Territoriality involves two kinds of territories: the concrete and the abstract. According to the kinds of mediators we use to relate the self to "exteriority" and/or "alterity," the relationship will be consonant or dissonant: concordant when all the mediators are in the realm of either the traditional or the modern, dissonant when they come from both.
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The relation between freedom and boundaries prompts recognition of a phenomenon that might be generally considered banal, that is, that the mode of mediation conditions territoriality. Many if not all authors of Utopias were implicitly preoccupied with this question. Implicitly because the phenomenon if noted, had not yet been precisely identified, and consequently did not give rise to any theoretical construction. Observing the discordances between the organization of space and individual liberties in the real world of their time and aiming for an ideal society, they postulated, as a prerequisite, a simultaneous spatial and social reorganization. From Plato to Moore, to Fourier, Utopians have proposed the establishment of a harmony between these two territories, the concrete and the abstract, to arrive at as perfect as possible a system of relations between the collectivity of things and beings, one which would guarantee a maximum of autonomy for the latter (thus individual liberty) while taking into account the resources of the system. This parameter would then give an indication of the relativity of any autonomy.
The Utopians suggest that all human societies are composed of two faces (as is the case for linguistic signs), one, the significant face, which I shall call concrete or geographical territory (spatial organization) and the other, the signified face, which I shall call abstract or symbolic territory (social organization). All relations of a collectivity or an individual with the physical and/or human environment presuppose a mediation which involves portions of both the concrete and abstract territories. The concrete territory is morphologically identifiable in the geographical sense while the abstract territory is culturally identifiable in the anthropological sense. The concrete and abstract territories are perfectly complementary in the sense that they alternately play the role of mediator for specific relations. A simple example will illustrate this mode of mediation. In crossing a street, I must mobilize not only my senses and my muscles, but also and particularly the very small part of the abstract territory called the rules of the road; in other words, my activity is mediated by certain rules. By forgetting to change these rules during my first visit to London, I almost put a premature end to the relations I was having with the environment.

The domestication of space and time, as it was called by Leroi-Gourhan, is determined by the modes of mediation of society. In Utopian societies, the concrete and abstract territories are envisaged as being simultaneous. In real societies on the other hand, these two territories have different spatiotemporal scales as well as variable rhythms of evolution and duration which are usually not comparable.

**MECHANISM OF THE MODE OF MEDIATION**

The subject can be collective or individual and the mediator can be borrowed from the abstract territory and/or the concrete territory. The object can come from either the exteriority (concrete physical reality to the outside observer) or the alterity (the individual's ability to change a role or project himself into another role). The completion of the relation constitutes the point of departure of territoriality. As a first approximation, territoriality can be defined as a complex of relations. In other words the relational spectrum of a collectivity, group, or individual constitutes its territoriality.
In fact, there are two notions of territoriality, one is narrow and one is broad. The narrow conception only includes the concrete territory while the broad conception takes into account the abstract as well. Human territoriality, defined in behavioral terms, encompasses, without really distinguishing between the two, both dimensions. This is illustrated by the definition used by Scheflen and Ashcraft (1976): that is, "the study of human territoriality is the study of human behavior." Human behavior is considered an all-embracing whole and the emphasis is placed on the product of the mode of mediation, that is, behavior.

One objection to this definition, however, is that it describes a product rather than a process. Because of the difference in scales referred to earlier, the process is more important than the product. For this reason, I consider a definition made in strictly relational terms and maintaining the idea of process to be preferable to one made on behavioral terms. As defined in a previous paper (Raffestin, 1977) "territoriality is the system of relations of a collectivity or an individual with exteriority and/or alterity by means of mediators." These mediators can come from either the concrete or the abstract territory. A remarkable approach to the problem was made by Ludwig Wittgenstein in "Tractatus logico-philosophicus" when he wrote, "The limits of my world are the limits of my language." This definition is essentially congruent with my own which suggests the following: "The limits of my territoriality are the limits of my mediators."

If this premise is true, the question of individual liberty and autonomy can be examined in a different light. Mediators can be seen as constituting the conditions for the exercise of power and they therefore define quite precisely the limits to liberty or autonomy of those who use them in their relationships with the exteriority. In addition to mediators, behavior is constrained by legal restrictions on behavior. What, for example, would be the value of freedom of religious belief if there were only one church? Or of freedom to work in the face of overwhelming unemployment? Or of freedom of political choice if there were only one candidate?

Even in situations where a wider choice is possible, the concrete and the abstract territories define "prisons," which we ourselves create, in which our relations take place and which connote the real degree of our liberty. This idea was very well expressed by Alexander Mitscherlich when he said, "Our cities are not only the creations of
our imagination but also of our lack of imagination," a proof of the liberty of our ideas but also of our narrowness of mind; But once created and given a concrete form, they become matrices and our adaptation requires that we modify our own behavior and being. In cities, man creates a vital space where he can express himself in a multitude of ways, but these cities, in turn, influence the social character of their inhabitants (Mitscherlich, 1970). This interaction between the "geographic and the symbolic" which limits our horizons, can perhaps be better illustrated in another way. Mitscherlich raises the difficult problem of the differentiation between the scales of time of concrete and abstract territory, that is,

when profound historical changes occur (growth and concentration of the urban population, radical transformation of the techniques of production and modes of transport) new requirements and new desires incompatible with the structure of the former city, immediately become apparent (Mitscherlich, 1970).

