Photon-number-splitting versus cloning attacks in practical implementations of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol for quantum cryptography

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Abstract

In practical quantum cryptography, the source sometimes produces multi-photon pulses, thus enabling the eavesdropper Eve to perform the powerful photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack. Recently, it was shown by Curty and Lutkenhaus [Phys. Rev. A 69, 042321 (2004)] that the PNS attack is not always the optimal attack when two photons are present: if errors are present in the correlations Alice-Bob and if Eve cannot modify Bob's detection efficiency, Eve gains a larger amount of information using another attack based on a 2->3 cloning machine. In this work, we extend this analysis to all distances Alice-Bob. We identify a new incoherent 2->3 cloning attack which performs better than those described before. Using it, we confirm that, in the presence of errors, Eve's better strategy uses 2->3 cloning attacks instead of the PNS. However, this improvement is very small for the implementations of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol. Thus, the existence of these new attacks is conceptually interesting but basically does not change the value of the security parameters of BB84. The main results are valid both for Poissonian and [...]
Quantum cryptography, or more precisely quantum key distribution (QKD) is a physically secure method for the distribution of a secret key between two distant partners, Alice and Bob, that share a quantum channel and a classical authenticated channel [1]. Its security comes from the well-known fact that the measurement of an unknown quantum state modifies the state itself: thus an eavesdropper on the quantum channel, Eve, cannot get information on the key without introducing errors in the correlations between Alice and Bob. In equivalent terms, QKD is secure because of the no-cloning theorem of quantum mechanics: Eve cannot duplicate the signal and forward a perfect copy to Bob.

However, perfect single-photon sources are never available, and in most practical implementation the source is simply an attenuated laser. This means that some of the pulses traveling from Alice to Bob contain more than one photon. These items, in the unavoidable presence of losses in the quantum channel, open an important loophole for security: Eve may perform the so-called photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack, consisting of keeping one photon in a quantum memory while forwarding the remaining ones to Bob [2,3]. This way, Eve has kept a perfect copy without introducing any error. In particular, here we consider the BB84 QKD protocol introduced by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [4]. In this protocol, when the basis is revealed in the sifting phase Eve can measure each photon that she has kept in the good basis and obtain full information on the bit.

Until recently, it was thought that this attack was the best Eve could do when two or more photons are present. However, in a recent work [5], Curty and Lütkenhaus (CL) have shown that this is not the case for noisy lines (optical visibility \( V < 1 \)) and imperfect detectors (quantum efficiency \( \eta \), dark count probability \( p_d \)), when the natural assumption is made that Eve cannot modify the detectors’ parameters. Basically, the idea is simple: consider pulses that contain two photons. In the PNS attack, Eve has full information after the basis announcement provided Bob has detected the photon that was sent. So, in the information balance, Eve’s information for such an item is \( \eta \times 1 \). Suppose now that Eve, instead of performing the PNS, uses a suitable 2→3 cloning machine, keeps one photon and forwards the other two photons to Bob. Eve’s information conditioned to Bob’s detection could be \( I_{\Delta} \leq 1 \), but now the probability that Bob detects a photon of the pulse is \( 1 - (1 - \eta)^2 \). Thus for small values of \( \eta \), Eve’s information for a two-photon pulse becomes \( 2 \eta \times I_{\Delta} \), and this may be larger than \( \eta \). Of course, by using such a cloner, Eve introduces some errors, so this attack is possible only up to the expected quantum bit error rate (QBER).

As we prove below however, the analysis of CL is restricted to a specific distance of the line Alice-Bob, which turns out to be unrealistically short. The goal of this paper is to evaluate the contribution of the individual attacks that use 2→3 cloning machines for all distances in a realistic range of parameters. When this is done, the contribution of attacks using 2→3 cloning machines leads to a negligible improvement over the usual PNS strategies: both the achievable secret-key rate and the maximal distance are for all practical purposes the same, whether these new attacks are used or not. This is our main result. In the run, we describe a different strategy that uses a 2→3 cloning machines, that performs better than those previously described. This strategy has an intuitive explanation which opens the possibility of intermediate generalizations: in particular, it may prove useful to study the security of other protocols, against which the PNS attacks are less effective [6–8].

The paper is constructed as follows. In Sec. II, we state our hypotheses precisely and write down general formulas, in which Eve’s attack is parametrized by the probabilities of performing each strategy, and submitted to some constraints.
At the end of this section, we show that the analysis of CL, correct though it is, is valid only for a given distance between Alice and Bob, whence the need for the present extension of their work. Section III contains the main results: we perform numerical optimization assuming the two known 2 to 3 cloning strategies and our new one, showing that ours performs indeed better but that its contribution is on the whole negligible. Section IV is devoted to some extensions and remarks. Finally, in Sec. V, we give some semianalytical formulas that reproduce the full numerical optimization to a satisfactory degree of accuracy: these are useful for experimentalists, to find bounds for the performance of their setups. Section VI is a conclusion.

II. HYPOTHESES AND GENERAL FORMULAS

A. Imperfect source, line, and detectors

We are concerned with practical quantum cryptography, so the first point is to describe the limitations on Alice’s and Bob’s hardware. We work in a prepare-and-measure scheme.

Alice’s source. Alice encodes her classical bits in light pulses; the number of photons in each pulse is distributed according to a probability law \( p_A(n) \). In most practical QKD setups, Alice’s source is an attenuated laser pulse, so \( p_A(n) = \mu^n e^{-\mu} / n! \) the Poissonian distribution of mean photon number \( \mu \). But our general formulae and most of our results will be valid independently of the distribution, so in particular they apply to all quasi-single-photon sources [9]. For heralded single-photons obtained from an entangled pair [10], the situation is more complex. If the twin photon is used only as a trigger, and the preparation of the state is done directly on the photon(s) traveling to Bob, then this source behaves exactly as a sub-Poissonian source, and our subsequent analysis applies. If on the contrary the twin photon is used also for the preparation (because one detects its polarization state, thus preparing at a distance the state of the photon traveling to Bob), then the PNS attack is not relevant [1,3].

