, Emigration Policy Division, Financial Services Division and Management Services Division. The Prime Minister’s Global Advisory Council, established in 2008 of People of Indian Origin can also be mentioned in this context, since it attempts to address issues of Indians overseas by drawing upon the experiences and knowledge of the “best Indian minds wherever they may be based” (MOIA 2013: 39) to consider ways and means for accessing the skills and knowledge of the Indian diaspora for meeting India’s development goals. The establishment of the gender advisory group in 2006 follows a similar logic, although obviously limited to issues of gender. It consists of representatives from related ministries, Indian state governments, NGOs and others to engage in exploring ways and means of providing assistance to women facing problems arising from marriages to overseas Indians (MOIA 2007: 33) – thus targeting also a specific category of the Indian population, i.e. Indian women. It sought to constitute a suited body whose main role was double: both to communicate with the central Indian government on issues relating to “overseas Indian marriages”, and also to propose new frameworks, policies and instruments for dealing with such issues. The organisation of the international conference on India-EU Mobility Partnership in February 2009 also needs to be mentioned in this context, since it is relevant for the development of a threefold track

Bharatiya Diwas. The government even went a step further by establishing in May 2004 this new ministry dedicated only to overseas affairs, initially known as the Ministry of Non-Resident Indians’ Affairs and renamed in September 2004 as the Ministry for Overseas Indian Affairs – as one of the smallest ministries in the Indian executive.
to address this issue, i.e. an academic, a business and an official track (MOIA 2009a: 34-5).

But as already mentioned above, we observe a pluralisation of authorities enacting the geo-economic problematisation of diaspora practices, thus pointing to other actors than Indian state agencies alone. A prominent role is thereby assumed by industrial actors. Both the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) as well as the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) are particularly worth mentioning. The Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas have in fact been organised principally by the CII, thus clearly revealing the economistic dimension of Indian diaspora practices. The CII was furthermore one of the principal contributors to the establishment of so-called Overseas Indian Facilitation Centres (OIFC), i.e. “not-for-profit” trusts. Many other industrial actors are obviously also part of this enterprise.

Universities, or more generally speaking, academic actors, also participate in the “translation” of the geo-economic problematisation of Indian diaspora practices. Four different practices can be mentioned in this context: the Scholarship Scheme for Diaspora Children (SSDC), the intended establishment of PIO Universities, several academic engagements as well as the organisation of thematic seminars. The Scholarship Program for Diaspora Children is designed to assist emigrants in enrolling their children in Indian institutions of higher education (Agunias and Newland 2012: 75). The program provides hundreds of scholarships for undergraduate courses in several disciplines (such as engineering, technology, humanities, commerce, management, etc.) to partially fund the tuition and hostel fees. The students are thereby selected on the basis of an entrance test conducted by a
private firm, i.e. M/s Educational Consultants India Limited (Ed.CIL) (MOIA 2007: 12). Similar in this regard and still in the educational sector, there have been plans since 2007 to establish universities in different cities only for PIOs and NRIs (Bharatan 2011; MOIA 2008, 2011). It would be established by a private organisation, and teach mainly disciplines such as engineering or commerce. But the university has not yet been realised. Staying in the sector of higher education, the MOIA has moreover begun to establish, from 2006 onwards, connections to several academic institutions through the legal instrument of memoranda of understandings (MOUs). The institutions include: a centre at the Nehru University in New Delhi, two academic centres in Thiruvananthapura (Kerala), the Hellenic Migrant Policy Institute in Athens, a centre at the University of Pennsylvania, the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) in New Delhi, the European Universitary Institute (EUI) in Florence, the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) in Washington DC and finally the International Migration Institute (IMI) in Oxford. These engagements are set up for respective periods of five years. A special grant of Rs. 200 lakh to the Indian Society of International Law (ISIL) to publish a book on the “NRI and Private International Law” should also be mentioned in this regard (MOIA 2009a: 20). The organisation of thematic seminars by the MOIA takes a similar path in this regard. One could cite in this context the “seminar on property related to issues of NRIs or PIOs” in 2010 as well as the “seminar on the Indian diaspora in the Caribbean”, taking place in 2009 (MOIA 2010: 12).

We finally witness an increased insistence on the Indian diaspora encouraged to govern themselves in an active and responsible way, i.e. in a way as suggested by neo-liberal principles. The organisation of regional Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas (or so-
called “Mini-PBDs”) points towards such a logic. These diaspora conferences not only took place in India itself – be it in New Delhi (2003, 2004, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2014), Mumbai (2005), Hyderabad (2006), Chennai (2009), Jaipur (2012) or Kochi (2013), but they began to be organised outside India from 2010 onwards in order to increase the “responsibilisation” of the Indian diaspora. Up to now, two regional PBDs have taken place: one in Durban (South Africa) in October 2010 and another one in Toronto (Canada) in June 2011.

We thus observe a veritable pluralisation of different authorities enacting Indian diaspora practices according to geo-economic problematisations.

**Networking language**

But neo-liberalism is not simply about the marketisation of Indian diaspora practices and diffusion/pluralisation of enacting agents. It is also about how the relations between subjects of diaspora practices and actors enacting them are conceived. It is in this context that the language of network comes into play. It should be recalled that neo-liberalism understood as a rationality of government is about governing through communities where these latter are linked to *global networks* rather than territorial nations. It is precisely with respect to such a conception of Indian emigrants as constituted through networks that one can analyse the emergence of several tools of Indian diaspora practices.

The aims of the MOIA an be evoked in this context: “*Developing networks with and amongst overseas Indians, empowerment and protection of emigrants [and] the promotion and facilitation of trade and investments of overseas Indians in India*” (Hercog and Siegel 2010: 82). While the second objective regarding the protection of
emigrants will be discussed in the next section where welfarist, liberal and pastoral technologies of power are emphasised, the goals of developing networks and of facilitating trade and investments of overseas Indians in India clearly point both to the geo-economistic problematisation of Indian diaspora practices as well as to the globalising assumptions informing the neo-liberal rationality. Instead of “forcing” or encouraging Indian emigrants to return physically “home” to contribute to economic and geo-political development of India, emigrants are, if not encouraged, then at least tolerated to remain abroad in order to fulfill their geo-economistic role. We thus encounter the network language which is so symptomatic of the neo-liberal rationality, since it points towards the discourse of “brain circulation” which came to replace the “brain drain” discourse.

This networking language is even more prominently pursued throughout another state-led body, i.e. the so-called Global Indian Network of Knowledge (Global-INK) which is institutionally situated within the Overseas Indian Facilitation Centres. It consists of a virtual platform for knowledge exchange and is aimed to create a network of people with expertise in areas of environment, healthcare, innovation, science and technology, but without relocating them – thus in accordance with the globalising strategies of states (as opposed to the return strategy) (cf. Larner 2007: 337). Membership in this network would only be by invitation, but would give them opportunities to seek advice, contacts, assistance and support in their sectors, to convert their ideas and research outputs into actions and to find research collaborators. As of 2013, there were a total of forty-three hospitals and Indian medical associations, thirty-three Indian diaspora associations (whose members are
physicians of Indian origin) and thirty-five doctors and scientists (of Indian origin) registered as members of the network.

Finally, we can mention the Overseas Indian Facilitation Centres (OIFC) which were expected to facilitate so-called diaspora investments and be active in the knowledge networking (MOIA 2007: 30; 2013: 40). Different practices were used to reach these aims, such as information dissemination (through a business networking portal, monthly newsletters and the publication of research reports), consulting and reaching out to members of its diaspora (in partnership with diaspora associations and sub-state authorities) and facilitation services (through the organisation of OIFC Market Places during the PBD, i.e. stands of investment opportunities or through so-called diaspora meets where opportunities for face-to-face connections could be established). The conduct of an interview survey from 2011 to understand the expectations of overseas Indians in their economic engagement with India is a final activity of the OIFC (in partnership with ICRA Management Consulting Services Ltd) worth mentioning. Another practice being institutionalised and very similar in its aims to the OIFC was the creation of the India Development Foundation of Overseas Indians. It was expected not only to facilitate investments by Indian emigrants, but also mostly to engage them in philanthropical projects to supplement India’s social development efforts – especially in the sectors of health care, education, empowerment of women and sustainable livelihood (water and rural energy management) (MOIA 2013: 39). It therefore can be said to function as the institutional embodiment of the idea of Indian philanthropy in a networked conception.
In short, neo-liberal technologies of power are well and truly operative within Indian diaspora practices. Not only do we observe a commodification of different issues discussed during Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas, but the pluralisation of authorities or experts enacting diaspora practices are at least as noteworthy as are the networking language or networking assumptions informing conceptions of the governing relationship between the Indian diaspora and enactors or conductors of the geo-economistic problematisation of Indian diaspora practices.

**Liberal-welfarist & pastoral technologies**

It might be astonishing to discover the presence of welfarist or liberal technologies of government with regard to the Indian diaspora, since most of the literature considers diaspora practices mainly through the neo-liberal prism. Yet, when analysing the diaspora practices in the Indian context, one realises that “old” welfarist technologies are well and truly operative here. They are not only “present”, but they constitute one of the principal modalities of power regarding the government of Indian emigrants *lato sensu*.\(^72\)

Diaspora practices falling under the welfarist logic are principally aimed at low- or mid-skilled Indian emigrants who reside in their majority, as we have seen in the beginning of this chapter, in the Gulf states. The focus with regard to their

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\(^72\) One admittedly could affirm that these practices should be put under a different denomination, such as *emigrant practices* rather than *diaspora practices*, since these practices are aimed in their majority at low- or mid-skilled Indian emigrants, but seldom at high-skilled Indian emigrants who are the favored subjects of Indian diaspora practices; but since one observes that such practices are mainly problematised by Indian authorities themselves as *diaspora practices*, we will adhere to their problematisation and consider *emigrant practices* also under the header or category of *diaspora practices*. 

government is thereby mainly put on social issues – thus in accordance with the logic
of the welfarist or liberal governmentality as a government through the social, where
the social is equivalent to the national [territory]. It should be recalled that their
emigration is problematised differently than that of the high-skilled one: while the
latter is deplored as a “brain drain” (and transformed into a “brain gain”, as just seen
above), low- or mid-skilled emigration is instead welcomed, since it allows the Indian
economy to be relieved of excessive labour forces.