In this case the concrete territory is no longer adequate to meet the needs of the abstract territory.

In order to illustrate the notion of the differentiation of the time scales, it is necessary to attribute a dimension of time to the abstract
and the concrete territory. For this purpose, I shall use the terms "tradition" and "modernity," the former to describe a moment in time where there is little or no distinction between "practice" and "knowledge" while the latter describes a period where they are distinctly separate. This is simply a more general formulation of Mitscherlich's idea.

With regard to the mode of mediation, these two time scales can be illustrated by Figure 3. These four situations determine four types of territorialities. Since situations I and IV present no discords in the mode of mediation, I shall concentrate on situations II and III. First of all, it is important to evaluate the advantages and the cost of the relations occurring in the territorialities created by the modes of mediation II and III. These advantages and costs would correspond to satisfactions and dissatisfactions composed of many elements difficult to qualify. Discomfort, fear and violence are costs while happiness, well-being and joy are advantages, but it is obviously not possible to make any quantitative comparisons. The dissatisfactions can, however, be considered "qualitative costs" which reduce or can reduce the liberties abstractly guaranteed by law.

THE MODERN URBAN ENVIRONMENT

Legally, for example, we have complete freedom of movement in our cities and should be able to go from one place to another without
problems. In practice, however, since the probability of being a victim of violence is remarkably high, visits to certain parts of the city at certain times might be avoided, thus reducing the territoriality of one or several relations and this reduction is the result of a dysfunctional mode of mediation.

To a great extent, our knowledge and practices regarding habitat are traditional, that is to say that the codes that we use in our relationships with the city are very old and have been transmitted to us as an entity and are retransmitted by us without questions. The concrete territory, on the other hand, is usually a product of modernity. Mitscherlich has observed that, when large construction companies set out to create habitable space with the aid of several technicians, avoiding as much as possible the advice of architects, urbanists, and especially social psychologists and psychoanalysts, there is a meeting of extremes; on the one hand an attempt is made to
provide acceptable housing while at the same time an environment is created which hinders all social intercourse (Mitscherlich, 1970). The concrete territory modulated by modernity is thus revealed to be incapable of being adequately mediated by an abstract territory, based on tradition. If it is true that the habitat modulated by modernity hinders all social intercourse, then autonomy and individual liberties are more hypothetical than real. Modernity should not be considered intrinsically good, particularly in the field of urban organization. “Building new towns, neighborhoods, satellite cities, that is done quickly, after which, one must live there for a long time: two, three generations or more” (Mitscherlich, 1970). According to Mitscherlich and many others, this raises the problem of effective communication. The impoverishment of interpersonal and social relations results in severely limiting the character of urban territoriality that defines its identity, that is, social intercourse. This leads to isolation, indifference, and finally to violence, to which society reacts by increasing the police force, which does certainly not favor a flowering of individual liberties.

THE MODERN RURAL ENVIRONMENT

It would be of interest to examine an illustration of situation III, that is, the manipulation of mediators characteristic of modernity with regard to traditional concrete territory. Agriculture over the last thirty years is a good example. Since World War II, what has passed for modernization of agriculture has consisted simply of giving farmers the instruments and signs of modernity, the use of which was to guarantee a substantial increase in production and income. This promise was kept, but at what price?

The conclusions of the book *L'Histoire de la France rurale* (Derby and Wallon, 1976) are relevant:

Today, out of every hundred Frenchmen at work, there are scarcely more than ten who are cultivating the earth or raising animals. Of these ten, two are simply farmhands, who have practically no chance for advancement in the social and economic hierarchy. Of the other eight, at least three, often old farmers, know that their farms will no longer be cultivated after their death. The remaining five are part of the rigid hierarchy of industrial capitalist society.

The transformation of the mode of mediation is made at the price of a loss of autonomy of farm labor, which "has become simply an act
of production of merchandise, much as any other productive activity” (Derby and Wallon, 1976). The liberty of the farmer has been diminished by industrial society which tells him what he must do, use, and produce. His former autonomy has been replaced by increasing heteronomy as “the relationship with nature experienced through work is now mediated and structured by the motor, the machine and the product of the laboratory: professional knowledge has thus lost its old naturalistic basis and has become technical.” Without necessarily taking a position for tradition and against modernity, I should like to point out that agricultural “progress” has been paid for with a drastic loss of liberty and autonomy, a loss that has not always been compensated for by substantial monetary gain. Furthermore, farmers are beginning to hold the view that in the long run, the relationships with the earth imposed by modernity may well be harmful to the earth itself as well as to nature as a whole.

REFERENCES


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