Alice-Bob quantum channel. The quantum channel which connects Alice and Bob is characterized by the losses \( \alpha \), usually given in dB/km (for optical fibers at the telecom wavelength 1550 nm, the typical value is \( \alpha \simeq 0.25 \) dB/km). The transmission of the line at a distance \( d \) is therefore

\[
t = 10^{-\alpha d / 10}.
\]  
(1)

Moreover, we take into account nonperfect visibility \( V \) of the interference fringes.

Bob’s detector. It has a limited quantum efficiency \( \eta \) and a probability of dark count per gate \( p_d \). The gate here means that Bob knows when a pulse sent by Alice is supposed to arrive, and opens his detector only at those times; so here, “per [Bob’s] gate” and “per [Alice’s] pulse” are equivalent. Those two parameters are not uncorrelated: in reverse-biased avalanche photodiodes, a larger bias voltage increases both \( \eta \) and \( p_d \). Typical values nowadays are \( \eta = 0.1 \) and \( p_d = 10^{-5} \).

B. Alice and Bob’s rates and information

We write \( p_B(0) \) the probability per pulse that Bob detects no photon sent by Alice. Since both losses in the line and detection are binomial processes

\[
p_B(0) = \sum_n p_A(n) (1 - \eta)^n;
\]  
(2)

for a Poissonian distribution on Alice’s side, \( p_B(0) = e^{-\mu} \eta \). We consider only those cases in which Alice and Bob use the same basis, because in any case the other items will be discarded during the siftig phase. Bob’s count rates per pulse in the “right” and the “wrong” detector are then given by [11]

\[
C_{\text{right}} = \frac{1}{2} \left[ (1 - p_B(0)) \left( 1 + \frac{V}{2} \right) + p_B(0) p_d \right],
\]  
(3)

\[
C_{\text{wrong}} = \frac{1}{2} \left[ (1 - p_B(0)) \left( 1 - \frac{V}{2} \right) + p_d p_B(0) \right],
\]  
(4)

where the factor \( \frac{1}{2} \) accounts for the losses in the sifting phase. The QBER is the fraction of wrong bits accepted by Bob,

\[
Q = \frac{C_{\text{wrong}}}{C_{\text{right}} + C_{\text{wrong}}} = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{V}{2 + 2 p_d p_B(0)}.
\]  
(5)

In particular, as long as \( (1 - p_B(0)) p_B(0) \), one can neglect \( C_{\text{wrong}} \) in the denominator and decompose \( Q = Q_{\text{opt}} + Q_{\text{det}} \) with the optical QBER defined as \( Q_{\text{opt}} = (1 - V)/2 \). The mutual information Alice-Bob after sifting is

\[
I(A:B) = (C_{\text{right}} + C_{\text{wrong}}) [1 - H(Q)],
\]  
(6)

where \( H \) is Shannon entropy.

C. Hypotheses on Eve’s attacks

Hypothesis 1. The characteristics of the quantum channel (the optical QBER, or more precisely \( V \), and the losses, that determine the transmission \( t \)) are fully attributed to Eve. On the contrary, Eve has no access to Bob’s detector: \( \eta \) and \( p_d \) are given parameters for both Bob and Eve. The eavesdropper will of course adapt her strategy to the value of these parameters, but she cannot play with them. This hypothesis is almost unanimously accepted as reasonable; it implies that Bob monitors the rate of double clicks when he happened to measure in the wrong basis; if this rate is larger than expected, he aborts the protocol. As realized by CL [5], it is precisely this hypothesis that opens the possibility for the cloning attacks to perform better than the PNS [12].

Hypothesis 2. Through her PNS attacks, Eve should not modify Bob’s expected count rate due to Alice’s photons \( C_{p_B} = \frac{3}{2} (1 - p_B(0)) \). This constraint is usually assumed in the study of PNS attacks, see, e.g., Refs. [2,3,5–7]; still, two comments are needed. One could strengthen the constraint by requiring Eve to reproduce the full photon-number statistics at Bob’s side. But one could weaken it as well: here, we are asking that Bob should not notice PNS attacks at all; Eve could be allowed to perform noticeable PNS attacks, in which case one should bound her information and study the possibility of privacy amplification.

Hypothesis 3. Eve performs incoherent attacks: she at-
tacks each pulse individually, and measures her quantum systems just after the sifting phase. The justification for this strong hypothesis is related to the state-of-the-art of the research in quantum cryptography: no one has found yet an explicit coherent attacks that performs better than the incoherent ones [13]. In other words, incoherent attacks are still used to compute upper bounds for security, while “unconditional security” proofs provide lower bounds [14], and for all protocols there is an open gap between the two bounds. Note also that incoherent attacks are not “realistic” in the sense of those described, e.g., in Ref. [15]; in particular, Eve is allowed to store quantum information in a quantum memory. The hypothesis of incoherent attacks implies in particular that after sifting, Alice, Bob, and Eve share several independent realizations of a random variable distributed according to a classical probability law. Under this assumption and the assumption of one-way error correction and privacy amplification, the Csiszár-Kőrner bound applies [16]: one can achieve a secret-key rate given by

\[ S = I(A:B) - I(A:E). \] (7)

Actually, this is a conservative assumption: in the presence of dark counts, \( I(B:E) < I(A:E) \) holds, so the strict bound for \( S \) is \( I(A:B) - I(B:E) \); however, the difference is small, and \( I(A:E) \) is easier to estimate. We devote Sec. IV C below to comments about \( I(B:E) \). The mutual information \( I(A:B) \) has been given in Eq. (6), we should now provide an expression for \( I(A:E) \).