We observe in this regard the development of a multitude of programs, projects or
formal governmental institutions following such a logic where the aim is clearly to
govern these emigrants through centralised institutions. The pastoral modality of
power can therefore be put in close perspective with the welfarist rationality, since
pastorship is principally about guiding the “flock” of the emigrant community by
taking care of each and everyone (“omnes et singulatim”) and thus also protecting
them from possible threats. It is thus both with regard to welfarist as well as pastoral
modalities of power that this section is interested.

**Economic government through protection**

Looking first at the definition of the “social”, it seems to be no coincidence to observe
the trope of the family within Indian diaspora practices. Such a trope is obviously to
be read in the context of the [renewed] transnational conception of the Indian nation
and fits well the pastoral logic where the guidance of a nation is dependent upon the
guidance of the family, i.e. what has been introduced in the theoretical framework as
upward continuity, where the guidance of the nation is premised on an economic
model (rather than the more recent and modern economic model). The trope of the
family is especially invoked during the first Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas in 2003. The statement of the chairman of the conference is indicative in this regard:

“Today, by common consent, the Indian diaspora is a force to reckon with and constitute what I termed long ago as the national reserve and resource of India. [...] The Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas is an affectionate invitation and a loving gift of Mother India to its overseas children. [...] It is for the first time that such a gathering of the global Indian family from sixty countries is taking place. [...] The Indian diaspora is a rainbow and, if I may say so, my head soars with a fond aspiration and pride and my heart leaps with boundless joy when I behold the rainbow of India and Indians over the globe” (Singhvi 2003: our emphasis).

We see clearly this oeconomic logic, where the Indian nation is presented as a family consisting of “overseas children” and where authorities would have to act as matriarch to protect its children.

Such a protecting stance is thereby discernible throughout many other tools that are established through the welfarist or liberal logic, i.e. as national institutions considered as main instruments to govern the Indian emigrant community.

The setting up of the MOIA, as described above, is just one of them, and obviously one of the principal ones. When recalling the aims of the MOIA as “[d]eveloping networks with and amongst overseas Indians, empowerment and protection of emigrants [and] the promotion and facilitation of trade and investments of overseas Indians in India” (Hercog and Siegel 2010: 82), we clearly see that the protection of emigrants is prominently and explicitly placed among the different objectives of this ministry. Therefore, it is not surprising to see a multitude of figures, institutions or
programs linked to the MOIA where the protection of overseas Indians is placed as the guiding rationale.

The so-called Protector General of Emigrants (PGE) is just one of these figures embodying the pastoral (and welfarist) modality of power. As already stipulated in the Indian Emigration Act of 1983 (and repeated in the amended Emigration Act of 2009), this officer – together with nine field officers, known as Protectors of Emigrants (POEs) – was charged to enforce the act. It is this authority who developed several practices concerning the protection of overseas Indians generally speaking, and overseas Indian workers (OIW) more particularly – thus clearly targeting this category of Indian emigrants, as opposed to the high-skilled members of the Indian diaspora. We observe in this context the development of several practices following the protective logic of the pastorship.

The handling of international crises or labour disputes where Indian emigrants were or could have been involved by the PGE is typical in this regard. Some illustrations include the evacuation of Indians from Lebanon during the war in 2006, the evacuation of Indians during the Bahrain fire accident in 2007, the arrangements for the return of fifteen Indian nationals involved in the Kenya plane crash in 2007, the negotiations with UAE authorities in the strike of workers in the UAE or the facilitation of deportation of dead bodies of seven Indian workers killed when a bridge collapsed in Dubai in October 2007.

Another form through which the PGE was intended to protect Indian emigrants was make the registration of those agents wishing to recruit Indian citizens for employment abroad compulsory. The recruiting agents would be required to deposit a
bank guarantee of Rs. 20 lakh. Almost 1’500 recruiting agents were registered from January 1984 (when the obligation became operational) to the beginning of 2013.73 The management by the PGE of the Overseas Workers Resource Centre (OWRC) in Delhi and the Migration Resource Centres (MRC) in Kochi, Hyderabad and Panchkula (Haryana) as well as the establishment of an Indian Workers Resource Centre (IWRC) in Dubai point to the same logic.74 The OWRC enables emigrants to seek information and file complaints against recruiting agents or foreign employers, while the MRCs are limited to the provision of information to prospective emigrants. Special measures were thereby foreseen for ensuring the safety and protection of female overseas Indian workers, in particular housemaids (Hercog and Siegel 2010: 36).

But it was not only the PGE who embodies the pastoral modality of power with its emphasis on guiding and protecting Indian emigrants. Other national institutions serve the same protective aims, such as the Council for Promotion of Overseas Employment or eventually the Indian Council of Overseas Employment (ICOE) which was established after the fifth Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas in 2007. This council was also meant to supplement the emigration act of 1983 aiming to protect overseas workers in

73 The simplification of procedures with regard to emigration processes can be cited in this regard, too. The issuing of emigration Clearance Books (EC Books) to the recruiting agents to keep a record of the emigration clearances of labour, the liberalisation of powers to the POEs, the abolishment of the Emigration Check Required Suspension in 2007 and finally – as part of the project on the computerisation of all offices of the POEs for e-governance in emigration – the requirement for all applicants to send all essential documents in PDF form all constitute practices aiming in fine to protect Indian emigrants.

74 It was within a project carried out both by the MOIA and the IOM that the so-called Migrant Resource Centres (MRC) were set up, with the first being in Kochi (Kerala). They were established in order to serve as a single contact point aimed at counselling future Indian emigrants (MOIA 2009a: 30). The subsequent development of further MRCs went thereby hand in hand with the establishment in 2008 of so-called Overseas Workers’ Resource Centres (OWRC) serving similar aims.
sofar as this act did not provide any institutional mechanism for the promotion or facilitation of overseas employment (MOIA 2007: 23). But the council would progressively take up new functions and develop new practices. Renamed India Centre for Migration (ICM) in 2008, it had the mandate to promote overseas employment, to better protect and ensure welfare of overseas Indian workers, but also to study emerging opportunities for overseas employment. But it would most importantly serve as a think tank on all matters relating to international migration. Several practices emerged out of this role, such as the skill development initiative for potential migrants from the North-Eastern States of India, the development of a database for policymaking on India-EU migration, the study on the health of migrant workers from India in the Gulf, the pilot project on the empowerment of women migrant workers in the Gulf, labour market assessments, the conduct of a research project on the movement of Indian capital, goods and labour in Africa, and finally the organisation of employers’ conference (MOIA 2012a).75

The Overseas Indian Centres (OIC) serve similar purposes. Set up in places with a large concentration of members of the Indian diaspora, they are headed by a counsellor to provide professional assistance, i.e. medical, legal and financial counselling to overseas Indian workers. The first such centre was established in Dubai to assist Indians in the Gulf countries (MOIA 2007: 31), while two additional ones were created at the Indian Missions in Washington DC (for the overseas Indian

75 It is by the way this institution, i.e. the ICM, which was responsible for the previously mentioned academic engagements of the MOIA with several research institutions.
community in the USA) and in Kuala Lumpur (for the overseas community in Malaysia).

We finally witness the development of several practices regarding the protection of a very specific category of the Indian population, i.e. Indian women being deserted by their overseas Indian spouses. It is regarding such overseas Indian marriages (MOIA 2007: 32-3), as the ministry came to call such issues that projects and institutions are developed all aiming at protecting such women one way or another.

In fact, the MOIA started a publicity and awareness campaign at two regional workshops in Chandigarh and Trivandrum as early as 2006, and also at parallel sessions of the PBD 2007 where such issues were raised. Furthermore, it issued at the same event a guidance booklet on marriages with Overseas Indians for the benefit of prospective brides and their families. The Ministry also organised a national convention in April 2009 to help jilted NRI brides (MOIA 2010: 14). MOIA’s practices with regard to these issues went even further, as it introduced a scheme to provide financial assistance for obtaining legal and counselling services – in several countries such as the USA, the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Gulf states for Indian women affected by such problems. In 2006, a gender advisory group was established which consisted of representatives from related ministries, Indian state governments, NGOs and others to engage in exploring ways and means of providing assistance to women facing problems arising from marriages to overseas Indians (MOIA 2007: 33). In 2008, the MOIA continued this course of action by constituting an inter-ministerial sub-committee responsible for presenting possible solutions to the problem (MOIA 2009a: 20), with a coordinating agency coming out
of the recommendations of the sub-committee (MOIA 2010: 13-4). Eventually, it was the India Centre for Migration (ICM) which would take up several practices with regard to the empowerment of Indian women.

**Social insurance schemes**

The protective logic of the pastoral modality of power is also pursued through alternative means, which can be put in perspective with the *welfarist logic* or *rationality* of power. These means are principally *social insurance schemes* aimed at ensuring social security, acceptable labour conditions, but also welfare funds of Indian emigrants.

The most classical approach which is thereby chosen is the conclusion of *bilateral agreements* with states where Indian emigrants are found. Such agreements can range from labour agreements (or so-called human resources mobility partnerships) to social security agreements. They fall under conceptions of international relations that Larner entitles “*developmentalist [...] as those that occur between discrete nation states [...] and are primarily focused on supporting and enhancing the activities of government institutions [...]*” (Larner 2007: 335) – thus corresponding to what the present study categorises as welfarist or liberal assumptions of government.

Regarding the *labour agreements*, they serve the purpose of enhancing employment opportunities and protection of workers, of obliging the host state to take measures for the protection of workers in unorganised sectors, of facilitating the procedures that the foreign employer should follow to recruit Indian workers and to constitute a joint working group (JWG) to ensure proper implementation of the agreement (MOIA
Several labour agreements have so far been concluded, mainly and little surprisingly with the Gulf states. These include agreements with Qatar and Jordan (signed in the late 1980s), the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2006, Kuwait (in 2007), Oman (in 2008), Malaysia and Bahrain (in 2009), whilst negotiations were still under way with Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain (MOIA 2007: 21-2; 2010: 18), Yemen and Libya (MOIA 2008: 33). The crafting of the Abu Dhabi Declaration of January 2008 together with the development of the Indo-UAE pilot project to develop best practices should also be mentioned in this regard, since it calls for a holistic approach to the problem of temporary contractual labour in both origin and destination countries by testing new measures (MOIA 2010: 28-9).