D. Eve’s strategies

Having stated the hypotheses on Eve’s attacks, we can now formulate Eve’s strategy as a function of some parameters. We suppose that the first thing Eve does, just outside Alice’s lab, is a nondestructive measurement of the photon number. Sometimes, she will simply find \( n=0 \) and there is nothing more to do. When \( n>0 \), she will choose some attacks with the suitable probabilities. We have attributed all the losses in the line to Eve: this means that Eve replaces the quantum channel with a lossless line, and takes advantage of the losses to keep in a quantum memory or simply block some photons.

Strategy for \( n=1 \). When Eve finds one photon, with some probability \( p_{c1} \) she applies the well-known optimal incoherent attack [17], that consists in (i) applying the optimal asymmetric phase-covariant cloning machine [18], (ii) forwarding the original photon to Bob while keeping the clone and the ancilla in a quantum memory, (iii) make the suitable measurement as soon as the basis is revealed. This strategy contributes to Bob’s detection rate with

\[ R_1 = \frac{1}{2} \eta p_{c1}. \] (8)

where the factor \( \frac{1}{2} \eta \) is due to the fact that Bob must accept the item (detect the photon and accept at sifting). On these items, Eve introduces a disturbance \( D_1 \) and gains the information \( I_1(D_1) = 1 - H(P_1) \) with \( P_1 = \frac{1}{2} + \sqrt{D_1(1-D_1)} \). With probability \( p_{b1} = 1 - p_{c1} \), Eve simply blocks the photon—in principle, one can define the probability \( p_{b1} \) that Eve leaves the photon fly to Bob without doing anything, but this is not useful for her (we left this parameter free in our numerical simulations, see Sec. III, and verified that one indeed finds always \( p_{b1} = 0 \)).

Strategy for \( n=2 \). Sometimes, Eve finds two photons. The standard PNS strategy is a storage attack: Eve keeps one photon in a quantum memory, and forwards the other one to Bob. Eve applies the storage attack with probability \( p_{c2} \). This strategy contributes to Bob’s detection rate with

\[ R_{2s} = \frac{1}{2} \eta p_{c2} p_{A2}: \] (9)

on these items, Eve introduces no disturbance \( D_1 \) and gains the information \( I_2(D_2) = 1 \). As stressed in the Introduction, the main theme of this work is CL’s observation that the storage attack may not always be the best Eve can do on two photons. With probability \( p_{c2} \), she rather uses a \( 2 \to 3 \) asymmetric cloning machine, keeps the clone and the ancillae and forwards the two original photons, now slightly perturbed, to Bob. This strategy contributes to Bob’s detection rate with

\[ R_{2c} = \frac{1}{2} \left[ 1 - (1 - \eta)^2 \right] p_{A2} p_{c2}: \] (10)

on these items, Eve introduces a disturbance \( D_2 \) and gains an information \( I_2(D_2) \) that depends on the cloning machine that is used. Finally, one can in principle define the probability of blocking both photons \( p_{b2} \); but this turns out to be always zero in practice (as for \( p_{b1}, \) we used this as a free parameter in the numerical simulations). The reason is the following. If Eve could reproduce Bob’s detection rate by blocking all the \( n=1 \) items (in which case, she might have to block also some of the \( n=2 \) items), she would have full information. Alice will then choose her probabilities \( p_{A}(n) \) in such a way that this is not the case: Eve must be forced to forward some items with \( n=1 \). Now, Eve gains more information on the \( n=2 \) than on the \( n=1 \) items: therefore, she had better use all the losses to block as much \( n=1 \) items as possible; but then, she cannot block any \( n=2 \) item. Thus \( p_{b2} = 0 \) and \( p_{c2} = 1 - p_{b2} \).

Strategy for \( n \geq 3 \). If Eve finds more than two photons, we suppose that she performs always the storage attack: she keeps one photon and forwards the remaining \( n-1 \) photons to Bob. This strategy contributes to Bob’s detection rate with

\[ R_3 = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{n=3}^{\infty} [1 - (1 - \eta)^{n-1}] p_{A}(n): \] (11)

on these items, Eve introduces no disturbance and gains full information. This is not always optimal: unambiguous discrimination strategies [6,7] or cloning attacks [5] may give Eve more information. However, we do not discuss the full optimization because in any case the contribution of items where \( n>2 \) to the total information is small, as will be clear below. Note also that in a storage attack Eve systematically removes one photon; at very short distances, this might not be possible because the expected losses in the line Alice-Bob are not large enough. To avoid any surprise, we shall start all our numerical optimization at a distance \( d=10 \) km, where
the losses are definitely large enough to allow storage attack on all items with $n \geq 3$ [19].

Summary. We allow different attacks with different probabilities, conditioned on the knowledge of the number of photons present in each pulse. Apart from the hypotheses made on $R_3$, this represents the most general incoherent attack on the BB84 protocol—provided the hardware is protected against “realistic attacks” such as Trojan horses, faked states, etc. [21], as we suppose it to be.

E. Formulas for Eve’s attack

We can now group everything together and describe the formulas that will be used for Eve’s attack. Eve’s information on Bob’s bits reads [20]

$$I(A:E) = R_1 I_1(D_1) + R_{2s} + R_{2c} I_2(D_2) + R_3,$$

where

$$I_1(D_1) = -H\left(\frac{1}{2} + \sqrt{D_1(1-D_1)}\right)$$

and where $I_2(D_2)$ is the information gained by Eve using a 2→3 asymmetric cloning machine, for which the optimal is not known (see next section). For a given probability distribution used by Alice $p_A(n)$, Eve chooses the four parameters $p_{c1}, p_{c2}, D_1,$ and $D_2$ in order to maximize Eq. (12), submitted to the constraints that determine $I$ and $V$. The constraint on $t$ guarantees that the losses introduced by Eve must be those expected on the quantum channel, so in particular that Bob’s detection rate is unchanged:

$$R_1 + R_{2s} + R_{2c} + R_3 = \frac{1}{2}[1 - p_B(0)].$$

Alice and Bob have to choose their source in order to ensure that Eve cannot set $R_1 = 0$, otherwise she has full information by simply using the PNS. This is the reason why the contribution of $R_1$ is small: the leading term is a fraction of $p_A(1)$, typically of the order of $p_A(2)$. Now, $p_A(3)/p_A(2) = O(\mu)$ ~0.1 for the usual Poissonian source, and even smaller for sub-Poissonian ones. The constraint on $V$ guarantees that the error rate introduced by Eve must sum up to the observed optical QBER, that is,

$$R_1 D_1 + R_{2s} D_2 + R_{2c} = \frac{1}{2}[1 - p_B(0)]\left(1 - \frac{1 - V}{2}\right).$$

In the next section, we discuss a good choice of $I_2(D_2)$, then perform numerically the optimization of Eve’s strategies over the four parameters $p_{c1}, p_{c2}, D_1,$ and $D_2$. Before this, we are now able to pinpoint the limitations of the analysis of CL.