Regarding social security agreements, they are considered central, since many overseas Indian workers were compelled to pay social security taxes both in India and the host country, leading to a double contribution – without receiving any further benefit from the contributions paid abroad, since many countries would not allow export of social security benefits. The bilateral social security agreements were therefore aimed at protecting the interests of such overseas Indian workers by exempting them from social security contribution under the host country legislation for a certain period of time and by providing for portability of pension in the case of those who have to contribute under the host country legislation (MOIA 2009a: 28). Such agreements have been concluded with several states where there are not only low- or high-skilled Indian emigrants. Such states are found mainly in the OECD and include Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic,
Luxembourg (MOIA 2009a: 28), Switzerland, Hungary, Denmark (MOIA 2010: 21), the Republic of Korea, Norway (MOIA 2011: 21), Finland, Canada, Japan, Sweden, Austria and Portugal (MOIA 2013: 29). Negotiations to conclude such an agreement are still under way with Cyprus, Australia, Spain, Bulgaria, Romania, the USA (MOIA 2009a: 28), Greece, Italy (MOIA 2010: 21), Japan (MOIA 2012b: 29) and Russia (MOIA 2013: 29).

Although adhering to a slightly different logic where the “deterritorialised” mobility is favored to the detriment of territorial factors, human resources mobility partnerships may be mentioned here, too, since they aim at similar objectives, i.e. maximising benefits from labour mobility and minimising its risks. Considered as supplementary to the social security agreements, they have been concluded principally with countries of the European Union (EU). Such partnerships are limited for the time being to just one with Denmark (in 2008) and another one with the Netherlands in 2010 (MOIA 2011: 19), while negotiations for further ones are still under way with Poland, the Czech Republic, Norway, Switzerland, Hungary, Romania (MOIA 2009a: 27), France (MOIA 2010: 19), Australia, Germany, Italy and Mauritius (MOIA 2012b: 27), but also the EU as an institution (MOIA 2011: 20).

The organisation of several conferences ultimately can be put under the same heading of inter-state practices aimed at governing Indian emigrants. The eight conference of the ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting, an intergovernmental forum) in December 2009 in Goa is to be mentioned in this regard (MOIA 2010: 30) just as the project implemented jointly by the MOIA and the IOM entitled Regional Dialogue and Program on Facilitating Managed and Legal Migration Between Asia and the European Union (EU). The latter project was aimed principally at facilitating – rather
than forbidding, as in the sovereign rationality of government – development and enhancing regional cooperation of migration, but also to enhance the capacity of the MOIA to assess and respond to the labour needs of the EU. The so-called Protector General of Emigrants (PGE) managed all of these practices and constitutes one of the most important embodiments – next to the more general MOIA – of the welfarist logic. Different consultation meetings with the sub-state governments taking place annually to discuss issues of Indian emigrants – although the latter do not take place on an inter-state, but rather on an intra-state level – follow similar patterns.

Welfare funds

But it is not just in connection with bilateral agreements that social insurance schemes operate. We witness the development of several institutions aiming more directly at such welfarist governing mechanisms.

One such tool is the development of pension and life insurance funds. Known initially as the Pension and Life Insurance Fund (PLIF), the Mahatma Gandhi Pravasi Suraksha Yojana (MGPSY) was developed in May 2012 as a specially designed social security scheme for the unskilled and semi-skilled Overseas Indian workers with ECR passports\(^7\) and employed on temporary work permits. Several governmental sections were involved in its development, such as the Indian Missions in the seventeen ECR countries, the Department of Financial Services (DFS), the Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority (PFRDA), and other financial institutions. This scheme,

\(^7\)Holders of ECR passports need a clearance called an Emigration Check from the Government of India's Protector of Emigrants when going to selected countries on a work visa. This is to prevent the exploitation of Indian workers (especially the unskilled and less-educated) when going abroad, particularly to Middle Eastern countries. ECR passport holders travelling on a tourist visa do not need a clearance; this is known as an Emigration Check Suspension.
following the previously established insurance fund for emigrant Indians known as *Pravasi Bharatiya Bima Yojana (PBBY)*, aimed at enabling entitled OWIs to save for their return and resettlement, to save for their pension and to get a life insurance cover against natural death (MOIA 2013: 24-5). A public sector bank, i.e. the Bank of Baroda, has been appointed to manage the scheme, which was initially made operational only in the southern Indian state of Kerala.

Another social insurance scheme is the instauration of the so-called *Indian Community Welfare Fund (ICWF)* from 2008 onwards. This institution allows coordinating sporadic and ad hoc services to overseas Indians workers (OIW) in a more efficient way, especially in the sector of social security. It focuses mostly on providing financially sustainable social security and support services to these OIWs, since many of them would face problems of different nature. These problems include high costs of migration, problematic payment of salaries, poor living and working conditions, physical abuse, fraudulent recruitment practices, difficulties in resettlement on return, financial insecurity or vulnerability against emergencies (MOIA 2009a: 31). The ICWF is thus at the disposal of Indian missions in seventeen countries where a so-called Emigration Check is required (ECR) in order to carry out practices, especially funding activities in the beginning, related to the welfare of Overseas Indian Citizens. It often would be the Protector General of Emigrants who would take the lead in asking for the enforcement of the redress of OIW’s grievances. As of September 2012, the mandate of the ICWF was extended to include the following activities: lodging for distressed OIW, extending emergency medical care, providing air passage to stranded OIW, providing initial legal assistance to OIWs,
funding and airlifting of mortal remains to India of deceased OIWs, paying penalties for illegal stay of Indian nationals (where the worker is not at fault *prima facie*), paying small fines or penalties for release of Indian nationals in jail, providing support to local overseas Indian associations to establish Overseas Indian Community Centres (in countries with a population of Overseas Indians exceeding 100’000) and finally providing support to start and run overseas Indian community-based student welfare centres (in countries that have more than 20’000 Indian students) (MOIA 2010: 24).

In short, pastoral and welfarist technologies of power seem to go hand in hand in the Indian context of diaspora practices. Operating mainly through the social qua national, tools developed according to this rationality aim principally at ensuring the protection of low- and mid-skilled overseas Indian workers (OWI) or Indian emigrants more generally speaking. The Protectorate General of Emigrants (PGE) with nine field officers known as Protectors of Emigrants (POEs) are particularly worth mentioning in this regard, since they perfectly embody this pastoral logic of guiding and protecting the “flock” of Indian emigrants. But other instruments point towards similar logics: the conclusion of bilateral agreements in order to protect the social security, welfare and labour conditions of the OWI are exemplary in this regard. The organisation of multilateral conferences on the international stage as well as the consultation meetings with sub-state governments belong in the same category. The development of social insurance schemes, such as the Indian Community Welfare Fund (ICWF), the Mahatma Gandhi Pravasi Suraksha Yojana (MGPSY) as pension and life insurance fund coupled with the Pravasi Bharatiya Bima Yojana (PBBY) or
the establishment of the India Centre for Migration (ICM), previously known as Indian Council of Overseas Employment (ICOE), charged to act as think tank on issues of international migration, including emigration are examples of such social insurance schemes. Even social issues regarding what has been called “overseas Indian marriages” receive the attention of political technologies within the welfarist and pastoral modality of power. Through the construction of a *gender advisory board*, the *awareness and publicity campaigns* or the financial and legal services offered to Indian women affected by such problems, the protection of Indian women concerned by such issues is thereby sought.

Until now, the analysis has revealed that two different, but complementary rationalities seem to operate within the Indian setting of diaspora practices: neo-liberal technologies aimed principally at high-skilled Indian emigrants constituting the Indian *diaspora* on the one hand and pastoral and welfarist technologies principally targeting low- and mid-skilled Indian emigrants. They undoubtedly constitute the dominant rationalities in the Indian case. But disciplinary and even sovereign rationalities are not to be neglected, although less important than these two regulatory technologies. It is to these rationalities that we now turn to in order to conclude this section on the governmentalities of Indian diaspora practices.

**Alternative technologies: Discipline & sovereignty**

Disciplinary technologies of power refer to the production of “appropriate” subjects in their conduct as members of the Indian diaspora or as Indian emigrants. Although the disciplinary modality of power is often described as the “other side of the coin” of
biopower – next to so-called security mechanisms of the governmental or biopolitical regime –, this type of power seems to be systematically neglected in the literature on diaspora practices, also with regard to the Indian case. As indicated out among others by Collier (cf. 2009), the automatic and almost mechanical coupling of the biopolitical rationality to the disciplinary one is mistaken; they should be seen as independent rationalities to some extent: “If previously Foucault saw regulatory power and discipline as complementary parts of a coherent logic of power that operated on different registers, then in the later work he posts no necessary link between them. [...] when Foucault returns to a discussion of ‘normalization’ it is no longer to indicate how regulatory power and disciplinary power together form a normalizing society, but to simply indicate how ‘each deals differently with what we call normalization’ (Foucault, 2007: 56)” (S. J. Collier 2009: 87). The disciplinary logic should thus be seen as an independent modality of power rather than a simple complement of the biopolitical component of the governmental rationality.

Although not dominant in the Indian context, disciplinary technologies are operative within emigrant and diaspora practices.