F. The limitation in CL

In our notations, the parameter $p$ that characterizes Alice’s source in Ref. [5] is given by $p = p_A(1)/[1 - p_A(0)]$, the conditional probability of having one photon in a nonempty pulse. Items with more than two photons are neglected, so in our notations $R_3 = 0$ and $1 - p = p_A(2)/[1 - p_A(0)]$. This assumption is not critical a priori. What is critical, is the choice of Eve’s attacks that are compared. The PNS attack $R_{2c} = 0$ is compared to a cloning attack in which not only $R_{2c}$, but also $R_1$ is set to 0. As CL correctly note, the comparison is fair only if the counting rates are the same between the two strategies, which reads here $R_1 + R_{2c} = R_2^{\text{PNS}}$; in turn, this condition determines $p = 1/(2 - \eta)$. Now, Alice should adapt the parameters of her probability distribution as a function of the distance of the quantum channel. Thus, a given value of $p$ will be optimal only for a given distance (or at best, for a small range of possible distances): the fact of setting $R_1 = 0$ in the cloning attack limits the validity of CL’s analysis to a given length of the line Alice-Bob.

In particular, if we consider that $p_A(n)$ is a Poissonian distribution, then $(1 - p)/p = p(2)/\mu)/p(1)/\mu = \mu/2$; setting $p = 1/(2 - \eta)$ leads to $\mu = 2/(1 - \eta) \gg 2$. This is a very large value of $\mu$, that consequently can be used only at a very short distance.

III. MAIN RESULTS

The problem that we want to solve involves a double optimization. For any given distance, Alice should choose the parameters of her source (e.g., for a Poissonian source, the mean number of photons per pulse) in such a way as to optimize the secret key rate $S$, Eq. (7). This quantity must be computed for Eve’s best strategy, i.e., for $I(A:E)$ as large as possible: so, for any choice of Alice’s parameters, we must find the values of $p_{c1}, p_{c2}, D_1,$ and $D_2$ that maximize $I(A:E)$ under the constraints (14) and (15). For this task, numerical algorithms are the reasonable choice. But, as an input for these algorithms, we need the explicit form of $I_2(D_2)$. We devote the next paragraph to this point.

A. The choice of the 2→3 cloning attack

Eve receives two photons in the state $|\psi^{+}\rangle_2$, where $|\psi\rangle$ is one of the four states used in BB84. She has these photons interact with a probe of hers, then she forwards two photons to Bob, having introduced an average disturbance $D_2$. By measuring her probe after the sifting phase, Eve gains an information $I_2(D_2)$ on the state prepared by Alice. Finding the optimal attacks means finding the best unitary transformation, the best probe and the best measurement on it, such that $I_2(D_2)$ is maximal for any given value of $D_2$. Though well defined, this problem is very hard to solve in general. Let us restrict to attacks where the photons flying to Bob after the interaction are in a symmetric state, so that the transformation reads

$$|k\rangle|E\rangle \rightarrow \sum_{k=1}^{3} e^{i k} |k\rangle|E_k\rangle,$$

where $|k\rangle$ is a basis of the symmetric subspace of two qubits. There are nine vectors $|E_k\rangle$, so Eve’s probe must be at least nine-dimensional to avoid loss of generality. In addition, the measurement that gives Eve the best guess on the state sent by Alice is not known in general. In summary, finding the optimal $I_2(D_2)$ in full generality amounts to solving an opti-
mization over more than hundred real parameters, for an undefined figure of merit. We give this up and try a different approach, namely to guess a good (if not the optimal) $2 \rightarrow 3$ cloning attack.

Let us first look at what is already known. Two asymmetric $2 \rightarrow 3$ cloning machines were proposed in Ref. [7]; Curty and Lütkenhaus [5] based their analysis of $2 \rightarrow 3$ cloning attacks on those. The first machine (cloner A) is a universal asymmetric cloner, recently proven to be optimal in terms of fidelity [22]. For a disturbance $D_2$ introduced on Bob’s states, this machine gives Eve an information [5]

$$I_3^A(D_2) = 2D_2 + (1 - 2D_2)[1 - H(P_2)]$$

(17) with $P_2 = \frac{1}{2}(\sqrt{8D_2(1-4D_2)}/(1-2D_2))$. A particularly interesting feature is that $I_3^A(D_2 = 1/6) = 1$. This sounds at first astonishing, because one is used to Eve’s getting full information only by breaking all correlations between Alice and Bob. But this is the case only if Eve receives a single photon from Alice. Here Eve receives two photons in the same state. In fact, the result $I_3^A(D_2 = 1/6) = 1$ is not only reasonable, but it can be reached by a much simpler strategy: Eve just keeps one of the two incoming photons (so, after sifting, she can get full information) and duplicates the second one using the optimal symmetric $1 \rightarrow 2$ cloner of Bužek-Hillery [23], which makes copies with fidelity $\frac{5}{6}$, whence $D_2 = \frac{1}{6}$.