In this context, we can emphasise for instance one of the typical instruments or sites outlined by Foucault where disciplinary power is operating, i.e. schools or, more generally speaking, educative institutions. Three different tools, which have been partly been addressed above, are instructive here: the Know India Program, the Scholarship Program for Diaspora Children and the intended establishment of PIO Universities. The Know India Program is directed at the youth of the Indian diaspora and consists of a three-week internship “to help familiarise Indian Diaspora youth, in
the age group of 18-26 years, with developments and achievements made by the country and bringing them closer to the land of their ancestors” (MOIA 2013: 17). It was instituted after the second Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas in 2004 where the then Prime Minister Vajpayee proclaimed to subsidise higher education for the children of NRIs and to engage more closely with second- and subsequent generations of Indian emigrants. The Scholarship Program for Diaspora Children points exactly in the same direction, since it is designed to assist emigrants in enrolling their children in Indian institutions of higher education (Agunias and Newland 2012: 75). The program provides hundreds of scholarships for undergraduate courses in several disciplines (such as engineering, technology, humanities, commerce, management, etc.) to partially fund the tuition and hostel fees. The students are thereby selected on the basis of an entrance test conducted by a private firm, i.e. M/s Educational Consultants India Limited (Ed.CIL) (MOIA 2007: 12). Finally, the plans to establish universities in different cities only for PIOs and NRIs (Bharatan 2011; MOIA 2008, 2011) have the same objective in mind as the other two instruments. Such universities would be established by a private organisation, and teach mainly disciplines such as engineering or commerce. Although the university has not as yet been realised, these three tools are indicative of the disciplinary modality of power, since they are aimed – among others – to discipline emigrant subjects to adopt a certain conduct in line with the geo-economistic problematisation. It would be upon such “new” subjects that the burden to continue the “proper” application or translation of geo-economistic problematisations of diaspora practices, i.e. to reach the goal of economic development while giving India its place back on the international scene, is laid.
We should also mention the development of other tools following upon the
disciplinary logic of power. The rewarding of “outstanding global Indians” (Hercog
and Siegel 2010; Lall 2001, 2003; Mani and Varadarajan 2005; Varadarajan 2010: 135) through the *Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Award* is to be stressed most notably in
this regard. Coming out of the HLCID report, these awards are the highest honour that
overseas Indians can obtain and are conferred upon NRIs, PIOs or any of their
organisations *having enhanced India’s prestige* in their country of residence. Many
other criteria that may justify the presentation of such an award are listed, eg. the
“[…] *significant contribution for the welfare of the diaspora*” or the “[…] *significant
contribution towards better understanding abroad of India and supported India’s
causes and concerns in a tangible way*” (MOIA 2013: 16). These awards obviously
thus have a direct impact on the ideally imagined subject of the Indian diaspora
practices and point to the *normating technology* where “what is normal is prescribed
in law” (O’Grady 2014: 515). It is through such awards that those who adopt the
“normal conduct” are rewarded with the result that it induces competition among the
emigrant population to conform to the norm and be rewarded (cf. Foucault 1975: 180-
3).

Similar results of inducing Indian emigrants to conform to certain geo-economistic
norms are obtained through so-called “*tool rooms and other technical training
centres*” (MOIA 2007: 23). These spatial arrangements would bring the skill level of
Indian emigrants on par with the overseas *market* requirements by equipping them in
a one-week module with basic knowledge about laws, language and culture of the
destination country (cf. MOIA 2007: 22-23). The *education* of potential emigrants is
Furthermore also effected by organising *national campaigns* in both print and electronic media – organisation which is principally assured by the Protectorate General of Emigrants (PGE).

In sum, normation technologies associated with the disciplinary modality of power are discernible in Indian diaspora practices. Visible through educative tools, such as the *Know India Program*, the *Scholarship Program for Diaspora Children* or the intended establishment of *PIO universities*, they “[...] seek to produce the subjective conditions, the forms of self-mastery, self-regulation and self-control, necessary to govern a nation [...]” (Rose 1993a: 289). But normating technologies operate also through other educative tools, such as special *training centres* or *national campaigns* targeting potential Indian emigrants. The rewarding technique of the *Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Awards* is equally aimed at educating Indian emigrants by demonstrating implicitly that those who comply with geo-economistic norms are rewarded while those who do not comply are punished – at least implicitly by not being eligible for such awards.

The last modality of power that stands out from the analysis of political technologies of Indian diaspora practices are *sovereign* ones. When recalling that such a regime operates principally through repressive and extractive logics, as typically found in laws or police-like regulations, the *obligation* imposed upon those who wish to recruit Indian citizens for employment abroad to register themselves with the Protectorate General of Emigrants (PGE) points towards this interpretation. The recruiting agents would in fact be required to deposit a bank guarantee of Rs. 20 lakh – thus clearly
falling under the sovereign “code” or category. Almost 1’500 recruiting agents were registered from January 1984 (when the obligation became operational) to the beginning of 2013.

But even more relevant for the sovereign rationality of power is the issuing of so-called PIO Cards and, eventually, of Overseas Indian Citizenship (OCI).

Regarding first of all the cards for Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs), they were initially, i.e. as of 2002, sold for 1’000 US dollars and later reduced to 250 US dollars. They give the holder certain privileges with regard to buying property and investments and constitute the equivalent of a twenty-year visa to India (Lall 2003: 134). It is the institutional embodiment of the blurring of categories, mentioned in the epistemic section of this chapter, since it puts PIOs on the same footing as NRIs. The creation of such a card was the result of the insistence of a large number of PIOs who had in fact been asking for dual citizenship. But as this was not considered politically acceptable at that time, the PIO card was considered a “second-best” offer from the Indian government (cf. Binod Khadria 2003: 19).

In order to materialise the renewed transnational conception of the Indian nation, Vajpayee declared during the first PBD in 2003 that a dual citizenship (amendment) bill would be introduced in parliament in the same year – signalling the definitive break with the Nehruvian tradition. The parliament subsequently, i.e. in December 2003, did pass the bill granting a new citizenship to overseas Indians, at least to PIOs from sixteen countries initially. (Non Resident Indians & Persons of Indian Origin Division (Ministry of External Affairs) 2004) – citizenship which came to be known by the new legal category of Overseas Citizen of India (OCI). It is with this bill that
the renewed transnational Indian nation was institutionalised. This citizenship would allow its holders to enjoy certain rights, but not participation in elections. It extended the so-called Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) to PIOs of all countries who were citizens of India in 1950. It would allow for a life-long visa, free travel to India and certain economic, educational and cultural benefits (MOIA 2007: 11). However, it should not be confused with dual citizenship, since the OCI does not confer any political rights. The introduction of voting rights for NRIs was announced only at the Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas in 2010 by the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh who promised to take steps to grant such rights to NRIs (MOIA 2011: 11).

Identification

To conclude this chapter, questions of subjectivity as assumed throughout diaspora practices are addressed: What subjects are *assumed* throughout these diaspora practices? Which kind of citizens are imagined as a result of these practices? It should be recalled that it is not about “real” subjects of diaspora practices that this discussion is dedicated to; it rather is about *identification* or *subjectivation*, i.e. the process to “[*] elicit, promote, facilitate, foster and attribute various capacities, qualities and statuses to particular agents” (Dean 2010: 43-4). It is about attempting to confer a certain subject upon imagined members of the Indian diaspora.

Regarding the Indian diaspora, we are interested at looking in more detail at the figure of the *global Indian* or the *Pravasi Bharatiya*, i.e. the Non-Resident Indian (NRI) who came to represent the entire diaspora. An analysis of speeches during Pravasi
Bharatiya Diwas, by Dickinson and Bailey (cf. 2007) among others, reveals that three qualities are regularly put forward to refer to the individual members of the Indian diaspora: professional success, Hindutva (or ‘Hinduness’) and transnationalism (as a particular form of multiculturalism).

**Professional Success**

Regarding first of all professional success, it marks a clear distinction of the current “new diaspora” with the pre-independence diaspora or the so-called “old diaspora”. The members of the “new diaspora” are considered as *highly qualified professionals*, as visible in excerpts below. The first stems from the speech of the Minister of External Affairs during the first PBD in 2003 while the second is from the Minister for Youth Affairs and Sports, i.e. the Minister in charge (jointly with the MOIA) for the organisation of the most recent PBD in 2014:

“In the case [of the old diaspora], the attainment of freedom from the shackles of colonialism by a large number of countries and the dawn of democracy resulted in the Indian diaspora becoming a political force in their respective countries. The post independence diaspora in contrast comprised of highly qualified professionals who through their hard work and dedication rapidly ascended heights of economic prosperity” (Sinha 2003: our emphasis).

“India has the second largest Diaspora in the world. [...] A significant section of this community consists of highly skilled young professionals who have moved to various parts of the world and have been extremely successful in their respective spheres of work” (Singh, Minister of State for Youth Affairs & Sports, quoted in: MOIA and Ministry of Youth Affairs & Sports 2014).
These successful members of the Indian diaspora are to be found in different economic sectors, as visible for instance in the speech of the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee, also during the first PBD in 2003:

“The Pravasi Bharatiya family today also includes: Indian writers in English with an international readership; Entrepreneurs and industrialists with a global reach of operations; Management and lifestyle gurus with a huge following; and, Filmmakers, sportspersons, artists and performers of great popularity” (Vajpayee 2003).

Important in this context is to highlight the role of the Indian culture in the production of such “successful” NRI. In fact, it is not sufficient to be in an anonymous global network to be considered a member of the Indian diaspora, but connections to India are crucial to this narrative.

The ideal member of the Indian diaspora is thus an educated professional with global networks enabling connections to India. But these connections are of double nature, since they are directed both toward India (by a shared sense of Indian identity), and also toward the host society. It is in other words about the transnational nature of members of the Indian diaspora which forms an integral part of the idealised NRI.

Transnationalism

Transnationalism consisting of loyalties both to the respective host society as well as to the Indian society is a further crucial element in the narrative of the idealised member of the Indian diaspora. While integration in the host society is certainly seen as an important part of a successful NRI – as a sort of remnant of the Nehruvian problematisation –, the emphasis is put at least as importantly on the maintenance of cultural and emotional links to mother India:
“Indians who have chosen to settle in foreign lands should be loyal to their country of adoption. The biggest challenge facing every immigrant community is to integrate harmoniously into the political, economic and social life of the host society, while preserving and cherishing its civilisational heritage. Over the years, Indians have achieved this delicate balance virtually everywhere, without a contradiction between their adopted citizenship and their original Indian identity” (Vajpayee 2003).