Cloner A is good (and we conjecture it to be optimal) to attack two-photon pulses in the six-state protocol [24], because of its symmetry. However, here we are dealing with BB84: for the one-photon case, it is known that one can do better than using the universal asymmetric cloner. In fact, the optimal incoherent attack on single-photon pulses uses the phase-covariant cloning machine, that copies at best two maximally conjugated bases out of 3 [18]. So we suspect that also for the $2 \rightarrow 3$ cloning attack, we should rather look for an asymmetric $2 \rightarrow 3$ phase-covariant cloner. The second cloner (cloner B) described in Ref. [7] is an example of such a cloner. However, it has some unpleasant features: on the one hand, in terms of fidelity it is slightly suboptimal for the parameter that defines symmetric cloning [25]; more important, $I_3^B(D_2) < 1$ for all values of $D_2$—we do not write $I_3^B(D_2)$ explicitly, because it is quite complicated and after all unimportant for the present work; see Ref. [5].

In summary, two $2 \rightarrow 3$ asymmetric cloning machines have been discussed in the literature, but they are suboptimal for our task. Still, in the sake of comparison with Ref. [5], we ran our first numerical optimizations using $I_3^B(D_2)$, then $I_3^B(D_2)$. The result is striking: (i) if $I_2 = I_3^A$, then the optimal strategy is always obtained for $D_2 = \frac{1}{6}$, whatever the values of the other parameters; (ii) if $I_2 = I_3^B$, the optimal strategy is the one that uses no $2 \rightarrow 3$ cloning attack ($p_{c2} = 0$). Following this observation, it is natural to emit the following conjecture: the $2 \rightarrow 3$ cloner is always used for the value of $D_2$ that gives

$$I_2(D_2) = 1.$$  

(18)

Under this conjecture, we can then replace $I_2(D_2)$ by 1 in Eq. (12), and we have to find the lowest value of $D_2$ for which Eq. (18) holds. In general, this is a task of the same complexity as optimizing Eve’s strategy for all values of $D_2$; but we can at least construct a very simple strategy which has an intuitive interpretation, and which performs better than the ones which use cloners A and B.

**Hypothesis 4.** The strategy for the $2 \rightarrow 3$ cloning attack is the following: out of two photons sent by Alice, Eve keeps one and sends the other one into the optimal symmetric $1 \rightarrow 2$ phase-covariant cloner. This provides Eve with $I_2(D_2) = 1$ after sifting, and Bob receives two photons with a disturbance

$$D_2 = \frac{1}{2} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right),$$

(19) that is, $\approx 0.1464$ [18]. Since this disturbance is smaller than $\frac{1}{6}$, for any fixed value of $V$ Eve can use the $2 \rightarrow 3$ cloning attack more often than in the optimized version of the attack using cloner A, see constraint (15). That is why our new attack performs better. Moreover, the attack has an intuitive form, that can be generalized: in particular, it seems natural to extend the conjecture to attacks on $n > 2$ photons, although here we do not consider this extension because these cases are rare (see above). In what follows, we comment on the explicit results that we find for the numerical optimization using this strategy.

**B. Numerical optimization for Poissonian sources**

We use numerical optimization to find, under hypotheses 1–4, Eve’s best strategy and the optimal value of Alice’s parameters (see Fig. 1). We consider a Poissonian distribution for Alice’s source

$$p_A(n) = p(n|\mu) = e^{-\mu}\frac{\mu^n}{n!}$$

(20) so that the only parameter that characterizes Alice’s source is the mean number of photons $\mu$ (see Sec. IV A below for extension to sub-Poissonian sources). As sketched above, the numerical optimization is done as follows. For any value of the distance $d$ Alice-Bob, we choose a value of $\mu$ and find the values of $p_{c1}$, $p_{c2}$, and $D_1$ that optimize Eve’s information...
FIG. 2. Secret key rate per pulse $S$ as a function of the distance, for $\alpha=0.25$ dB/km, $\eta=0.1$, and $p_d=10^{-5}$, and for $V=1,0.95,0.9,0.85,0.8$. The best attack (full line) uses strategy C for $2\rightarrow3$ cloning; the value of the optimal $\mu$ is fixed by this strategy. For comparison, we plot the results that one would obtain using strategy A for $2\rightarrow3$ cloning (dashed lines) and without using any $2\rightarrow3$ cloning (dashed-dotted lines), computed for the same $\mu$.

under the constraints. This gives a value for the secret key rate $S$. Then we vary $\mu$ and repeat the procedure, until the highest value of $S$ is found. This defines the optimal value of $\mu$.

We have done these calculations for the nowadays standard (and even conservative) values $\alpha=0.25$ dB/km, $\eta=0.1$ and $p_d=10^{-5}$. Of course, the qualitative features are independent of these precise values.

The achievable secret key rate $S$, Eq. (7), is plotted in Fig. 2 as a function of the distance, in log scale. The full lines are obtained by allowing Eve to use our new $2\rightarrow3$ cloning attack defined above. Supposing this attack we can extract, at any distance, an optimal value of $\mu$; this is the mean number of photons Alice and Bob should choose. For the so-computed $\mu$, we then compute $S$ by supposing two suboptimal attacks by Eve, namely, no $2\rightarrow3$ cloning, and $2\rightarrow3$ cloning with cloner A [5]. The results of these suboptimal attacks are plotted in the discontinuous lines. We see that indeed our strategy yields the best results for Eve (the smallest $S$ achievable), but the difference between the optimal and the suboptimal attacks is very small—in fact, under the assumptions of practical cryptography this difference is completely negligible, see beginning of Sec. V.

Figures 3 and 4 illustrate in detail the parameters for Eve’s optimal attack, for a fixed distance (30 km), as a function of the visibility $V$. In Fig. 3 are plotted the probabilities introduced in Sec. II D that define Eve’s strategies on the pulses with $n=1$ (lower half of the figure) and with $n=2$ (upper half). Figure 4 represents the four terms that sum up to Eve’s information (12). Much information is stored in these graphics.

First note that at $V \leq 0.74$, that is $Q_{\text{opt}} \geq 13\%$, one has $I(A:E)=I(A:B)$ so $S=0$. For smaller values of the visibility, with our assumptions on the attacks and on the numerical values of the parameters, the BB84 protocol becomes insecure for all $\mu$ at 30 km. This is due to the characteristics of the source: recall that for incoherent attacks on the BB84 protocol with perfect single-photon sources, the critical visibility is $V=0.7$ ($Q_{\text{opt}} \geq 14.67\%$) independent of the distance [1,17].

For $V=1$, Eve is not allowed to introduce any error. Therefore, for $n=1$ she can either block or forward the pulse without introducing any error ($D_1=0$), and she gains no information; for $n=2$, she can only perform the storage attack.

As soon as $V<1$, Eve’s strategy on the one-photon pulses does not change, while on the two-photon pulses she starts using the cloning strategy. She uses it on as many pulses as possible, compatible with constraint (15). This situation goes on until $V=0.88$: for that visibility, Eve can perform the $2\rightarrow3$ cloning on all the two-photon pulses. Then, for $V\leq 0.88$, Eve can start introducing errors (and gaining some information) on one-photon pulses as well; and indeed, we see the increase of $D_1$ in Fig. 3 and the corresponding increase of $I_1$ in Fig. 4.

In the region $0.88 \leq V < 1$, we note an ambiguity of the simulation for the single-photon pulses. In fact (Fig. 3) we have $p_{1>0}$ but $D_1=0$, so this “cloning” actually amounts to

FIG. 3. Probabilities that define Eve’s optimal attack as a function of the visibility, for $d=30$ km, for the optimal $\mu$. In the lower half one reads the probabilities for the attacks on $n=1$; in the upper half, for $n=2$. The white symbols represent $D_1$ (lower half) and $D_2$ (upper half). Note that high visibility (small optical errors) are on the left. See text for detailed comment.

FIG. 4. The four terms that sum up to Eve’s information (12) as a function of the visibility, for $d=30$ km and for the optimal $\mu$. Eve’s information is divided by the value of $I(A:B)$ at any $V$. See text for detailed comments.
leaving photons undisturbed and might as well be accounted for through \( p_{h} \). Recall that in Sec. II D we said that one can always set \( p_{h} = 0 \); it is now clear why: as long as \( D_{1} = 0 \), letting it pass is equivalent to cloning and we see that when \( D_{1} \) becomes larger than 0, cloning is applied on all the forwarded photons so that indeed \( p_{h} = 0 \).

There is a slight discontinuity in Eve’s information, visible in Fig. 4, at the point where Eve starts to use the cloning strategy on the single-photon pulses. We ran more detailed simulations in order to rule out the possibility that this is an artefact. It appears that this discontinuity is a direct consequence of a discontinuous modification of \( \mu \); for that value of the parameters, Alice and Bob should decrease \( \mu \) slightly more than expected by continuity.

At the end of this discussion, one might reasonably raise a doubt. We have just seen that the 2\( \rightarrow \)3 cloning machine is used as soon as \( V < 1 \), and that for some rather high visibility (\( V = 0.88 \) at \( d = 30 \) km) it is used on all the two-photon pulses. Why then is its effect so negligible in comparison to the two-photon pulses, then she can introduce errors, and performs the storage attack instead of the cloning attack on different if the 2\( \rightarrow \)3 cloning machine is not used. If Eve performs the storage attack instead of the cloning attack on the two-photon pulses, then she can introduce errors, and consequently gain information, on the single-photon pulses: we would have \( D_{1} > 0 \) and \( I_{1} > 0 \) as soon as \( V < 1 \), not only for \( V \approx 0.88 \). It turns out that all the information, that Eve loses on the two-photon pulses by not using the cloning attack, is almost exactly compensated by the information that she gains on the single-photon pulses. This casts a new light on the result of Fig. 2: the difference between the optimal and the suboptimal strategies is small, not because the 2\( \rightarrow \)3 cloning is rarely used, but because the constraints (14) and (15) imply that using the 2\( \rightarrow \)3 cloning attack on \( n = 2 \) reduces the possibility of using the 1\( \rightarrow \)2 cloning attack on \( n = 1 \).

IV. EXTENSIONS AND REMARKS

A. Extension to sub-Poissonian sources

For the numerical optimization, we have supposed the Poissonian distribution for the number of photons produced by Alice, because this is the most frequent case in practical implementations. However, sub-Poissonian sources are being developed for quantum cryptography [9]. The main result, namely, that 2\( \rightarrow \)3 cloning attacks contribute with a very small correction to Eve’s information, remains valid for these sources: the fraction of pulses with \( n = 2 \) photon is even smaller than in the Poissonian case, so the contribution of the 2\( \rightarrow \)3 cloning attack will be even more negligible—actually, it is even possible that, for a sufficiently large deviation from the Poissonian behavior, this kind of attack does not help at all.

B. Extension to other protocols

One might ask how our study applies to other protocols. In the last months, practical QKD has witnessed great progress: several ideas have been put forward that make the PNS attacks less effective by modifying the hardware [8], the classical encoding [6,7] or the quantum encoding [26]. Of course, even if the PNS can never be used by Eve, multiphoton pulses open the possibility for elaborated cloning attacks: these must be taken into account when assessing the security of new protocols.

C. About reverse reconciliation

In Sec. II, when defining \( S \) in Eq. (7), we mentioned the fact that \( I(B:E) \) is slightly smaller than \( I(A:E) \) here, so that Alice and Bob would better do “reverse reconciliation” [27]. In this paragraph, we want to elaborate a little more on this point.

The first cause of the relation \( I(B:E) < I(A:E) \) is the presence of dark counts: when Bob accepts an item, Eve (as well as Bob himself) does not know if his detector fired because of the photon that she has forwarded (and on which she has some information) or because of a dark count (on which she has no information). It is easy to take this effect into account. Suppose that Eve forwards \( n \) photons to Bob. Conditioned to this knowledge, Bob’s detection rate reads \( r_{g} = r_{ph} + r_{dark} \) where \( r_{ph} = [1 - (1 - \eta)^n] \) and \( r_{dark} = p_{d}(1 - \eta)^n \). Thus, to obtain \( I(B:E) \), the \( n \)-photon contribution to formula (12) should be multiplied by a factor \( [1 - H(\epsilon_{1})] \), where \( \epsilon_{g} = r_{dark}/r_{g} \). Now, \( \epsilon_{g} = p_{d}/\eta \), and \( \epsilon_{g} > 2 < \epsilon_{1} \); so all these corrections are really negligible.