It is also this criterion, which enables the exclusion of certain communities from the Indian diaspora. A prominent example is constituted for instance by South African Indians who played an active role in ending apartheid, but who were nevertheless strongly criticised by the Indian state for their non-integration into South African post-apartheid society:

“Such all-too-frequent eruptions of anti-Indian sentiment among the Blacks are no doubt due also to the feeling ingrained in them during apartheid days that the ISAs [Indian South Africans] had been exploiting them by sharp trade practices, an allegation that is not entirely correct. But perhaps a more important reason for inter-racial antagonism is the social aloofness and cultural superiority, even arrogance, that some Indians apparently still find it difficult to overcome or conceal against their Black compatriots. […] Meanwhile, the richer members of the Indian community have been living in ‘gilded cages’, protecting themselves behind iron grills and electronic alert systems” (Singhvi 2003: 84).

**Hindutva**

At least as important as the integration into the respective host society is the other side of the medal, i.e. the requirement of the ideal member of the Indian diaspora to keep emotional connections to mother India, i.e. to its “shining nation” and to its “Indianness”. However, to understand the meaning of substance of this Indianness, a
closer look at the development of Indian nationalism is required. Following Vertovec (2000), Van der Veer (2001) and Rajagopal (2000), a special version of Hindutva (or Hinduness), i.e. cosmopolitan Hinduism (cf. Van der Veer 2001), would in this respect be imperative since it would be best suited to multicultural societies (where many Indian emigrants live). It is this form of Hindutva, which would allow Indian emigrants to reconnect to India. It is in other words a reterritorialisation of global Indians as a Hindu diaspora, which characterises this move (cf. also Chaturvedi 2005). Furthermore, it should be stressed that the HLCID report assumes throughout all chapters that members of the Indian diaspora are interested to “[…] explore new avenues and sectors for mutually beneficial interaction […]” (Singhvi et al. 2001: xi), thus attaching to members of the Indian diaspora the role of having a deep and abiding connection with regard to the Indian home-state – diaspora who simply would be “[…] waiting to be tapped if the right policy framework and initiatives are taken by India” (Chaturvedi 2005: 149).

In sum, the ideal members of the Indian diaspora are seen as professionally successful people, who are able to adapt to their host-states while remembering the civilisational ethos linked to the Hindutva ideology. They are expected to contribute to the economic development of the Indian homeland, while also proving the Indian citizens that it is possible to succeed in a globalising world marked by the open competition of markets.
Synthesis of Indian governmentalities

As just seen from the analysis above, Indian practices with regard to its emigrants – low-, mid- and high-skilled emigrants with only the latter being discursively included in the Indian diaspora – are highly complex and cannot simply be categorised as belonging to the neo-liberal rationality. The analysis suggests in fact a more complex picture or topology of different rationalities co-existing with the neo-liberal and welfarist mentalities of rule as the dominant ones.

Regarding first of all the problematisations, we have observed a reversal of the Nehruvian problematisation of Indian emigrants characterised by its “indifference” towards a renewed conception of the Indian nation as a transnational one. This Vajpayeean problematisation draws heavily on how the anti-colonial movement under the leadership of Gandhi has imagined the role of the Indian diaspora for the home-state. We see that the majority of Indian emigrants who are low- or mid-skilled and reside principally in the Gulf states are not included in the diasporic problematisation, but rather included in the larger emigrant problematisation where they are seen as contributing to economistic goals by relieving the territorial Indian nation of excessive labour forces. It is thus the territorial logic associated with liberalism or welfarism which is operative at the problematising stage for the emigrant problematisation. Regarding the diasporic problematisation, it operates throughout the figure of the global Indian or the Pravasi Bharatiya. It has thus constructed the Indian diaspora – but not the large bulk of low- and mid-skilled Indian emigrants – as saviours of both the economic crisis India was facing since the 1980s as well as saviours of the loss of its place on the international, geo-political scene –
problematisation which we accordingly have called geo-economistic. The globalising logic associated with neo-liberalism is thus principally at work during the problematising stage, insofar as the members of the Indian diaspora are not required to return physically home to contribute to solve these problems.

It is this geo-economistic problematisation which has been made governmental, i.e. visible, knowable, manageable and thus governable through neo-liberal and welfarist technologies of power. We observe first a diffusion of different sites where such knowledge is produced – thus pointing to the relational ontology of power, as assumed by Foucault’s accounts. But it is not only with regard to where knowledge is produced, but foremost with which tools and techniques such knowledge has been rendered governable. The commodifying logic of the market associated with neo-liberalism (as rationality of government) as well as the diffusion of authorities and the networking language is clearly operating in the Indian setting. It seems however that this mentality of rule is targeted only towards the high-skilled Indian emigrants which has been seen as constitutive of the Indian diaspora. Regarding the low- and mid-skilled Indian emigrants, pastoral and welfarist technologies seem to be much more important. Several institutional tools have in fact been created in order to protect the “flock” of Indian low- and mid-skilled emigrants – mainly found in the Gulf states –, also through such typical welfarist tools as social insurance schemes (including labour agreements, social security agreements and schemes, and welfare or pension funds). But even disciplinary and sovereign technologies have their place in Indian emigrant and diaspora practices. Applying to both categories of Indian emigrants, i.e. low- and mid-skilled emigrants on the one hand and high-skilled emigrants on the other hand, these technologies operate principally through normating techniques, i.e. educative
and rewarding techniques for the disciplinary modality of power and through legal or police-like regulations for the sovereign modality. The PIO Cards or the Overseas Indian Citizenship are exemplary in this latter regard.

We thus observe a topological picture of different rationalities at work within the diaspora practices of India, ranging from “modern” welfarist and neo-liberal rationalities of rule to “older” ones, such as disciplinary and sovereign technologies.
VI. Conclusion

The present study has investigated emigrant and diaspora practices within two settings in more detail, i.e. in Jamaica and in India. It thereby has examined how such practices have been *problematised* and *rendered operational or governmental* in order to uncover underlying power mechanisms rather than looking for their causes or origins. Diaspora practices have thus been analysed as a policy option consisting of certain discourses and technical means intended to governmentalise them through different technical instruments or tools. We thereby attempted to demonstrate that different rationalities or mentalities of rule are at work within such “diaspora options” – thus alluding to the need for *topological analyses* where different governmentalities coexist rather than spelling out one singular rationality, as [too] often effected in the relevant literature. The study finally has explored the [finalised] effects of such practices, regarding the constitution of diasporas as governmental subjects.

**Main findings**

Instead of understanding diaspora practices as the result of states’ interests – as suggested both by the migration development nexus and the transnationalism literature – or of social interactions defining how certain ideas and identities regarding citizenship and nation are shared intersubjectively – as advocated by many citizenship studies –, we embarked upon a more critical theoretical framework associated principally with Foucault and his lectures on *governmentality*. Such a framework approaches diaspora practices as part of wider discourses – within the “brain gain” discourse – and is much more interested in questions of *how* such practices govern. It
therefore is not simply about identifying the societal demands by transnational migrant groups and analysing their operating mechanisms, as suggested by the transnational approach; it neither is about identifying the elements within the “brain drain” or “brain gain” discourses and analysing – in a rather prescriptive mode – their operating mechanisms, as emphasised by the migration development nexus; neither should we look exclusively at norms underpinning conceptions of citizenship, as stressed by citizenship studies. Although all of these approaches are important for the development of our central argument, we suggested that the most important factor to understand diaspora practices are governmental rationalities, i.e. how different authorities think about such practices, thereby constituting them and serving as a basis to be “governmentalised”, i.e. rendered operational.

As emphasised by Foucault and mainly British neo-Foucauldian scholars, several rationalities of government, mentalities of rule or simply governmentalities are thereby developed, drawn from meticulous historical analyses. Sovereign rationalities are principally aimed at ensuring the territorial rule of the “prince” and rule through repressive, negative, extractive, subtractive and punishing logics. They were predominantly encountered in the feudal states of medieval times. Although still operating with sovereign instruments, the development of three consecutive rationalities, i.e. reason of state, cameralism and pastorship, announce the advent of a new type of power associated no longer with the “negative” conception of power as operative in sovereign regimes. They adhere more to “positive” conceptions of power where the power is no longer to forbid, but rather to induce certain desirable behaviors or conducts. But it is definitely with the development of the administrative states in Western Europe from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries onwards that we
observe this new “positive” type of power taking root in the disciplinary technologies of power. These are directed towards the education and socialisation of subjects in accordance with the underlying objectives of governments and operate principally through observing, normating and examining techniques. The “discovery” of the population as a new object of government towards the end of the eighteenth century brings about this new type of power known as government. The ruling of entire populations becomes henceforth possible and is in this context that we witness the development of new regulatory power mechanisms aimed at governing a population, known as biopower. The welfarist type of government is one possibility to regulate the population and can be described as governing through the social – where the social comes to be equated with the national territory. Social insurance technologies are exemplary in this regard. But most prominent in the literature on diaspora practices are neo-liberal technologies of power which constitute the most recent form of regulatory power mechanisms. Assuming that “there is no such thing as society”, it attempts to govern through communities and individuals and attaches central importance to the market. This latter is in fact seen as the ideal embodiment of the neo-liberal rationality, since it perfectly endorses the decentralised mechanisms, as zealously advocated by neo-liberalism. The dispersion of authority and expertise is thereby integral to this type of power.

Equipped with such rich theoretical tools, we decided to compare two cases of diaspora practices in order to explore governmentalities in more detail: Jamaica and India. The selection of these two cases is primarily justified by their striking similarities: both have been exposed to the colonial power of the United Kingdom,
both have mainly economic emigrants and, probably most importantly, both seem to follow similar diaspora practices. This should not belie the fact that the emigration rate of the highly skilled parts of the respective emigrants glaringly differs between the two cases – with only four percent in the Indian case, and 85 percent in the Jamaican one. However, the similarities were considered much more relevant than the differences in choosing them as the sites of comparison for the present study. It is based on the sources of textual documents, including governmental reports, newspaper articles, websites and secondary literature that we have led a discourse analysis. Three analytical steps were thereby set out, aiming at spelling out the most relevant governmental rationalities at work within the respective Jamaican and Indian diaspora practices: (1) how diaspora practices have been problematised, (2) how these problematisations have been and are rendered knowable, manageable and thus governable and (3) how such practices assumed the subjects of diaspora practices.