The second contribution is much less easily estimated: it comes from the 2\( \rightarrow \)3 cloning machines. The formulae we used for strategies A and B, derived by CL [5], refer to the mutual information Alice-Eve. In strategy C, that looks optimistic when \( I(A:E) \) is optimized, Eve’s information on Bob’s result is smaller than 1 because she does not know deterministically whether Bob will obtain the same bit as Alice or the wrong bit. This study would require some more work. We do not think this work is worthwhile, after seeing how small the correction introduced on the final values of \( \mu \) and \( S \) by taking the 2\( \rightarrow \)3 cloning attack into account’s.

V. ANALYTICAL FORMULAS FOR RAPID ESTIMATES

A. Further simplifying assumptions

As mentioned before, the goal of this section is to provide some simple formulas that allow a good estimate of the important parameters (optimal mean number of photons, expected secret key rate \( S \), maximum distance) for implementations of the BB84 protocol, without resorting to the full numerical optimization. Indeed, for practical implementations, absolute precision of these calculations is not required: on the one hand, existing algorithms for error correction (EC) and privacy amplification (PA) reach up to some 80% of the attainable \( S \); on the other hand, nobody is going to operate his cryptosystem too close to the critical distance. So in short, what one needs is (i) an estimate of the critical distance in order to keep away from it, (ii) an estimate of the optimal mean number of photons per pulse in order to calibrate the source, and (iii) an estimate of the secret-key rate (of Eve’s information) in order to choose the parameters for EC+PA. Note that similar formulae have been found by Lüt-
kenhaus [3]; in that work, however, Eve was supposed to have an influence on all the sources of inefficiency, in particular the parameters of the detector. This is why we cannot simply refer to L"{u}tkenhaus’ results here.

Thus, for this analysis, we make two further simplifying assumptions on Eve’s attack.

(1) We completely neglect the contribution of the pulses with \( n \geq 3 \) photons. Since we are interested in sources where the mean number of photons \( \mu \) is significantly smaller than 1, we have

\[
p_A(1) = \mu, \quad p_A(2) = g_2^2 \frac{\mu^2}{2},
\]

whence, in particular, \( 1 - p_1 = \mu \eta \). The factor \( g_2 \) is 1 for a Poissonian source, smaller than 1 for sub-Poissonian sources.

(2) For \( n = 2 \), we neglect the \( 2 \rightarrow 3 \) cloning attack and focus only on storage attacks, that is, \( p_{2c} = 1 \). In fact, we have seen that the cloning attack plays a non-negligible role only for \( V = 0.8 \); but this means an optical QBER of 10\%, which is enormous and would lead to the failure of the EC+PA algorithms. For practical cryptography, \( V \approx 0.9 \) is required, and in this region the correction due to cloning \( 2 \rightarrow 3 \) is really negligible.

### B. S as a function of \( \mu \) alone

Using the Poissonian distribution (20), the mutual information Alice-Bob (6) reads

\[
I(A:B) = \frac{1}{2} (\mu \eta + 2p_2) [1 - H(Q)]
\]

with the QBER

\[
Q = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{V}{2 + 2p_d \frac{\mu}{\mu \eta}}.
\]

Using our assumptions \( R_{2c} = 0 \), the first constraint (14) that Eve must fulfill reads \( \mu p_{2c} \eta + g_2^2 (\mu^2/2) \eta = \mu \eta \), whence one can extract

\[
p_{2c} = t - g_2^2 \frac{\mu}{2}.
\]

The second constraint (15), using \( R_{2c} = 0 \) and the expression we have just found for \( p_{2c} \), reads \( \mu [t - g_2^2 (\mu/2)] \eta D_1 = \mu \eta [1 - V] / 2 \), whence

\[
D_1 = \frac{1 - V}{2 - g_2^2 \mu t}.
\]

Then, the mutual information Alice-Eve (12) reads

\[
I(A:E) = \frac{1}{2} \mu \eta \left[ (t - g_2^2 \frac{\mu}{2}) I_1(D_1) + g_2^2 \frac{\mu}{2} \right],
\]

where we recall that \( I_1(D_1) = 1 - H(P_1) \) with \( P_1 = \frac{1}{2} + \sqrt{D_1(1 - D_1)} \). Presently then, \( S = I(A:B) - I(A:E) \) is written as a function \( S(\mu) \) of \( \mu \) alone—in particular, our hypotheses removed two of the four parameters of Eve’s attacks, and because of the two constraints there are no more free parameters for Eve. One can then find the optimal \( \mu \) as a function of the distance, and the corresponding \( S \), by running a numerical optimization of \( S(\mu) \). This is already simple enough and gives very accurate results, see Fig. 5. Still, we want to go a few steps forward, to provide less accurate but explicit formulas.