The results of the analyses reveal that several governmentalities are at work in the Jamaican and Indian cases, thus pointing towards the need to adopt topological analyses.

Regarding first of all the problematisation, we observe similarities: in both cases, diaspora practices aim at contributing to their respective economic development. While the Jamaican case was shown to have started in a context of the perceived failure of an “old” model of economic development based on foreign direct investments and thus in a context of the national development agenda, India was confronted with an economic crisis since the beginning of the 1980s – both on an agricultural level and a monetary level with the ensuing foreign exchange crisis. An
additional contextual factor also needs to be mentioned when referring to the Indian case, where it is clearly absent in the Jamaican one: self-esteem. India saw itself as increasingly losing its sovereignty – thus facing both an external and an internal challenge, i.e. a dire economic situation as well as a lack of self-esteem on the global stage. It is in this context that both chose the idea of using the diaspora as an [economic] knight in shining armour, thus adopting the diaspora option or the diaspora discourse. Instead of turning to the International Monetary Fund and bowing to external pressure (by adopting their loan conditions), the Indian government actually anticipated accusations of giving up its sovereignty against the “imperialist” IMF – such as experienced in the 1960s – and deferring this by adopting a strategy with “homegrown conditionalities” and more importantly by re-initiating relationships with Indian emigrants. The “old” Indian structure of the economy, dominated by some Indian industrialists who were under the protection of the Nehruvian economic policies, was considered as incapable of tackling such problems whereas the figure of the Non-Resident Indian (NRI) – who came to stand increasingly for the Indian diaspora at large77 – was increasingly seen as the solution to them. Such a strategic move implied the factual end of the Nehruvian approach to Indian emigrants which had been adopted since Indian independence in 1947. The

77 The Indian diaspora was in fact problematised in a singular, universalising and homogenous way. Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) and People of Indian Origin (PIOs) were in fact treated in the same way, despite the fact that such categories originally referred to different migration histories: PIOs were normally identified with the “old” Indian diaspora, having emigrated before Indian independence in 1947, while NRIs were commonly considered to belong to the “new” Indian diaspora, emigrating mainly from the 1970s onwards. Regional differences among Indian emigrants (such as Punjabi emigrants, Gujarati emigrants, Keralite emigrants, etc.) were also rendered invisible – exactly as emigrants who were forced out of Indian borders during the sub-continent’s political partition in 1947.
stance of the Indian government towards its emigrants following Nehru was in fact characterised by its *indifference* towards them during more or less thirty years, although the anterior Indian nationalist movement led by Gandhi included such people of Indian origin in the Indian nation. The diaspora option constituted in other words a move “back to the future” in the sense that it relied on an already existing [Gandhian] rationality where Indian emigrants are integral to the Indian nation – although obviously in a different context, since the Indian nationalist movement did not include Indian emigrants for purely economic reasons in the Indian nation. The “Vajpayeean” problematisation was thereby to replace the “Nehruvian” problematisation where Indian emigrants were simply not considered relevant, or even counter-productive, for the aims of the anti-colonial and non-aligned movement that India under Nehru was aspiring to lead.

Similarly, Jamaica decided in the aftermath of the perceived failure of the FDI-development-model to turn to its diaspora – but with a crucial difference compared to the Indian case: the Jamaican diaspora has never previously been problematised, implying that the main conductors of the Jamaican diasporic governmentality could not rely on an already existing actor, as in the Indian case. In other words, they chose to problematise and thereby create a truly new actor, i.e. the Jamaican diaspora. On the one side, we observe an *economistic* problematisation in the Jamaican case, on the other side, Indian diaspora practices are set in a wider *geo-economistic* discourse – thus also partially confirming a finding by Ragazzi {, 2014 #109} who classifies India as a “global-nation state” and Jamaica as a “managed labour state”.

But crucial is to note that we witness another problematisation of emigration in the Indian context which is absent in the Jamaican one, i.e. regarding low- or mid-skilled
emigrants. These are seen in a positive light, since they would allow to discharge the Indian economy of excessive labour forces. It is thus also with a second, parallel problematisation in the Indian context that we needed to pursue – second one, which is absent in the Jamaican case.

However, it is not only with regard to what diaspora practices are problematised to resolve; it is also about how these problematisations have taken place. Regarding diaspora practices in the Indian setting, we were able to show how problematisations could rely on the previous construction of the Indian nation as a transnational one under the egide of Gandhi and the anti-colonial movement. The Vajpayeean problematisation adhered principally to the globalising logic by putting the figure of the global Indian or the Pravasi Bharatiya at the centre. Such a logic breaks with the territorially-oriented logic of return where emigrants are required (or encouraged) to physically go “home” in order to contribute to the economic development of the homeland. This globalising logic is also dominating in the Jamaican case. But the territorial and welfarist logic of return is, contrary to the Indian case, operative throughout the problematisation. We observe that the globalising logic is dominant in both cases, but the Jamaican case also works through the territorial logic of return. Such logics were shown to be operative through the constitution of central tools in both cases, i.e. diaspora conferences. Aimed at recognising and integrating the high-skilled emigrants in the respective nations, they took place in an annual rhythm around the Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas (PBD) around the ninth of January – the date when Mahatma Gandhi returned to India from South Africa – in the Indian case, the
Jamaican diaspora conferences were organised around the *Jamaica diaspora day* around the sixteenth of June in a biennial rhythm.

However, it was primarily concerning the “technical” aspect looking at how such economistic and geo-economistic problematisations have been rendered visible, knowable, manageable and thus governable that we were able to spell out governmentalities. It is in this regard that the topological analysis optimally succeeds – complementing the neo-liberal rationality, as emphasised thus far by the literature on diaspora practices. We were in fact able to show to what extent at least four different governmentalities are at work in both the Indian and Jamaican cases. In doing so, the analysis revealed that governmentalities are not at work in their entirety; it is rather about hinting at elements of such governmentalities that we were able to point toward the topological analysis.

The neo-liberal rationality is dominant in both the Indian and Jamaican diaspora practices, which is not surprising when recalling the literature. Operating through the market where different and dispersed authorities or experts govern through the neo-liberal, i.e. cost-benefit reasoning of high-skilled emigrant communities. This modality was shown to work in the Jamaican setting through diverse and heterogenous elements, such as nation-branding strategies, the use of certain vocabulary emphasising market-like reasoning, but also spatial arrangements favoring business zones. Similar elements are found in the Indian setting where the commodifying logic of the market is translated through networking tools – networking language being surprisingly absent in the Jamaican setting (!) –, but also the diffusion of authorities. Several actors next to state agencies are in fact at work in
order to *enact* the problematisations of diaspora practices in the respective Indian and Jamaican settings: private sector representatives are dominant in both cases, with the industrial Indian federations Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) taking the lead in the Indian case\(^78\) while seeing agents from the food distribution and the financial sectors dominating the Jamaican diaspora conferences; Jamaican statesmen acting increasingly as Jamaican salesmen, while not necessarily observing similar patterns in the Indian case; academic actors joining the train by offering scholarship schemes, thematic seminars or even PIO universities in the Indian case and the MONA business school of the University of the West Indies hosting the Jamaica Diaspora Foundation and Institute; even cultural actors are well and truly present in both cases, especially for rendering [geo-]economistic diasporas visible, i.e. singers and festival organisers in the Jamaican setting and cinematic (Bollywood), literary and journalistic actors in the Indian case. We finally see an emphasis on diasporic communities encouraged to govern themselves through the setting up of regional diaspora groups, overseas trade councils or a diaspora advisory board in Jamaica while seeing the organisation of regional Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas designed for similar purposes.

Despite the dominance of neo-liberal technologies of power, *welfarist* rationalities were shown to be occurring in both cases, too – although very little in the Jamaican case. While such technologies were clearly aimed at protecting the large bulk of low- and mid-skilled Indian emigrants residing in the Gulf states through an impressive

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\(^{78}\) The CII was in fact unraveling, or at least undermining, the hegemony of the “Nehru-protected” Indian bourgeoisie consisting mainly of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASSOCHAM). The symbiotic relationship of the CII with the Indian state stood thereby for the end of Nehruvian “socialism” and the beginning of the “neo-liberal” geo-economistic agenda aiming for the opening up of Indian markets to global ones.
number of social insurance tools (social security agreements, labour agreements, welfare pensions, social insurance schemes) in the Indian case, thus mixing with pastoral modalities of power, such technologies were much less present in the Jamaican setting. Social insurance tools actually seem to be absent in the Jamaican case. But the establishment of national institutions intended to govern the Jamaican diaspora still points towards the liberal rationality of power, since the liberal conduct is typically based on governing through the social qua national.

Disciplinary rationalities of rule come to complement the regulatory modalities of power of neo-liberalism and welfarism both in Indian and Jamaican diaspora practices. Targeting individual emigrants rather than the emigrant population in its whole, they operate through normating technologies of observation, examination and rewarding (or punishing). Both the Jamaican awarding of medals of appreciation (or the Governor-General Diaspora Award of Excellence) to outstanding Jamaican emigrants and the Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Awards of India point towards the use of these rewarding technologies, as does the congratulating practice during Jamaican diaspora conferences. But many other tools are developed within the disciplinary logic in both cases: the use of pragmatic language centred around notions, such as stakeholdership and ownership, have a normating effect on individuals as well as the pricing of attendance of diaspora conferences in the Jamaican setting. The different educative tools, such as the Know India Program, the scholarship schemes for diaspora children or the intended PIO universities, as well as national campaigns and tools rooms or other technical training centres serve similar normating purposes in the Indian context.
We finally observe even *sovereign* governmentalities as operating in both contexts – although to a very limited degree, it must be conceded. Operating through repressive, subtractive and “negative” mechanisms typically found in laws or police-like regulations and aimed at forbidding certain behaviors, they are visible in the Jamaican context in the “law and order” discourse during diaspora conferences, the establishment of a parliamentary board committee in order to rule through “sovereign” bodies or, most importantly, in the ruling by the Jamaican Supreme Court regarding citizenship eligibility criteria of Jamaican emigrants. Even more developed in this regard are citizenship schemes in the Indian context with the PIO cards and, eventually, the citizenship scheme for Indian emigrants known as Overseas Indian Citizenship (OCI). The obligation to register as recruiting agents with the Protectorate General of Emigrants (PGE) can be seen in the same vein as operating through “negative” mechanisms of power.

Regarding governmentalities of diaspora practices in the Indian and Jamaican contexts, we can thus conclude that both present a similar, but surely not identical topological picture of different rationalities of rule. While the neo-liberal technologies are clearly dominant in both cases, other mentalities of rule are operative, too. Welfarist and pastoral modalities were shown to apply principally to low- and mid-skilled Indian emigrants residing in the Gulf states while being not as important in the Jamaican context. Disciplinary and sovereign rationalities come to complete the governementalities pictures in both cases.

Having analysed both how diaspora practices have been problematised in the two cases and how they have been rendered governmental, the analyses finished with
reflections on which kind or type of subjects the respective diaspora practices imagined. It was consequently concerning to how such subjects have been identified. Important in this context is to recall that diasporas were considered here as effects of political projects or mobilisations rather than as pre-constituted agents – as typically found in the literature. Political entrepreneurs who enact certain problematisations of diaspora practices are thereby seen as keen to create a “transbordered imagined community” where the respective diasporas constitute the centrepiece of the diaspora option. However, the strategic construction of this new governmental actor known as “diaspora” was far from being universalistic; the analysis rather pointed at very particularistic identity categories.

While the Jamaican diaspora refers principally to creole and high-skilled Jamaican emigrants, thus highlighting the phenomenon labelled “racialised capitalism”, the Indian diaspora came to denote NRIs or “global Indians”, i.e. the figures ideally representing the Indian diaspora, as professionally successful Indian emigrants residing principally in the “West”, i.e. in Canada, the United States of America or the United Kingdom, but still exposing some form of cosmopolitan Hinduism. Both identification processes come thus to rely on similar criteria: the economic criterion is unsurprisingly prominently placed – unsurprising considering the economistic problematisation of diaspora practices in both cases. Be it the global Indian (Pravasi Bharatiya) or the member of the Jamaican diaspora, both figures are considered as central in rescuing the home-country from a dire economic situation. They were mainly presumed to be in both cases a repository of capital, skills and contacts and constituted therefore an optimal source of investments and entrepreneurship. Interesting in this regard is to note that respective members of the diaspora were
allowed, even encouraged to stay abroad – thus clearly pointing to a softening of the territorial logic so much present in the “brain drain” and “brain gain” discourses. Instead of being obliged to return home to contribute towards economic development, the *circulatory* logic coupled to the promincence of networks is notably at work here. But it is not only the economic criterion which binds both identification processes together; the underlying racial or religious identity-markers are also pointing towards restrictive and particularistic identity constructions. The international (or transnational\textsuperscript{79}) outlook which is expected from members of the respective diasporas comes to complement such a picture of particularistic identity constructions in both cases. The only criterion which is more universalistic in both cases is to be observed when considering the “feelings” towards the home-country members of the respective diasporas were assumed to expose. They were as a matter of fact believed to be motivated by a nationalistic zeal towards the respective homeland, discernible in both cases through the use of a vocabulary linked to positive emotions and ties, such as the references to “mother India”, the “global family” or “nationalistic zeal”. The only discernible difference as to the subject positions members of the respective Jamaican and Indian diasporas were assumed to take on is with regard to the “image” of the homeland: while India seems to use in many instances a vocabulary reminiscent of *pastoral* rationalities, as expressed through references to notions of the family (eg. “mother India”, the “global Indian family”), Jamaica uses nationalistic vocabulary\textsuperscript{79} Transnational in the Indian context comes to denote the respect that members of the Indian diasporas are expected to show towards both the respective host states as well as retaining the cultural and civilisational heritage of [Hindu] India. The ideal member of the Indian diaspora was in other words assumed to be, and therefore to conduct her- or himself, as a *cosmopolitan (or transnational)* Hindu. \textsuperscript{79}}
thus hinting at more “modern” (or bio-political) rationalities where such “family” references are less present.\(^{80}\) It still remains that members of both respective diasporas were assumed to have emotions towards their respective homeland exactly as children would experience towards their parents. We thus observe very similar patterns with regard to the identification processes of the diaspora practices in both Jamaican and Indian cases.

**Limits & Strengths**

Briefly, it is with the governmentality framework that we were able to highlight different aspects linked to diaspora practices in the Jamaican and Indian contexts, respectively, i.e. how they were problematised, how and according to which rationalities of rule they were rendered governmental and, finally, which subjects are assumed throughout such practices. This should not preclude, however, an overvaluing of the governmentality approach, as often found in the literature. Brass’ statement might be representative in this regard: „[…] Foucault’s discussions and analyses of power and government are so original, so striking in their import not only for the way we do political science, but for our lives, thought, and practices as scholars, that his work ought to have become a focal point for the resurrection of these topics and their restoration to centrality in the discipline“ (Brass 2000: 305). This enthusiasm is often linked with a depicting of alternative theories as clearly inferior, if not useless.

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\(^{80}\) It is in this context that we introduced the distinction between *oeconomic* government as modeled around the family and *economic* government as modeled around independent processes taking place at the level of the population (or, we could be attempted to say, the nation).
A closer examination and comparison of the Foucauldian governmentality framework with other theories, such as neo-Gramscian accounts, different versions of the neo-institutional theory or pluralist theories, points to a different direction (cf. also Biebricher and Vogelmann 2012; Biebricher 2013). It seems in fact having antecedents and similarities in several other theories thus rendering it much less original than often purported. It is to such a discussion that we briefly want to turn in order to outline one of the main “limits” of the present study.

At least two different aspects or elements of the governmentality approach seem to be conspicuous rendering it incredibly “original” and “innovative”.

The first aspect regards the extension of the analytical focus beyond the state (cf. Rose and Miller 1992 as “founders” of the neo-Foucauldian perspective), i.e. the theoretical call to consider not only state institutions for a better understanding of the mechanisms of power, but to include several other fields – be they public or private. But a quick glance at other prior theories reveals that this criterion can certainly not be held accountable for the governmentality’s originality claim. The pluralist versions of democratic theory for instance might be mentioned in this regard, including those with a special focus on interest or advocacy groups (cf. for instance Bentley 1908; Truman 1951). Linked to such theories and worth mentioning is another famous theory known as the systems analysis of Easton, which gives a prominent place to so-called inputs from the social environment, i.e. fields outside the state (Easton 1957).

The literature on social movements considers precisely one potential actor on the input-side and considers contentious politics as integral to the study of the political, while the linked concept of political opportunity structures, consisting both of an institutional and a discursive component, looks rather at the output-side (cf. Cinalli
and Giugni 2013; Giugni 2009, 2011; Johnston and Klandermans 1995; Klandermans et al. 1988). The more recent theoretical approach associated with the already mentioned literature on governance, including its focus on political networks and public-private partnerships, is another candidate to disprove the governmentality’s originality claim with regard to analysing power mechanisms beyond the state – although other problems arise with this corpus of literature, as already mentioned in the introduction of the present study. The analytical focus of the governmentality perspective on practices beyond the state can therefore not be treated as central criterion of its originality. But it is true that several of these latter theories treat the state as well as actors beyond the state as “given actors” rather than considering them as effects of contingent processes of production.

Other theoretical perspectives do not expose this “essentialist” problem, however, such as most prominently Gramscian and neo-Gramscian accounts of political power (Bieler and Morton 2004; Gramsci 1971). The Gramscian concept of the integral state is most relevant in this context, since it includes by definition actors outside or beyond the state, i.e. actors belonging to what is commonly referred to as “civil society”. These theories consider the state furthermore as effects, rather than as pre-given substances – exactly as the governmentality perspective does. This strategic logic, i.e. the consideration of the state as site and originator of strategies, is in fact as present in some of the neo-Marxist or neo-Gramscian accounts as it is in the governmentality literature. Jessop’s strategic-relational account (cf. 2008) is most relevant in this context, since it outlines a sophisticated approach to the state, drawing from sources such as Poulantzas, but also Luhmann or Laclau and Mouffe (cf. also B. Jessop 1985).
In sum, several theories other than the one associated with the Foucauldian governmentality theory focus their analytical attention on actors other than the state alone, with neo-Gramscian accounts even adhering to the same processual ontology as the governmentality approach. The originality claim of this latter theoretical account can therefore not be justified with reference to the object of study neither with its processual ontology.

What about the governmentality’s interest and focus on the nexus between ideas and its implementation, or to put it more bluntly, with regard to the power of ideas? Governmentality can in fact be defined as the exercise of power in a reflected manner, thus understanding the exercise of power as resulting from the implementation of ideas rather than some external factors – be it for instance globalisation, inter-state competition or the forces of capitalism. Can this criterion be held accountable for the originality or innovation claim of the Foucauldian framework? The answer in short is no. It certainly is correct to point out that the classical institutional theories, present in the field of political science at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with their restricted focus on state institutions do not consider any ideational elements – or at least in a very limited manner. But when considering the versions of the neo-institutional theory, more particularly in its historical and sociological versions, a different picture arises. Especially its “fourth” version, i.e. discursive (constructivist or ideational) institutionalism (cf. among others Hay 2006; especially Schmidt 2008; Schmidt 2010), is worth mentioning in this context, since their central focus is how ideas, forms of thought or what Foucault refers to as political rationalities form and transform statecraft (Panizza and Miorelli 2012; Schmidt 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010).
other words, other theories have treated ideas in a similar way as scholarship on
governmentality.
What if the originality did not simply lie in the focus on ideas on the exercise of
power per se, but rather in the specific link between ideas and the exercise of power?
As noted among others by Lemke (cf. 2002), the governmentality perspective is in
fact most interested in the “space in-between” governmental ideas (or programs) and
their actual implementation. This link is in fact hypothesised to fail permanently, i.e.
there would be a permanent non-correspondence between governmental rationalities
and their implementation (cf. especially Foucault 1975). Programs would fail in
certain ways, but turn out to be functional for other purposes. Foucault’s hypothesis is
in other words about the dysfunctional nature of social practices, with a special focus
on their unintended consequences – an answer by the way to a critique effectuated by
O’Malley and others (O’Malley 1996; O’Malley et al. 1997) who showed that power is
not exercised as coherent, as often purported. But this is precisely what several
scholars of the historical school of the neo-institutionalist theory have been also
doing. Some of its central concepts, such as path-dependence, positive feedbacks or
lock-in-effects intend in fact to capture, among others, the discrepancy between the
intentions inherent to the ideas (or programs) and the outcome(s) of them: „Instead we
should anticipate that there will often be sizeable gaps between the ex ante goals of
powerful political actors and the actual functioning of prominent institutions. […]
Thus the long-term effects of institutional choices, which are frequently the most
profound and interesting ones, should often be seen as the by-products of social
processes rather than embodying the goals of social actors“ (Pierson 2004: 14-5).
Both approaches thus show major similarities with regard to the dysfunctional and still productive [unintended] consequences of ideas or programs.