### C. Formulas for high visibility and not too long distances

To perform analytical optimization, we must get rid of the \( \mu \) dependence in the nonalgebraic functions \( H(Q) \) and \( I_1(D_1) \). This can be done for not too long distances, that is when \( 2p_d \ll \mu \eta \), because then \( Q = Q_{\text{opt}} = (1 - V) / 2 \). Moreover, one can easily see that for \( V = 1 \), the optimal \( \mu \) (satisfying \( dS/d\mu = 0 \)) is
\[ \mu = \frac{t}{g_2} \quad (V = 1). \]  

(27)

Therefore, we set this value for \( \mu \) in \( D_1 \), so that now \( D_1 = 1 - V = 2Q_{\text{opt}} \) also becomes independent of \( \mu \) [28]. This gives \( P_1 = P = \frac{1}{2} - \sqrt{V(1-V)} \). Under these new assumptions

\[ S(\mu) \approx \frac{1}{2} \mu \eta \left( (H(P) - H(Q_{\text{opt}})) - g_2 \frac{1}{2} H(P) \right); \]  

(28)

the maximum is obtained for \( dS/d\mu = 0 \), that is,

\[ \mu \approx \frac{t}{g_2} \left( 1 - \frac{H(Q_{\text{opt}})}{H(P)} \right). \]  

(29)

This must be non-negative, so this approximation (in particular here, the approximation \( \mu = t/g_2 \) in \( D_1 \)) is valid provided \( Q_{\text{opt}} < P \), that is for \( V > 0.8 \); as we discussed in the introduction of this section, this is perfectly consistent with the visibility requirements in practical setups. Inserting Eq. (29) into Eq. (28), we find an explicit formula for the secret key rate

\[ S = \frac{1}{4} \eta \frac{t^2}{g_2} \frac{1 - (H(Q_{\text{opt}})/H(P))^2}{1 - H(e/2)} \]  

(30)

In the limiting case \( V = 1 - e \) we can set \( H(P) = 1 \) while \( H(Q_{\text{opt}}) = H(e/2) \) cannot be neglected because \( H \) increases very rapidly for its argument close to zero. Therefore

\[ S \approx \frac{1}{2} \eta \frac{t}{g_2} \left( 1 - \frac{H(e/2)}{2} \right) \]  

(31)

This formula has an intuitive meaning [29]: \( \frac{1}{2} \eta (t/g_2) \) is simply the sifted-key rate; \( H(e/2) \) is the fraction that must be subtracted in error correction, and a fraction \( \frac{1}{2} \) is subtracted in privacy amplification because of the PNS attack [28]. For distances far from the critical distance, the agreement of both Eqs. (29) and (30) with the exact results is again satisfactory (Fig. 5).

D. Exact limiting distance for \( V = 1 \)

For the value of the limiting distance, we were able to find a closed formula only for the case \( V = 1 \). The idea is that \( \mu \) decreases very rapidly when approaching the limiting distance, so that now \( \mu \eta \ll p_d \). The QBER (23) becomes \( Q = \frac{1}{2} - e \) with \( e = \mu \eta /4p_d \) [30]. Now, it holds \( 1 - H_e = (2/\ln 2)\epsilon^2 + O(\epsilon^3) \). Inserting this into Eq. (22) we obtain

\[ I(A:B) = p_d \frac{1}{8} \ln 2 \left( \frac{\mu \eta}{p_d} \right)^2 + O(\mu \eta^3). \]  

(32)

On the other hand, \( I(A:E) \) is still given by Eq. (26), of course with \( I_1(D_1) = 0 \) since \( V = 1 \), so \( I(A:E) = \frac{1}{4} g_2 \mu \eta^2 \). The limiting distance is thus defined by imposing \( I(A:B) = I(A:E) \), i.e., \( S = 0 \), that is, by the attenuation

\[ t_{\text{lim}} = \sqrt{2 \ln 2 g_2 p_d \eta}. \]  

(33)

This result is in good agreement with the limiting distance found in the exact calculation, see Fig. 5. The calculation of Eq. (33) is easy because \( \mu \) drops out of the condition \( S = 0 \); this is no longer the case for \( V < 1 \), which is why the estimate of the limiting distance becomes cumbersome: one has to provide the link between \( \mu \) and \( t \) when approaching that distance, different from Eq. (29).

VI. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we have discussed incoherent attacks on the BB84 protocol in the presence of multiphoton pulses that allow both for the photon-number splitting and the \( 2 \rightarrow 3 \) cloning attacks. We have identified a new efficient \( 2 \rightarrow 3 \) cloning attack: Eve keeps one of the incoming photons, and sends the other one into the suitable symmetric 1 \( \rightarrow 2 \) cloner, then forwards the two photons to Bob. The effect of taking the cloning attacks into account is negligible for realistic values of the parameters (in particular, for an optical visibility \( V \approx 0.9 \)) with respect to the PNS attacks. This means that these attacks do not change the security of BB84; however, they may be important when assessing the security of modified protocols aimed at countering the PNS attacks.

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We consider only one-way communication protocols for error correction and privacy amplification. For two-way protocols (“advantage distillation”) an advantageous coherent strategy has been found (D. Kaszlikowski, J. Y. Lim, L. C. Kwek, B.-G. Englert, quant-ph/0312172), but it has been proved recently that the same result can be achieved by individual attacks and measurements provided Eve waits until the end of the advantage distillation procedure (Acín et al., quant-ph/0411092).

For the most advanced lower bounds on BB84 with practical devices, see D. Gottesman, H.-K. Lo, N. Lütkenhaus, and J. Preskill, Quantum Inf. Comput. 4, 325 (2004). Note, however, that their bounds cannot be compared directly to the ones described in this paper, since they suppose that Eve has full control over the imperfections of Bob’s detectors.

At first sight, the condition $Q=2$ under these assumptions is perfectly consistent: indeed, if $\mu=\tau/2$, then $p_{A1}=\tau/2$: Eve introduces errors in half of the transmitted photons. Consequently, she can introduce a double disturbance on these items.

If we neglect a small contribution to $Q$, Eve can gain some information on Alice’s bit even from the single-photon pulses that she does not forward to Bob, if Bob has a dark count and accepts the item. This contribution is completely negligible, because it is of the order $-p_{b}p_{A}(1)$, compared to $R_{\text{c}}\sim \eta p_{A}(1)$.

Note that the relation $D_{1}=2Q$ under these assumptions is perfectly consistent: indeed, if $\mu=\tau/2$, then $p_{A1}=\tau/2$: Eve introduces errors in half of the transmitted photons. Consequently, she can introduce a double disturbance on these items.

We thank N. Lütkenhaus for bringing this point to our attention.