It therefore seems that the originality claim of the governmentality approach is overstated. Even though Foucault constructed his governmentality approach mainly in opposition to institutionalist theories, since they would treat institutions as given and look at their effects, a closer look at neo-institutional theories considers institutions larger than its classical and older counterpart and is therefore completely compatible with the Foucauldian view.

But critiques with regard to such a framework have also been addressed at other elements of the theory. Hindess (1997) for instance has criticised this strand of literature for failing to adequately account for the difference between what is considered governmental and what is referred to as political. Another legitimate critique (cf. Kerr 1976) is directed at the lack of the governmentality’ literature to identify actors and not just political processes.

Notwithstanding such critiques and “lacks” of originality, the governmentality approach has been retained throughout this study for at least three reasons, thus addressing some of the strenghts of our present investigation.

One of the main reasons lies in the fact that it appears to be one of the best suited theoretical accounts combining political issues of mechanisms of power with more private issues of identities or identifications. Cultural analyses or Elias’ account of the process of civilisation might be similar in some respects to such a Foucauldian endeavour. But some of their weaknesses, such as the neglect of political questions from cultural analyses or the focus of Elias on a single possible process of civilisation,
are responsible for not choosing them and turning towards the Foucault-inspired
governmentality approach.

Another (weaker) line of justification is that the governmentality approach appears to
constitute a unique combination of a wide range of elements that point to other
research traditions as far apart as cultural studies and strategic-relational approaches
of neo-Marxist or neo-Gramscian accounts.

But the most important and crucial reason for having chosen and retained the
Foucauldian framework of governmentality lies in its ability to engage critically with
the state in a novel way. It does so by looking at the conditions enabling to
problematise state practices, such as diasporic ones, and it is this focus which seems
to set it apart from other critical theories. A quote of Foucault summarises this focus
best: „The problem is knowing when, under what conditions, and in what form the
state began to be projected, programmed, and developed within this conscious
practice, at what moment it became an object of knowledge and analysis, when and
how it became part of a reflected and concerted strategy, and at what point it began
to be called for, desired, coveted, feared, rejected, loved, and hated. In short, it is the
entrance of the state into the field of practice and thought that we should try to grasp“
(Foucault 2007: 247). The governmentality approach succeeds thus to combine de-
institutionalising, de-functionalising, de-naturalising and processual elements in a
unique way and constitutes a critical approach to state practices in a novel way so as
to appear as the best suited theory available to an endeavour of diasporic practices.

Other contributions and strenghts next to some of the theoretical ones just outlined are
also worth mentioning. We have in fact been able to point towards the active role of
governmental actors in constituting [diasporic] subjects instead of considering the latter as mere results of external processes, such as for instance geo-political, military, economic factors or globalisation acting as a structural force on diasporas. We have looked at how the Jamaican and the Indian diasporas, respectively, have been constituted by highlighting the central and leading role of politics and more particularly of the Jamaican and Indian nation-states within such processes. Contrary to many accounts in the literature with regard to diaspora studies, diasporas are in fact often neglected or simply not taken into account, since it would increasingly lose its role in a globalised world. Especially the globalisation literature as well as the numerous pieces of research coming out of transnational studies can be mentioned in this regard, since they consider the phenomenon of globalisation as an external force or factor imposing itself upon different actors, such as nation-states. But by highlighting the active role the nation-state has played in adopting the diaspora option to reach political objectives, the present study has demonstrated that politics and power relations are still fundamental – even when looking at the constitution of an actor considered as a typically transnational one, such as the diaspora. Diasporas are thus not only to be approached as pre-existing actors with pre-constituted roles attached to them. They are not simply to be seen in their capacity as agents or conflict perpetuation, conflict resolution, development or democratisation, as typically found in the literature on diasporas. They are not simply exogenous factors with whom we must cope. They rather are to be considered, it was argued, as part of wider discourses attributing specific roles and qualities to such actors. Diasporas are thus treated as effects of political projects or political mobilisations and constitute just one particular or type of “transbordered imagined communities”. The Jamaican and Indian diasporas
more particularly were shown to constitute forms of strategic social identity constructions in which different political entrepreneurs – in their role as *enactors* of certain problematisations – attempted to include them into certain discourses. It is such a discourse which came to be known as “diaspora option” in the literature forming the focus of the present study.

We finally and most importantly were able to hint at different modalities of power through which diaspora practices are exercised. Instead of concentrating only on neo-liberal technologies, as often found in literature, we revealed that other technologies, such as welfarist, pastoral, disciplinary or even sovereign ones do play an important part in such practices. Different sites of power reaching beyond the state, including cultural, economic, scientific or social ones, were thereby shown to constitute and contribute important aspects to the problematisation and its operationalisation in diaspora practices.

We have thus been able to show how far the exercise of power in the fields of emigration is linked to the production, reproduction and reification of knowledge most importantly. While traditional accounts see the exercise of power as an effect of the physical use of force in a *punishing* logic or – in a historically other period – in a re-educative or *re-socialising* logic, the conduct of diasporic conduct also makes use of other mechanisms of power directly linked to knowledge. By problematising an actor, such as a diaspora, and attaching certain qualities to it in a certain manner, the actors enacting such problematisations are able to rely on such newly created realities in order to govern them through different political technologies. As shown throughout
the study, this also obviously impacts the respective subjectivity positions that members of the respective diasporas are expected to take up.

**Future research perspectives**

Having summarised the main findings of the present study as well as strengths and limits of it, what is still left to be done in scientific terms? What are future research perspectives based on some of the lessons of the present study? By referring to the analytical triad of *identities, borders and orders* (cf. Albert et al. 2001), one can imagine several possibilities analysing them separately or in combination, with the latter effectuated in the present study. We thereby can separate them in research on a descriptive, analytical and normative level.

Descriptively and analytically speaking, there obviously still needs a lot of work to be done on emigrant and diaspora practices on the international, but also on the intra-state level. We have hinted throughout the present study at different sites where different actors “claim” the respective emigrants and diaspora in specific ways, such as scientific, cultural or social sites. The production of specific knowledge in the cultural domain still needs to be investigated in much more detail, also in cooperation with scholars of cultural studies for instance. Literary accounts, musical and film productions, artistic works, culinary dishes, but also fashion designs might in fact open up new possibilities of research by highlighting how such sites contribute to rendering the subject of the diaspora more visible and thereby governable. This obviously holds not only for the Indian and Jamaican cases, but also for other cases.

But it is not only with regard to how diasporas are problematised in economistic terms, but it might be at least as interesting to examine how other problematisations of
emigrants are operationalised afterwards. One could imagine for instance to see the emphasis on sovereign technologies of government when emigrants are problematised as a threat to the security of the state, the nation, the economy or whichever other domain. It is also in this regard that comparisons of a different research design, i.e. based on Mill’s method of difference (instead of his method of agreement, as used throughout the present study), might prove even more useful. The corpus of literature interested in norm diffusions could be of major help in this regard, since it highlights how the “diaspora option” as a norm comes to be diffused around the globe.

A related research perspective points towards an increased attention that scholars should put on diasporas used not simply as “national discourses”– as we have done throughout the present study. It would in fact be instructive to see how other diasporas than simply “national” ones are problematised and operationalised. The concept of the “diaspora” “[...] has proliferated, its meaning has been stretched to accommodate the various intellectual, cultural and political agendas in the service of which it has been enlisted. This has resulted in what one might call a “diaspora” diaspora’ – a dispersion of the meaning of the term in semantic, conceptual and disciplinary space” (Brubaker 2005: 1). Discursive analyses of diasporas of different nature, such as linguistic (eg. Francophone, Anglophone, Lusophone), religious (eg. Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim, Catholic), cultural (eg. Dixie, gay, queer) or “other” (eg. Yankee, white, liberal, conservative, deaf, redneck, digital, fundamentalist, terrorist) ones would be more than welcome in this regard.

More analytically speaking, the different technologies of government are in need of further scholarly consideration – especially with regard to post-colonial settings which until now and surprisingly seem to be neglected in the literature. When
recalling that neo-liberal rationalities are not simply to be found in Western countries and “[…]
born in the Thatcherite-Reaganite years” (Larner 2007: 343), the genealogical method is highly relevant to further the analysis on neo-liberalism as a rationality of government.

Finally, there is also work to be done on a normative level, linked to what we have been doing throughout the present study. Such analyses are not simply limited to looking at the different categories of people neglected or even excluded from diaspora practices and deploring such facts, based on certain inclusive normative criteria. We are also challenged to cope with the normative implications of neo-liberal government for instance where the “social” qua national seems increasingly to be disappearing. What is to be done to still hold together a society of individuals? Are new social mechanisms to be created – without necessarily returning to “welfarist” technologies of government?

In short, the analysis of diaspora practices sets out new questions of descriptive, analytical or normative nature that the scholarly community needs to tackle in order to contribute to the “historiography of the present” and thus be well equipped to deal with contemporary challenges.


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